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“If parenthood is the epitome of social citizenship today, the normalisation of 
non-heterosexual parenting is a crucial step. Pratesi shows how this barrier has 
been broken in the interactions of everyday life, where the emotions surround-
ing doing care smooth the way. A deeply empowering and optimistic book.”
—Randall Collins, University of Pennsylvania, USA
“This enlightening book challenges many of the tired assumptions surrounding 
research on care by questioning binary and heteronormative accounts of expres-
sive women versus instrumental men. The empirical focus on same-sex parents 
and the thoughtful theoretical combining of phenomenology and symbolic 
interactionism result in a novel account of doing care as a doing of citizenship 
that can sometimes create forms of emotional inequality. This helps further 
understandings of the complex interweaving of social stratification with felt 
experience and thus makes a welcome contribution to the sociology of emotion 
as well as to scholarship on care.”
—Mary Holmes, University of Edinburgh, UK
“This empirically grounded book provides an engaging explication of the mean-
ings and experience of care in urban and suburban Philadelphia. Pratesi’s inter-
pretive phenomenological analysis of the macro–micro intersections which 
inform the processes of doing care is skilfully executed. Rich and original data 
illustrate the informal and formal networks of care that emerge to support and 
sustain dependents, loved ones and lifestyles. Rather than focus on what people 
do, Pratesi instead focuses on how they feel and in so doing brings together the 
emotional dynamics and structural inequalities that shape caring responsibilities 
and different types of carers. Care is thus situated as a deeply emotional, multi-
faceted and problematic phenomenon that lies at the heart of contemporary citi-
zenship. Some caring practices are strategic, others spontaneous; many derive 
from necessity and/or the political desire to do things differently. Across this 
diverse caring landscape, Pratesi weaves a path that unpicks the gendered para-
digm of care, while the inclusion of queer and heterosexual participants ensures 
that analysis drills down into the materiality of caring practices, to contest the 
rigidity and reification of sexuality and gender as social categories. Paying equal 
attention to the nourishing and draining aspects of caring work, the analysis 
engages with and invigorates feminist writings on the ethics of care. While data 
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are rooted in the North-eastern United States, the analysis here has wider reso-
nance across contemporary Western societies. The underpinning argument is 
rigorously theoretical, but the writing is anything but dry. Indeed, the account 
presented is full of tenderness and rich description; the writing brings both the 
subject and research subjects to life. The resulting embodied social theory of care 
which Pratesi crafts is accomplished, engaging and insightful.”
—Jacqui Gabb, The Open University, UK
“Alessandro Pratesi’s book engages with theory and original research to offer a 
cutting-edge analysis of the links between care and citizenship. It provides novel 
insights into how care is done and experienced in a range of intersecting con-
texts, and discusses parenting, class, gender, sexuality, race and migration. The 
book makes a vital contribution to our understandings of the emotional dimen-
sions of inequality and citizenship. It is a must-read for anyone interested in the 
contemporary dynamics of care and citizenship.”
—Brian Heaphy, University of Manchester, UK
“Alessandro Pratesi has skilfully interwoven different theoretical perspectives 
with a deep understanding of care and its links with social status, social inequali-
ties and social change. The ethnomethodological investigation has revealed, 
uniquely, how it is through the doing of care of children through parenthood, 
that individuals create forms of emotional stratification at the micro level that 
affect their social position at the macro level. Through this detailed phenomeno-
logical investigation of the processes of doing care, insights into the very nature 
of doing citizenship emerge. The focus on same-sex parents enables an under-
standing of just how people’s status and ranking in society is fundamentally 
linked to emotional dynamics in addition to structural factors. This book is 
essential reading for all those interested in new ways of thinking about how the 
dynamics of care mirror the dynamics of citizenship, social inclusion and social 
change in a context of rapidly changing society—through emotions.”
—Carolyn Kagan, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK
“Doing Care, Doing Citizenship is an exceptional piece of scholarship that draws 
clear links between the latest research, practice and critical theory. It deserves to 
be widely cited given its originality.”
—Jason Powell, University of Chester, UK
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Introduction
There are at least three main reasons that make of care a crucial territory 
of inquiry. First, care is a universal experience and a familiar phenome-
non to everyone. All of us have provided help to or received a helping 
hand from others and many of us are most likely going to provide care to 
significant others in the future. Second, due to the ongoing changes in 
family structures, working patterns, demographic trends and social secu-
rity systems, the problem of providing care in flexible and responsive 
ways is becoming increasingly important. And third, at present, there is 
no agreement on how to frame a sociological discourse on this significant 
phenomenon.
This book illustrates the emotional implications of informal care1 by 
focusing on different kinds of care arrangements, as they emerge in dif-
ferent types of family contexts and other forms of intimate relationships. 
Partners, relatives and friends are the most important providers of infor-
mal care; their practices and individualities provide a fundamental basis 
to understand this universally shared experience and to shape new 
approaches to study this complex phenomenon within the context of our 
rapidly changing societies. To get closer to the core of its nature, different 
methodological approaches are needed, based on the collection of new 
high-quality data, focusing on detailed narratives and phenomenological 
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interpretations of different care experiences in different family contexts. 
By definition, what comes into play with care is something that cannot 
be subsumed under any kind of statistical generalisation without the risk 
of failing to catch important and not-so-visible aspects of this phenome-
non. Care cannot be fully understood or explained without considering 
how it is experienced by the different social actors directly involved and 
what it means for them; in other words, without immersing ourselves 
into a 360-degree phenomenology of care.
The theoretical background of this research considers the heuristic and 
epistemological potential of phenomenology for a critical understanding 
of symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology. These traditions of 
inquiry seem the most suitable to get insights into the multiple ways 
through which the emotional dynamics of the caregivers shape their 
experience of care and produce different outcomes in terms of inequality 
and social exclusion. The phenomenological perspective allowed me to 
highlight the natural but not necessarily evident links between symbolic 
interactionism, social constructionism and ethnomethodology, the latter 
being more specifically identified with the approach of Sarah Fenstermaker 
and Candace West (2002). The authors conceptualise gender in terms of 
a fluid, contingent and situated accomplishment (Fenstermaker and West 
2002) through which outcomes of inequality are constantly reproduced. 
They use the expression doing gender suggesting that the performative 
aspects of gender can be interpreted and understood as a way of doing 
difference. My argument is that a careful, phenomenological investigation 
of the processes involved in doing care provides significant clues to inter-
pret and visualise the concept of doing citizenship, in other words the 
multiple ways in which inequalities and dynamics of inclusion/exclusion 
based on socially constructed categories result from ongoing interactional 
accomplishments. Care environments are places where dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion are constantly produced; therefore, they repre-
sent a strategic site to reveal the invisible, emotion-based, interactional 
mechanisms through which social exclusion and inequality, on the one 
hand, but also social inclusion, status membership and citizenship, on 
the other, are constantly reproduced at the micro-level of analysis. The 
integration of Fenstermaker and West’s ethnomethodological approach 
with some of the most recent advances in the sociology of emotions was 
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intended to help me overcome the limitations of a traditional study on 
the gendered division of care work, and to offer a more reliable picture of 
feminine and masculine ways of thinking, feeling and doing care within a 
heterogeneous set of family and non-family contexts.
Several scholars lament the absence of theoretical frameworks able to 
analyse individuals’ behaviours transcending traditional sociological 
dichotomies such as public and private, work and home, structure and 
agency, rationality and emotionality, continuity and change, and so on. 
In our concerns, this makes it all the more difficult to formulate a com-
prehensive theory of care that might help us to clarify several unsolved 
contradictions, such as the contradictions connected with the gendered 
definition of private and public spheres. Many arguments about care pro-
ceed from misleading dichotomies between a female world of expressive-
ness and care and a male world of instrumentality and rationality, 
reproducing empirical and theoretical divides between the two worlds of 
sentiment and rationality. The Cartesian dualism between mind and 
body which has characterised for centuries Western culture has pushed 
the emotional components of individuals and their social systems out of 
view. One of the issues I address in this book is the necessity to overcome 
these dichotomist ideologies and look for more innovative, flexible and 
reliable ways to think about inequality and social exclusion; the necessity, 
in other words, “to grasp the interplay of individuals and society, of biog-
raphy and history, of self and world” (Mills 2000: 1). This can be done by 
putting emotions at the centre of current sociological thinking and theo-
rising. It is only by focusing on individual, emotionally driven and micro- 
situated care interactions rather than on assumed differences between 
male and female care work that we can extend our understanding of the 
phenomenon of care. In this sense, the inclusion in the research of care 
models that cannot be gender based for the simple reason that they are 
performed within the context of same-sex couples or other unconven-
tional family arrangements reveals important insights. Once the concep-
tual categories of gender and care are expanded and the real (rather than 
assumed) dynamics of inequality and exclusion associated with doing care 
are visualised, the next theoretical and empirical achievement of this 
book is identifying and understanding the less visible rationales and 
implications of care, which force us rethinking both care and inequality. 
1 Introduction 
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Thus, the sample included a variety of caregivers: partnered/married and 
single caregivers, male and female caregivers, heterosexual and gay/les-
bian caregivers.
The specific focus of this book on same-sex parents is essential to 
address care and gender through a critical approach aimed to challenge 
cultural scripts according to which nuclear family and heterosexuality 
represent the norm. When I started my research on the phenomenology 
of informal care, I decided to include same-sex parents not only because 
they had been largely excluded from conventional research on informal 
care (or, when included, that was typically to highlight the alleged speci-
ficities of their parental practices) but also because they are key to visual-
ise the emotional dynamics of social inclusion/exclusion people produce 
while caring for others. I realised only later, as I clarify in the last chapter, 
that they also constitute a key subject to visualise and understand another 
crucial link between micro-situated (inter)actions and macro-structural 
dynamics: in this specific case, between care and social change; or better, 
between doing care and doing social inclusion and social change. During the 
more than two-year long empirical research, the parents I met made me 
question common assumptions and conventional ideas about fatherhood 
and motherhood and induced me to challenge deceptive comparisons 
between same-sex and heterosexual parents. And if, for research-related 
reasons, I was forced to use the label same-sex parents throughout my 
entire work, I share the position of all those mothers and fathers who told 
me that “parents are parents” and they do not need any specific label or tag 
to qualify their parenthood.
Emotions represent the missing link to explain the real—rather than 
alleged—dynamics by which inequality is reproduced situationally, 
beyond the rigid and reifying categorisations of sex, sexuality and gender. 
By looking at the inner, interactive, emotional dimensions of informal 
care, this book illustrates how, by doing care, people create forms of emo-
tional stratification at the micro-level that affect their social position at 
the macro-level. One of the research’s goals was to emphasise the neces-
sity of an embodied social theory of care, which is not worried of being 
accused of psychologism in its attempt to reconcile micro- and macro- 
realities of social life by looking at the experience of care in terms of an 
emotionally charged experience with important sociological and political 
1 Introduction
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implications. In this sense, the new image of the social actor and the 
reformulation of rational action emerging from some of the latest theo-
retical advances in the sociology of emotions (notably Collins 2004) 
seemed a promising start to overcome both the unclear issues left unsolved 
by rational choice theories and several contradictions still left unanswered 
by current literature on care.
The analytic perspective I present in this work provides a more detailed 
description of the person who cares and a broader phenomenological 
approach to the issues of care and care related inequalities. By looking at 
people’s narratives about their lived and felt experience of care, the book 
offers a better understanding of the phenomenon of care, its multiple and 
not-so-visible purposes and implications, and its core nature. The meth-
odological approach is based on an interpretive process aimed at rethink-
ing the phenomenon of care in a more inclusive perspective, by offering 
rich, innovative qualitative analyses of non-conventional family contexts. 
This approach intends to build up a phenomenology of the emotions 
revolving around care through a thick description (Geertz 1973) of the 
qualitative data collected at the micro-level: where informal care is actu-
ally experienced and felt; it also aims to illustrate the crucial importance 
of inductive research and interpretive phenomenological analyses for a 
deeper, more thorough explanation of the emotional processes involved 
in care work and in the reproduction of inequality. Based on a compre-
hensive, ethnographic immersion into informal care which lasted more 
than two years, this work reports the findings of a micro-situated study of 
daily care activities within the context of different types of family con-
texts, with an explicit focus of same-sex parents. All the caregivers I met 
and interviewed—be they single or partnered/married, heterosexual or 
homosexual—contributed to the completion of the study illustrated in 
this book, and I feel an enormous and sincere sense of gratitude for each 
of them. Without them and their generous contributions, this work 
would have not been accomplished and my knowledge of care would 
have remained underdeveloped. Their stories made me think, laugh, cry, 
reflect and understand; but, above all, they radically changed both my 
personal perspective on and my intellectual interpretation of care. Being 
immersed for more than two years in all these experiences of care, so 
heterogeneous and yet so similar, allowed me not only to develop my 
1 Introduction 
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theoretical understanding of this fundamental phenomenon but also to 
cultivate and refine my own subjective interpretation and appreciation of 
it. Even more, it made me understand the extent to which empirical 
research can create contexts of learning and growth where the pleasure of 
knowledge is never merely cognitive or intellectual.
The interpretive phenomenological analysis I illustrate in this book 
provides new empirical evidence of people’s embeddedness in gender sys-
tems and cultural beliefs, but it also helps us to get significant insights 
into the inner, interactional and emotional mechanisms through which 
individuals, by doing care, open the doors to social change. Like all works 
based on interpretation, this work is not meant to be exhaustive or con-
clusive. It is instead open to the readers’ own interpretations and, above 
all, it is meant to initiate a dialogue with scholars interested in shaping 
new theories and new methods of inquiry to understand the phenome-
non of care as well as the sociological and political relevance of emotions 
in our life.
Notes
1. Defined as unpaid, non-professional care of a physical, emotional and 
social nature that is provided by adults within the context of families, 
relationships and intimacies.
1 Introduction
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Towards a Reconsideration of Current 
Theoretical Perspectives on Care
 Far Away, So Close…
Robert (40) is a happily married man, father of three children, project 
manager in a large corporation, slightly torn between his career ambi-
tions and his family, between his intention to mark an important turning 
point in his professional life and his effort to equally share childcare 
responsibilities. Eliza (48) is an adoptive single mum who works as a 
programme analyst for an urban regeneration project association pro-
moting and supporting social and economic justice for low-income 
women and their families. Kendrick (47) is a freelance executive man-
ager, working part-time for two large non-profit organisations and full- 
time as an adoptive single father of an eight-year-old son. Kendra (39) is 
a part-time researcher for a well-known research institution, mostly 
working at home, where she is also a full-time mom of two daughters and 
about to deliver her third child; she is married. Keene (43) is a happy 
stay-at-home dad of three small kids, married to a physician working for 
a pharmaceutical company; at the time of the interview, he did not 
exclude the possibility of going back on the job market after several years, 
but is very satisfied with the current care arrangement. Brenda (37) is a 
part-time teacher at the university where she is completing her PhD in 
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Education; she is the adoptive mother of a five-year-old son, waiting to 
adopt her second child and sharing her care responsibilities with Sydney, 
a lawyer who is working as a full-time teacher in a local high school. 
Stephan (40) is a French artist trying to realise his own version of the 
American dream in a wealthy small town in Pennsylvania, where he shares 
both the joys of a quite comfortable life and the challenges related to 
unresolved visa issues of his partner Claude. Stephan and Claude have 
two biological children: a five-year-old son, whom Stephan had with his 
sister’s female partner, and a newly born daughter, whom Claude had 
with Stephan’s sister. The mothers and two children live in France and 
Stephan and Claude regularly visit them; they also come to the United 
States for a few months, whenever they can. Thus, the children live partly 
with the four parents and partly with the two mothers. Despite the dis-
tance and the relatively complex and unusual family structure, the four 
parents seem to have found a reasonably acceptable balance to manage 
their shared custody and care responsibilities.
These people are only some examples of the extremely rich kaleido-
scope of caregivers I met, interviewed and spent time with during my 
two-year research on care and full-immersion in the phenomenology of 
care. What do all these people have in common? How might their differ-
ent biographies, life choices, family and care arrangements intersect with 
each other? Why should we rely specifically on them to introduce our 
phenomenological journey around “Care”? What can they tell us about 
care and its multiple and not-so-visible implications? How can they help 
us visualising the several reasons why we might need to rethink care and 
our theoretical and methodological approaches to study such a crucially 
important phenomenon of our lives?
Let’s start by looking at some of the common denominators of these—
in many respects—extremely different types of caregivers. The majority 
of these people belong to the middle class or upper middle class.1 They all 
live in the Philadelphia urban area or in its immediate surroundings. 
They are all involved with care activities and responsibilities, and, with 
the exception of Keene, the married stay-at-home father, they all have 
full-time or part-time jobs. But, most importantly, all of them have made 
quite clear and mindful choices concerning the balance they have chosen 
to achieve between care and career; or better, each of them, in a different 
2 Theoretical Perspectives on Care
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and creative way, has strived to work out a suitable balance between their 
care- and career-related obligations; a balance that could allow them to 
keep together the pieces of their existential puzzle in a relatively reward-
ing and satisfying way. These persons are no exceptions nor are they 
exceptional: they are just a few examples of caregivers taken from the 
sample of dozens of people I met and interviewed during my research, in 
which I studied the complex emotional and practical implications of care 
by focusing on different care arrangements as they emerge in different 
kinds of family contexts and other forms of intimate relationships. What 
exactly are individuals doing when they engage in care work? What are 
the multiple symbolic and social implications of care? How do such social 
and symbolic implications affect the different types of caregivers? How 
does care work intertwine emotional/inner processes and public/outer 
processes involving power and status dimensions? How does it open up 
new and unexplored possibilities for social inclusion and social change?
This book addresses these questions, pointing in particular to the ways 
in which day-to-day care activities and routines shape people’s actual and 
perceived status and positioning in society and their emotional well- 
being. For example, Eliza, the adoptive single mom, in the past did not 
embrace the prospect of career advancement because she did not want to 
alter her balance between work and family time. At the time of the inter-
view, she did not have any regret about her choice; on the contrary, she 
was considering adopting a second child and even caressing the possibil-
ity of having a partner if she met the right one. Kendrick spent several 
years doing business before he decided to adopt a child as a single man. 
In order to realise his parental desire, he left both his successful career as 
a businessman and his partner, who was not keen to have a child. When 
I met and interviewed him, Kendrick was an extremely successful man-
ager, and his career pathway allowed him work flexibility and even the 
possibility to switch from one managerial position to another. He too had 
never had any regret about his care choices; the only complain he had at 
the time was that he had still not found the right partner for himself and 
a father for his son.2
Kendra—another example of working mother I met during my 
research—was married to a full-time trainee physician whose night-shift 
packed schedule hindered him from being present at home and 
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 collaborating with care tasks as much as he would have liked. As a conse-
quence, Kendra’s work and care activities were extremely challenging, 
especially because she did not have a substantial and close network of 
people she could rely upon in case of need. At the time of the interview, 
she liked her job very much and she was trying hard to keep the right 
working pace within a highly competitive environment; but she did not 
complain about the difficult juggling of care and work, and, despite the 
evident challenges, she described herself as a very happy and fulfilled 
person. Keene was happy that his wife’s income allowed him to stay at 
home taking care of their three children. Whilst he did not exclude the 
possibility of joining the job market again in the future (he wanted to 
open a bakery and sell homemade bread), this prospect did not seem to 
be one of his main priorities when I met him. He described himself as 
utterly satisfied with the care arrangement he had agreed with his wife, 
that is, that he would care for his three children, bring them to school 
and day care, take care of the house, cook the family meals and so on, 
while his wife, whose income was higher, would work full-time as a 
physician.
Despite the manifest difficulties these people met in reconciling their 
care and work responsibilities, they all described themselves as emotion-
ally and psychologically gratified and thoroughly satisfied with their pri-
vate lives and existential choices. In this book, I argue that precisely these 
private and emotional processes are relevant to public and structural pro-
cesses that involve status and power dimensions, such as social inclusion/
exclusion, status membership, citizenship and social change. From the 
theoretical point of view, this study draws on those aspects of the sociol-
ogy of emotions that explain inequality in terms of emotion-based pro-
cesses which occur at the level of micro-situated interactions (Barbalet 
2001; Clark 1990; Collins 1990, 1993, 2004; Gordon 1990; Hammond 
1990; Hochschild 1979, 1995; Katz 1999; Kemper 1978, 1990; Scheff 
1990; Smith-Lovin 1993; von Scheve and von Luede 2005). More spe-
cifically, it is based on Collins’ theory of Interaction Ritual Chains (2004), 
according to which the fundamental mechanisms defining both the indi-
viduals’ interconnections and their positions in society (i.e. their statuses) 
possess an emotional nature rather than a merely economic, cultural, 
social or political one.
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The idea is intersecting care and emotion and analysing less explored 
and less visible dimensions of care-related inequalities: the inequalities 
which emerge from and are related to the emotional dynamics revolving 
around care. For example, parenthood and parental care are convention-
ally constructed and thought as typically heterosexual, leaving sexual 
minorities out of the picture. Thus, one of the aims of my research was 
shedding light on the interactional and emotional dynamics through 
which care can produce forms of inequality which are not (only) related 
to the care activity in itself but rather to the feeling of entitlement to care 
or its lack thereof. This involves showing the real variation within the 
socially constructed categories of gender and sexuality and their complex 
interactions with the lived and felt experience of the phenomenon of care. 
In other words, this involves suggesting a more inclusive and reliable phe-
nomenology of care and examining its multiple implications in terms of 
status inclusion/exclusion, entitlements and responsibilities.
The literature on care tends to pay more attention to its “costs” and to 
define care in terms of duties and responsibilities rather than in terms or 
rights, neglecting the implications in terms of exclusion that those who 
are denied such rights may experience. As a corollary of this, care-related 
policies tend to be defined in neutral terms, reinforcing inequalities based 
on gender, class, race/ethnicity, age, ablebodiness and sexual orientation. 
Current studies and theories on care tend to be concerned with the 
uneven distribution of care between men and women and to refer them-
selves to the traditional nuclear and heterosexual families, portraying care 
mainly in terms of individual and collective burden. As a consequence, 
they do not seem to entirely capture the manifold meanings and implica-
tions of care.
The meaning of care cannot be taken for granted. It can have very dif-
ferent resonances in different cultural contexts and is frequently inflected 
by hierarchies of gender, race, marital status and sexual orientation. 
Within UK and EU social policies, for example, “care” is highly gen-
dered, whereas “work-family balance” policies tend to be framed in gen-
der neutral terms. Moreover, while social scientists have frequently 
glossed “care” as a form of “diffuse enduring solidarity”, this ignores the 
dynamic trajectories that “care” can take. The emotional tenor of a caring 
relationship changes through time and can encompass sentiments as 
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diverse as affection, love, pity, resentment, bitterness and hatred. To 
understand these sentiments, we need to examine the full range of factors 
and social actors influencing the forms relationships take and to investi-
gate how the emotional trajectories of relationships may vary across dif-
ferent cultural contexts, between “heteronormative” and “non-normative” 
relationships, within and beyond the intimacies of “the family” and 
within emergent new patterns of intimate relationships around the world.
The experience and interpretation of such complexity and modularity 
fulfil or prevent aspirations, forging new kinds of “caring” (or uncaring) 
selves and “cared for” selves that go on to be social actors in a host of 
other situations. It is therefore increasingly recognised how important 
understanding the lived experience of care and the multiple factors that 
shape this experience can be: a major intellectual and moral development 
with significant interdisciplinary implications. A nuanced understanding 
of what care might encompass in highly specific contexts—the kind of 
insight that qualitative research provides—enriches and revitalises impor-
tant current debates within social sciences, but also in the field of social 
policy, as public policies and political rhetoric in Western societies keep 
shaping the kind of families which it is possible for public services to 
recognise and support.
Care environments are places where dynamics of inclusion and exclu-
sion are constantly formed, often invisibly. These dynamics are supported 
and/or hindered by the felt experience of care. Emotions are key to show 
the grey areas connected with the concept of care and challenge conven-
tional assumptions that associate care with ideas of burden, stress and 
inequality, neglecting the energising, empowering aspects of it but also its 
full implications in terms of social inequality and social exclusion. Care 
work may be in fact connected with physical, emotional and psychologi-
cal exhaustion but also with gratification, reward, self-empowerment and 
status membership. The focus on emotions in informal care is a necessary 
step to show the ambivalences and the grey areas connected with this 
concept and to challenge the assumption that care often corresponds to 
burden and stress and/or is associated with accidental circumstances. 
Caregivers experience both positive and negative emotional states in care 
situations; however, there has been considerably less published work on 
the rewarding and energising aspects of care, and further studies on this 
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may help us broadening our understanding of how to reduce the degree 
of burden related to care while increasing its positive aspects3 and its mul-
tiple potentialities in terms of social inclusion, social justice and civic 
entitlement. By shedding light on the less visible and less investigated 
nature of care and its deep connections with emotions, I will shed light 
on the latent purposes of care, purposes that diverge substantially from 
the manifest purposes of tending to and looking after someone.
This book illustrates the emotional implications of informal care4 by 
focusing on different kinds of care arrangements, as they emerge in dif-
ferent kinds of family contexts and other forms of intimate relationships. 
Partners, relatives and friends are the most important providers of infor-
mal care; their practices and peculiarities provide a fundamental basis to 
understand this universally shared experience and to shape new approaches 
to study this complex phenomenon within the context of our rapidly 
changing societies. To get closer to the core of its nature, different 
approaches are needed, based on the collection of new high-quality data, 
focusing on detailed narratives and thick interpretations5 of individuals’ 
care experiences and including in the analysis new and creative ways to 
become a parent or to make a family. By definition, what comes into play 
with care is something that cannot be subsumed under any kind of statis-
tical generalisation without the risk of failing to catch subjectivity as well 
as “the essentiality of contingencies”,6 a term I borrow from Jack Katz 
(1999, 2001). Care cannot be fully understood or explained without 
considering how it is experienced by the different social actors directly 
involved and what it means for them. I embrace here the Goffmanian 
stance according to which situations and interactions have conceptual 
priority over individuals and their aggregates, and I claim that credibility 
rather than validity is the criterion to assess the ideas developed in this 
work and put the readers themselves, as Becker maintains (2001), in the 
condition of ruling out competing hypotheses by means of an accurate, 
fine-grained and thorough analysis of the data.7
There is now an extensive body of literature on care that I will not 
attempt to summarise here. In the remaining part of this chapter, I will 
review some of the most significant feminist debates on care, the concept 
of the rationality of care (Waerness 1984), the theoretical distinction 
between caring for and caring about (or the care as work or act of love 
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debate), the sociological, political and ethical spheres involved in care 
work and the limitations of classic and current analyses which are still 
largely focusing on gender and essentialist accounts of care. At the end of 
the chapter, I suggest the necessity to formulate innovative theoretical 
and methodological perspectives on care by going beyond gender and its 
essentialist narratives. However, before doing that, I need to describe the 
research sample and methods on which this study was based.
 Who Are the Caregivers in the Study? Sample 
and Methods
Between the winter 2006 and the summer 2007, I met and interviewed 
80 caregivers, mostly living in the Philadelphia urban and suburban 
areas. The research was based on a multi-method, phenomenological 
approach, which included semi-structured in-depth interviews, partici-
pant observation, diaries, online discussion forums between members of 
parents’ associations, ongoing conversations with the interviewees beyond 
the interview context, key-informants’ interviews, secondary sources on 
informal care and parenthood collected from adoption agencies and local 
associations, journal and newspaper articles and the web. All this, in 
order to get an empirically grounded, situated and thorough understand-
ing of informal care, analysed in a variety of contexts.
The sample was diverse mainly in terms of respondents’ sex, sexual 
orientation and marital status; on the other hand, it was relatively homog-
enous in terms of social class and type of care. The principal type of care 
involved in my study was childcare. I also included some cases of elderly 
care in the picture because I wanted to have a broad, panoramic snapshot 
of the phenomenon of care, which excluding elderly care would have 
impeded. However, the main focus of this book is parental care, and 
more specifically same-sex parental care, for the reasons that I illustrate in 
what follows. Parenthood is increasingly becoming a carefully planned 
choice for many people, especially within the context of middle-class and 
upper-middle-class families to which the subjects of my research belong. 
For gay and lesbian parents, though, the element of choice is more  evident 
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and compelling as they usually do not become parents by chance. On the 
contrary, their paths towards parenthood are often difficult, painful and 
complicated. The ways in which gay and lesbian couples become parents 
vary, and most of them have to clear obstacles that are rarely faced by 
their heterosexual peers. Their inclusion in a study on informal care was 
thus fundamental for a number of reasons. Firstly, gay and lesbian par-
ents have been largely excluded from “normal” research on informal care 
and particularly parental care. When included, they have been taken into 
account either in a comparative perspective, to focus on the differences 
between gay and heterosexual parents or caregivers, or in an exclusive 
perspective, to focus on the specificities of their experiences as caregivers 
(Clarke 2002, 2007; Fenge 2010; Kurdek 2006, 2007; Mallon 2004; 
Muraco and Fredriksen-Goldsen 2011; Nelson 2007; Stacey 2006). 
Further, no studies have ever considered how and under what conditions 
the parent’s sexual orientation can produce dynamics of inclusion/exclu-
sion based on the emotionally felt and lived experience of care. Secondly, 
gay and lesbian parenthood can represent a key site to visualise the crucial 
role of emotion in the reproduction of social inequality. A number of 
studies have addressed issues connecting the economic and emotional 
resources and well-being of gay and lesbian parents or couples with their 
openness about sexual orientation, their experiences as same- sex couples 
or the emotional support received from family and friends (Kurdek and 
Schmitt 1987; Patterson 2000; Weston 1997; Weeks et al. 2001). Yet, 
these studies tend to limit their analyses to an assessment of psychological 
health or stress without explicitly connecting the different emotional out-
comes with the themes of inequality, entitlement and status membership. 
Thirdly, gay and lesbian parents can be crucial in understanding the link 
between agency and structure, between micro-situated (inter)action and 
macro-structural inequalities. Finally, I considered their inclusion as cen-
tral to reopen the discussion on both care and gender by means of broader, 
more inclusive approaches that challenge heterosexuality as the norm. 
The intention was to avoid reproducing an ideologically tainted discourse 
on informal care and to instead widen the perspective on care by getting 
closer to its more complex nature.
The purposive sample was eventually enlarged through snowball sam-
pling. Within the sample of 80 caregivers, there were exactly 40 men and 
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40 women; 42 caregivers self-identified as gay and lesbian. About one- 
third of the participants were single and approximately two-thirds were 
married or in a couple relationship (see Table 2.1). All participants, except 
for two African-Americans and one Asian-American, self-identified as 
White/Caucasian (Table 2.2). Age of the participants ranged from 25 to 
65 with a mean age of 40.9. Age of the children ranged from 3 months 
to 13 years. The duration of face-to-face interviews ranged from 1.5 to 
4 hours.
Both research methods and the characteristics of the caregivers are 
described at length in the book Appendix; however, in order to have an 
overall idea of the respondents’ cultural and economic background, more 
than 80 per cent of respondents had obtained at least a Bachelor’s degree, 
and approximately 80 per cent of them had a total income of at least 
$60,000 (see Table 2.2).
The rationale behind the main focus on middle- and upper-middle-
class subjects is also discussed in the methodological appendix. Suffice it 
to say here that what makes the observation of middle- and upper-mid-
dle-class subjects particularly significant is related to their key role in 
producing and reproducing “gender differences in behaviour and cul-
ture” (Collins 1992: 213). Middle- and upper-middle-class subjects con-
trol the production of behavioural standards most valued in advanced 
industrial societies and tend to define ideas of masculinities and feminini-
ties, valued styles of family management and gender-based division of 
labour. Collins noted that much of the work women do in the household 
is the reproduction of Weberian status cultures, while men readily allow 
their wives/partners and other women around them to do this Goffmanian 
work for the household unit.
Table 2.1 Respondents by sex, sexual orientation and current relationship
Non-gay Gay
TotalMen Women Men Women
Partnered 14 15 13 17 59
Single 4 5 9 3 21
Total 18 20 22 20 80
N = 80
Number of men: 40; number of women: 40; number of gay subjects: 42; number 
of non-gay subjects: 38
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The transformation of status cultures certainly involves the overcom-
ing of stereotypes linked, for instance, to the customary ideas of mother-
hood and fatherhood, of which much evidence has been found already; 
but it also involves a number of other elements at different levels. One 
clue, for instance, is provided by an aspect of social change that is very 
apparent in the last decades but that has still not been carefully investi-
gated. The tendency for older standards and rituals of deference and 
demeanour to disappear and be replaced by much more informal styles—
which Collins refers to as the “casualness revolution”8—could be, for 
instance, reframed in the light of new standards defining what it means 
to be “a good father” or a “good mother”. From a Goffmanian point of 
view, these shifts in demeanour involve several aspects; most importantly, 
backstage has been rather deliberately projected onto the frontstage. By 
bringing into public discourse talk about the importance of equally 
shared care responsibilities and of nurturing/expressive behaviours from 
both men and women, backstage becomes frontstage, as if the current 
standard of demeanour was to excel in how much the backstage can be 
projected.
One of the visible changes of upper-middle-class status culture thus 
seems to be its progressive replacement by a sort of reverse status culture: 
individuals show their high standing by how strongly they reject and 
reverse traditional upper-middle-class demeanour standards. One possible 
hypothesis is that men have reacted to the demands for increasing equality 
in household care activities by redefining the standards towards a more 
minimal level. Similarly, women may have reacted to the discouraging 
change in men’s standards of care by redefining both their work and care 
standards, although, quite often, at the expense of their own well- being 
(England 2010; Hochschild 1989, 1997, 2003). Both men and women 
are changing, but they follow different social agendas and produce differ-
ent outcomes. The result is a continuing gender gap in the domestic 
sphere, even as the standards by which it is judged are changing. Middle- 
and upper-middle-class families are the place where these standards seem 
mostly to be set, and also where the changes in the standards are especially 
manifested. Moreover, as a few scholars have already highlighted,9 middle-
class families have rarely been submitted to close and attentive scrutiny 
despite the influence that they have in spreading cultural and behavioural 
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models and despite the fact that much has been written about resistance 
and opposition to dominant and pervasive culture.
All the interviews were transcribed verbatim, coded and entered in 
N-VIVO7, a software programme helping to organise and formalise the 
analysis of qualitative data. The analysis was guided mostly by what 
Denzin (2001a) calls interpretive interactionism and other scholars have 
called interpretive phenomenological analysis (Smith 2004; Smith et al. 
1999). This approach was used to build a phenomenology of emotions 
revolving around (parental) care through the thorough, fine-grained 
analysis of the information collected at the micro-level. One of the sev-
eral analytical steps of this approach involves repeated reading of the 
interview transcripts and diaries, resulting in annotations concerning key 
concepts, general themes and common patterns. Once this process has 
been repeated with each transcript several times, the resulting set of 
themes is connected with recurrent patterns across the transcripts to pro-
duce a final set of broader themes. The findings, thus, form a coherent 
narrative grounded on data, an emotional map, a composite framework 
of the phenomenon analysed, but they cannot be generalised to the entire 
population. In this sense, credibility (Becker 2001)—rather than validity 
in the dogmatic sense in which it is often proposed—and the social sig-
nificance of my findings—than their statistical significance—become the 
criteria to assess the persuasiveness of the analyses developed in this kind 
of qualitative work, since statistically significant differences might be 
socially insignificant and socially significant differences might not be 
revealed by statistics (Epstein 1997; James 1997). Furthermore, an exces-
sive emphasis on techniques of data collection and analysis is probably 
misplaced in qualitative research precisely because the potential contribu-
tion of such research lies in acts of interpretation, convincing reconcep-
tualisation of a phenomenon and dialogue within and across fields and 
disciplines.
Quite obviously, by no means was the sample supposed to be represen-
tative of the entire population of the American middle- and upper- 
middle- class caregivers: I was interested in the representativeness of 
situations and processes rather than that of individuals. Each specific case 
did not need to be representative of the general population of which it 
was supposed to belong: for example, a gay man was not supposed to be 
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representative of “all gay men”, nor a single woman representative of an 
alleged population of single women and so on. Each case should be rather 
viewed as a sort of simulacrum, a miniature coherent world in its own 
right and with its own specific characteristics. In other words, what I was 
looking for was to make generalisations about processes, not populations 
(see also Becker 1990). It was nonetheless crucial that each case presented 
specific characteristics, and that such core characteristics functioned as a 
replicable pattern by which future cases could be defined. The essential 
peculiarities of a phenomenon such as care cannot be clarified without 
showing how its invariant themes are translatable in variant possible 
ways, and in the social sciences the “essences” are never context-free. The 
level of generality or invariance in social sciences is thus not necessarily 
universally applicable, but it applies within similar contexts: the scientific 
concern of credibility is therefore satisfied by detailing each of the invari-
ant themes and by giving examples of how, where and in what circum-
stances they took place with reference to the particular experiences of 
each respondent.
The ways in which I found the respondents composing my purposive 
sample are diverse. I contacted numerous day cares and infant centres, 
local associations and community centres, and I posted flyers and placed 
notices in several local gay associations, bookstores and centres. At first, I 
managed to meet and interview mostly heterosexual caregivers and only 
subsequently, after several months, I could finally find a good number of 
gay caregivers. I was then able to contact the rest of the interviewees 
mostly through word of mouth and snowball sampling.10 More detailed 
information about the sample, the rationale underlying my methodologi-
cal and epistemological choices, the characteristics of the in-depth semi- 
structured interviews and the other instruments used for this research are 
presented in the Appendix.
Guided by the necessity to take a fresh and more inclusive look at the 
phenomenon of care and to approach the project without preconceived 
notions about what I would find, I opted for a method of research known 
as Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) which could allow me to 
discern common patterns, define key concepts and modify constantly the 
strategies as required according to what emerged from the preliminary 
findings.11 In terms of selection criteria, the respondents were supposed 
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to have a job and, at the same time, important care responsibilities. Then 
I needed to have a reasonable distribution between the different 
 sub- categories: male and female, gay and non-gay and single and part-
nered caregivers. Beyond these explicit and common requirements, I did 
not put any other specific limitations on the composition of the purpo-
sive sample, even if living in comparable (urban or suburban) contexts, 
although not a strict prerequisite was a desired condition. After this nec-
essary parenthesis on research methods and sample, it is now time to 
review what the literature tells us about care.
 What Do We Know About Care?
Care is a universal experience, a fundamental component of people’s life, 
survival and flourishing, with significant sociological, philosophical, 
political and moral implications (Barnes 2012). Most human activities, 
from birth up to the last steps of our existences, start and end through 
care. All of us at one time or another have provided assistance to or 
received help from others and, most likely, will have to deal with care in 
the future, either directly or indirectly. Yet, despite its universality, the 
fluid character of its definition—at the intersection between informal 
communities and formal organisations—makes the phenomenon of care 
quite problematic and in need of further specification. The classic cul-
tural and social categorisations do not capture care entirely, as care tran-
scends the typical distinctions between work and leisure, public and 
private spheres, and productive and reproductive relations, making it dif-
ficult to conceptualise it in a clear-cut way.
The complex nature of care leaves open several unresolved contradic-
tions, notably those connected with the gendered definition of private 
and public spheres. Many arguments about care and gender emerge from 
a misleading dichotomy: women’s world of expressiveness and care, on 
the one hand, and men’s world of instrumentality and rationality, on the 
other. In this way, they tend to reproduce deceptive distinctions—if not 
overt oppositions—between the two worlds of sentiment and rational-
ity.12 Some early care theorists emphasised the emotional components of 
care, describing care as meaningful and fulfilling to many women and 
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viewing care as a model to be extended to the larger social arena (Gilligan 
1982; Ruddick 1998). Other scholars emphasised the practical/material 
components of care, describing care as oppressive to women, who are 
compelled to provide care by a variety of material and ideological forces 
(Finch and Groves 1983). Kari Waerness (1984) attempted to overcome 
the dichotomies characterising care introducing the concept of the ratio-
nality of care, which includes both emotion and rationality without 
being restricted to either of them. In her seminal article inspired by 
Hochschild’s concept of the sentient actor (1975), Waerness suggested 
that the subject caregiver has to be both thinking and feeling, and that this 
image of a social actor as more than a bloodless calculator or a blind 
expresser of uncontrolled emotions was the most adequate to analyse 
phenomena like care and caregiving. In order to give us a better sense of 
how the rationality of care differs from scientific rationality, Waerness 
described how learning in the context of motherly care, as an ideal type 
in the Weberian sense, differs from learning in the context of science 
(1984). Whereas in the context of science “one understands from the 
position of an outsider” and predictability, generalisability and control 
constitute the scientific criteria for success, in the context of everyday 
motherly care “one has to think and act on the level of the particular and 
individual […] and to understand from the position of an insider” (1984: 
197). Recognising the intrinsic value of the rationality of care involves, 
among other things, creating the conditions for making individuals’ per-
sonal knowledge and practical experience a more important component 
in the care system “at the expense of professional and bureaucratic control 
and authority” (1984: 204) and giving women voice and decision- making 
power on the basis of their intellectual contribution in understanding 
care and direct experience as primary caregivers in the private domain.
Waerness’ ground-breaking concept, however, did not manage to pro-
duce a radical paradigm shift within the classic sociological thought, which 
still tends to conceptualise emotions and rationality as mutually exclusive 
and strongly gendered and to undervalue the role of emotions to under-
stand social structures and social processes. Within the classic sociological 
tradition, even those sociologists who did not necessarily conceptualise 
emotion and rationality as radically opposed to one another were still 
inclined to separate them analytically.13 As we will illustrate and discuss at 
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length in the fourth chapter, a growing body of literature within the field 
of the Sociology of Emotions developed over the last 35–40  years has 
shown the crucial role of emotions in connecting micro- (i.e. interac-
tional) and macro-(i.e. structural) levels, explaining social structures in 
terms of emotion-based processes which occur at the level of micro-situated 
interactions (Barbalet 2001; Clark 1990; Collins 1990, 1993, 2004; 
Gordon 1990; Hammond 1990; Hochschild 1979, 1995; Katz 1999; 
Kemper 1978, 1990; Scheff 1990; Smith-Lovin 1993; von Scheve and 
von Luede 2005). Nonetheless, both the macro-structural relevance of 
emotions and their key role in visualising and, possibly, overcoming cur-
rent unsolved contradictions which characterise the complex nature of 
care still require further theoretical development.
Definitional issues add an extra layer of ambiguity to the complex 
nature of care, as expressions like “care”, “caregiving”, “care work”, “car-
ing” and “caregiving labour” are often used by scholars to designate either 
the same concept or completely different notions. Moreover, there is still 
no internationally agreed definition of care work, and no consensus 
about the extent to which it is helpful to draw lines between care that is 
done at home (informal care) and care that is done in the context of paid 
work (formal care). However, a preliminary conceptual distinction 
between professional/paid care carried out by professional caregivers, on 
the one hand, and non-professional/unpaid care carried out by relatives, 
friends and other voluntary caregivers, on the other, seems to be helpful 
here, at least to clarify the specific focus of this book. Conventionally, 
everyday care for children, older people and other adults who need assis-
tance is part of what current literature qualifies as informal care and that 
is separate from formal care, which includes professional care and other 
forms of qualified and paid care work. A substantial part of the feminist 
literature (e.g. Ungerson 1995) suggests that both the conceptual and 
empirical boundaries between formal and informal care are dissolving in 
ways that have gendered impacts. Yet, the theoretical dispute on the dis-
solving boundaries between the two kinds of care still seems to be open 
(Graham 1991; Thomas 1993; Ungerson 1995, 1997; Himmelweit 
1999) and in what follows some if its main dimensions will be 
outlined.
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 Between Labour and Love: Caring 
for and Caring About
One of the common themes characterising sociological theories on care is 
that, in broad terms, this concept encompasses both instrumental tasks 
and affective relations, ranging from activity to ethics, that is, from taking 
charge of the physical and psychological well-being of others up to feeling 
concern for others’ well-being (Arnlaug Leira 1994; Graham 1983, 1991; 
Kittay 1999; Kittay and Feder 2003; Noddings 1984; Ruddick 1995; 
Thomas 1993; Tronto 1994). According to these premises, caring for is 
used to indicate when a person is literally attending to another person in 
need of care and caring about refers instead to those aspects of care related 
to being and feeling emotionally concerned about someone else’s well- 
being. Early work discussing care as a field of feminist studies defines care 
within two different and distinguished modes of transaction: love on the 
one hand and labour on the other. Feminist scholars emphasise the 
unpaid work of kin and dependent people within the private spheres of 
families and households and indicate the way in which social policy rein-
forces the disadvantaged and subordinated position of those who care for 
the family (Graham 1983; Ungerson 1983).
Shaped in large measure by the social policy climate in which it was 
taking place, early and middle feminist literature on women as caregivers 
by default follows a very distinctive trajectory into the mainstream litera-
ture on care. By focusing, in particular, on the exploitative nature of 
women’s traditional roles in modern industrialised societies, feminist 
scholarship increasingly questions the idea of care as a “labour of love” 
and stresses the necessity to deconstruct the concept of care all together 
as well as to challenge the assumption that care embodies labour and love 
in harmonious integration.14 The case is consistently made to consider 
the role of caregiver as a female one and the consequences of that role in 
terms of social inequality. Rather than doing a broad structural analysis 
of everyday work of reproduction within families, most early feminist 
research on care focuses on one form of care (unwaged care by relatives) 
and one structural division (gender), described as the dominant system of 
social relations which shapes the organisation of care. The ways in which 
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racial, ethnic and class divisions are embedded in everyday reproductive 
work are largely absent from the first works on care.
As early as the mid-1980s and during the 1990s, a substantial body of 
feminist scholarship makes the case for a more extensive and inclusive 
view, suggesting that the original dualism that neatly distinguishes 
between formal and informal care, although of fundamental importance 
to show the similarities of paid and unpaid work and the ways in which 
unpaid work affect women’s opportunities for paid work (Graham 1991; 
Thomas 1993; Ungerson 1990), is increasingly dissolving and that the 
boundaries between private and public domains are increasingly vanish-
ing. Acknowledging both the theoretical and empirical importance of 
these first seminal works,15 several scholars begin nonetheless to reflect on 
their limitations, arguing that the dual perspective had resulted in a par-
tial and fragmented picture of care in society which neglects the differ-
ences among women and the intersections with race and class issues. 
Graham (1991), for example, highlights the way in which some forms of 
(private) care are waged in practice by illustrating the case of domestic 
service within the domestic sphere, where race-, class- and gender-based 
social divisions are reproduced through women’s experiences of looking 
after families. Leira (1994) discusses how the extent to which the provi-
sion of care for dependent persons is perceived as public/collective con-
cern or as a question of individual responsibility determines the different 
meanings and implications of care. Defining care as a private concern—
combined with the gendered division of labour—means excluding women 
from a series of entitlements and benefits and reproducing a “gendering of 
the social rights of citizenship” (1994: 199). In general, feminist scholars 
emphasise the risks posed by a rigid conceptual dichotomy between pri-
vate and public spheres, between informal care (unwaged and based on 
affection) and formal care (waged and professional), suggesting that a 
logical and qualitative difference between formal and informal care is dif-
ficult to maintain both theoretically and empirically since they both 
include elements of love and labour (Ungerson 1990).
While a general agreement on the necessity to overcome major dualisms 
or dichotomies characterises these early works, ideas on the role and place 
of care in women’s lives are far from homogeneous. The debate between 
those scholars who emphasised the emotional, meaningful and fulfilling 
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aspects of care—viewed as a potential benchmark to be applied also to the 
public sphere (Gilligan 1982; Ruddick 1998)—and those who instead 
emphasised the oppressive aspects of care—viewed as one of the many 
patriarchal practices reproducing gender inequality (Finch and Groves 
1983)—ended up recreating that same dualism and dichotomous think-
ing which was meant to be overcome. In fostering such dualism, these 
perspectives reproduced reified or essentialist accounts of care, accentuat-
ing the socially constructed aspects of the concept. Ignoring the material, 
instrumental aspects of care and highlighting mainly its affective compo-
nents means reproducing essentialist arguments about care, that is, describ-
ing care as something that is naturally connected to people’s biological and 
psychological motivations, inclinations and needs. Within the context of 
care, essentialist accounts assume that care and caregiving behaviours—
which tend to be associated to women’s roles—are “naturally” coming 
from inner, fundamental caring attitudes and feelings; by doing that, they 
tend to assign women nurturing and caring traits that should instead be 
viewed as problematic (Graham 1983). On the other hand, by focusing 
mostly on care as a political and economic relation supported by the wider 
system of gender divisions, the risk is to neglect the symbolic, rewarding 
and emotional components of care, which represent instead—as we shall 
see—some of its most important and distinctive aspects. Both perspectives 
are inadequate. The first emphasises the differences that end up being 
transformed into ideological constructs determining women’s subordinate 
position in society and the second describes care mostly in terms of indi-
vidual and collective burden and ignores the emotional and psychological 
components of care and its rewarding and empowering aspects which also 
involve important status and power dimensions.
 Towards a Reconsideration of Current 
Approaches to Care
A possible way out to overcome this theoretical impasse can be found by 
contextualising care and analysing it into highly specific and empirical 
settings. In fact, whilst feminist scholars still disagree on the place and the 
meaning to attribute to care in women’s lives, most of them now seem to 
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agree on the necessity to look for broader and empirically grounded defi-
nitions of care including affective (i.e. emotional) and tangible (i.e. con-
crete/physical) components. Thomas (1993) argues that the concept of 
care is broadening to include waged activities and emotional compo-
nents, and that care can be provided in either public or private spheres, 
concluding that care cannot be envisioned as a unified theoretical category 
but rather as an empirical one. In other words, there is no need for con-
ceptual boundaries and all attempts to conceptualise care are nothing but 
“purely empirical categories reflecting the concrete manifestations of 
types of activity which society recognizes as looking after people” (1993: 
665). According to such perspectives, examining care within specific his-
torical and social contexts might be the most effective way to grasp a 
fuller understanding of its place and meaning in people’s lives, which is 
precisely the objective of this book. Care is a particular kind of work, an 
activity directed to identify and meet the needs or the well-being of cer-
tain others and challenging dichotomous thinking and dualisms which 
oppose head with heart and rationality with emotion. Understanding care, 
then, requires a different type of rationality, compatible with but more 
substantive than the formal rationality by which orthodox economists 
analyse labour supply decisions. Care activities are different from but 
need to be integrated with other activities in both the economic and 
political spheres (Hochschild 1983; Zelizer 2005; Folbre and Nelson 
2000), and the increasing intertwining of love and labour calls for innova-
tive research perspectives and theoretical formulations.
The necessity to formulate new research perspectives on care is also 
highlighted by the ways in which gender is typically thematised within 
the care debates. Care possesses important implications in terms of social 
justice, gender equality and citizenship. Whilst several scholars have high-
lighted such implications, conceptualising care responsibilities in terms 
of universal, public concern (Knijn and Kremer 1997; Tronto 1994; 
White and Tronto 2004), care is still highly gendered and social policies 
tend instead to define the notion of “citizen-carers” in neutral terms 
(Barnes 2012). Informal care is a thoroughly gendered issue that possesses 
important implications in terms of entitlements and equal opportunities 
for women and men. The participation of women in paid work has 
become all the more dependent on their abilities to be the architects and 
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organisers of everyday life of the household, the family or other signifi-
cant social networks. When reliable and affordable childcare services are 
not available, women are often obligated to make a choice between gain-
ful employment and having children. Likewise, when flexible care 
arrangements for elders or frail adults are not available, the career oppor-
tunities of many women are strongly limited. The care-related gender 
inequality—which is a fact—is made, however, of many components and 
perpetuated by several factors, which seem to be quite often overlooked.
More than ten  years ago, Hochschild (1995) was talking about a 
stalled gender revolution. “It is a revolution”—she claimed—“because in 
two decades women have gone from being mainly at home to being 
mainly at work. It is stalled because women have undergone this change 
in a culture that has neither rewired its notion of manhood to facilitate 
male work- sharing at home, nor reconstructed the workplace so as to 
allow more control over and flexibility at work. Caught in this stall, 
women have little time to care for their children and elderly parents, 
much less a sick neighbour. […] In the absence of wider changes in the 
culture of manhood and workplace, two-job couples often suffer a micro-
version of the care deficit” (Hochschild 1995: 337). In this quote, 
Hochschild is pointing to an important aspect, which is the necessity to 
acknowledge, in explaining the gendered nature of care, the role played 
by our notions of masculinities and femininities. In the absence of a 
radical change in the social definition of successful masculinity, even 
those (few) men who already share care work and work at home will be 
trapped in a stalled gender revolution or will continue to “come to terms 
with the values embedded in and expressed through the package deal”, 
which Townsend powerfully defines as the tetragonal complex whole 
made of marriage, children, home ownership and work (Townsend 
2002: 204). The package deal is an essential component of the dominant 
cultural values defining fatherhood and masculinity in Western societ-
ies. Within the framework of such cultural values, work remains central 
to the engineering of the social system and to the construction of male 
identity and experience under present productive conditions; but no 
mention is ever made of care work, nor is it wondered whether being 
female or male, gay or heterosexual, makes any difference in living under 
these circumstances.
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A number of feminist scholars have argued that the collective denial of 
care and dependency is central to the construction of the public world as 
we know it. Bringing in care means unmasking the binary gendered 
thought that underlies certain ideas of masculinity and femininity. As a 
consequence, a first step toward the revalorisation of care is a deconstruc-
tion of the existing concept of care, a process that also requires decon-
structing the idea of masculinity that gives it shape (Leira 1994; Ungerson 
1990; Thomas 1993). Deconstructing masculinity highlights limitations 
of a gender-specific ethic of care and the need to bring gay and lesbian 
caregivers to the frontstage of research on care. Social scientists have long 
thought in dichotomous terms when talking about gender and its rele-
vance to the division of care work within the domestic sphere. Many 
arguments about care seem to rely on deceptive distinctions: the separate 
worlds of sentiment and rationality; as such, they preclude the ability to 
view the phenomenon in anything but a dichotomous manner.
It is time to look for new paradigms in the discussion of both care and 
gender as well as for more complex models able to disentangle the con-
nections between human agency and social structures and to provide 
more accurate information about status and power differences.16 In order 
to fully understand how gender affects the emotional dynamics revolving 
around care and the structural patterns of inclusion/exclusion that are 
built through them, a careful analysis needs to advance simultaneously 
throughout and beyond gender. Such an analysis must be able to overcome 
traditional dichotomies (public/private) and gender boundaries; it must 
be able to show the invisible strings created by heteronormativity and 
reveal the understated and the exceptions that confirm the rule. It must 
be able to show, in other words, the actual variation within the socially 
constructed categories of gender and sexuality, their complex interactions 
with the phenomenon of informal care and their aforementioned impli-
cations in terms of social justice, equality and citizenship.
Lynn Jamieson (1998) has traced the historical emergence of patterns of 
intimacy as a varied combination of social/personal practices taking place 
in a variety of social contexts and relationships and several other scholars 
have showed how this work has shaped the field of family studies showing 
the necessity of going beyond conventional definitions of the family 
(Beck-Gernsheim 1999; Morgan 2011; Gabb 2008; Giddens 1992; 
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Skolnick 1992; Smart 2004, 2007). Other relevant work has shown the 
connections between different forms of intimacy and citizenship (Donovan 
et  al. 1999; Plummer 2003; Richardson 1998; Roseneil 2010; Weeks 
1998; Weeks et al. 1999; Weeks et al. 2001). Several studies of intimacy 
and intimate relationships have challenged the public/private dichotomy 
(Hochschild 1989, 2003) and, among them, Viviana Zelizer (2005) has 
criticised the doctrine of “hostile worlds” suggesting that what we need is 
a “feminist rethinking of care concerns” which focuses attention on actual 
care relationships in order to break down “the traditional hostile worlds 
dichotomies that erroneously split economic transaction and intimate per-
sonal relations into separate spheres” (Zelizer 2005: 303). In addition, 
there is a growing body of critical theorisations of care, intimacy and citi-
zenship from feminist, multicultural and global perspectives that attempt 
to bridge the gaps between the theories and practices of care, sexuality and 
intimacy, providing a broader, more grounded, intersectional understand-
ing of inequality, social inclusion and citizenship (Epstein and Carrillo 
2014; Fudge 2014; Kershaw 2010; Longman et al. 2013; Parreñas 2005; 
Pratesi 2016; Sevenhuijsen 1998; Yuval-Davis 2007). For example, 
Longman et al.’s (2013) comparative, intersectional analysis of “mother-
ing” in non- conventional mother–child relationships shows how care 
work and its micro-based, affective potential to shape politics of inclu-
sion and recognition become a form of “citizenship practice” which 
changes hegemonic understandings of belonging and entitlement. 
Kerhsaw’s claim the “caregiving for identity is political” (2010) advances 
the debate on the contested status of care work as a form of political citi-
zenship. Fudge (2014) discusses the extent to which universal human 
rights and citizenship discourses intersect when migrant workers claim 
for greater protection in a growingly globalised world. Epstein and Carrillo 
(2014) illustrate the concept of immigrant sexual citizenship by discussing 
ethnographic data from a study on Mexican gay and bisexual male immi-
grants to California and describing the multiple, intersectional chal-
lenges they face. Parreñas (2005) addresses transnational intergenerational 
relationships between Filipino migrant mothers and their young adult 
children and examines how families achieve intimacy across long distances 
by showing how economic conditions, gender and larger  systems of 
inequality shape transnational family communication. Notwithstanding 
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their different perspectives and their specific foci, these visions of inequal-
ity, social inclusion and entitlement share the necessity to overcome decep-
tive dualisms and situate the debate on care, intimacies and citizenship 
within more inclusive, intersectional and interdisciplinary boundaries. 
Together with the above-mentioned examples, these studies represent sig-
nificant theoretical advances in the study of relationships, intimacies and 
care and their complex intersections and implications, providing further 
evidence to the necessity of new paradigms in the field.
My argument in this book as well as my contribution to such necessity 
is that emotions represent a significant missing link. Emotions can explain 
the dynamics by which care-related inequality is reproduced situationally, 
beyond the rigid and reifying categorisations of sex and gender and family 
discourses which posit heterosexuality as the norm. By looking at the 
inner, dialogical, interactive, emotional dimensions of informal care, I 
want to highlight the necessity of an embodied social theory of care, one 
that needs not be scared of being accused of psychologism in its attempt 
to reconcile micro- and macro-realities of social life and overcome current 
limited and limiting interpretations of care. In the next chapter, I illus-
trate both the premises for and the characteristics of such an embodied 
social theory of care by conceptualising gender in terms of a fluid, contin-
gent and “situated accomplishment” (Fenstermaker and West 2002) and 
by looking at the growing body of feminist scholars who have already 
started going beyond an exclusive focus on gender and rethinking differ-
ence and inequality in terms of their multiple and differing dimensions. I 
then highlight the central role of emotions in linking agency and social 
structures, that is, individual action and interaction, on the one hand, 
and the emergence, maintenance and transformation of social structures, 
on the other. The analytic perspective I present in the next chapter argues 
for a more accurate and detailed description of the person who cares and a 
broader, phenomenological approach to the issues of gender and care.
Notes
1. With a couple of exceptions.
2. This was the case at the time of the interview. After the completion of this 
study, Kendrick eventually met another single father and they formed a fam-
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ily of four. Kendrick is one of the few interviewees with whom I managed to 
keep in touch for a relatively long time (a few years) after the research.
3. “Speaking more generally, a focus on work highlights care’s burdens; the 
pleasures of caring are mentioned late if at all. ‘Caring for’ surely is often 
burdensome; the cared for are ill, disabled, and, most by definition, 
needy. They may be unresponsive, resentful of their plight, and critical of 
the care that is offered to them. But the ill and disabled can be also 
humorous, lovable, charming, and thankful. Frail elderly parents, even 
lying in the bed in which they will shortly die, are sometimes apprecia-
tive and enchanting recipients of care. And, as is evident to anyone who 
knows them, healthy children are often delightful and delighted. Hence 
it is not surprising when caregivers in propitious circumstances not only 
love their children, elderly parents, and ailing friends and kin, but also 
love caring for them and love themselves as carers. In remembering only 
or primarily the burdens of care, we fail to make senses of the lives of 
such caregivers or of their yearning for care past” (Ruddick 1998: 16).
4. Here defined as unpaid, non-professional care of a physical, emotional, and 
social nature that is provided by partners, relatives or friends.
5. According to Norman Denzin’s interpretive interactionism, crucial links 
between personal experiences, structures and public policies can be made 
through the examination of experiences that are elicited as thick descrip-
tion, analysed through thick interpretation, and made meaningful by 
enfolding relevant contextual material. “Thick interpretation constructs 
a system of analysis and understanding that is meaningful within the 
worlds of lived experience. It assumes that any experience has meaning 
at two levels: the surface (or the intended) level and the deep (unin-
tended) level. Meaning, which must be captured in interpretation, is 
symbolic. It moves in surface and deep directions at the same time. Thick 
interpretation attempts to unravel and record these multiple meaning 
structures that flow from interactional experience. It assumes that mul-
tiple meanings will always be present in any situation. No experience 
ever has the same meaning for two individuals. This is so because mean-
ing is emotional and biographical” (Denzin 2001a: 17).
6. See Katz (1999, 2001).
7. Data are accurate “in the sense of being based on a close observation of 
what is being talked about or only on remote indicators”; data are precise 
“in the sense of being close to the thing discussed and thus being ready 
to take account of matters not anticipated in the original formulation of 
the problem”; and the “analysis is full or broad, in the sense of being 
based on knowledge about a wide range of matters that impinge on the 
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question under study, rather than just a relatively few variables” (Becker 
2001: 328).
8. This expression came out in the context of an informal conversation with 
Randall Collins. To read more on anti-status or reverse snobbery, see 
Collins’ Situational Stratification: A Micro-Macro Theory of Inequality. 
In: Sociological Theory, 18, 1, March 2000.
9. See Lamont (1992).
10. A purposive sample is a non-representative subset of some larger population 
and is constructed to serve a very specific need or purpose. A snowball sam-
ple is a subset of a purposive sample selected by relying on previously identi-
fied group members to identify other members of the same population.
11. Whilst Randall Collins’ Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) is the main 
theoretical reference of my study, I used grounded theory as a general 
methodological approach allowing me to generate new theory and to 
change my strategy of inquiry following a process of continuous dis-
covery and reformulation of themes, hypotheses and analytic catego-
ries. In this sense, my research approach was both deductive and 
inductive. The analytic strategy I used is based instead on an attempt to 
combine two important theoretical touchstones of qualitative method-
ology: Phenomenology and Symbolic Interactionism. I illustrate my ana-
lytic strategy in the Appendix of this work.
12. “Paradoxically, by perpetuating the myth of inescapable divisions and bat-
tles between the worlds of sentiment and rationality and, of market and 
domesticity, hostile worlds arguments divert us from real solutions. […] 
To the extent that normative discussions assume the existence of separate 
spheres and their mutual corruption at point of contact, those normative 
programs will fail to accomplish their announced objectives. It therefore 
matters to get the interaction of intimacy and economic activity right. 
Looking at coupling, care, and households we did not find separate worlds 
of economy and sentiment, nor did we see markets everywhere. Instead, 
we have observed crosscutting, differentiated ties that connect people with 
each other. We witnessed people investing energy and ingenuity in mark-
ing differences among their relations to each other and regularly including 
economic transactions in those intimate relations. None of us, we have 
seen, lives in segregated spheres with unbreachable barriers between our 
personal relations and our economic ties” (Zelizer 2005: 297–298).
13. On the relationship between emotionality and rationality, see also Kemper 
(1990), Smith-Lovin (1993), Barbalet (2001), Turner and Stets (2005).
14. For a discussion of caring as both labour and love, see Graham, “Caring: 
a Labour of Love”, in A Labour of Love. Women, Work, and Caring, Finch 
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and Groves (eds.), London, Routledge 1983; Ungerson, “The Language 
of Care: Crossing the Boundaries”, in Gender and Caring: Work and 
Welfare in Britain and Scandinavia, London and New York, Harvester/
Wheatsheaf 1990; Kittay, Love’s Labour, New  York, Routledge 1999. 
After its first thematisation in Finch and Groves, (1983), the usefulness 
of defining care as a practice that encompasses affection and labour is 
maintained by several theorists of care, including Abel and Nelson 
(1990), Tronto (1994), Bubeck (1995) and Ruddick (1998).
15. It is to the credit of the early 1980s’ feminist studies on care that respite 
care, support and, more recently, payment for caregivers have been effec-
tively brought into the debate.
16. “According to a very comprehensive body of results from a number of 
disciplines, emotional outcomes of interaction can be predicted from a 
model that centres on the social dimensions of power and status. Power 
and status interactions directly produce emotions. Fundamental to the 
model is the idea that actors necessarily interpret their and others’ power 
and status positions subjectively” Kemper (1990: 11–12). See also 
Kemper (1978), Collins (1981, 1990, 2000, 2004).
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The End of Inequality as We Know It
Isn’t it crazy, with all people in the world, to put all our eggs into the one 
basket of a family consisting of four people? How can we create new social 
forms, new forms of association and solidarity that fulfil people’s needs of 
intimacy in new ways?
Joan Williams
 Differing Dimensions of Difference: 
Overcoming Deceptive Dualisms  
in Current Debates on Gender
Existing theoretical perspectives on gender are increasingly less concerned 
with denying or embracing difference than revising the terms in which 
we traditionally conceptualise it. Whenever we measure sex-related dif-
ferences in the distribution of care tasks and responsibilities, we end up 
reinforcing oppositional categories, diverting attention from power 
dimensions that cut across sex-based categories. One of the key purposes 
of this book is to overcome the misleading dualism of gender while, at the 
same time, to contest the implicit heterosexism of current literature on 
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informal care, which explains the inclusion of gay and lesbian carers and 
parents. The inclusion of gay and lesbian parents1 in the study aims to 
overcome both the taken-for-granted assumption that all parents are het-
erosexual and the limited way of using a gender lens in the analysis with-
out considering all the different ways in which gender can be enacted and 
social inequality can be reproduced. In doing so, I find support in a grow-
ing body of feminist studies which have already indicated a third way: 
relocating difference as the exclusive focus of gender-related questions 
and focusing the inquiry on the differing dimensions of difference (e.g. 
Bem 1993; Butler 2004; Epstein 1997; Fraser 2013, 2016; Ferree et al. 
1999; Gillies 2003; Holland et  al. 2003; James 1997; Nixon 2011; 
Ridgeway and Correll 2000; Risman 1998; Taylor 2007, 2009, 2010; 
Travis 1992). This alternative way to conceptualise difference aims to 
challenge the power that dualism continues to exercise on collective con-
sciousness, highlighting the necessity to worry less about difference and 
more about patterns of disadvantage or subordination.
Closely related to this alternative approach is the necessity to under-
score the fundamental importance of emotions as a bridging element 
between agency and structure, that is, between individual action and 
interaction, on the one hand, and the emergence, maintenance and trans-
formation of social structure, on the other. Therefore, another aim of this 
book is to provide empirical grounding to those theories in the sociology 
of emotions which explain social structures, social order and social change 
in terms of emotional dynamics that occur at the micro-level of interac-
tions. The theoretical framework illustrated in this book draws on a large 
number of approaches to the sociology of emotions that have already 
inspired a rich research agenda, establishing important links between 
micro- and macro-levels of analysis and addressing the emotional mecha-
nisms through which social bonds, social behaviour and social structures 
are interactionally and situationally reproduced or challenged (Barbalet 
2001; Clark 1990; Collins 1990, 1993, 2004; Gordon 1990; Hammond 
1990; Katz 1999; Kemper 1990; Scheff 1990; Turner 1999b, 2000). 
More specifically, it draws on Collins’ theory of Interaction Ritual Chains 
(2004), according to which people’s statuses and positions in society pos-
sess an emotional component rather than a merely economic, cultural or 
social one and social structures—including gender and inequality—are 
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constantly reproduced through emotional dynamics. I will provide a 
detailed illustration of Collins’ theoretical model in the next chapter.
Based on these premises, the analytic2 perspective I present in this 
book argues for a more detailed description of the person who cares and a 
broader phenomenological approach to the issues of gender and care.3 
Fenstermaker and West (2002) maintain that gender—as well as other 
socially constructed categories, like class and race—is a fluid, contingent 
and “situated accomplishment” through which outcomes of inequality 
are often reproduced. They use the expression “doing gender”, implying 
that the performative aspects of gender are to be understood as a way of 
“doing difference”. My argument is that a careful investigation of the 
processes involved in doing care provides significant clues to understand 
the ways in which inequalities based on socially constructed categories 
(such as gender or sexuality) result from ongoing interactional accom-
plishments. We also saw in Chap. 2 how, together with inequality, care 
intersects issues of social justice, entitlement to rights and citizenship. 
Thus, informal care represents a strategic site to reveal the invisible, 
emotion- based mechanisms through which social exclusion and inequal-
ity, on the one hand, but also social inclusion, status membership and 
citizenship, on the other, are constantly reproduced at the micro-level of 
analysis.
The idea that gender-based inequalities are fluid, situated and con-
stantly accomplished into specific settings seems to me a compelling way 
to overcome the current limitations of conventional studies on care in a 
gender perspective. In fact, this idea allows us to look at individual actions 
and interactions through different lenses, as a potentially continuous 
micro-reconstruction of non-normative definitions of sex categories, 
going beyond both traditional approaches to the question of unbalanced 
gender distributions of care work and deceiving dichotomies characteris-
ing present and past debates on informal care. As we have seen, one of the 
most important dichotomies affecting gender-based inequality is the 
dichotomy between public and private spheres and their respective moral 
codes or ethics. Overcoming this deceptive dualism from a theoretical 
point of view is one of the important tasks to accomplish if we want to 
reduce gender inequality and get to a better understanding of it.
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 Private and Public Ethics of Care
According to a large part of the current literature on care, informal care 
identifies a private ethic defined in opposition to the public ethic of legal 
justice. Some scholars have reinforced the contrast between two ethical 
orientations through the association of care with femininity and relation-
ality, and justice with masculinity and rationality. Others have tried 
instead to overcome the oppositional logic between the two ethics and to 
explore the possibilities for an alternative moral theory encompassing 
both care and justice (without deflating either) and connecting men and 
women on a same level.4
More than 50 years ago, Betty Friedan’s Feminine Mystique (1983/1963) 
set the groundwork for a cultural revolt of white, middle-class women, 
who started to reflect on their housewife status acquired through choice 
or societal expectations.5 Many women began to reject that status, and 
some of them joined the struggle of the feminist movements by starting 
consciousness- raising groups, discussing their sense of oppression as 
home-workers and rejecting the patriarchal and bourgeois values associ-
ated with it. On the academic front, as we have seen, Marxist feminists 
started to discuss “women’s work” in the resulting debate about the status 
of domestic labour and to raise questions about collective responsibility 
and social justice. In the early 1980s, a liberal feminist scholar took up a 
quite different sort of consciousness-raising within moral psychology. 
Gilligan’s In a Different Voice (1982) suggested that it is an “ethic of care”, 
rather than an appeal to justice and rights, that determines women’ moral 
judgments. Gilligan insisted that this “voice” needed to be heard, not 
dismissed, in ethical discussions. As a result, feminists across all disci-
plines, not just feminist ethicists, took up the notion of a “woman’s way 
of knowing and caring”.6
Since then, the particular ethic supposedly expressed by care work as 
moral work has been either firmly opposed to or tentatively integrated with 
an understanding of morality as something concerned also with justice. 
While a number of feminist theorists (Tronto 1987; Bubeck 1995; West 
1997) have argued for a synthesis between justice and care which might 
overcome this deceptive dualism, others (Ruddick 1995, 1998; 
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Noddings 1984) seem more inclined to maintain the existence of a sharp 
distinction between “right, law, and justice”, on the one side, and “receptive-
ness, relatedness, and attentiveness” on the other (Nagel 1997: 320).
In her description of the ethic of care, Noddings (1984) simply leaves 
aside considerations of justice, endorsing a subjectivist model of care. 
Whilst maintaining the usefulness of a distinction between care and justice 
and recommending a shift between the two moral orientations, Ruddick 
(1998) seems eventually to mitigate the contrast, recognising that the oppo-
sitional definitions required by the justice versus care theoretical framework 
risks diminishing both care and justice. In her attempt to develop a general 
theory of care,7 Tronto (1987) suggests a “contextual moral theory of care” 
based on the assumption that, since morality is embedded in the cultural 
norms of any given society, it must be situated concretely in specific con-
texts and interpreted in light of the specific social actors involved. She also 
suggests discussing and rethinking the ethic of care in terms of moral and 
political theory, rather than simply as a complement to traditional moral 
theories based on justice.8 Bubeck (1995) and West (1997) maintain that it 
is quite difficult to imagine how an ethic of care in itself and by itself could 
allow for distributive justice9 to work within it. West (1997) points to the 
damage that the divorce of care and justice provoked historically, not only 
to women but also to our law, to our understanding of the sense of justice 
itself. For most of our history, she claims, our practices of care have not 
been regarded as necessary to the capacity to do justice, other hand, our 
practices and our ideals of justice have been uncaring, with the consequent 
deflation of both virtues. Bubeck (1995) criticises Gilligan’s and Noddings’ 
models of an ethic of care, but she is interested in expanding and revising 
them, provided that these models can take into account women’s disadvan-
taged positions and stress the necessity to avoid a romantic and repressive 
they have been unjust; on the ethic of care.10
A key challenge for all these ethic-of-care theorists is how to avoid 
essentialist constructions of women’s voice as victims’ voice and to include 
a man’s voice that is not necessarily a persecutor’s voice. By the end of the 
1980s, however, a different awareness increasingly seems to take place in 
light of the second shift phenomenon (Hochschild 1989), which seems to 
require a synthesis of the two ethical positions, those related to care with 
those related to justice.
 Private and Public Ethics of Care 
a.pratesi@chester.ac.uk
42 
 The Care Deficit and Its Consequences
In the Second Shift (1989), Hochschild describes the failure of a transi-
tion in progress: the transition toward men’s and women’s equality both 
in the private and the public sphere. Although women are entering and 
remaining in the labour force in unprecedented numbers, they continue 
to bear the principal responsibility for what Hochschild calls the “second 
shift” of housework and child care, putting in on average an extra month 
of 24-hour days each year in various combinations of paid and domestic 
work. Hochschild captures the tensions and contradictions American 
wives and husbands experience as they strive to cope with the second shift 
in the context of their differing gender ideologies, the demands of jobs 
and family, the reality of family economic pressures and the absence of 
cultural and structural supports in the broader society. Structural con-
straints of economic and social realities, along with the weight of norma-
tive expectations, shape the choices of working couples. Macro-level 
changes have extraordinary micro-level impacts within the family unit 
and Hochschild describes the complexities of the processes by which 
individuals forge a collective family strategy, as husbands and wives nego-
tiate and renegotiate the implicit contracts between them. One of the 
most significant challenges that macro-level changes impose to these 
couples is precisely connected to the growing need and demand for care 
caused by recent social and demographic trends in the American society.
Describing the growing crisis in care affecting the United States and 
other Western industrialised countries, Hochschild (1989, 1995, 1997) 
coins the expression care deficit. Recent trends in Western societies have all 
increased the need for care. These trends have expanded the need for care 
while contracting the supply of it; that is, they have created a care deficit, in 
both private and public life, the costs of which are mostly borne by women. 
Several factors highlight the risk that care might reach a dead- end in our 
societies. As a result of well-known demographic and structural changes, 
such as the downsizing and instability of the family, the ageing population, 
the growing number of women in the active workforce, the increasing 
demands of work and the deficits in public economies, the challenges 
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national governments face are growing rapidly while their economic capa-
bilities to respond seem to be in decline. What is worse, as Hochschild 
maintains, by reducing the financial deficit, legislators and politicians 
increase the care deficit. The consequences of current social changes in 
Western societies considerably influence the quality of life of both infor-
mal carers and people in need of care and dramatically increase the risk of 
social exclusion and inequality.
The gender gap in both the private and public spheres, and the care 
deficit that widens it, demands a reconciliation of the private ethic of care 
with the public ethic of justice. By reframing the question in these terms, 
we shift the focus of the analysis on the politics of care, which underlines 
the implications of the low value placed on care, the strategic importance 
of the social organisation of work and leisure time, and the difficult rec-
onciliation between labour for the market and labour of love, which is still 
largely assigned to women. In Hochschild’s view, the interplay of the 
wife’s and husband’s gender strategies and the wider social and economic 
pressures that impinge on them determine how couples actually divide 
housework and child care. The uneven effects of these pressures on men 
and women help to explain why the problem of the second shift is so 
often resolved via the working mother’s “double day”. To solve the prob-
lem, Hochschild invokes a national gender strategy based on the assump-
tion that social institutions possess their own gender strategies in the 
same way individuals do: the way a nation organises its institutions 
(schools, factories, corporations, universities etc.) reflects the gendered 
division of labour in the family. What she suggests is a sort of “Marshall 
Plan for the Family” (Furstenberg 1990) that includes reduced work time 
for parents, sick child leave and a range of other benefits to support fam-
ily life. It should be noted that many of her critical observations are dis-
armingly similar to what other researchers have reported over the past 
decades. Hochschild’s study confirms findings published earlier (Rapoport 
and Rapoport 1978; Hertz 1986; Gerson 1987), in the same years (Finch 
1989; Stacey 1990; and DeVault 1991), and later (Blau et al. 1998; Garey 
1999; Folbre 2001; Fraser 2013, 2016; Fraser and Bedford 2008; Orloff 
and Monson 2002; Rapoport et  al. 2002; Presser 2003; Jacobs and 
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Gornick 2002; Jacobs and Gerson 2004; among others). All these works 
describe the multiple ways in which contemporary social organisation 
simultaneously constrains and makes possible specific patterns of social 
relations for women.
The importance of Hochschild’s contribution is a more in-depth and 
insightful delineation of the multiple, subtle strategies men and women 
employ in trying to rationalise inequality in the home. These “gender 
strategies” tend to be mutually developed by both spouses to explain why 
a more egalitarian arrangement is unnecessary or impossible. A “gender 
strategy” is a complex articulation of one’s ideas and feelings about gender 
and marriage, and the actions one takes on behalf of them.11 When the 
rationale underlying inequality is mutually accepted, marital tension is 
reduced. Thus, whilst previous research on the domestic division of 
labour has generally failed to explain the persistence of traditional role 
behaviour in two-job marriages, Hochschild shows the importance of a 
close, in-depth analysis of family dynamics and interactions in order to 
understand how gender inequality is constantly reproduced at the micro- 
level of everyday care practices. In other words, although an equal sharing 
of the second shift is uncommon among the couples she studied, 
Hochschild is able to provide insights into mechanisms for change.
Even so, and similarly to what happens with other scholars, her analy-
ses and suggestions for change reveal some important gaps in contempo-
rary feminist theory, among which a problematic understanding and 
discussion of race/ethnicity, social class and sexual orientation. All the 
above-mentioned works refer to heterosexual and mostly white, middle- 
class families, that is, to an assumed idea of family that does not include 
other forms of households or other, less conventional ways to make a 
family.12 While these authors acknowledge their exclusive focus on het-
erosexual households and families, none of them seems to be interested 
in problematising this limitation in any way. What is missing, here, is a 
critical analysis of existing assumptions about “the family” and of the 
place that gender divisions and stereotypes, heteronormativity, the rheto-
ric of domesticity and the ideology of the nuclear family hold in main-
taining and reproducing them.
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 The “Assumed” Family, the Rhetoric 
of Domesticity and Other Ways  
to Reproduce Gender
The reliance on what Fineman (2000) calls the “assumed family” risks to 
create serious limitations to both analysis and policy. From the theoretical 
point of view, assuming the existence of only one or two prevalent models 
of family and excluding all other forms of kinship, connections, intima-
cies and relationships that accomplish similar functions in terms of care 
and reciprocal support means ignoring a substantial component of the 
societal tissue and, as a consequence, completely misrepresenting the 
reality. From a policy point of view, assuming that the family and, in 
particular, the nuclear family is a distinctive, immutable, separate and 
autonomous institution not only means ignoring a conspicuous set of 
individuals and non-family contexts which are not conventionally or 
institutionally definable as “a family”, but also overestimating the auton-
omy and the capacity of the “assumed family” to handle with the every-
day challenges connected to care responsibilities.
The assumed family is a specific ideological construct with a particular pop-
ulation and gendered form that allows us to privatize individual depen-
dency and pretend that it is not a public problem. Furthermore, the 
gendered nature of this assumed family is essential to the maintenance and 
continuance of our foundational myths of individual independence, 
autonomy, and self-sufficiency. This assumed family also masks the depen-
dency of society and all its public institutions on the uncompensated and 
unrecognized dependency work assigned to caretakers within the private 
family. In economic and other important public policy discussions, we 
focus on the appropriate relationship between market and state, with the 
family relegated to the ‘private’ sphere. Discussions proceed as though the 
policies that are designed to affect these institutions in the public sphere 
have only few implications for the unexamined private family. Even more 
fundamental, the discussions fail to grasp the fact that the actual (as con-
trasted with the assumed) family might profoundly affect the possibility of 
success and failure of policies created for the market and the state. (Fineman 
2000: 14)
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Changing the ideology of the assumed family and its highly gendered 
nature would require a common effort of men and women to start think-
ing of themselves as both carers and workers, and to transform individ-
ual/private dependency into a matter of public relevance. This involves 
challenging gender stereotypes within the family and unmasking the reli-
ance of society and its public institutions on the family—be it real or 
assumed—and all the other typologies of carers who are taking care of a 
needy person. If the remedy seems conceptually clear, the actual possibili-
ties for men and women to challenge their gender cultures and habits are 
severely delayed both from outside and inside the domestic sphere, where 
gendered behaviours connected to routine and convention end up being 
much stronger than any hypothetical and idealistic attempt to reach gen-
der equality.
Some scholars underscore the double-edged sword connected to the 
power women have gained from their care work and housework within 
the home (Cahn 2000) or try to relocate the analysis of gender not in 
terms of difference or dominance, but rather in terms of tradition 
(Williams 2001). Acknowledging that men are penalised when they 
modify their work and care arrangements and assume nurturing/expres-
sive behaviours, Naomi Cahn (2000) argues that a change is required not 
only at a policy level but also within the private sphere, where women 
need to give up some of the power and control they currently exercise 
within the family. Far from blaming women for accepting domesticity 
and motherhood as their primary sources of power or from accusing 
them of complicity in their own subordination, the author wants none-
theless to underline “the persuasive power of the rhetoric of domesticity” 
and suggest strategies that might help women to relinquish this historical 
and oppressive power while simultaneously ensuring more participation 
from men.
“Mothers’ power within the home has developed not only through an 
ideology of domesticity that celebrates women’s maternal roles, but also 
through women’s actual performance of childcare and housekeeping” 
(Cahn 2000: 179). In other words, it is not necessary to be an “angel in 
the house” and/or to assume a Victorian model of domesticity to get 
trapped in the role of primary housekeeper and caregiver—the author 
maintains—and it is not sufficient to be an open-minded feminist to be 
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totally safe from it. “Mother-work is not necessarily a fundamental part 
of every women’s identity nor is it necessarily women’s choice to perform 
this work; it has, however, been constructed as women’s work, and many 
women are drawn into it. Even women excluded from the traditional 
conception of domesticity have taken care of the children and the home; 
their mother-work has been a form of power for them” (Cahn 2000: 179) 
as well as a source of reproduction of status cultures (Collins 1992). This 
is an important point, because it highlights many of the contradictions 
and unsolved issues still open within feminist debate, especially when the 
latter tries to explain the continuing hold of domesticity. The solution 
suggested by Cahn (2000) would overcome the dilemma allowing both 
men and women to experience power within and outside the domestic 
sphere, instead of diminishing the value of care and ignoring its positive 
aspect.
Joan Williams (2001) explains the ways through which domesticity 
sets the material and ideological frame of care. Domesticity is described 
as a gender system that historically allocated informal care to the women’s 
sphere, defined a particular organisation of market work and family work 
and developed specific notions of femininity and masculinity that sup-
port a binary breadwinner/primary caregiver distinction of gender roles.13 
While domesticity is an extraordinarily useful tool to conceptualise care 
and to analyse the work/family axis, the author maintains, it is not the key 
concept to understand gender. A more useful explanation of gender inter-
preted not merely as a system of male dominance but rather as a system 
of meaning that structures and connects micro- and macro-levels is rep-
resented by Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, which in Williams’ analyses is 
defined by domesticity. According to Williams, Bourdieu’s insights into 
the logic of practice—by which institutional arrangements, collective 
representations and social/personal identities conform to durable disposi-
tions (in this case: standard gender performances)—are more helpful 
than a model of gender inequality merely based on male domination. On 
the one hand, domesticity links feminine identity to motherhood and 
parental care, forcing women to come to grips with work/family balance 
dilemmas; on the other hand, it measures men’s worth by whether or not 
they are successful workers, encouraging them to avoid care commit-
ments in order to affirm their status membership and masculine identity. 
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The rhetoric of domesticity, the motherhood mystique and the celebra-
tion of an ethic of care as the key element of gender difference all contrib-
ute to reinforce the subordinate position of women, who are often 
induced to renounce their personal and social fulfilment in the name of 
an assumed moral mission. But these ideologies are also detrimental to 
those men who consider the ethic of care an important component of 
their personal identity, but are socially and culturally induced to focus on 
their career as a way to confirm their masculine identity and gain social 
approval. The problem then, as the author maintains, does not reside as 
much in the rhetoric of domesticity but rather in the ways we socially 
construct the concept of the “ideal worker” in Western societies. 
Restructuring workplaces by allowing the ideal worker—be it male or 
female—to fit with the care needs of children and elderly people is the 
solution to promote gender equality while at the same time avoiding 
sterile sameness/difference debates. We need a new feminist ethics, 
Williams concludes, informed by the recognition that we all have a life 
shaped by domesticity in a certain way, and that we all reproduce domes-
ticity at the same time we are trying to challenge it.
We do so because domesticity is constitutive of who we are, and because it 
is an indispensable weapon for making feminist proposals sound resonant 
and persuasive even when they push the envelope. Our proposals will be 
neither an efficacious insurrection nor a painful insubordination, but an 
instable coexistence of both.14 We all are trying to avoid the most likely 
result, where the accumulated force of a historically entrenched and 
entrenching rearticulation overwhelms the more fragile effort to build an 
alternative cultural configuration. (Williams 2001: 1491)
Williams’ influential article appeared exactly 20 years after Stacey’s dis-
heartened comments on the state of sociological theory when she 
observed: “we lack a conceptual framework, let alone a theory with any 
explanatory power, which will permit us to analyse paid and unpaid 
labour in a variety of social institutions and social settings within one 
notion of the division of labour, which can encompass the domestic arena 
of Adam and Eve as well as the industry of Adam Smith, which can 
articulate the home as well as the market place and the state and relate the 
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class order to the gender order” (Stacey 1981: 172). Since then, as we 
have seen, considerable progress has been made thanks to the valuable 
contributions of several feminist scholars. However, the links that are 
supposed to bridge the gaps precluding the construction of a comprehen-
sive analytical framework based on an ethic of care and aimed at incorpo-
rating different dimensions of difference are still far from having been 
reached.
The lack of a broader conceptual framework to study care delays prog-
ress on several of the theoretically and empirically problematic issues out-
lined so far; but it also represents an opportunity to explore whether there 
is room for a fully developed moral theory based on the ethic of care as 
an alternative—rather than simply as a complement—to traditional 
moral theories based on justice (Tronto 1987), or whether existing theo-
ries, including more comprehensive models not directly connected with 
care, can be appropriately elaborated and integrated in order to overcome 
present gaps. Moving the centre of the debate from a mere discussion on 
gender difference towards a broader discourse on the adequacy of the 
ethic of care as a contextual moral theory developed along with the ethic 
of justice15 and highlighting the role of emotions represent the first steps 
in the direction of: (1) a more general conceptual framework to analyse 
care and (2) of its multiple implications in terms of equality, social inclu-
sion and citizenship.
 Bringing Emotions to the Foreground: 
Imagining New Theoretical Frameworks 
to Study Care and Its Intersections 
with Emotion and Social Inequality
The paradoxes and contradictions connected with the gendered defini-
tion of private and public spheres highlight the critical intellectual task to 
show how certain dichotomies could be transcended and how justice and 
care could come into a new alignment in the twenty-first century. Such a 
task can be undertaken through: (a) a careful reconsideration of current 
theoretical perspectives on care, (b) an integration of these perspectives 
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with some of the most recent advances in the sociology of emotions and 
(c) the definition of a contextual theory of care able to take into account 
the different circumstances and conditions by which people reproduce 
exclusion and inequality or, instead, create the possibilities for social 
inclusion and social change. A first step towards a contextual theory of 
care is perhaps the recognition—along with Thomas (1993)—that a 
more useful starting point is to define care as an inclusive empirical cat-
egory rather than a theoretical one. This implies focusing the research on 
a clearly defined, identifiable and possibly measurable part of the whole 
and openly acknowledging such an epistemological stance. Many of the 
existing theoretical and empirical approaches claim to talk about the 
totality of care while they are actually focusing only on fragments of it. 
This is why the study illustrated in this book focuses explicitly on infor-
mal care and on a specific aspect of this phenomenon: its emotional 
dynamics and implications for “different” types of carers. Rather than 
who does what, for whom and when, I consider more relevant how she/he 
feels about that. I am not interested in checking the state-of-the-art of the 
unbalanced distribution of tasks and roles between men and women 
within the domestic sphere, but rather in gaining insights into the inter-
actional mechanisms by which social inequality is daily constructed or 
de-constructed through the emotional dynamics revolving around the care 
responsibilities of different types of carers.
One of the central aspects that current literature on care has thus far 
ignored concerns the intra-subjective or inner aspects of care analysed 
and contextualised within the whole ecology of people providing infor-
mal care. My ontological and epistemological stance in this book is that 
informal care must be reframed in all its complexity as a deeply emo-
tional, multifaceted and problematic phenomenon that is strongly related 
to: (1) the constant definition of self during adulthood (2) people’s reflex-
ivity and their consequent positioning in a given social structure medi-
ated by such reflexivity. In this study, I analyse the ways in which thinking, 
feeling and doing care affect people’s doing or undoing difference in their 
everyday lives. More specifically, I provide insights in the ways in which 
they produce gender-based inequality and social exclusion (or equality 
and social inclusion) through an in-depth observation and analysis of dif-
ferent family contexts characterised by the presence of important care 
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responsibilities. Regarded as problematic and changing processes rather 
than static and given categories, I explore care, gender and sexual orienta-
tion within the spectrum of their phenomenological nature and their 
multiple implications in terms of inclusion/exclusion, entitlement and, 
ultimately, citizenship.
Four main components may be prompted to frame a sociological dis-
course on the phenomenon of care: behaviours, feelings, cognitions and 
self-reflexivity; as the experience of care raises simultaneously questions 
about “what I do”, “how I feel”, “what I think” and “who I am”.16 The 
acknowledgment of these multiple dimensions is essential for the analysis 
of care illustrated in this book. The fact that these four components tend 
to be gendered represents an additional challenge for currently accepted 
analytical tools and requires the creation of new, more inclusive theoreti-
cal and methodological approaches in the discussion of care. Overstating 
one of these aspects—for instance, considering care as a “labour of 
love”—reproduces traditional ideologies connected with the romanticisa-
tion and feminisation of care. Taking for granted the ways through which 
women’s and men’s doing care are connected to their feminine and mas-
culine identities encourages ideological falsifications that produce gen-
dered forms of citizenship, in the same way that a taken-for-granted 
heteronormativity reproduces a dual and oppositional logic that should 
instead be discussed.17
Nonetheless, as I will illustrate, the emotional component of care rep-
resents a key element to explain people’s positioning in society, their roles, 
their statuses and also their civil entitlements. Thus, the main focus of this 
book is represented by the interactional dynamics through which the 
experience of care produces outcomes of emotional stratification at the 
micro-level that are reflected at the structural, macro-level. More specifi-
cally, this book illustrates the ways in which the conceptual categories of 
gender, sexual orientation, care and emotion can be more explicitly reframed 
as public processes involving status and power dimensions as well as pri-
vate psychological and emotional processes involving comparable dimen-
sions at a different level. For example, instead of asking what are the effects 
that gender and sexual orientation have on the quality and value society 
attributes to parental care, I asked myself: how do people think of, feel 
about and interact along their parental care experiences, in ways that pro-
duce forms of symbolic, real or felt inequality, whether intended or not?
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 Insignificant Others: The Strategic Importance 
of Gay and Lesbian Parents
Both public and private processes intertwining care, gender and emotion 
produce different levels of inequality based on the different outcomes in 
terms of status, power and emotional dynamics. The next chapter exam-
ines in detail the mechanisms through which this happens. What is 
important to observe here is that, whereas for heterosexual carers such 
processes are played on a level that involves gender and gender related 
inequality in a relatively unambiguous way, in the case of same-sex par-
ents these processes and the idea of inequality involve different aspects 
and dimensions, including the implicit reference to the nuclear family 
template. In fact, this implied standard constitutes a powerful model 
against which a large part of men and women still measure their sense of 
personal worth in our societies.
On the one hand, mainstream literature on care and gender related 
inequality still passionately debates, from different perspectives, the old 
controversial question concerning the balance between work (for the 
market) and (work for the) family for men and women. On the other 
hand, there is the parallel and still relatively invisible context of same-sex 
parents, for whom an additional, fundamental issue is at stake, which is 
that of being acknowledged and valued as fully entitled parents not 
despite their sexual orientation but regardless of it; that is, being acknowl-
edged as fully entitled members of a society which does not discriminate 
its citizens based on the privileges of hegemonic identities or statuses. 
Thus, for all those parents who still do not have sufficient visibility or 
recognition, their right to be acknowledged as fully entitled parents 
embodies a new frontier for civil rights which is not necessarily aligned 
with the agenda and the interests of other parents who, whilst have gained 
visibility and rights, still need to keep fighting to protect them. The stra-
tegic importance of same-sex parents and their inclusion in a study on 
parental care was therefore fundamental for several reasons, as I explained 
in the previous chapter, and as clearly resonates with more recent research 
on same- sex couples and parents (Gabb 2008, 2009; Gabb et al. 2013; 
Gabb and Fink 2015; Hicks 2011; Stacey 2005; Weeks et al. 2001; 
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Weston 1997). Such research, however, tends to discuss same-sex rela-
tionships and parenthood as their specific focus, rather than try to build 
a more inclusive phenomenology of care. Challenging an ideologically 
tainted discourse on parental care and expanding the perspective on it by 
simultaneously getting closer to its complex nature was the intention of 
this book.
In the theoretical framework I illustrate in this book, any form of 
inequality can be visualised in terms of interactive processes constantly 
created and reproduced in concrete settings. The interactionist perspective 
on and the processual view of the reproduction of inequality here illus-
trated allow me to visualise not only the link between agency and struc-
ture but also the link between the individuals’ ongoing interactions across 
time and space. In line with such interactionist perspective, we can visu-
alise how carers’ thinking, feeling and acting vary not only according to 
the ideas, feelings, tools, norms and habits available in the specific and 
real care settings in which they are embedded but also in relation to a 
series of more general and virtual care settings where the carers can only 
anticipate or imagine such ideas, feelings, tools, norms and habits. In 
other words, the (macro-) structural level should not be thought of as an 
overarching entity living a separate and autonomous life but rather as an 
archipelago of micro-situations that create dynamics of status inclusion 
or exclusion and reproduce, through interactive processes, recurrent pat-
terns and conditions of inequality (Schwalbe et al. 2000).
 Inequality as Generic Process: Contextualising 
Inequality into Situated Interaction
The idea that inequality can only be grasped starting from the dynamic 
processes that produce it and that these processes need to be analysed 
directly, in situated action and interaction, is deeply rooted in the 
 interactionist tradition (see also Goffman 1959, 1967). Qualitative 
research discussing the ways in which disparities in power and status, and 
punishment or reward are created and reproduced through interactional 
dynamics suggests several processes whereby dominant and subordinate 
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status groups are defined, including oppressive othering, creation of success-
ful virtual selves, defensive othering among subordinates, subordinate adapta-
tion, boundary maintenance and emotion management (see Schwalbe 
2000). A system of inequality requires a constant presence and combina-
tion of these broad processes, which we now need to describe. The general 
term othering refers to the process by which a dominant group defines a 
subordinate group (Fine 1994). This process implies the creation of cul-
tural scripts that describe what generally characterises the status member-
ship of these categories.18 There can be several forms of othering. Oppressive 
othering is the process whereby one group explicitly and overtly affirms its 
moral and/or intellectual superiority over another group by virtue of a 
difference defined as a deficit. For example, we can think about the 
oppressive othering process produced and imposed by the cultural script 
of the nuclear family on all the unconventional forms of relationships or 
intimacies that are not based on the “package deal”—“marriage and two 
kids”—we mentioned in Chap. 2 (Townsend 2002). The creation of suc-
cessful virtual selves is identity work typically done by élites or would-be 
élites; it entails the creation of powerful public selves that implicitly pro-
duce subordinate others. Among the examples cited in Schwalbe’s article 
(2000), a classic study showing how medical students learn to fashion and 
present a “cloak of competence” to foster impressions of trustworthiness 
and validate their status as physicians. Defensive othering among subordi-
nates occurs when members belonging to a subordinate group seek mem-
bership in a dominant group or try to deflect the stigma they experience 
as members of the subordinate group. A pertinent example, here, may be 
represented by those same-sex families who either explicitly or implicitly 
take a distance from some of the stereotypes typically associated with 
sexual diversity (such as sexual promiscuity or affective instability) and 
embrace positions and life choices that implicitly accept the legitimacy of 
a devalued identity enforced by the dominant group. Subordinate adapta-
tion refers to the different strategies that people endorse to handle their 
subordinate status. For example, there can be a process of adaptation to 
inequality accompanied by a negotiation with the members of the domi-
nant group to derive compensatory benefits, the creation of alternative 
subcultures which allow psychological and emotional needs to be met 
despite subordination, and acquiescence or withdrawal which usually, 
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though not always, have the effect of reproducing inequality. Most strate-
gies of adaptation have been shown to produce opposite outcomes, repro-
ducing some inequalities while challenging others. Boundary maintenance 
refers to the strategies élites perform in order to preserve their dominant 
position and limit the access of the subordinate groups to valued resources. 
Most of these strategies are carried out institutionally (schools, police 
forces, banks, work organisations etc.); however, qualitative research has 
also highlighted three ways in which boundary maintenance is main-
tained through face-to-face interactions, which are transmission of cul-
tural capital, control of access to social networks and use of violence or 
threat thereof. Finally, a system of inequality requires a constant emotion 
management and control of the potentially subverting emotions (anger, 
resentment, envy, jealousy, hopelessness, bitterness etc.) it generates. A 
large body of qualitative research describes people’s face-to-face manage-
ment of emotions and shows how emotional subjectivity can be condi-
tioned in ways that reproduce inequality.19 Hochschild’s (1983) famous 
work on flight attendants and bill collectors is a classic example, where 
the author provides a vivid discussion of “emotion management” as part 
of the public world of modern service occupations.20 Leidner’s analyses of 
the process and impact of routinisation by two organisations that employ 
service workers required to interact directly with customers or clients is 
another one (1993, 1999). By problematising—rather than reifying—the 
boundaries between work and non-work, public and private spheres, and 
masculine and feminine, these authors contribute to a better understand-
ing of the relationships between gender, emotion management, identity 
work and inequality.
The interest in the processes through which dominant and subordinate 
status groups are defined resides not only in their processual and interac-
tional character—which moves us from a description of gender (or other 
social categories) as a reified category to a framework that reveals the 
interactive and dialectical nature of the relationship between dominant 
and subordinate groups—but also in the fact that they can be located in 
specific contexts empirically analysable and interpretable. One might say 
that social interaction is the medium and the specificities of the cultural, 
normative order provide the content of the generic processes of reproduc-
tion of inequalities. Schwalbe et al. (2000) analyse at length some of these 
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processes which they call “generic” because they occur in multiple con-
texts and generate patterns and conditions that are broadly relevant to 
large numbers of people. Their key work provides a useful and compre-
hensive review of the literature on inequality based on qualitative and 
interactionist approaches. These approaches have shown the ways in 
which inequalities are created, the ways social actors can simultaneously 
reproduce or challenge inequalities and the ways by which the relation-
ships between dominant and subordinate status groups are constantly 
negotiated through several forms of complex interaction mediated by 
several variables (class, gender, race/ethnicity, education etc.). 
Nevertheless, there are some missing links in current literature on inequal-
ity and some evident gaps in these approaches which I have tried to fill 
with this book. Among them: (1) the study of inequality as it is repro-
duced or challenged by dominant groups (rather than only by subordi-
nate ones); (2) the problematisation of the concepts of gender, sexuality 
and care and the attempt to understand how multiple systems of inequal-
ity can be related (see also James 1997; Epstein 1997); (3) an inclusive, 
phenomenological approach to the study of care aimed at being compre-
hensive of—rather than at comparing—different types of carers; and (4) 
the study of care in specific, situated and empirical settings, from which 
patterns of inequalities and their generic processes can be identified and 
eventually applied to other settings.
Focusing on the interactional and emotional processes that reproduce 
inequality into specific settings allows us to visualise the conservative forces 
supporting the status quo but also the simultaneous potentialities for 
social change intrinsic to any social categorisation such as gender or sexual 
orientation. Since these social categorisations are not likely to disappear 
soon, we can at least eliminate or substantially reduce the cultural beliefs 
attached to them that reproduce inequality. Thus, for example, if sex cat-
egorisation (gender) is so embedded in social relations and so central to the 
process by which one makes sense of self and other that many men and 
women still have a deep cognitive interest in maintaining a reasonably 
stable framework of gender beliefs, the interactional and emotional pro-
cesses can eradicate cultural beliefs about male rationality and superiority 
or female emotionality and inferiority (see Ridgway and Correll 2000). 
Similarly, if the labelling process through which we distinguish between 
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same-sex and heterosexual parents (or unconventional and conventional 
families) is most likely to persist in the near future, the interactional and 
emotional processes can challenge and erode cultural beliefs about hetero-
sexual parenthood and families as natural and same- sex parenthood and 
families as aberrations of nature.
Contextualising inequality in situated interaction and stressing its dia-
logical and emotional nature allow us to solve many of the theoretical 
issues arising from the reification of gender, sexuality and other social 
categories and to transform them into empirical ones, analysed in specific 
contexts. What needs to be done now is clarifying the central role emo-
tions in the processual and dialogic reproduction of inequality. In the 
next chapter, I first illustrate some of the current perspectives on the soci-
ology of emotions that are specifically connected to the theme of social 
inequality; then, I show how Collins’ Interaction Ritual Model, by locat-
ing the nexus micro-/macro-in emotion and situated action, explains 
inequality in terms of emotional stratification; and finally, I explain the 
dynamics by which care-related inequality and emotional stratification 
can be connected to social inclusion and social change.
Notes
1. It is probably worth noting that when I talk about “gay and lesbian par-
ents” I am not referring to an assumed (and debatable) presence of a 
community of gay and lesbian parents as such, but only to a specific 
subset of people who are involved in important childcare responsibilities 
and who define themselves as gay men and lesbian women. The main 
focus of this book, as mentioned elsewhere, is gay and lesbian parents, 
that is, carers involved in childcare, whose label “gay” and “lesbian” and 
whose belonging/status membership to an alleged gay/lesbian commu-
nity at large are put into question, as we shall see, precisely by their par-
enthood status.
2. This adjective should be intended here in the sense indicated by Jack 
Katz (2001) when he uses the rubric analytic research dropping the refer-
ence to “induction” to signal both his departure from several aspects of 
the tradition of analytic induction and his debt to the tradition’s essential 
guide to research practice. “Analytic field studies will not produce ‘proof,’ 
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i.e. artefacts of evidence which speak in a standard language or  specialised 
fashion about representativeness, reliability, and so forth. […] But ana-
lytic fieldwork does create an elaborate framework which can be used by 
researchers to assess how well they are doing and by readers to make 
evaluations. That framework is a social system, which, applied consis-
tently in field research, will: force the researcher to focus on social pro-
cess as experienced from within; induce research subjects to act toward 
the researcher as a meaningful member of the native world; enfranchise 
readers as colleagues competent to make an independent analysis of the 
relation between data and explanation; and shape a role which subse-
quent researchers can readily take up for testing substantive findings” 
(Katz 2001: 334).
3. The main contribution of a phenomenologically oriented approach to 
qualitative research is twofold. On the one hand, it allows us to use the 
lifeworld as a source of evidence for our enquiries; on the other, it allows 
us to look for good ways of describing the “whatness” (what it is and 
what makes it what it is) of a phenomenon as it appears, so that we may 
better understand its nature, more than to build a whole and exhaustive 
theory.
4. For an overview of possible relationships between care and justice, see 
also Joan Tronto, “Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care”, 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 1987, vol. 12, no. 4: 
644–663, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, 
New  York, Routledge, 1993; Virginia Held (Ed.) Justice and Care, 
Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1995; Diemut Bubeck, Care, Gender, 
and Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995; Robin West, Caring for 
Justice, New  York, New  York University Press, 1997; Nel Noddings, 
Caring, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2003 
(1984); Sara Ruddick, “Care as Labor and Relationship”, in Haber and 
Halfon (Eds.) Norms and Values, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
1998, 3–25.
5. She defined this “mystique” as the worthlessness women feel in roles that 
require them to be financially, intellectually and emotionally dependent 
upon their husbands. Through her findings, Friedan hypothesised that 
women are victims of a false belief system that requires them to find 
identity and meaning in their lives through their husbands and 
children.
3 The End of Inequality as We Know It
a.pratesi@chester.ac.uk
 59
6. See Carol Gilligan, “In a Different Voice: Women’s Conceptions of Self 
and of Morality”, Harvard Educational Review 47, no. 4: 431–46; In a 
Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982.
7. On this, see also Abel and Nelson (1990), and Fisher and Tronto (1990).
8. “The possibility that an ethic of care might lead to the reinforcement of 
existing social patterns also raises the question of relativism. It is difficult 
to imagine how an ethic of care could avoid the charge that it would 
embody different moral positions in different societies and at different 
times. […] The only way an ethic of care could entirely bypass the charge 
of relativism would be to posit some caring relationships, for example, 
the relationship of parent and child, as universal. This path, however, 
seems fraught with even greater difficulties for feminist scholars and pre-
judges in an unacceptably narrow way who ‘caretakers’ should be. […] 
The only other way to resolve this problem is to specify how social insti-
tutions might be arranged to expand these conventional understandings 
of the boundaries of care. Thus, the legitimacy of an ethic of care will 
depend on the adequacy of the social and political theory of which it is 
a part” (Tronto 1987: 661).
9. Distributive justice is concerned with the normative principles designed 
to guide the fair allocation of the benefits, resources and burdens among 
diverse members of a community. Fair allocation typically takes into 
account the total amount of goods to be distributed, the distributing 
procedure and the patterns of distribution that result.
10. Bubeck disagrees with those Marxists who claim that it is primarily the 
capitalist who benefits from women’s household work. She also finds 
limited and limiting those feminist scholars who argue that it is hus-
bands who benefit. Rather, it is all men who benefit from women’s 
unpaid work, she maintains. We need to look at care as work, she says, 
in which women engage and are exploited. Therefore, care is most of all 
an exploitative practice. This is why Bubeck is less sympathetic to those 
feminist accounts, such as Noddings’ (1984) which, by overlooking the 
exploitative nature of care, reinscribe its oppressive functions.
11. The gender strategy encompasses a course of action informed by cultural 
messages regarding notions of “maleness” and “femaleness”, as well as the 
emotion work one does in pursuing a course of action.
12. An interesting, early exception in the panorama of works on American 
families and relationships is represented by Blumstein and Schwartz’s 
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American Couples (1983), which is a book about how the challenges of 
conventional marriages can be better understood through the study of 
unconventional families. This pioneering book was the result of an 
impressive large-scale survey of four types of couples: married, cohabit-
ing, heterosexual, gay and lesbian, which is remarkable for that time. By 
comparing these groups, the authors investigated the influence of gender 
(or its lack thereof ) on couple interactions and compared married cou-
ples with couples in unconventional relationships. However, the lack of 
an explicit theory and the lack of reference to prior work on family, 
gender and sexuality make the authors’ comparative comments some-
how difficult to interpret.
13. For a review of the literature criticising the role of domesticity in per-
petuating and reinforcing class and racial hierarchies among women, see 
Joan Williams, Unbending Gender, (2000).
14. Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter, (1993: 137).
15. The ethic of care should be situated in the context of existing political 
and social order. Social and political institutions that constitute the con-
text of moral actors should be clearly specified each time. “Perhaps the 
most important characteristic of an ethic of care is that, within it, moral 
situations are defined not in terms of rights and responsibilities but in 
terms of relationships of care. The morally mature person understands 
the balance between caring for the self and caring for others. The per-
spective of care requires that conflict be worked out without damage to 
the continuing relationships. Moral problems can be expressed in terms 
of accommodating the needs of the self and of others, of balancing com-
petition and cooperation, and of maintaining the social web of relations 
in which one finds oneself ” (Tronto 1987: 658).
16. On the multiple implications of care, see also Leira (1994), Graham 
(1983) and Hochschild (1990); on the complex nature of emotions as 
both self-reflective actions and experiences, see Katz (1999).
17. “We even construct biological sex—whether one is male or female—in 
terms of opposites—‘the opposite sex’—setting up the sexes to be com-
pletely different and as potentially in conflict with each other. This is a 
social priority, NOT something that is naturally occurring. While the 
sexes may be different, they are not, in fact, opposite. The reality is that 
neither sexuality nor biological sex is made up of opposites; yet, our dom-
inant meaning system imposes that structure. These are both examples of 
thinking straight—thinking in terms of opposites and polarities when 
none exist and naturalizing social practices and beliefs rather than seeing 
them as social, political, and economic creations” (Ingraham 2005: 2).
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18. Michelle Fine (1994) highlights how sociological research is often impli-
cated in the process of othering. When researchers define a group or type 
of people as objects of curiosity and targets of study, the unconscious 
subtext may be that “these people are interesting because they are differ-
ent from us”. To focus attention on a group in this way—that is, from 
the implicit standpoint of the dominant culture—is, in effect, to con-
tribute to their continued othering (Schwalbe 2000). This is the reason 
why I emphasise, from the outset, that the main focus of this study is the 
“carer” (with no attributes) and his/her emotions. However, for the sake 
of clarity, I am obliged to use the labels same-sex parents and heterosex-
ual parents, female and male carers and so on and, by doing this, I some-
how contribute to the othering process.
19. For a review of the literature on how people manage their own and oth-
ers’ emotions in interaction, see also Smith-Lovin (1995), Turner (2002, 
2004) and Turner and Stets (2005).
20. In other works, Hochschild (1979, 1989) describes the feeling rules and 
emotion ideologies that, by specifying how individuals should feel in a 
given situation and compelling individuals to do emotion management, 
benefit the privileged and reinforce the subordinate positioning of the 
disadvantaged. In any social situation, individuals must engage in emo-
tion management to adapt the presentation of self to emotion ideologies, 
feeling rules and display rules about appropriate attitudes and emotional 
responses in basic spheres of activity. As a general rule, the higher the 
social status, the more attention is paid to one’s own feelings; the lower 
the social status, the more likely one is to manage emotions in the service 
of someone of higher status. In addressing the relationships between 
gender, social class and emotion management, Hochschild points out 
one of the contrasts that could be interpreted as an important compo-
nent for the analysis of what I have called doing care as well as a further 
justification for the focus of this study on upper/middle class carers. The 
author claims that “More emotion management goes on in the families and 
jobs of the upper classes than in those of the lower classes. That is, in the class 
system, social conditions conspire to make it more prevalent at the top. In the 
gender system, on the other hand, the reverse is true: social conditions make 
it more prevalent, and prevalent in different ways, for those at the bottom—
women. […] The reason, at bottom, is the fact that women in general have 
far less independent access to money, power, authority, or status in society” 
(Hochschild 1983: 162–163).
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4
Macro-Structural Relevance of Emotions
The study of emotions in everyday life helps remedy the failure of the social 
and psychological sciences to appreciate the hidden sensual and aesthetic 
foundations of the self.
Jack Katz
 Emotions as the Interface Between Micro 
and Macro
Emotions have historically had a varied position and role in both social 
processes and social theory. The sociology of emotions as a distinctive 
and structured area of inquiry is relatively recent. Although over a hun-
dred years ago Émile Durkheim identified the crucial role of emotions 
in producing the glue that underlies moral solidarity (Collins 1990: 
27), it was not until the late 1970s that sociologists re- discovered emo-
tions and undertook their systematic study (Heise 1977; Hochschild 
1975, 1979, 1983; Scheff 1979, 1983, 1990, 2003; Collins 1975, 
1981, 1984, 2004; Kemper 1978, 1990; Shott 1979). Ironically 
enough, showing “that a sociologically robust understanding of  emotion 
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makes good sense” (Barbalet 2001: 12) did not seem to require such a 
massive effort to the early sociological theorists as it does today. 
Sociologists within the classic sociological tradition, such as Parsons, 
Weber and even Marx and Engels, did not conceptualise emotion 
explicitly, but implied it in their models (Collins 1990). Major sociolo-
gists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (including Durkheim, 
Pareto, Tönnies, Elias and Simmel) had already highlighted the explan-
atory role of emotions in sociology in various ways.
Today, emotions still do not form a natural class of events with suffi-
cient functional specificity and unity to justify a single concept. After a 
long history of debates about their classification, emotions have come to 
form a quite heterogeneous group. Various conditions and states have 
been included in the category for different reasons and on different 
grounds, against the background of shifting contrasts. However, most 
scholars now agree on a broad definition of emotions as complex phe-
nomena that usually involve (not always simultaneously) neurophysiolog-
ical and neurochemical changes, cognitive and motivational appraisals of 
a situational stimulus or context, display of expressive gestures or behav-
iours and cultural labelling processes. Labels like sentiments, feelings, affect, 
moods and emotions are used rather loosely,1 and more than a terminologi-
cal ambiguity is involved in these definitional problems: diverse uses of 
terms often parallel important disagreements between and within differ-
ent disciplines and paradigms over what emotions are and how they arise.
Terminological disagreements and conflicting interpretations of emo-
tions notwithstanding, some of the most original contributions in the 
sociology of emotions have challenged the traditional resistance of soci-
ologists to attribute to emotions an explanatory role, establishing impor-
tant links between the emergence and maintenance of social structures 
and their interplay with agency and its emotional processes. In these theo-
retical perspectives, emotions become a crucial link between the micro- 
and macro-levels of social reality (Barbalet 2001; Kemper 1978, 1990; 
Gordon 1990; Hammond 1990; Lawler 2001; Scheff 1990, 1997; Collins 
1981, 1984, 1990, 1993, 2004; Smith-Lovin 1990; Summers-Effler 
2004; Stryker 2004; Turner 1999b; Turner and Stets 2005).2 Moreover, 
whereas previous sociological discussion of emotions has typically stressed 
pathological manifestations of emotions and their negative consequences, 
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the explanatory role these scholars attribute to emotions shows instead 
the centrality of emotions to the routine processes at the basis of “normal” 
structures of social interaction and highlights the positive and crucial 
function of emotions not only to explain people’s behaviour and social 
order but also to set the possibilities for social change. It seems now widely 
accepted that rational choice, as we traditionally understand it, can hardly 
explain people’s means-ends oriented behaviour. A more explicit under-
standing of the crucial importance of emotions, not only as mere intimate 
subjective experiences but also as social processes that produce different 
outcomes in terms of status and power dimensions, has been gradually 
emerging in recent years thanks to the work of micro- and macro-theo-
rists such as Collins, Hammond, Hochschild, Thoits, Smith-Lovin, 
Summers-Effler, Heise, Clark and several others (for a complete collec-
tion of sociological theories on emotions see Kemper 1990; Turner and 
Stets 2005; Stets and Turner 2014).
This more realistic and less romanticised understanding of emotions has 
emerged in other disciplines as well, notably psychology, and its implica-
tions have been increasingly studied and applied in contexts beyond the 
sphere of privacy and intimacy. Understanding the centrality of emotions 
in the everyday dynamics of social processes does not mean denying the 
existence or the relevance of macro-concepts (such as material entities and 
status group ranking) that perpetuate social inequality, but rather ground-
ing them in the everyday interactions across time and space. In other words, 
this means micro-translating them (Collins 1990) and then observing and 
analysing them in their most elementary forms. It is like reducing a math-
ematical expression or fraction to its lowest terms, or, in our specific con-
text, using a magnifying glass to get a closer look at the less visible rationales 
and implications of care that no statistical inquiry can illuminate.
 Inconsistencies Between Attitudes 
and Practices: Is Gender Enough?
Thus conceptualised, emotions reframe radically the phenomenon of 
care: they allow a better understanding of the care experience by which 
the carers define themselves and their statuses as carers. The constant 
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changes in the cultural scripts defining what “a good carer” is or should 
be—with all their implications—develop in various, non-fixed ways and 
require a counter-discourse on gender and, particularly, on men and mas-
culinities.3 When we look at recent research on family care in Western 
societies, a contradictory picture of the characteristics of men’s and wom-
en’s behaviours within the family emerges. On the one hand, women are 
primarily expected to reconcile dilemmas between paid work, care work 
and domestic chores. On the other hand, there is a growing disposition 
of some men to assume larger amounts of responsibility for child rearing 
and/or other care-related tasks which possibly correspond to cultural 
contexts where both partners are increasingly expected to play equal roles. 
Nonetheless, the longing for equality remains too often a desire or an 
ideal, and women still meet several forms of resistance to translate it into 
a reality. Although many of the cultural norms underlying the gender 
contract are changing and recent social policy has become more informed 
in their attempt to reconcile work and care with an eye on gender issues, 
this has not resulted in a direct and substantial redistribution of burden 
sharing in the context of family practices. To put it in Furstenberg’s 
words, “it is still possible that fathers in the recent past did more than 
they got credit for and today do less than we like to think” (1988: 207).
One of the seeming contradictions that conventional sociological and 
economic theories can barely explain is the inconsistency between the 
actual and perceived distribution of care tasks: while women do the 
majority of unpaid care, both men and women claim to take equal parts. 
In many cases, carers do not perceive the unequal participation as intoler-
able and the fact that the total amount of care work still affects women’s 
participation in the labour market more strongly than that of their male 
partners is often justified on the basis or rational choice and/or practical 
issues such as who has more time, who earns more and who has a more 
flexible or rigid work schedule. But something more complex than ratio-
nal choice is involved in the decision-making processes at the basis of 
work and care arrangements. In trying to explain these contradictions, 
Duncan talks of grey areas that “become the site of new conflict and, pos-
sibly, the origin of transition to another overall contract. The gender sys-
tem will therefore show major variations in space and time, both with 
regards to the nature of the gender contract and to its rigidity” (Duncan 
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1995: 271). On a micro-level, Duncan maintains, each household prob-
ably has its own particular grey areas in which people make big and small 
changes to their care arrangements and/or gender contracts; on a macro- 
level, structural changes may help either to shade these areas or to make 
them more pronounced. The gender contract, then, assumes particularly 
harsh tones and shades under neoliberal times characterised by growing 
economic inequalities, reduction in workers’ rights, lower wages, privati-
sations and welfare cuts (Esping-Andersen 1990/2013; Lewis 1997; Young 
2000; Scharff 2014).
However, these considerations leave out those carers who do not nego-
tiate their work and care arrangements on the basis of gender, either 
because they are not in a couple (single parents/carers) or because they are 
not in a heterosexual couple (same-sex parents). As I have mentioned 
earlier in this book, one of the important issues addressed in this study 
concerns the necessity to overcome the dichotomist ideology characteris-
ing past and current debates on gender and care, and to look for less 
biased ways of thinking about women and men within and outside tradi-
tional family contexts. Ruddick reminds us that “men can participate in 
every aspect of mothering except lactation; both women and men can 
perform paternal functions” (Ruddick 1998: 14). Perhaps if we focus on 
individual, contextual and situational care relationships rather than on 
“assumed” differences in parental work, we can extend our understanding 
of care. In this sense, placing several models of care and housework allo-
cation side by side discloses significant insights, including those models 
that cannot be gender-based for the simple reason that they are composed 
of people of the same sex or just of one single carer. And yet, this does not 
clarify why men and women accept a gender imbalanced distribution of 
tasks and responsibilities in heterosexual couples.
The problem, then, can be perhaps addressed by: (a) analysing how the 
above-mentioned grey areas are built up and negotiated within the context 
of a diverse, heterogeneous sample of carers which includes carers who do 
not negotiate their care arrangements on the basis of gender; (b) under-
standing the real and multifaceted implications of doing care in terms of 
social inequality; and, above all, (c) shedding light on the less visible ratio-
nales of care that lie beyond the allocation of care responsibilities, regardless 
of people’s sex or sexual orientation. In short, and paraphrasing Katz (1999), 
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the question gets translated into explaining what it is that, being itself invis-
ible, is responsible for all that is visible (1999: 2). Emotions, I claim in this 
book, represent the missing link which explains the factual and essential 
dynamics by which inequality is situationally reproduced beyond the rigid 
and reifying concepts of gender and sexual orientation.
 Social Stratification as Unequal Distribution 
of Emotional Energy
The Interaction Ritual model (Collins 2004) allows us to overcome many 
of the problems left unsolved by current literature on care and gender.4 
Starting from the consideration that the complex contingencies of social 
structures cannot be always calculated rationally, Collins proposes that 
the essential mechanism holding society together has an emotional nature 
rather than a merely cognitive one. Its theory suggests that emotions are 
the common denominator of rational action because rationality depends on 
assessing the utility of (i.e. the capacity to confer positive affect to) alter-
natives lines of conduct (1993, 2004). The rational actor perspective, 
Collins says, collides with a number of troubles: first, with a whole series 
of behaviours that do not fit with cost/benefit analysis; second, with the 
absence of a common metric that allows actors to compare costs and ben-
efits across whatever range of situations they may encounter; third, with 
the simple evidence that people are not all the time compulsively obsessed, 
cold-blood calculators.
The Interaction Ritual model (2004) is a theory of how persons choose 
to interact in any given situation or encounter. Collins’ main argument 
can be summarised by looking at two orienting points: first, the centre of 
micro-sociological explanation is not the individual but the situation.5 
Collins’ theory is above all a theory of situations and interactions. It is a 
theory of momentary encounters among human bodies charged up with 
emotions and consciousness because they have gone through chains of 
previous encounters. This is not to say that the individual does not exist; 
but an individual is not simply a body, it is an emotionally charged body 
whose present, past and future features are determined by the contextual 
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dynamics of situations and interactions. The second orienting point is the 
term ritual, to be interpreted in a Durkheimian and Goffmanian sense. 
Ritual is a mechanism of mutually focused emotion and attention occur-
ring during an interaction and producing a momentarily shared reality.
Every interaction generates status and power effects: successful interac-
tions combine a high degree of mutual focus of attention, that is, a high 
degree of intersubjectivity, together with a high degree of emotional attun-
ement, and produce feelings of membership or group solidarity, that is, 
there are not unbalances between the interactants in terms of status and 
power. Collins describes this sense of status membership in terms of emo-
tional energy (EE), which is similar to the psychological concept of drive 
but with a specific social orientation: it is a long-lasting emotion that 
builds up across situations and makes individuals initiate or fail to insti-
gate interactions; it is “a feeling of confidence and enthusiasm for social 
interaction” (Collins 2004: 108). On the other hand, unsuccessful inter-
actions are those interactions in which there is no boundedness, there is 
not a real focus of attention, there are differences in terms of power and 
status of the two interactants and, above all, there is not an emotional 
attunement. Unsuccessful interactions produce feelings of status exclusion, 
withdrawal for action and interaction and negative emotional states. EE 
is thus both the ingredient and the outcome of the interaction. People’s 
choices, behaviours and decisions regarding daily-life issues are in fact 
based on their emotional outcomes and inputs; and people’s chance to 
gain or lose EE is affected by their (perceived sense of ) power and status 
membership. To sum up: emotion-oriented behaviour is produced by a 
social mechanism, the dynamics of interaction rituals (IRs); emotional 
solidarity with a group (status membership) is the primary good in a suc-
cessful social interaction and EE is a measurable, physiological analogue 
to the concept of utility; the interaction ritual engenders a variable level 
of EE in each individual that operates as the common denominator for 
choosing different courses of action or behaviour; the cognitive process is 
“micro-situated” in the short-run of the immediate interaction, or better, 
“the individual thinking is determined by the emotional energy and the 
cognitive symbols generated by IRs” (Collins 1993: 205).
The idea of a market for interaction rituals represents an important 
link with rational choice theory. Individuals invest in rituals according to 
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the amount of EE they may dispose of, the availability of collective sym-
bols, and the other ingredients that allow for a successful interaction. 
Decisions regarding the balance between daily-life issues such as leisure 
and work, and other similar categories are in fact based on the emotional 
outcomes (see also Smith-Lovin 1993). This is undoubtedly a significant 
theoretical advance. The manifestly unrealistic characterisation of human 
motivation portrayed by economists and rational choice theorists, who 
define rationality as the efficient pursuit of self-interested preferences, is 
reframed in a theoretical model in which preferences are oriented around 
the production of EE. “Comparing” or “choosing”, Collins maintains, 
may be merely metaphorical. Most of the time persons do not consciously 
calculate what they are going to do, but since EE can be felt, as either an 
emotional attraction or lack thereof, individuals make emotionally ori-
ented choices also unconsciously. EE is the benchmark of all choices and 
the attractiveness between alternative options is assessed in terms of the 
amount of EE they respectively carry and perceived accordingly either as 
a gain or as a loss of EE. “Power, altruism, love, and every other social 
goal is measured by the same yardstick, the increment or decrement that 
the interactional process involved in it produces for one’s emotional 
energy” (Collins 2004: 172). Privilege, power, and status are not “simply 
a result of unequal material and cultural resources. It is a flow of emo-
tional energy across situations that makes some individuals more impres-
sive, more attractive or dominant; [and puts] other persons in their 
shadow, narrowing their sources of emotional energy to the alternatives 
of participating as followers or being relegated passively to the sidelines” 
(Collins 2004: xiii). Thus, in Collins’ model, the level of emotional 
energy becomes a clear and sensitive indicator of social position. “There 
is no sharp distinction between material markets and the market for emo-
tional payoffs in IRs; these are all motivated by emotional energy- seeking” 
(Collins 2004: xv). In other words, within such a model, people’s deci-
sions and choices circuit in the loop of the EE production and we can 
think about social stratification as an unequal distribution of EE rather 
than a mere unequal distribution of material resources or social positions. 
Along with that, we can empirically visualise (and perhaps measure) 
social stratification through a careful analysis of how emotional stratifica-
tion is enacted in micro-interactions.
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 Internal Conversations and Permanent Visitors
Not all interactions are successful and, among those interactions that do 
succeed in evoking a common reality of shared symbols, “some produce 
a feeling of egalitarian membership among the interactants, while others 
produce feelings of rank differences, including feelings of authority and 
subordination” (Collins 1993: 999). Though “relationality” and “being in 
relation” represent the ontological foundation of every individual, within 
the context of care the mutual acknowledgment of the relation as a caring 
relation from both caregiver and care-receiver appears to be an essential 
condition for the existence of the relation as such (Noddings 1984 [2003]). 
In other words, we cannot validate ourselves as a person who cares just by 
claiming or thinking “I care”. If the care-receiver does not perceive, 
acknowledge or feel my caring concern or activity, the care relation does 
not exist. Most importantly, we define our identity as caregivers through 
a constant dialogue with an entire complex of real or imaginary gener-
alised others. In order to be successful, the care relation must be acknowl-
edged by the subject caregiver, the care-receiver and a variety of generalised 
others.
One of the most significant features of the epistemological approach I 
illustrate in this book lies in shifting the focus of attention from the more 
visible relationship between caregiver and care-receiver to the less evident 
relationship between caregiver and generalised other. We can look at care 
activities as chains of interactions. The specific kind of interaction I focus 
on is the constant internal dialogue between the subject caregiver and a 
whole network of generalised others or what Norbert Wiley (1994) calls 
permanent visitors, that is, all those people who are variably present in our 
thoughts and with whom we are in a constant internal conversation.6 
Within the context of parental care, the acknowledgment of the care rela-
tionship of both the subject caregiver and these generalised others is an 
essential condition to give visibility and entitlement to the status of par-
ent and to confer to this latter a sense of belonging to what I shall call 
here the intangible community of legitimate and successful parents.
During their constant internal dialogue with all these permanent visi-
tors, all parents—regardless of their gender and sexual orientation—
wonder about the quality of their parental care and constantly verify or 
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disconfirm their status membership to such intangible community. Am I 
a good/successful parent? Am I acknowledged as a legitimate and successful 
parent?—the parents ask themselves. But when it comes to same-sex par-
ents, issues of acknowledgment, belonging and entitlement become more 
stringent: Will I be acknowledged as a legitimate, “fully entitled” and success-
ful parent? Heteronormative definitions of parenthood constantly repro-
duced and conveyed by different types of permanent visitors (media, 
peers, families, institutions etc.) shape who is eligible or not to the status 
of fully entitled, legitimate and successful parent. As a consequence, and 
even before enquiring about the goodness or the quality of their parental 
practices, same-sex parents need to confirm or disconfirm their status 
inclusion or membership to a wider imagined/intangible community of 
legitimate and fully entitled parents.
Status membership, or status inclusion—in Collins’ theoretical 
model—is the criterion which defines whether an interaction is success-
ful or not, and therefore whether there is an increase or a decrease in the 
supplies of EE, with consequent effects in terms of social inequality. The 
outcomes of the parents’ inner dialogues with their “permanent visitors” 
determine the emotional stratification at the origin of inequality.7 The 
internal processes of thinking and feeling parental care and the ongoing 
process of reflexivity are what mostly make the difference in terms inclu-
sion or exclusion. Parental care, therefore, is not only about tending to or 
caring for someone but it also involves significant consequences in terms 
of status inclusion/exclusion, entitlement and citizenship. Without 
 necessarily being aware of it, all parents participate in this invisible pro-
cess of inclusion/exclusion through their care activities. The difference—
and therefore inequality—connected to parental care is thus redefined as 
a difference between those who are deemed to be “fully entitled” to it and 
those who are not. Parenthood, thus, becomes a crucial site to observe the 
unceasing reproduction of emotional stratification that is at the basis of 
social inequality.
Within the continuum which in Collins’ model goes from formalised 
and strongly focused to informal and relatively unfocused interactions, I 
am mostly referring here to the informal and less focused interactions, 
which clearly define those individual reputations that in our societies are 
becoming increasingly more important than categorical identities.8 More 
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precisely, the problem is connected with the seemingly irreconcilable 
incongruity between the following statements:
 – I care for and I feel responsible for the care of ABC.
 – To feel confident that I am an adequate and successful parent, I need to 
belong to the intangible community of entitled and successful parents, 
which means to be visible as a fully entitled parent and acknowledged 
as such by a whole set of generalised others.
 – I am not visible as a fully entitled and successful parent and acknowl-
edged as such by a whole set of generalised others.
Reconciling any two of these statements entails the negation of the 
remaining one, and none of them alone is sufficient to contradict any of 
the other two. The discrepancy can be resolved by eliminating any of the 
three statements. In other words, it is not by adding something that one 
can solve the problem but rather by getting rid of it: at least one of the 
three statements must go. The negation of the first statement (“I care 
about someone”) is relatively straightforward in principle but less plau-
sible in practice. It is certainly possible that people just “do not care”, in 
the sense that either they do not have care responsibilities or they do not 
take them on seriously. The “I do not care” position automatically 
deprives the other two statements of their own meaning and substance. 
Yet, due to the ongoing socio-demographic changes we all know, it is 
quite unlikely that any of us will find themselves without any form of 
care responsibility at all throughout the course of our entire life. The 
rejection of the second statement (“I need other people’s acknowledg-
ment to perceive and live my status as a fully entitled and successful par-
ent”) is connected to people’s level of freedom from social conventions or 
spoken and unspoken social norms; what sociologists call the invisible 
strings. There are certainly individuals who are more able than others to 
free themselves from orthodoxy and conformism. The position of such 
exceptions could be summarised as follows: “I consider myself as a fully 
entitled, legitimate and successful parent even though I am not acknowl-
edged as such by a whole set of generalized others”. However, decades of 
sociological thought and research have provided copious evidence about 
the multiple mechanisms through which social control and conformism 
are constantly reproduced. It is quite implausible to imagine parents who 
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have never asked themselves whether they belonged or not to what I have 
called the intangible community of legitimate, fully entitled and success-
ful parents. Thus, the negation of the second statement is thus undoubt-
edly possible but, again, highly improbable, at least in its most radical 
terms. Finally, the exclusion of the last statement (“A whole set of general-
ized others does not acknowledge, validate and/or give visibility to my 
status as a fully entitled, legitimate and successful parent”) is certainly the 
most difficult one among all the three negations. It entails, in fact, a cul-
tural change and therefore requires time.
 Status Inclusion and Exclusion: Some Examples
Care and parenthood can be lived by everybody as experiences of either 
inclusion or exclusion regardless of people’s gender, marital status or sex-
ual orientation. One belongs to the community of parents and conse-
quently feels excluded from other groups or communities such as, for 
example, the groups of single friends or childless couples with different 
lifestyles, or the community of successful colleagues who are mostly 
career-oriented and whose achievements, profiles and CV records are 
higher, and so on and so forth. But, at the same time, one can experience 
the nice feeling of joining a sort of exclusive club which possesses its own 
advantages and benefits. Meredith, a married mother of two, gives here a 
clear example of the seductive power exercised by the exclusive club of 
parents.9 She seems somehow annoyed by her friend’s joke about that; 
but, simultaneously, she emphasises the enormous importance, both for 
her and her husband, of being included in the exclusive club:
R:  Oh, completely, completely, and they’re explicit about it, yeah. I 
have a friend who said, welcome to the club, welcome to the club. 
[Laughter] Yeah. And I resented it at the time, I thought, well, that’s 
just ridiculous, you know, that I’d somehow become something 
completely different.
I: There’s a club of parents?
R: Yeah, yeah.
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I: Of working parents.
R:  Yeah, yeah, and it does seem kind of exclusive when you’re on the out-
side. I mean especially because we had the experience of infertility so 
we desperately wanted to be on the inside, you know. I think it is dif-
ferent for people who choose not to have children.
Interestingly enough, a similar concept is expressed by Karen, whose 
experience of parenthood induces a sense of belonging to the club of 
parents but, at the same time, changes the way she looks at and under-
stands the world around her, producing a radical change in the way she 
perceives herself:
I think that the way you look at things changes when you become a parent. 
I mean I think there’s—it’s one of those things because I became a parent 
at 41, I feel like I now can say, ohhhh, there this thing that everybody who’s 
a parent just sort of knows or they—it’s like this—this isn’t a good analogy, 
really, but it’s kind of like this club and people just all have this common 
knowledge and I wasn’t part of that. Not that I cared, but I wasn’t part of 
that. And then, when I had a child, I started to sort of understand things 
in a different way.
In the following emotionally intense excerpt, Olivia highlights the 
typical dilemma most working women face as she talks about her border-
line position torn between career and care. At the time of the interview, 
her daughter was five months old and Stacey predicted that, in the near 
future, she would have probably been the one who would have stepped 
back from her professional ambitions. The sense of impending exclusion 
that she was feeling during the interview is expressed by her recurring use 
of words such as “loss”, “pressure” and “sacrifice”. Quite interestingly, 
although at the end of the quotation she does not miss the opportunity 
to emphasise her disappointment about recent statistics on the gender 
career gap, she also describes her husband’s frustration, as if they were 
both inescapably trapped in an economic system which does not leave 
much room for negotiating shared care responsibilities when “his earning 
potential is higher” than hers:
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And I think there’s a loss, I think the loss for a man and the loss for a 
woman—well, again, you can’t generalize and this is gonna sound really 
sexist, but once, you know, John and I want to keep things sort of equal but 
then once you have the baby you realize that—right now his earning 
potential is higher, and so on a practical level whose career is gonna suffer? 
It makes more sense for mine to, doesn’t it, given that I am sort of tied up 
anyway with the breastfeeding and given that he has more earning poten-
tial. So then there’s pressure on him to make money, whereas if we don’t 
have a baby there’s no pressure on him to make money. So I think he loses 
that in the sense that there’s that pressure. And there’s a pressure on me 
both to make money but then also to be, you know, what kind of mother 
you want to be. And even if, okay, do you want to be one of those mothers 
who just is like okay, I’m not gonna let this stop me at all, you know, I’m 
just gonna have a very—my career, whatever, isn’t gonna suffer a bit because 
of the baby. Well, that’s impossible—if that doesn’t suffer, something does 
because if you’re doing both then you’re either sacrificing your leisure time, 
your family time, your… I don’t know, whatever it is, you can’t make up 
time. There’s only a limited amount of hours and so the amount of hours 
you have to spend on things before you had the baby you probably felt 
busy, then, once you have the baby, it’s, you know. So there’s always some 
loss somewhere, it’s got to come from something. […] I mean there’s no 
reason why—what is the statistic, like 66 percent of men tenured have 
children and 33 percent of women do—there’s some statistic like that. 
Sure, I mean yeah, of course the man is favoured.
Dynamics of inclusion and exclusion fluctuate and quite often overlap 
one another for most of the parents I met, making it difficult to establish 
clear-cut profiles. Yet, supposedly, same-sex parents may be expected to 
experience parental care as a site of status exclusion in a more prescriptive 
and rigid way than their heterosexual counterparts. In fact, heteronorma-
tive10 assumptions about the family and, in particular, the nuclear family, 
still provide a powerful cultural script to cast in people’s minds a series of 
generalised others with whom they engage in internal conversations. In 
the following case, for example, Curtis, father of a nine-month-old son 
and manager of a large corporation, visibly points out a typical dilemma 
originating from the double-bind situation of “being gay” and simultane-
ously “wanting a family”:
4 Macro-Structural Relevance of Emotions
a.pratesi@chester.ac.uk
 77
One of the reasons I didn’t want to be gay was I wanted a family, you know, 
I was like I want to—I had this picture of my life and it always involved 
kids.
Similarly, Jerry and Clayton describe here their adolescent experience 
of exclusion from the people who could marry and have children because 
of their sexual orientation. Interestingly enough, what was initially per-
ceived as a limitation became eventually the motivation to build up a 
different type of family, a more extended and open-ended family which 
also includes close friends:
Jerry:  When we talk about family, there’s of course the blood family, 
there’s family by genetics, but we also have a lot of friends that we 
refer to as family. In fact, even before our son was born we referred 
to them as the aunts and uncles. And, really, they’re not true 
uncles and aunts by blood line, but they’re an important part of 
the extended family. And I think that growing up gay, you know, 
when I was a child and a teenager, I didn’t realize that marriage 
and family was going to be possible. In fact, this would be some-
thing that wouldn’t happen because of, because I was made gay. 
And so early on I always kind of, my family was whoever was 
with me, friends as well as real family. Are you agreeing? He’s 
agreeing. [Baby speaking]
Later in the interview, Jerry and Clayton describe a deeper sense of 
exclusion stemming from the total absence of legal protection of their 
rights as parents and, even more fundamentally, as a couple. “People are 
much more ahead of the social reality than our legal institutions”—they 
claim. However, during their experience as an unconventional couple, 
they also met people who made it problematic for them even to buy a 
house:
Jerry:  […] but the reality of the laws in this country today are there are 
a lot of places that if we defined legally which one of us was the 
sperm donor, the other one, the other of us would lose rights, I 
mean some serious rights. […] And if the genetic identified 
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father died, the child would go to an orphanage, right. I mean, 
so for that reason we have just said it’s okay, we just, we will stay 
in that grey area undefined and when we’re undefined […] it’s a 
strange thing. I think people are much more ahead of the social 
reality than our legal institutions. And even in places where the 
laws are just completely against us, I think that when we intro-
duce ourselves as people, we have never been treated unfairly. It 
was scary a few times. […] I don’t want to get into a long story 
because I talk too much, but when we were looking for houses, 
there were times that, because we were gay, we were discrimi-
nated against. Not a doubt in our mind. One time we made the 
highest offer for a house and they took the next lowest offer. They 
did not take our offer of cash. We were pre-approved, everything 
was done, there was no question that we could afford the house. 
They bypassed on our offer and went to the next lowest. And 
another house we walked in, and when the woman saw who 
walked in the house, she freaked out. She came running in the 
house, she ordered us to leave. It was just a, it was a mess. So we 
knew this was necessary, we need laws like this until society and 
the reality can catch up.
Homophobia and forms of more or less patent discrimination based 
on people’s sexual orientation are still widespread both in Europe and in 
the USA, where this study was originally conducted. In the following 
example, Leila, mother of two children, highlights an interesting paradox 
which, she thinks, may be typical of the United States. Talking about the 
gender stereotypes and the typical two-opposite-sex-parents model of 
family, she concludes that the social status of single parents is probably at 
the lowest levels in the symbolic hierarchy of valued and respected fami-
lies/parents. Although still strongly stigmatised, she maintains, same-sex 
parents are better served than single parents:
And I think once you get out into the sort of broader Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania and US I think it shifts a little bit. I think there still is a, well, 
that’s a really hard question to generalise. I think that, on a broader level, 
there are significant forces that think that, you know, women should stay 
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home with kids. So the paradigm’s a little bit different because, you know, 
people would look at us and think oh, we both should be staying home 
with the kids [laughter]. But I think the work aspect sort of in the broader 
society, I think someone is expected to work and that it is still pretty much 
a dual, two-part equation so that within a couple, you know, there’s big 
pressure, it should definitely be a couple. We don’t like single parents in 
this country. And we don’t really like gay parents either but, you know, it’s 
probably better than a single parent [laughter].
In the next excerpt, Glenn highlights a more noticeable and challeng-
ing consequence of being excluded by the intangible community of legit-
imate and fully entitled parents:
R:  That’s how we did it, yes. Yes, Peter was the adoptive parent and then 
bureaucratically we made sure that I become part of the parents 
and…
I: You had to pay a lawyer, I guess.
R:  Yeah, yeah. In Philadelphia I had to sue my partner for parental 
rights in court. Yeah, isn’t that crazy? But it worked out fine, just 
fine.
I: So now everything is…
R:  Everything is legal and we’re both parents. And that’s, you know, for 
peace of mind and also for the child to feel that, you know, she or he 
has two parents, not one, not that one is more legal than the other, 
because that’s what was important is that the children feel like both 
of us are a team working together.
An interesting finding I will discuss at more length later on in the book 
is the (self-) exclusion experienced by same-sex parents in relation to their 
networks of friends. Once parenthood comes on the stage, anything else 
or anybody who is not directly connected with childcare responsibilities 
becomes difficult to manage. Childless friends are left back for a while, 
not only because they do not possess the care expertise so indispensable 
during the first years, but also because they do not share any of the time- 
and energy-consuming concerns that typically characterise the first few 
years of intensive childcare. Such is the case of Linda:
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[…] And I would say that, during these first few months, the community 
of lesbians that I know hasn’t been a very big support just because I’ve been 
really needing support in terms of advice on raising a child or advice on 
having a baby. So I think that those things are things that they can’t help 
me with right now. I think in a year it’ll probably come back to, I’ll have 
more friendships that are just based purely on the friendship and it doesn’t 
have to be based on what I’m going through right now. I guess temporarily 
they’re off the map, but I think they’ll be back on the map in a year or two, 
I do, I really do. Because, right now, just day-to-day, learning what I’m 
needing to learn and understanding how to get through the first few 
months of a baby’s life is all consuming. And you don’t really have time, 
you don’t have the energy to maintain friendships just for the sake of 
friendships.
Kurt, a divorced gay father who was previously married to a woman, 
feels the entirety of his isolation and exclusion every time he has to face—
on his own—his daughter’s ritual happenings or events related to the 
school. Differently from his ex-wife, who takes part to these school events 
with her new husband, Kurt is always alone and dreams of a time when 
someone will stand by him and support his “public presentations of self ”:
Well, you know, I just have books on my bookshelf like, you know, Finding 
a Gay Relationship or The Advocate sitting out or whatever. So I don’t 
really—I’ve gotten to a point in my life where other people’s opinions 
just—if they want to look at me differently, you know what […] you need 
to do whatever you need to do, but I’m gonna live my life to be happy. It 
actually would be a really good thing in my mind because it becomes very 
uncomfortable going into the concerts and there’s my ex-wife with her 
husband and her parents and here I am by myself. Or my daughter will say 
come to church and hear me sing. So, I go to the mother’s church and 
there’s my ex-wife with her husband and, again, the parents, and I’m by 
myself, and you know, getting dirty looks from the ex-mother-in-law. So it 
would be so much more comfortable to have that support there to be able 
to stand by me in situations like that.
The exclusion from the intangible community of fully entitled and 
successful parents is reinforced in Jack’s and Ishmael’s case because of the 
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additional stigma potentially attached to their religious affiliation. Jack 
and Ishmael are adoptive fathers and their main concern is mostly revolv-
ing in the following excerpt around the attitude of the biological grand-
mother, that is the person “who doesn’t want the daughter to give away the 
baby”. Beyond the witticisms about the potential double stigma for being 
simultaneously gay and Jewish, what emerges from their interview is an 
authentic and deep sense of guilt connected to their “mediated” parent-
hood. This guilt, as we will see in more detail further on in the book, 
seems to represent a common pattern for adoptive parents, and especially 
for those who know and meet the biological mother.
Jack:  So then we met her mom, which made me really nervous 
because […] the grandmothers are kind of the scary ones 
because they’re the ones who don’t want the daughter to give 
away the baby. Because the daughter’s the one making the 
decision to give it away but the mother is like don’t give my 
granddaughter away. But we met her and she was, you know, 
they’re Mennonite, they’re very strictly religious, and she 
admitted how difficult it was that her daughter was giving the 
baby away to gay men, you know.
I:  Oh, specifically to gay men, not just to…
Jack:  Well, just in general how difficult it is, but then the idea they’re 
also gay men, one of whom is Jewish, it was like quadruple.
Ishmael:  Yeah, so they were like oh, no [laughter]. First of all, two 
homosexuals, then you killed our Lord, Jesus Christ and now 
you’re gonna have my…
Jack:  She didn’t say that, she said you know, I grew up thinking that 
your people killed my God.
Ishmael:  It was intense, it was…
Jack:  It was very intense because she’s telling us how much she has 
to get over to be okay about the adoption. But she was also…
Ishmael:  It was a lot for this lady.
Jack: She was also complimenting us because she liked us.
Ishmael:  Yeah, it was a lot for her, I feel sorry.
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Career or work-related exclusion can be as painful and damaging as the 
exclusion connected to same-sex parenthood. Nora highlights here the 
sudden and merciless exclusion she experienced when she decided to 
leave her job in an important law firm to become a stay-at-home mom. 
In the following quote, she powerfully describes how people abruptly 
downgraded her status and treated her differently as soon as she started 
being a full-time mother. She concludes with a very strong statement, 
saying that, in her entire life, she had never felt as much discriminated 
against as when she was a fulltime parent. Neither her gender nor her 
sexual orientation, she claims, had been so powerful in depriving her 
social status of value before. As a full-time mother, it was like she had “no 
status at all:”
I think the year when I left my law firm to stay home with Maggie, I was 
just shocked by how my status changed because I had, you know, a certain 
status as a partner in a law firm and doing the kinds of things I was doing, 
going to benefit dinners and doing this and doing that. And then going 
and meeting people in social settings and saying to them, they’d say oh, 
what do you do and I’d say well, I’m staying home taking care of my daugh-
ter fulltime. And people would literally turn their back and walk away 
from me, like I was an uninteresting person. Whereas, you know, those 
same, a week before if I had said, oh, I’m a partner in a law firm and I do a 
lot of entertainment litigation and, you know, and all of a sudden people 
are, oh, that’s really interesting, boy, that’s, you know. And for me, I think 
being a fulltime mother was the first time I really felt actively discriminated 
against, more so than I ever felt discriminated against as a woman and 
more so than being discriminated against as a lesbian. Being a mother and 
being a fulltime caregiver kind of mother, it was like I had no status at all.
The total lack of recognition and appreciation of care work in Western, 
neoliberal societies is effectively condensed in the following words, where 
Pamela tells me about the difficult period when she felt “cut off from the 
rest of the world and underappreciated” because of her parental care. Her 
ambivalent stance towards the value and the implications of care work is 
still evident; first, she says “I wasn’t working and accomplishing … etc.”, 
and then, immediately after, she acknowledges she was actually “raising 
beautiful little people”, and that, yes, care is actually work in itself, 
although still strongly undervalued in our societies:
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Yeah, I mean I chose to be home and I wanted to be home but it was also 
very isolating. Even though I went out with other, I was out around other 
adults, it was very hard because I wasn’t working and accomplishing and—I 
didn’t feel I was…. Even though, in retrospect, you know, I was raising 
beautiful little people. […] Yeah, it is work. And I think it did have an 
effect on me, a negative effect on me, to some extent, feeling a little cut off 
from the rest of the world and maybe underappreciated. And a lot of that 
I put on myself. I’m not saying that my partner said anything along those 
lines, but it was very hard for me emotionally to be at home. I didn’t bal-
ance it very well.
Finally, Stephan provides us with further empirical evidence of how 
even a simple overseas travel can become the occasion to feel excluded 
not only from the community of “fully entitled parents” but also from 
that of “fully entitled partners”. His being French and married11 to 
another French man regularly exposes him to stigmatising treatment and 
blatant discrimination every time he goes to France to visit his two chil-
dren and then goes back to the United States where he lives with his 
husband:
R:  Oh, when I cross the border, Immigration, they are awful, they are 
awful. They always arrest me, they…
I: Are you kidding me?
R:  No, I’m not. They keep me like for hours, like interrogating me, it’s 
awful, it’s awful.
I: Because you don’t have a visa?
R:  I have a visa but it’s a domestic partner visa. So they gave it to me but 
my partner is a man. And when they… Because they don’t under-
stand what kind of visa it is. And when they ask me what your wife 
is doing, I say I’m sorry, it’s not my wife, it’s my husband. And they 
say, what? And they just took me and they said, okay, you are not 
clear, come with us.
I: Every time?
R:  Every time, every time. And sometimes it’s just one hour, sometimes 
it is eight hours, eight hours.
 Status Inclusion and Exclusion: Some Examples 
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 The Consequences of Status Inclusion 
and Exclusion: Always Black or White?
The perceived exclusion or failure to inhabit an ideal can have negative 
effects, involving feelings such as pain, anxiety, concern, fear and depres-
sion. Yet, it can also lay the foundation for social change. On the one 
hand, status exclusion can drain the supplies of EE, with long-term nega-
tive consequences in terms of social equality. On the other hand, status 
exclusion or what I shall call status uneasiness—meaning that one might 
also feel included but in a stigmatising and non-clearly-fitting way—can 
push people to look for alternative sources of EE, producing, in the long 
run, a gain in the supplies of EE and reversing the outcomes in terms of 
emotional stratification.
The exclusion experienced in certain contexts can be compensated by 
the inclusion in other contexts or group affiliations. Thus, for instance, 
the non-fitting feeling of the single mother (emotionally draining) can be 
compensated by the satisfaction of being able to manage complex sets of 
activities on her own (emotionally energising); the status exclusion expe-
rienced by a same-sex parent (draining) can be amply compensated by the 
creation of a parallel network of same-sex or straight parents and friends, 
the “family people choose” (energising) that acts as a buffer in a still largely 
heterosexual and heterosexist world and so forth. The fast- growing phe-
nomenon of lesbian motherhood and the remarkable  number of women 
who opt for motherhood outside of marriage12 and who, having tossed 
out conventional definitions of motherhood and family, nonetheless 
embrace quite conventional and customary roles concerning child-rear-
ing, provide us with further evidence of how the self- empowering effects 
of the pursuit of motherhood can thoroughly compensate for the enormous 
sacrifices preceding, accompanying and following their care choice. By 
the same token, the new generations of gay men are more likely than their 
straight counterparts to look for alternative and less conventional routes 
to personal affirmation and social success and to embrace and enjoy nur-
turing, care-taking and domestic activities without feeling their masculine 
identity threatened or their EE drained because of that (see Dermott 
2008; Fredriksen-Goldsen and Hoy-Ellis 2007; Golombok 2015; Hicks 
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2011; Landgridge 2013; Mallon 2004; Stacey 2005, 2006; Weeks et al. 
2001). Moreover, gay men are more likely to be single than heterosexual 
men or women of any sexual orientation (Laumann et al. 1994). Therefore, 
at least at a certain stage of their life, a larger proportion of their time and 
energy is potentially available to assume care activities, be it by default (to 
care for an ageing/frail person) or as a sort of compensatory strategy in 
their search for intimacy and enduring love in our fluid high modernity. 
In some cases, this might take the form of an adoption choice, in others, 
of taking care of an elderly relative, a sibling, a nephew or a close friend. 
Whatever the case, their starting point is different in terms of status mem-
bership and range of available choices compared to their heterosexual 
counterparts, and the consequent feeling of exclusion might produce 
long-term effects in terms of EE drain, loss of confidence, enthusiasm and 
initiative for further action and interaction.
Regardless of their marital status or sexual orientation, parents (and 
carers in general) can compensate for the temporary or persisting dissat-
isfaction with their professional situation and the consequent feeling of 
status exclusion from the intangible community of successful colleagues 
(emotionally draining) by engaging in gratifying care activities and 
responsibilities acknowledged and valued by certain others (emotionally 
energising). On the other hand, the perceived exclusion from the intan-
gible community of successful parents as a whole (emotionally draining) 
might push some people to work hard and compensate this form of 
exclusion through the inclusion in the intangible community of  successful 
colleagues (emotionally energising). As we will see, the care choice can 
even become, for some, a sort of alibi to justify people’s not-particularly- 
brilliant career or it can be used as a sort of emotional decompression cham-
ber to allow work-related stressors or dissatisfactions to settle or to 
dissolve, facilitating the transition towards other life choices. However, 
whereas for heterosexual men and women parenthood can be perceived 
as a relatively taken-for-granted component of their package deal13 or as 
something that just occurs randomly, for same-sex parents this is never 
the case. Same-sex parents cannot enjoy this kind of spontaneous emo-
tional decompression chamber effect and they cannot get to parenthood 
by chance; on the contrary, they must struggle and invest quite a lot of 
energy in order to attain it.
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The examples could be multiplied, and each time a combination of 
several factors comes into play, showing at times parallels or highlighting 
divergences between the different parents and care circumstances. 
However, whereas being a man or a woman, gay or straight and single or 
coupled still makes a difference, it by no means translates into an auto-
matic outcome in terms of status inclusion/exclusion and in terms of 
emotional stratification. Moreover, it might be worth reminding to the 
reader here that the study illustrated in this book is not a matter of com-
parison (straight vs. gay or men vs. women) but rather a matter of inclu-
sion, in a theoretical and methodological perspective that aims to highlight 
the complex intersections between care, gender, sexual orientation and 
emotion and to show the necessity to rethink our understanding of care 
and its multiple potential implications. More inclusive, comprehensive 
and in-depth analyses of informal care can help us to grasp important 
insights into the several ways in which people experience different forms 
of power and status dimensions, different forms of social exclusion/inclu-
sion and different forms of entitlement, along an ideal-typical continuum 
which goes from the highest levels of inclusion and emotional gain to the 
highest levels of exclusion and emotional drain, and in which the differ-
ent ways to do gender, to do care, to do class, to do race/ethnicity and to do 
sexuality must be carefully assessed.
 Towards New Paradigms to Study Care?
More efforts need to be invested in working through the implications of 
the complex intersections between care, emotions, gender and sexualities. 
In my view, the idea of a reflexive, social and emotionally charged self, 
constantly under construction—an idea originally developed by sym-
bolic interactionism and supporting the several accounts of the social 
construction of sexuality (Gagnon and Simon 1973)—offers a practical 
and preferable alternative to essentialist explanations. Reframed in this 
way, the study of care can also account for the complex relationships 
between emotion, gender, sexuality and politics, and develop new inter-
pretations of the multiple implications related to the transformation of 
relationships, intimacies and care occurring in modern societies.
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Research is showing the crucial links between citizenship and sexuali-
ties (Wilson 2009; Langdridge 2013) and the necessity to develop broader 
definitions of citizenship, including cultural dimensions and new forms 
of belonging, beyond the traditional contexts of law, politics and welfare 
(Turner 1993, 1999b; Pakulski 1997; O’Byrne 2003; McLaughling et al. 
2011; Richardson and Monro 2012, Yuval-Davis 2007). More specifi-
cally, a growing literature on same-sex partnership and parenthood has 
discussed the ways in which non-conventional forms of intimacy and care 
may represent an opportunity to overcome the binary logic of social, legal 
and political entitlement and redefine conventional notions of families, 
intimacies and relationships (Berkowitz and Marsiglio 2007; Duncan and 
Smith 2006; Hicks 2011; Langdridge 2013; Mallon 2004; Rabun and 
Oswald 2009; Roseneil and Budgeon 2004; Smart 2007; Stychin 2001, 
2003; Stacey 1996; Weston 1997; Weeks 1998; Weeks and Heaphy 
2002). This broadening of customary notions of families, intimacies, rela-
tionships and parenthood has also implied an expansion of the concept of 
citizenship, not only with regard to the acknowledgment of sexual diver-
sity but also in terms of plurality of lifestyles and choices (Plummer 2003).
A few years ago Giddens was talking about “emotional democracy” 
(Giddens 1992), discussing the idea of sexual or sexualised citizenship in 
our fluid and reflexive modernity. The democratic restructuring of 
 intimacy into new forms of sexualities and relationships based on ethics 
of mutual care, love, trust and respect for others, would possess an eman-
cipatory potential conducive to personal and therefore social democrati-
sation. Giddens used the term “pure relationship” to describe a relationship 
of sexual and emotional equality which would be at the basis of the dem-
ocratic restructuring of intimacy. According to this model, gays and les-
bians would represent the pioneers of the practice of emotional democracy 
in our late modernity, shedding light on the power dynamics of hetero-
sexual relationships while simultaneously playing an avant-garde role in 
the ongoing transition towards a sort of radical democratisation of the 
personal sphere (Giddens 1992). But the limitations of this somehow 
simplistic and glamorised analytical perspective have been highlighted, 
among others, by Duncan and Smith (2006), Jamieson (1999) and 
Roseneil (2010) as well the necessity to find alternative routes to study 
family care, relationships and intimacies. In this respect, Gabb’s original 
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contributions provide us with innovative conceptual and methodological 
frameworks for grasping the complexity of the processes shaping inti-
macy and sexuality in contemporary families and challenging dichoto-
mous interpretations of private and public spheres (Gabb 2008, 2009).
From the interactionist and constructivist perspective adopted here, the 
comparison between same-sex and heterosexual intimacies or care rela-
tionships is neither considered productive nor the main purpose of this 
study. Whether or not same-sex parents are different from heterosexual 
parents, and whether male and female parents are really different, do not 
represent the main questions of this book. What is of concern here are the 
hows and the whys; that is, the ways in which and the reasons why male and 
female parents/carers and, among them, same-sex parents/carers, are con-
stantly and situationally constructed as either different or equal, and the 
theoretical and political consequences these social constructions imply in 
terms of inequality. Even more important are the emotional dynamics 
emerging from the internal conversations through which each parent/carer 
constructs their difference; a difference which is subjectively interpreted 
and then transformed either into inequality or in the possibility for social 
inclusion and social change, depending on the lived and felt experience of 
care activities, responsibilities and chains of interactions. The next chapters 
explain the mechanisms through which such emotional dynamics are con-
nected to social inclusion and social change, and further clarify the ground 
and the scope for a new theoretical framework to study care and its real 
(and not reified) connections with the reproduction of social inequality.
Notes
1. In sociology, Gordon (1981) distinguished emotions as relatively undif-
ferentiated bodily arousals from sentiments as combinations of bodily sen-
sations, gestures and cultural meanings learned in enduring social 
relationships. Thoits (1989) differentiated between feelings, which include 
the experience of physical drive states (e.g. hunger, pain and fatigue) as 
well as emotional states; affects, which refer to positive and negative evalu-
ations (liking/disliking) of an object, behaviour, or idea and possess 
intensity and activity dimensions (Heise 1977); moods, which are usually 
more chronic and less intense than emotions, and less tightly tied to an 
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eliciting situation; sentiments, as “socially constructed patterns of sensa-
tions, expressive gestures, and cultural meanings organized around a rela-
tionship to a social object, usually another person” (Gordon 1981); and 
emotions, as culturally delineated types of feelings or affects. Following 
Turner and Stets’ suggestion (2005), I will use here the term emotion as 
subsuming the phenomena denoted by all these different labels. For a 
thorough analysis of definitional issues and an extensive review of the 
sociology of affect and emotion, see also Lynn Smith-Lovin (1995).
2. For a recent, introductory and critical overview of the work sociologists 
of emotions have carried out so far, see also Bericat (2012, 2015). For an 
exhaustive review of interdisciplinary approaches to emotions and their 
relationship with social structures, see the article by Von Scheve and Von 
Luede (2005).
3. An interesting overview of research that focuses on the neglected experi-
ence of men as caregivers is offered by Betty Kramer and Edward 
Thompson (2005).
4. Notably, it allows us to explain the inconsistencies between people’s atti-
tudes and behaviours. As Collins puts it in the following passage: “What 
IR theory adds to contemporary cultural theory in this regard is that what 
people think they believe at a given moment is dependent upon the kind 
of interaction ritual taking place in that situation: people may genuinely 
and sincerely feel the beliefs they express at the moment they express 
them, especially when the conversational situation calls out a higher 
degree of emotional emphasis; but this does not mean that they act on 
these beliefs, or that they have a sincere feeling about them in other every-
day interactions where the ritual focus is different” (Collins 2004: 44).
5. “Every individual goes through many situations: indeed, a life time is, 
strictly speaking, a chain of interaction situations. […] An appropriate 
image of the social world is a bundle of chains of interactional experi-
ence, criss-crossing each other in space as they flow along in time” 
(Collins 1984: 387).
6. Wiley as well as other scholars talk about a similar concept by using differ-
ent terms such as shadow others, shadow selves, hidden selves and absent others 
(see Wiley 1994; McMahon 1996; Doucet 2006; Archer 2003, 2007).
7. Getting insights into the emotional stratification produced by parental 
care was not an easy task and it required a qualitative multi-method 
approach, which I describe with details in the appendix of this book.
8. Collins (2004: 272, 291, 295).
9. The interview question was: Do you think other people started thinking of 
you in a different way since you became a parent?
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10. For a recent contribution to critical heterosexual studies, see also 
Ingraham (2005).
11. Actually, they are “PACSed”. At the time of the interview, and before 
same-sex marriage became legal, in France, a Pacte Civil de Solidarité (civil 
pact of solidarity) commonly known as a PACS was a form of civil union 
between two adults (either same-sex or opposite-sex) for organizing their 
joint life. It brought rights and responsibilities, but less so than marriage.
12. See Rosanna Hertz (2006), Frank Furstenberg (2002, 2005).
13. Townsend (2002).
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The Dark Sides of Care
The specific focus of this book is on same-sex parents, viewed as a key 
subject to visualise and understand the link between doing care and doing 
social inclusion and social change. Yet, in order to clarify the ground and 
the scope for a new theoretical framework to study care, it is important 
to consider potential overlapping elements and specificities emerging 
from a comprehensive analysis of both heterosexual and gay/lesbian par-
ents and to say something about the other type of care which, although 
not particularly emphasised in the book, still represents an important 
component of the vast empirical research on which the book is based: 
elderly care. This and the next two chapters are devoted to this aim, based 
on the analysis of some of the key themes emerging from the empirical 
material.
Most certainly, the themes emerging from the extensive phenomeno-
logical analysis of care practices and their multiple sides and implications 
are numerous and it would be out of the scope of this book to illustrate 
and discuss them all. Therefore, this chapter focuses on a key thematic area 
which I called “the dark sides of care”—or the draining aspects of care—
which includes a wide-ranging group of sub-themes or nodes,1 to use an 
N-VIVO terminology, that can make of care a particularly challenging 
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and/or problematic experience. More specifically, it illustrates and dis-
cusses the conditions under which care becomes a potential site for unsuc-
cessful and emotionally draining forms of interaction rituals. Since one 
of the objectives of the study was to build a wide-ranging phenomenol-
ogy of the emotions revolving around care through a thick description 
(Geertz) of the qualitative data collected at the micro level, this chapter is 
also aimed to provide a more accurate and comprehensive description of 
the phenomenon of care and—somehow—to counterbalance the subse-
quent chapter, which instead will illustrate examples of the less explored 
and less visible dimensions of care or the “bright sides of care”, that is, the 
conditions under which care becomes a context of successful and emo-
tionally empowering forms of interaction rituals. As we shall see through-
out this chapter, however, even in the darkest regions of the phenomenology 
of care, there is room for unanticipated glimpses of light, which seem to 
even further reinforce the idea that care is a strategic site for the produc-
tion of emotional energy (EE). In what follows, some of the examples of 
the draining aspects of care (or its dark sides) are summarised and organ-
ised in groups of quotations introduced by key sub-headings.
 A Child Is Forever: “Before” and “After” Times
One of the first not-so-irrelevant truisms about childcare is that a child, 
unlike a partner, is forever. People cannot divorce or be fully exempted 
from their childcare responsibilities. Once you are a parent, you remain a 
parent forever—Morgan reminds us in the following excerpt—and, dur-
ing the first years of the baby’s life, you are a parent almost 24 hours a 
day:
[…] one of the things with Henry is that he’s always there. So I mean it’s 
not like 24 hours a day but it’s, you know, like 12 hours every day and 
mostly he’s awake when you’re awake, I mean there’s a lot of responsibility 
for—and so this is one of the things about like thinking about caring for 
him is that it’s partly having to do specific things for him, like Henry needs 
to be fed, Henry needs to have his diaper changed, Henry wants to go for 
a walk. […] But it’s also that at any time someone needs to be responsible 
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for Henry. And like I’m a responsible feeling person and I just felt like boy, 
I just cannot be responsible for this kid this much, you know, this is just 
too much responsibility. Not sort of the, you know, the awesomeness of it, 
just the amount of hours. And so that’s something that I’ve, you know, 
we’ve tried to work that out.
Morgan (41), who at the time of the interview was in a tenure-track 
position at a liberal arts college, is married to an assistant professor with 
whom he shares not only his life and childcare responsibilities but also his 
job through a job-sharing work option. He loves, or rather, would love to 
paint and have more free time for his hobbies. During our long conversa-
tion, he candidly admits that care responsibilities, originally, had not 
been contemplated. Nonetheless, beyond what he told me during the 
interview, the way he acted and interacted with his child—his lovingly 
and caringly holding and entertaining the child during the entire inter-
view was indeed manifest—allowed me to get a much more reliable pic-
ture and much more reliable insights on the bright and energising aspects 
of his care responsibilities.
By the same token, Emily underscores how the gruelling aspects of 
24-hours-a-day care may involve not only menial chores or tasks but also 
the thinking process itself, evoking the crucial theme of internal 
conversations:
Yes, he drains a lot of my time and my thoughts. I think of him when he’s 
not around, especially now that we’re going through such a big change, you 
know, moving back to Xxxxxxx. […] I think before, before it was more, 
you know, ride life as it comes. Of course, we had projects, we came here, 
we wanted to get our Ph.D. but ultimately it was more an adventure, if it 
works out well, you know, we’re gonna do our best to adapt. Now I feel I 
have less room to adapt if something happens, I have to worry about him 
more, yeah. […] All the time, yes, I feel very, I feel, yes, I feel that all the 
time. I feel that I’m limited, for example, I feel that I feel tired all the time 
and that limits me. […] […] I was, even as much as I love Liam, you know, 
it’s an obligation, you have to do that, you can’t postpone it, you have—so 
I was always doing something either for him or for my work. And I felt 
very constrained. […] and, you know, say okay, or take a shower, you 
know, that’s something that all of a sudden became something that you 
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treasure so much because you don’t have that time to do it without having 
to run.
And yet, as we will see with more details in the next chapter, devoted 
to the energising and empowering aspects of care, Emily is also one of the 
most fervent supporters of the idea that care can be one of the main driv-
ers to increase work productivity. In fact, far from becoming less impor-
tant, work seems to assume for the majority of the caregivers the function 
of a safety valve, not only to contain the draining and energy-consuming 
effects of care responsibilities2 but also to be a better parent. Such is the 
case of Gillian:
Yes, yes, I was doing my PhD and then I was at home, Simon was on sab-
batical also, so we were both at home with her all the time. And we couldn’t 
send her to a day-care centre because she was prone to infections and things 
like that, so she had to be isolated from other children. And also babysitters 
were not possible at the beginning. So we invested a lot of time in her, too, 
and by the end of that year that was spent mostly with her, I realized that 
in order to be a better mother, or a happier mother, I needed just to work 
outside of the house. […]
One of the key issues connected to childcare is the internal struggle 
between the commonly shared idea that “children come first” and the 
necessity to reconcile such idea with a wide variety of other tasks, roles and 
responsibilities, but also hobbies, interests and leisure activities. A vastly 
misleading assumption is that the world can be divided into two main 
categories: those for whom having or not having kids is a sort of “natural” 
consequence of their life choices and those for whom procreative options 
are not contemplated at all. Such a misleading assumption hides the con-
siderable range of varieties and possibilities of all those people—the vast 
majority—who lie in between. It is probably not by chance that both the 
rhetoric of parenthood as a sort of naturally forthcoming gift that is 
expected to bless heterosexual couples and the rhetoric of petty-bourgeois 
feminism connected with the idea of the “feminine mystique” (Friedan 
1983/1963) are clearly challenged, more than by any other parent, by the 
truly genuine “mothers by choice” of my sample, that is, lesbian mothers. 
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This is the case, for example, of Allison, a lively and upfront teacher who 
criticises the often unspoken ambivalence about parenthood typical of 
most parents. She in fact acknowledges that the loss of control over time 
and interests is one of the biggest trades-off of childcare responsibilities:
…No, I don’t mean that it’s important to do it or not do it, I think some 
people want to, some don’t. And I wasn’t sure I wanted to have children, I 
wasn’t sure at all because I didn’t know if I wanted to give up my life, you 
know. Because the baby has to come first for many years. And I’m still 
ambivalent about that many times. But I think most everyone is. […] 
Yeah, I think the biggest thing that I lose is just, it’s just control—every-
body has this, I guess, just control over your time and your tasks. You 
know, I used to be someone who would come home from work and relax 
for a little bit and then kind of make a list on paper, in my head, oh, okay, 
I have to do these four things. I might not get them done but if I didn’t get 
them done it was probably my fault, you know, or I decided to do some-
thing else. And that just doesn’t happen anymore. So it’s not, you know, it’s 
sort of not my decision what I do next or how long I have to do them.
This is also the case of Maeve, a mother of two biological children and 
of a third adoptive child on his way, who describes childcare as a sort of 
sport race, where, once you have moved in, you never stop running. Her 
experience of parenthood is like a contest in which the biological time 
and the time one would like to dedicate to professional career or other 
personal interests almost never get along very well:
[You cannot anymore] come and go freely, step out and do anything, it was 
a very drastic transition. I don’t think I was prepared for that, but you just 
keep running with it, don’t look back. […] So I feel like I’m running con-
stantly. […] I remember thinking, you know, five years ago, I wish I could 
wait 10 years to have children but I knew I couldn’t, at 40 I can’t wait 
10 years to have children, so like now or adoption or finding a younger 
wife [laughter].
The theme of the almost total loss of control over daily routines is also 
raised by Christian, a heterosexual single father. Consistently with what 
most respondents told me, Christian draws attention to the gap between 
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“a before” and “an after” period, although, as an adoptive father, he surely 
had more time than the standard nine-month period to develop his pro-
creative consciousness and parental identity.3 Regardless of the different 
ways one might achieve parenthood, he seems to imply that there is 
always a life before the child and a life after the child, and the two differ 
quite drastically:
I mean he’s certainly been a great part of my life. But it’s hard to, you know, 
I don’t know how you measure that. So I’m clearly happy with my decision, 
it’s just that people always ask me is this what I expected. And I don’t know 
what I expected. I guess the reality is, and this would probably go for any-
body, even somebody that just had a child of their own, somebody who 
was pregnant, I don’t think anybody really thinks about how hard it is. You 
can’t really contemplate, you can’t really know that until you have a child. 
And even me, before I had a child I used to, I never would understand, like 
I’d call friends who have children and they would never, you know, it was 
harder to reach them or they wouldn’t write e-mail and I’m like how busy 
can you be, the child is probably sleeping or they’re in school. But now I 
understand, I mean of course I’m working also, some of these people were 
not working, but I mean it’s just, you know, I mean I try to keep in touch 
with a lot of people but […] I mean like in days before I would like go out 
drinking or I would at least have the energy to talk to friends on the phone. 
And now it’s just like, I don’t know, I want to go to bed and just… […] 
Sometimes I just feel like I have too much. I mean there are times I just feel 
overwhelmed and I have to just sit back and work through it in my head.
This overwhelming sense of loss of control over the usual daily patterns 
and routines is shared by all parents, regardless of their sex or sexual ori-
entation. The presence of a new-born baby—who is completely depen-
dent on you—forces people to renegotiate not only their habits but also 
their relationships with others and within the couple. This may create 
some tensions, but it can also represent an opportunity to reconsider 
one’s priorities and develop or discover new skills, precisely because it 
involves engaging with a completely new existential design. In other 
words, parenthood opens up new, unexplored landscapes of meaning, in 
which people experience new cognitive and emotional styles and need to 
rediscover themselves while confronted with something totally unknown.
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 Care Loops, “Good Parenthood” and Financial 
Constraints
Another not-so-infrequent occurrence characterising the care experience 
can be a chain of adverse events that sometimes overlap with each other, 
making of it an almost unbearable experience both from a practical and 
emotional perspective. Jodie divorced immediately after she had her ten- 
year- old son, while she was still building her professional career in a 
country where she could not rely on any form of care or family network. 
Thus, during the first years of her parenthood, she was completely alone 
in dealing with care and work-related responsibilities. Then, partly 
because of these challenges, she also lost her job. After many vicissitudes, 
combined with a difficult economic situation, at the time of the interview 
she was living back home, she had a new relationship and she was sup-
ported by a quite rich social network, which included her parents, her 
sisters and several friends. But, eventually, other care-related issues 
emerged, overlapping with childcare and raising, once again, important 
concerns in terms of financial constraints. In the following quotation, 
Jodie describes a difficult period during which her present partner lost 
her job because of a serious illness, which resulted into an additional and 
unanticipated care and financial responsibility for her:
You get really tired sometimes, you get really, really tired and discouraged. 
You know, when things don’t work out or there’s not enough money com-
ing in or whatever, you get discouraged. With all these health issues I get 
really discouraged because we’re struggling with the medical system so 
much because, you know, they don’t really know what’s wrong, the doctor 
sends you to another doctor and another doctor and it’s really dishearten-
ing. It’s very disheartening, especially cause, you know, she’s young, she 
wants to do things, you know, very active, very high energy, so this is like 
we were going down this road and all of a sudden it was like a big brick wall 
came down, like errrrrr, stop, you know. All right, so then we had to—and 
sometimes it’s very discouraging.
The literature on the care deficit and crisis (Benería 2008; Ehrenreich 
and Hochschild 2002; Fraser 1994, 1997, 2016; Hochschild 1995, 2003; 
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Thorne 2004) has highlighted the increased polarisation within the con-
text of care between those who can afford to lessen the time strain with 
some outsourcing of caring tasks and those who are literally crushed 
under the burden of care work.4 As I explain in the second chapter and 
further clarify in the methodological Appendix, the sample of this study 
is mostly (although not exclusively) composed of middle- and upper- 
middle class caregivers for several reasons. Suffice it to recall here that one 
of the reasons underlying such a choice is that middle- and upper-middle 
class subjects control the production of behavioural standards most val-
ued in advanced industrial, neoliberal societies and tend to define and 
impose dominant ideas of masculinities/femininities, work and care bal-
ance standards and standards of what is considered to be a good parent. In 
other words, understanding the changing nature of these dominant ideas 
and standards—rather than considering how care intersects with the class 
dimension—represents the explicit and declared scope of this book.5
Nonetheless, the above quote is interesting also because it highlights 
how the care deficit—although with radically different implications and 
different types of resources and constraints—affects all types of caregiv-
ers, regardless of their social class. It is also interesting because people can 
experience different forms of downward social mobility, particularly in 
relation to separation and divorce and within the context of neoliberal 
politics and policies characterised by a constant withdrawal of the state 
from many areas of welfare provision and a growing commodification of 
care.
Another typical source of EE-drain connected with care concerns the 
gap between people’s professional ambitions and what they manage to 
achieve in reality. Indeed, what Jason underlines in the following quota-
tion clearly indicates a certain uneasiness vis-à-vis his relatively modest, 
low-profile job; an uneasiness which emerges from his internal conversa-
tions with a whole series of generalised others. During the interview, Jason 
appears confused about several other issues, including what it means to 
be a “good father”. However, what seems to mortify him the most in 
terms of professional career—and even to induce in him almost a sense of 
shame—is what other people, and particularly his colleagues, might 
think of him:
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R:  I just always kind of feel like I’m not doing enough or, you know, 
messing up my kids’ minds somehow. And also in academia […] 
even though I am kind of at the place where I am pretty happy right 
now, I know the rest of academia and my professors here and some 
of my other graduate students kind of would see teaching at a dinky 
little liberal arts school as, well, that’s nice but, you know, too bad 
you didn’t do more. I just saw it in my job here and, you know, there 
is a sense of—we didn’t talk much about it, but…
I: You mean you perceive that, or…
R:  I perceive that, yeah, I perceive a little sense, and I feel a sense, almost 
a sense of shame, kind of like you could have done better.
I:  That’s interesting; but you feel that this is mostly coming from your-
self or you feel that this sense of shame is reflected from the others, 
too?
R:  Mostly from the others. But I feel a little, like I wish, I think I could 
have done more in graduate school, say, to position myself to maybe 
teach at a top, more of a top level liberal arts school or a medium 
level research university kind of thing. And I wish I would have done 
that. Those aren’t huge regrets, but they are, I do regret that. And 
part of that is due to, I think, becoming a father during graduate 
school, you know. I shifted my priorities then and didn’t put as 
much into getting into the right research project or publishing my 
Master’s thesis. […] I mean in a lot of ways I wish, there are many 
days where I wish I could go back to the point where you’re at right 
now and be, you know, just work a little bit harder. […] I think 
some days about going back to doing that. I won’t but, you know, 
would that make me feel more adequate somehow? I don’t know.
In Jason’s case, however, the major source of EE-drain connected to care 
is linked to his feeling torn between his status and role of father and his 
recent coming out as a gay person, a fact about which he is not open with 
everybody: at the time of the interview, he still had to find a way to recon-
cile his (new) status as a gay man with his (changing) status as a father of 
two small children in a heterosexual marriage. Jason is one of the many 
respondents with whom I had the chance to talk on several other occasions, 
beyond the interview context, and this gave me the possibility to get more 
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insights about his feeling torn between his allegedly conflicting statuses and 
his painful existential angsts; many of which, for obvious reasons, are not 
reported here. In the next interview’s excerpt, Jason is trying to explain 
what it feels like to experience such a conflicting condition6; he tells me 
that he is hoping that, in the future, he will manage to become “more gay”:
[…] Any time spent pursuing being a gay man feels like time spent taken 
away from being a dad. And I haven’t found a way to integrate those. […] 
Because in my mind I can justify that part of being a dad is doing paid 
work and bringing money home to be able to support the family—part of 
being a parent, I should say. […] But I can’t justify that when I go to a 
GAMMA meeting, say, or I go to Xxxxxx, you know, a gay bar—not to 
pick up people, but just to be around gay men, you know, and just to hang 
out with friends. It feels very disconnected to me at this point. And so in 
terms of the [existential] ladder, I kind of hope that down the road I will be 
able to—maybe as the kids separate themselves and become more indepen-
dent, then I can become more gay [laughter].
 A Nine Years Long Pregnancy
Jason’s account represents an example of how some of the draining aspects 
of care highlighted thus far—which commonly tend to apply to all type of 
parents—intersect with sexual orientation. Parental care can be, for some, 
a draining experience not only in itself but also because it can be difficult 
to get to it. While this also applies to those heterosexual couples who have 
infertility problems, the additional challenges to attain parenthood, in the 
case of gay and lesbian parents, represent an inescapable fact. Attaining 
parenthood through pathways other than heterosexual intercourse can 
foster creativity and imagination, but it can also be extremely demanding 
and draining, both financially and emotionally. At the time when this 
study was conducted, Jack, Ishmael, and their beloved six- month old 
daughter were a wealthy, relatively happy family owning an elegant restau-
rant in the city centre of Philadelphia. Getting to that point, though, was 
not an easy goal, and, before they could finally manage to adopt their 
daughter, they had to go through a series of major obstacles which lasted 
nine years and costed them a great deal of emotional troubles, including a 
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clinical depression. In the following dialogue, when Ishmael compares one 
of the many failed attempts to adopt to a miscarriage involving grief and 
bereavement, the dramatic tones of such emotional journey clearly emerge:
Jack:  Well, we had been picked three months before that by a 
15-year- old girl who was gonna have a boy. And that fell 
through, that was a horrible experience for us. That was 
another part of the horrible nine years of like hell because we 
got really excited
I:  So it was difficult, all in all; […] you had several kinds of steps, 
I mean, several kinds of possibilities that didn’t work.
Jack: Yeah, it was very
Ishmael:  And some got very close. The last one that got really close, and 
that’s when I really knew how powerful the emotions really 
were, when this baby that we
Jack: Thought we had
Ishmael:  That we thought we had for like […] Yeah, we knew about it 
for two weeks.
Jack: Two and a half weeks, but
Ishmael:  The moment I heard about the possibility, I just like, I just 
filled up with like a rush of like hot temperature from my feet 
up to my head and I felt like I was gonna explode, I was so 
happy. And then when that didn’t work, we actually went 
through a depression like we lost a child, it was very powerful. 
And then that’s when we, that’s when I knew like oh, my God, 
this is just huge.
 Necessity to Protect Children 
from Discrimination
Once parenthood is attained, another potentially draining aspect of care 
specifically connected with the caregivers’ sexual orientation is the need of 
gay and lesbian parents to protect their children from stigmatisation and 
discrimination because of their being born and raised in unconventional 
families. There are several ways to be discriminated against and several 
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contexts in which this can happen. One of the first concerns in fact 
emerges from the very beginning of the procreative choice, particularly 
when this is connected with adoption. What kind of child can we adopt? 
This is the question that the majority of the gay and lesbian parents I met, 
especially male subjects, ask themselves. And in that “can” should be 
included not only available options in terms of adoption agencies that do 
not discriminate against same-sex adoption but also several other consid-
erations such as race/ethnicity, age, gender, country of origin or health-
related issues of the adoptive child. All this, quite obviously, has nothing 
to do with issues of personal preference, but rather with the potential 
implications for the child’s emotional and psychological well-being.
For example, for a couple of white male adoptive fathers, choosing to 
adopt an African-American or an Asian child might imply, as Curtis and 
Omar explain below, adding an extra layer of pressure and potential stig-
matisation upon the child:
Omar:  I feel that us being gay parents, having a black or a Chinese 
baby, it will be putting an extra layer of pressure on the baby.
Curtis: He’s gonna have a lot already.
Omar:  That’s not needed. I mean I have a friend, she adopted a girl in 
Barcelona, really nice, perfect, but everybody knows she’s 
adopted and who’s her mom. It’s just like…
Curtis: It puts you on the spot.
Omar:  You don’t want your kids to be, in fact it’s enough, those kids 
are gonna be going to school with lots of kids and they will be 
educated by, some of them are going to be well educated from 
good  households and some of them are gonna be, look at it 
from like … and then they’re gonna be making fun of them. 
So how much do you want to expose them to all of that?
Curtis:  Yeah, our sons are gonna be, have to deal with having gay 
parents already, and to be, you know, if it just so happened, 
like the only black kid in a class with gay parents, it’s tough. 
You know, you’re just putting a lot of things for a kid to have 
to deal with emotionally. And we felt like having two gay dads 
is a big enough emotional challenge for a little boy to have to, 
or a little girl to have to deal with that that was enough.
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Perhaps, it is partly because of such dilemmas that, eventually, Curtis 
and Omar opted for surrogacy. However, it is evident that similar dilem-
mas and considerations do not affect heterosexual couples in the same 
way. For these latter, on the contrary, adopting a child of a different eth-
nicity can even add an extra layer of worth to their individual’s reputa-
tions and statuses.
Another common concern of gay and lesbian parents is the necessity to 
protect their children from verbal violence and harm while, at the same 
time, allowing them to navigate through the real world and making them 
aware of the “importance of diversity”.
Berenice:  I just don’t think our kids have ever even heard of the word, 
gay. Once in a while, if we’re on the playground and there’s, 
there just happen to be two women with their kids, they may 
or may not be a couple, and my daughter will say, oh, look, 
there’s another family with two mommies and their kids. 
They’re looking, they’re also curious, they’re, you know, begin-
ning to have awareness and I don’t want them, you know, you 
want to protect your kids and not have them, especially from 
families, who’s gonna be very myopic and hurtful.
Glenn:  Oh, I mean we have friends, you know, same-sex families with 
kids and we have friends who are not same sex families with 
kids, and I’d like August and Perry to be exposed to both of 
them. I mean it’s important to me that they see families of dif-
ferent combinations, so if we didn’t have the socialness with 
some friends who have, same-sex couples, both men and 
women with children, perhaps we would pursue that kind of 
association more [the respondent refers here to the local asso-
ciation of same-sex parents], because I do think it’s important 
for the kids to see that, that they’re not alone in this sort of 
family type.
And indeed, a growing number of heterosexual parents seem to 
become more aware, them too, of this important pedagogical aspect: 
education to diversity; but whereas for many heterosexual parents the 
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opportunity to expose their children to a variety of “families of different 
combinations” can be a desirable option, dealing with the issues of diver-
sity and education to diversity represents one of the many unwritten, 
imperative rules for all gay and lesbian parents. More often than not, 
then, a careful choice of the living area, the school or day-care, and the 
people to include in the circle of closest friends represents another com-
mon pattern characterising all same-sex parents I met, as exemplified by 
Forrest’s account below. Occasionally, however, the process of positive 
contaminations can go both ways: choosing a gay-friendly area of the city 
can make same-sex parenthood more manageable; yet, sometimes, it is 
precisely the presence and visibility of same-sex parents that transform a 
city area into a gay-friendly one. I will come back to this very important 
aspect later on.
We purposefully chose to live in a big urban metropolitan setting like 
Philadelphia where there’s gay people. We joined an organization like 
XXXX in Philadelphia […] so that Arabel can see that she’s not the only 
person like that, that there are other kids with mothers and dads. And so 
we have tried to intentionally make decisions to make it easy on our kid so 
that she doesn’t feel strange. But again, I think we were only able to do that 
because we have money, we could move from, we could not, we could live 
here, we don’t have to live here. But we tried to set up our situation so that 
it’s easy for the kid, for the child.
At times, there can be similar kinds of considerations for heterosexual 
adoptive parents, be they single or partnered. However, differently from 
same-sex adoptive parents, heterosexual adoptive parents will not have to 
deal with discrimination related to sexual orientation, but rather with 
other issues, such as disclosure or other forms of diversity. How can they 
help their adopted child with the issues of ethnic and cultural back-
ground? How can they explain their adopted child that they do not have 
mommy and daddy in case of single-parent adoption, as it happens in 
Christian’s case? Christian—a heterosexual single adoptive father—did 
not seem to be excessively concerned about these issues when I met him, 
partly because he lived in a diverse environment (NYC) and partly 
because he was not excluding the possibility of finding a wife (and a 
mother for his adopted son) in the future:
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And I have a lot of friends who were adopted and I have a lot—my friends 
here in New York City are very diverse. I have a lot of Asian friends and 
White and African-American and Latino and whatever, so I mean from 
that standpoint it’s not like, I’m not like some white couple in the suburbs 
who has like an Asian kid who will be totally whatever, I mean he will have 
a lot of Asian role models, aside from having me as a role model. And living 
in New York City there is diversity all around, like in this building or wher-
ever we are. So I think from that standpoint he, you know, a lot of adopted 
kids sometimes do have issues when they grow older about who are they, 
why are they here, you know, what about their parents or their natural born 
parents, what happened to them and, you know, cultural issues and all that 
stuff. And I don’t presume to have answers for all those questions but, you 
know, I think that people who adopt children are probably all looking to 
provide a loving household and sometimes it works and the kid has a great 
life and loves the parents and sometimes it doesn’t, you know, whatever, 
just like with any family, I guess. I mean because I have experience with 
adopted friends and my brother, like I said, I don’t think my son should 
not feel at all out of place living in my life, I don’t think, except that there’s 
no mom here, at least right now. There may be a mom later.
Eliza, a heterosexual single adoptive mother, is planning instead a trip 
to her son’s country of origin so that he can get an idea of his origins and 
ethnic background, and perhaps visualise, as she says, the customariness 
of his physical appearance, which some of his classmates might instead 
perceive as uncommon in the United States:
We have, you know, there are conventional family friends but then you also 
have a gay, you know, gay couples without children, gay couples with chil-
dren, many different configurations, and different race configurations as 
well. And so I like that. My sister-in-law is Chinese and my niece and 
nephew are, you know, half Chinese, and I think that that’s also a nice, you 
know, thing for him in terms of […] some kind of identity. I think one 
thing that I hope we can do is, you know, spend time in Vietnam so that 
he can sort of get a chance to, not just the culture but just to see physically 
that he’s like so many people. Whereas he’s likely to be, you know, one of 
the smallest kids in his class, you know, he’s very petite and he’s so thin; but 
it’s not unusual, you know, like in terms of his ancestry, it’s very common. 
[…] I’m not really worried about it, but I just kind of feel like it will be 
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good for him to have an idea that he’s not the one kid who’s this small, but 
that there are hundreds of millions of kids, you know. So I just feel like 
going to Vietnam can have some benefit.
 Entitlements’ Dilemmas (and Other 
Quandaries) Within Same-Sex Couples
There can be several other potentially draining aspects of care which are 
specifically related to gay and lesbian parenthood. One of these can 
emerge from dynamics of power imbalances within a same-sex couple 
where only one of the two partners is the biological parent. Sometimes, 
these dynamics can even prompt a conjugal crisis. This is the case of 
Pamela, a single mother separated from her same-sex partner who hap-
pens to be the biological mother of her two children. After a period of 
crisis linked to the separation, the two ex-partners eventually found an 
agreement for a 50 per cent custody sharing. At the time of the interview, 
they were in very good terms. Pamela’s ex-partner was also engaged in 
another relationship. When I met and interviewed Pamela, her two chil-
dren could rely upon the care of three moms on an equal basis. At the 
time of their separation, however, Pamela felt that her partner “had more 
of a say” when decisions regarding childcare were involved:
I:  And do you think that this perception of a different kind of balance 
was one of the reasons why […] the relationship eventually broke up 
[…] because you felt that there was an imbalance in this respect?
R:  Yeah, there was. And I think part of it is I think as the biological 
parent [she] felt that she had more of a say in decisions regarding the 
kids, although she didn’t say that, but I felt that from her. And I 
brought it up and she denied that she felt that way but it came across 
in that way on more than one occasion. I mean she complimented 
my parenting and all of that but I always felt there was this underly-
ing what she says goes.
In the following excerpt, Pamela also describes how difficult and chal-
lenging the relationship with her son can be, despite the fact that, when 
he was born, she was the primary caregiver as a stay-at-home mother. If 
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some of these dynamics can also occur within the context of a hetero-
sexual couple, they assume completely different meanings and implica-
tions within the context of a same-sex couple, especially in a two-mom 
couple, where notions of motherhood, cultural scripts and ideologies 
associated with the concept of feminine mystique (Friedan 1983/1963) are 
interestingly challenged and rewritten in a completely new perspective:
R:  It was interesting because being the non-biological parent I wanted 
to be home with the kids to make that extra bond, extra connection. 
And I don’t know if it was, if that actually happened or not, it’s hard 
to say but he and I have had a more difficult relationship than he and 
my ex. […] I mean we’re very connected but it’s different, it’s a little 
bit different. I think maybe she understands him better than I do or 
is more like him and can relate to him better than I can, if that 
makes sense. I don’t know, I mean he still loves me dearly, I know 
that. He’s also very affectionate and, you know, so there’s, we can go 
within an hour or within a half an hour we can go from, you know, 
the most furious, ahhh!, I can’t believe you’re my parent, and then he 
can be hugging and kissing. So yeah, there’s a lot of […] Yeah, I’ve 
kind of learned to go with the flow and know that it will pass. I’m 
not always gonna make decisions that he’s gonna like, you know. It’s 
been a challenge, definitely a challenge.
 Critical Care, Lack of Resources and Families 
of Choice
The draining aspects of care can become particularly evident when elderly 
care and critical care are involved, and although the main focus of this 
study is parental care, it is worth providing in this chapter some examples 
of other experiences of care in order to visualise how dynamics of inclu-
sion/exclusion and the production of EE occur regardless of the type of 
care and of the characteristics of the caregivers involved in it. Joyce and 
Janice, taking care of their elderly parents, highlight an interesting dis-
tinction between childcare and elderly care, a distinction which has to do 
with being or not in control of the person cared for and having or not the 
possibility to make clear-cut decisions regarding their care choices. When 
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childcare is involved one feels totally in charge and responsible for the 
care-receiver; yet, when it comes to elderly care, Joyce and Janice main-
tain, there are a lot of grey areas where one does not really know what the 
right choice to make is and whether this is the same choice the care- 
receiver would make. This creates additional sources of stress, particularly 
in a context where people know they are dealing with a closing chapter of 
life:
Janice:  You know, it’s interesting as I look at the pictures of the kids 
and the caretaking around families and I think what’s so dra-
matically different is that caretaking of children, you’re in 
charge, you’re not dependent upon anybody else, really, to 
kind of provide the support. In other words you’re not 
depending
Joyce: You’re in control.
Janice: You’re in control. Where with the elderly
Joyce: you’re not always in control.
Janice:  It’s more dealing with bureaucracy and the infrastructure and 
the healthcare system and navigating that than [phone 
ringing]
Joyce:  Yeah, but again, [with childcare] you have choice and you’re 
more in control. You can either put your kids in day-care or 
you can hire somebody to be at your house or you cannot 
work as much and be home with them more, you know, you 
have all of those range of choices to go through. And kind of 
what Janice’s talking about was when the stroke first hap-
pened, we were at a hospital talking to doctors going, is she 
gonna come back—oh, we don’t know. […] But yeah, I think 
that Janice hit on something there, that with kids there’s this 
promise of what will come and what you can give them for the 
future. And with dealing with parent issues, it’s an ending and 
a closing and trying to have things end as good as possible. But 
you lose so much control. I think that’s what makes it espe-
cially stressful, scary and hard. With kids it’s kind of like you’re 
in it together and there’s no question about you’re totally 
responsible for them being safe and well. With parents, you 
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know, me saying to mom and dad what do you want is one 
thing, but if my dad were to have something happen with that 
surgery where he was not either physically fully capable of 
being at home or mentally fully capable of being at home, 
then what do we do, you know. […] So you have all these 
kinds of grey areas, you know, where you’re not sure what the 
answer is. It’s not black and white, you know.
The sources of emotional drain while caring for the ill, elderly family 
members or even dying people intersect with many other factors. The 
time and the context in which care take place, the level of financial 
resources available, the family background, the personal characteristics of 
the caregivers and, above all, the social resources and care networks upon 
which one can rely, can make a considerable difference both in terms of 
quality of care and the caregiver’s well-being. Many of the same-sex cou-
ples I met, especially when adult/elderly care was involved, talked about 
their families of choice, suggesting broader and more inclusive ideas of 
family or kinship which also included friends and/or other caregivers. 
The word choice, here, does not always imply a different level of freedom 
or resources available: cultural background and family history, social cap-
ital, symbolic capital, emotional capital, material circumstances, geo-
graphical location and personal characteristics always make a dramatic 
difference in determining the amount and quality of alternative or addi-
tional social networks on which people can count on in case of need. 
However, it is certainly not by chance that most of the gay and lesbian 
caregivers I met were living between Chestnut Hill and Mount Airy, that 
is, suburban areas which are well-known for their social, cultural, sexual 
and ethnic diversity.
Janice and Joyce went through a very difficult period which involved 
solving a substantial amount practical and bureaucratic problems and fig-
uring out the most suitable care solutions for their elderly parents while 
working full-time. Despite that, during the same period, they also became 
part of a local network of friends that was specifically arranged to help 
and support another lesbian couple—simultaneously engaged with child-
care and elderly care—when they discovered that one of the two female 
partners was affected by a serious form of breast cancer. In the following 
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excerpt, Janice clarifies what constitutes a family to her and describes the 
complex but impeccably organised coordination of shifts and helpers 
through which what she calls “the lesbian community” responded to the 
emergency:
I’m thinking of kind of larger than the family, family that I’ve always con-
sidered friends part of my family. Like in many ways friends are kind of 
more my family than my family of origin. So for instance, when Frida and 
Leila were going through some of their trying times over the last two years, 
with Leila’s mom and then Leila’s dad and Frida’s health issues, we were 
very engaged in trying to make sure that people provided childcare a cou-
ple times a week, people provided meals three times a week. We had a 
whole system set up that people actually signed up for days. And this was 
our lesbian community that responded to the downpour of stuff that fell 
on them for a little while.
Even when there is not such an organised network of helping friends 
and neighbours outside the family, asking for help to the family of origin 
seems to represent the last resort for many same-sex couples. For exam-
ple, if there is a crisis, Brenda and Sydney prefer to call their friends rather 
than their families, although, quite obviously, this does not imply that 
friends are always available. It would be interesting to further inquire the 
extent to which this attitude might be related to the necessity of sexual 
minorities to affirm an arduously gained sense of independence, auton-
omy and resourcefulness, and to mark a difference with conventional, 
heterosexual couples who do not seem to have a similar reluctance when 
it comes to involve their families of origins for care-related needs7:
I sometimes feel jealous about people who have family who live around the 
corner in one sense, because then there’s someone who can help, and 
quickly and easily. But in another sense I feel, I mean I do love your family 
[talking to her partner] but I feel a little grateful that they’re not exactly 
next door. […] We don’t have as much help as I would like outside the 
family. I would rather have more of a network that—we tend to rely on 
each other more than we rely on other people, which I think is probably 
pretty common. But I think we also, we organize things such that we won’t 
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need outside help as much because there’s not a lot of it that we feel… […] 
Well, I feel, I always feel reluctant to ask Sydney’s parents for help, and I 
don’t know if she would admit it or not, but she feels reluctant to ask them 
for help. One day we were sick, she and I were both on the couch all day. 
Thank God, Eli was well enough to go to school because if we had to be 
with him all day, it would have been horrible. And we were both like 
throwing up all day, it was just unbelievable. And I said, should we call 
your mother? And she said, no. And I said are you completely sure. She 
said no, call Gail [a friend of the couple]. Sydney’s parents are kind of for-
mal and like we couldn’t invite them here if the house wasn’t clean and we 
weren’t together and things like that, like yeah.
Critical care, especially when experienced in a relative isolation and 
without some of the above described social resources, can activate dan-
gerous loops in which people keep going while they try to deal simultane-
ously with the emergency and with their daily working routines. This is 
the case of Gill, a Project Manager who at the time of the interview was 
working for a large American company and had been taking care of her 
dying father for more than two years. Gill’s story also represents a good 
example of how care and care practices can become a source of EE even 
in the most problematic and difficult situations. When I interviewed 
Gill, she had lost her father a few months earlier. In her account, though 
undeniably problematic, care seems to be, at the same time, the main 
source of distress and its best remedy; in other words, it somehow repre-
sents the source of EE which helps people keep going, even when the 
levels of stress and exhaustion can be very high:
It was hard. I did not go on vacation for the last two years; I did not do 
anything but work, play some sports locally and take care of my family. 
And, you know, I had a drink every night when I got home, I had a glass 
of wine as soon as I got home because that was the only thing that I could, 
like I needed to decompress for a half an hour by myself. Every day was a 
fight, was a struggle. I got up because, and I got out of bed and I went to 
work because I knew that I might have to take care of my father for the rest 
of his natural life, however long that was […] I got up in the morning 
because my dad was around. That was what I did.
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Gill’s painful care experience was further complicated by the fact that she 
had not only a difficult relationship with her mother but also additional 
care responsibilities towards one of her aunts (her father’s sister). Gill had 
also a younger brother and a mother who could have been more involved 
in family care, but she was the primary (and almost sole) caregiver. She 
took care for years of both her father and her aunt, struggling in relative 
isolation. Why should she do all that? Why would she not delegate to 
someone else at least part of such demanding care work and responsibil-
ity? The answer to these questions lies in what I have described earlier on 
in the book in terms of latent and/or less visible purposes of care. Critical 
care and end-of-life care can have deep repercussions on the caregiver’s 
psychological, emotional and physical health. And yet, they can also pos-
sess significant potentialities in terms of production of EE. Beyond the 
unquestionably draining aspects of her care experience, at the end of her 
exhausting, painful and solitary care journey, Gill rediscovers a new sense 
self-worth and describes herself as empowered. Gill’s account assumes par-
ticularly dramatic tones in the following quote, where she expresses all the 
fondness she felt for her father, who was an absolute role model for her:
I was the apple of his eye and he was the apple of mine. He was my guy and 
I miss him. [Crying] I cry daily for my dad. I mean he’s been gone for six 
months—he was the best guy in the world.
What Gill possibly misses is not only her father, but her taking care of 
him—that chaotic, critical, and distressful period that produced so much 
stress, but which also represented, in other respects, a sort of drive and a 
source of EE. What she is mourning is not only the absence of her beloved 
father but also the absence of care, the sudden vacuum created after such a 
dense and intense emotional period, for better or for worse. The theme of 
the absence of care as well as the theme of the continuing care for a loved 
one after their death represents another unexplored opportunity to rethink 
care and care practices, and encompasses both the political and experien-
tial character and value of feminist ethics of care work. What is missing 
from current debates on care with regard to these aspects is a broader 
understanding that the embodied and emotionally charged relationship 
with the dead person does not die with the person.
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 How Western Societies (De-)Value Care
When talking about the dark sides of care, we cannot leave out the mul-
tiple ways in which our Western, neoliberal societies devalue care and are 
unprepared to deal with it. As emphasised by Brown (2012: 1066), “neo-
liberalism is not just an economic theory, but a form of governmentality” 
that creates and corroborates commodified and marketised interpreta-
tions of the relationships between public and private spheres, promoting 
personal responsibility and individual choice and autonomy in contrast 
with collective and equally distributed obligations and responsibilities. 
While in our societies discourses on care tend to confine it either within 
the sphere of professional care practices or within the private sphere of 
interpersonal relationships, care possesses important sociological, politi-
cal and moral implications in terms of social justice, equality and citizen-
ship. Despite the fact that several scholars have highlighted such 
implications (Barnes 2012; Knijn and Kremer 1997; Tronto 1994), try-
ing to conceptualise care responsibilities as a public value and universal 
right equally applicable to all citizens (White and Tronto 2004), social 
care policies tend to define the notion of citizen-carers in neutral terms 
(Barnes 2012). This has resulted in rising care-related inequalities, based 
on gender, social class, race/ethnicity, age, able-bodiness and sexual orien-
tation. Care-related inequalities are even more amplified in a political and 
economic context in which people are forced to manage their care needs 
in a self-sufficient way as governments and social/health systems struggle 
to cope with rising costs, changing demographics and what are often 
conceptualised as unsustainable care burdens. A sort of collective denial 
surrounding care is fostered by our strongly market-driven societies and 
their politics and policies of care. With regard to this collective denial, 
Claire talks here about the necessity to educate people and prepare them 
on how to deal with the aging process characterising our societies and 
with parents or relatives who get older and dependent.
I have always been very interested in how people, when we get older, how 
do we relate to the society or how do we stop relating to the society. And a 
few years ago when I was still in Xxxxxx, I had a period of about two years 
that I was very close to an uncle of mine who was in his late 70s, early 80s, 
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yeah, early 80s, and he lost his wife and when he lost his wife he started to 
be very sick, psychologically, and his health was not good anymore. He had 
perfect health before she died, but it was a huge impact on him. And that 
was the first time in my life that I had to take care of somebody so closely 
in, you know, because he really depended on somebody and he just lived 
across the street from us. […] And that was a very interesting period for me 
because it made me think a lot about how this society is not prepared to get 
old. Even today […] when you think that people have so many resources 
and everything, you see that getting older is always a struggle and a chal-
lenge for every family and we don’t know how to do it. And people don’t 
know how to get old, either. It’s almost like we had to be educated for that, 
in many respects. We are educated to take care of children and babies and 
we have all this information about all of this, what do you do with your kid 
and how do you do for your baby and little one, but you are not educated 
in what to do with your parents when they get older and they need you.
On the other hand, Ruth criticises the typical youth-oriented and 
youth-focused attitude characterising our societies in ways that tend to 
ignore and undervalue both childcare and elderly care:
I think that our society falls short with this because we’re not really, we’re a 
society that cares about youth, not children and not the elderly. We don’t 
really give to either one […] and I think we really need to start looking at 
that aspect and providing for older people and, of course, younger children 
as well. But especially for the elderly, as our population ages, even though 
they’re trying to pretend they’re not getting old. [laughter] But anyway, I 
think that […] we really fall short when it comes to caring for the aged. 
[…] And if people haven’t gone through it, they have no clue. But I mean 
they will at some point, maybe, I don’t know. But if some people have a lot 
of money, and when you have a lot of money then it’s easy, that people just 
hire people or do this or that. But when you have a restricted amount of 
money, that’s another issue.
In the following quote, Guy points to another significant care-related 
taboo characterising our societies, which has to do with people’s right to 
terminate their life when unalterable, chronic health conditions make it 
unbearably painful and ethically unsustainable:
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And I don’t think in our medical community nor in our, either community 
of children who have elderly parents or elderly people, people as a default 
decision want to stay alive. I don’t think they think about their healthcare 
choices as…—I don’t think enough people say to themselves and have 
thought about it before anything bad happens to say, look, you know what, 
I really don’t want to do that because I know if I go this route my quality 
of life, I’ll be alive three years or five years, probably my life is gonna be 
horrible. And now, having been through my experience with my mom and 
having the benefit of actually talking it out with somebody, and I would 
have never had started this dialogue, I think, if this hadn’t happened with 
my mom and plus I was studying Buddhism, to actually think about what 
life is and what choices you should make about your life when you get to a 
certain point. I think we really, I mean I think I’m talking myself into 
silence because I’m becoming repetitive, I’m not articulating it very well, 
but I don’t think we have enough dialogue of when we should die, when we 
should stop making those medical choices, when we should think about 
the quality of our life. I mean, I’m sorry, we’re getting into harder issues, 
but you know, I thought about this stuff a lot and I think, hopefully when 
I reach that point I’ll have learned from mistakes of some other people, to 
adopt a different approach. I mean I definitely, you know, having been 
through what I was through with my mom, I definitely have decided that 
if my quality of life isn’t, and that may actually be to euthanize myself, or 
request that. I mean, I just, or to have a clear path of, you know, how can 
I get out with the least pain possible at this point, because I know the five 
years are gonna suck.
 Guilt Connected to Care
Another relatively common theme emerging from the interviewees’ 
accounts within the context of the draining aspects of care is the sense of 
guilt connected with care. There can in fact be several forms of guilt con-
nected with care responsibilities. Guilt can arise when people feel they are 
not as involved in care as they wished, when people feel inadequate or 
insecure about their caring activities, or even when people do not feel 
enough gratification and satisfaction (as they think they should) from 
their care responsibilities. In my sample, particularly when childcare is 
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concerned, guilt is something that typically accompanies women—more 
than men—from the very beginning of their care experience. Interestingly 
enough, there are only four exceptions among male subjects who talk 
about care-related guilt, and three of them are gay men. In general, as we 
will see more clearly in Chap. 7, men tend to describe themselves as less 
affected than women by negative feelings (such as sense of inadequacy, 
insecurity, lack of preparation and anxiety) with regard to their care activ-
ities and responsibilities. Whether this is the result of a social desirability 
effect or of a different capacity and willingness to show their vulnerabili-
ties (or both) still needs to be confirmed; yet, the fact that the majority of 
heterosexual male subjects of the sample tend to present themselves as 
somehow exempt from care-related guilt represents, in itself, quite an 
interesting information.
Rebecca—a heterosexual single mother—is one of those parents who 
feel guilty and who are constantly concerned about their performances as 
“good mothers”. In the following excerpt, she even describes a sort of 
retrospective guilt in recalling the period of her daughter’s conception, 
when, because of a period of generous partying and drinking, she might 
have accidentally harmed her daughter’s health. She vividly illustrates the 
constant concerns accompanying her never ending parental journey:
I don’t know, like from the moment you get pregnant till probably the kid, 
till the moment you die probably, there’s like this incredible feeling of guilt 
and like I know pretty much at least once a week I’ll lose “the Mother of 
the Year” award again, [laughter] you know, that I’ll mess up something. 
And so, like from the moment you get pregnant, and I know that like I was 
pregnant and like the 26th of December seems to be like my conception 
date, if I go back to everything, and then like New Year’s Eve I went out 
and got ripped, you know, and so like drank and got really, really drunk. 
And so then like now I have this huge sense, it’s like now she’s gonna have 
foetal alcohol addiction, you know, like from that point, from the moment 
that you’re conceived forward, anything you do that could possibly screw 
up your kid, you’ll feel guilty about, you know. Or you could do more, you 
know, like I could have read more books to her, I could have sang more 
songs to her, I could have not pried or not got emotional or not had any 
distress while I was pregnant, you know, like you think of all those things, 
and maybe she’d be better if I didn’t, you know. And so like I don’t know, 
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like I think that guilt burdens me and keeps me always like […] Like she 
could, I could always be doing something better or something more, I 
could have done something bad less, you know. Does that make sense?
Rebecca’s guilt arises each time she has to take care of her job and/or to 
“unplug” for a while from the strong emotional connection with her 
daughter. In the following quotation, she observes and makes comments 
about a photo representing the image of a multitask mom who is simul-
taneously busy on the phone, holding her child, taking notes on her lap-
top and doing other stuff in the kitchen.8 Rebecca sees herself in that 
photo; but instead of focusing on the positive emotional states such as 
feeling pride for being able to manage several tasks simultaneously—
which seems a more common attitude among the single fathers I met—
Rebecca tends to focus on guilt and her fears of not being a good enough 
parent:
Sometimes I feel like this mom on the cell phone with the kid in her arm, 
it’s like me having to deal with a lot of stuff because I’ll be talking on the 
phone and she’ll be talking to me at the same time and like she doesn’t even 
know I’m on the phone or whatever, like that whole being with her but not 
really being with her, you know, like that difficult thing versus like being 
like this, being able to focus attention on her.
The importance of building up individual reputations as good parents 
and the constant comparison of one’s own goodness with abstract, ideal 
templates of what good parents are and/or are supposed to do, represent 
a common denominator for the majority of the parents I met. Sometimes, 
the guilt related to the difficulties of finding a good balance between 
work and care is intensified by the guilt related to the fact that one is not 
always feeling extremely fond of care activities and responsibilities, as 
Tanya illustrates here:
Right, but I feel like, like today, this morning, I mean our house was so 
disgusting and we had to clean our house and Matthias had to go do some 
errands, and so in a certain way I felt like I was kind of ignoring Zelli. He 
was also doing fine. Like I think that there’s also this sense of as parents 
we’re supposed to give our kids this endless amount of attention […] So 
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there’s a sense of, in this picture I see this and then I feel the guilt of, you 
know, wanting to take care of my work and also sometimes feeling that 
that’s more interesting and compelling than playing trains or dealing with 
whatever it is.
Kurt is one of three gay men representing an exception9 in the “feeling 
guilty” category, which in my sample is predominantly populated by 
female subjects. Kurt’s guilt is mostly related to his feeling responsible for 
the disruption of his heterosexual marriage and his being extremely con-
cerned about his daughter psychological and emotional well-being. It is a 
form of guilt largely connected to his sexual orientation and which is also 
affecting his intimate life choices:
Well, what happened was, you know, when you’re married and then you 
come out and say you’re gay, there’s a lot of, at least for me there was a lot 
of guilt that went along with that. You know, here I am in some ways 
destroying this family and what people looked at as the ideal perfect family. 
So because of that, in the beginning I said you get what you want. And 
then as time went on and I realized that not only was it not the best thing 
for me, but it was also not the best thing for my daughter. Then you go 
backwards and say this isn’t really working for me, and that’s where it gets 
difficult. So it would not have been my first choice, but I think I did what 
I had to do at the time. And then now I’m doing what I need to do now. 
[…] And then, yeah, I mean letting everyone else know was easy, it’s just 
been the whole custody thing that’s made the most difficult. And just dat-
ing, trying to date, please, don’t even get me started on that one, you’ll have 
four hours of tape. But, yeah, so, but it’s just, you know, looking at things 
and also going into a dating scene with a child is a whole other thing as 
well.
Sullivan, another gay father, feels guilty because of his own parenthood 
itself. When he adopted his first son and, subsequently, his daughter, he 
felt as if he was “taking away someone else’s child”, as if he was stealing 
from someone else her right to care, a right to which he did not feel fully 
entitled because he had not given birth to those children. In the following 
excerpt, the excitement, joy and happiness of his approaching parent-
hood blend together with an enormous sense of gratitude but also an 
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enormous sense of guilt towards the biological mother, and this complex 
mix of feelings erupts into an intense emotional climax. In order to pro-
vide the reader with a flavour of Sullivan’s emotional state, I include in 
what follows some of the most emotionally powerful excerpts of the 
interview. Sullivan recalls the entire story with a lot of details—which are 
here partially omitted. When he describes how simultaneously “happy” 
and “miserable” he felt when he went with his partner to pick up their 
adoptive son, he suddenly bursts into unrestrained weeping10:
R:  It was a child through an agency, an agency in Texas. We had never 
been involved with them. But luckily that week we were able to 
make the decision of what we wanted to do. […] So that was our 
first child. And so we had to make plans, we couldn’t get him until 
we were legally able to get him, so we had to do tons of paperwork 
in Pennsylvania. We had to have a home study, like have a social 
work agency study us and declare us fit parents. We had to prepare 
child abuse clearances, criminal background checks, do a lot of legal 
work to be able to go forward, and we did it. And I remember being 
very excited and very efficient. And I think five weeks later we went 
down, because he was five weeks old when we heard about him, then 
five weeks later we went and picked him up, which I remember very 
well, which was very, it was terrible.
I: Terrible?
R: Mm, hmm.
I: In which sense?
R:  Well, it was terrible, he was living in this southernmost part of Texas 
on the Mexican border and oh, I remember taking a plane down to 
San Antonio, we had the night together. […] So we meet, we get 
there and we go to this house and we meet this foster mother, whose 
name is—that’s his birth mother’s name—Xxxx, her name is Xxxx. 
[…] And she’s lovely, and she’s like, you know, a Mexican woman 
who’s this big, she’s lovely. And we go in and, you know, she […] 
There’s the baby and, you know, of course we don’t really know the 
baby, we’re like hi, you know, and we pick up the baby—I had never 
held a baby, I’m like holding the baby like this [laughter]. And the 
foster mother’s going, oh, and the foster mother was in love with the 
baby because she had him for eight weeks, him for eight weeks and 
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she was in love with him. And you could tell, it was a lovely environ-
ment. There were other kids around, they loved this baby. So we go 
spend some time and it’s weird cause we’re gonna take the baby, 
we’re gonna take her baby. And ohhh, ohhh, and so put the baby in 
the car and we leave, and they follow us. And I was so upset because 
we were taking her baby. And that’s why it was terrible, we were tak-
ing her baby.
I: It wasn’t their baby…
R: Yeah, I know, but that’s the way it felt then. [Crying profusely]
I: Do you want to take a pause?
R:  Oh, no, I basically cry every time I tell this story because it was so 
upsetting, it was so upsetting. You know, it was just that, you know, 
it was wonderful because she was so in love with the baby.
A similar emotional amalgam of positive and negative feelings is expe-
rienced by Sullivan with his second adoption, which is an open adoption: 
Sullivan and his partner met the biological mother, they followed the 
entire pregnancy and they were present at the birth of the child. This 
time, the guilt of “taking someone else’s child” is combined with the fact 
that Sullivan feels that the birth mother is strongly stigmatised by the 
hospital personnel because—in his words—she is “giving her baby to gay 
parents”:
We got a call one day—what we did was at the birth, you know, the birth 
period, it was nine months and our car was always packed. The trunk 
always had everything in it so we could just get in the car […] so we could 
be at the birth. And the birth date came and passed and it’s like 10 days 
past and we’re like, and no one heard from her. […] But then we got a call 
and she was there and we went to Xxx Xxxxx. Max was there and we were 
there and I was with her when she […] She went to the hospital so she was, 
we got there an hour and a half later and she was dilated and she didn’t give 
birth, she actually couldn’t, she had to have a caesarean section. And I felt 
terrible for her, I felt like ohhh, what a generous, loving thing she was 
doing and she was so, it was so sad. It was again, the thing of taking some-
one else’s child. […] Because it is [like] with adoption, you’re taking some-
one else’s birth child. So I felt terrible for her, though of course, I know she 
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wanted us. And then she ends up with a caesarean section and they took 
her. And I could tell the hospital was treating her like shit, they weren’t 
respecting her. And in fact they were very cold to her because of what she 
was doing, giving her baby to gay parents. […] It takes incredible strength. 
She’s an incredible woman to be able to do that. So I remember the driving 
away, too. [Crying]
Sometimes, especially when elderly care is involved and the care 
responsibility is perceived as unbearable or unjust, people are faced with 
another form of emotional dissonance which induces, as in Ruth’s case, 
guilt and other conflicting emotions because of the cultural scripts dictat-
ing what a ‘good caregiver’ is allegedly supposed to feel:
R:  Well […] the strain, the emotional strain that it takes on you because 
it does, it’s very emotionally draining and stressful. And sometimes 
it doesn’t bring out the best in me and I have to like work at that, like 
it’s something to work at. The most positive things, to find out things 
about yourself that you don’t want to find out but…
I: Like what, for instance, if I can ask?
R:  Well, just you know, that it’s like feeling—you know what it is, is 
I’ve had so much responsibility at such an early age that there’s a part 
of me now that I don’t want any responsibility. But that’s not realis-
tic, but I still feel it, you know, and I just don’t want any responsibil-
ity. But that’s just what I’m thinking, but I know I have to accept it, 
and I do accept it. But it doesn’t mean there’s not a part of me that 
doesn’t fight it. So yeah, I guess that’s about it.
Simon, finally, is the only heterosexual man of the sample who describes 
a sentiment of guilt mixed with regret when he talks about his care 
responsibilities. In the following quotation, he talks about the geographi-
cal and emotional distance separating him from his 11-year-old with 
whom, for several reasons, he did not manage to be in touch on a regular 
basis. Although Simon clarifies the key role of his ex-wife in denying 
shared custody, he still describes himself as an absent father, showing a 
clear sign of care-related guilt. While his taking care of the two children 
he had with the second wife seems to provide him with a considerable 
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amount of EE, the parallel (and less bright) side of care concerning the 
son who lives far away, unquestionably represents for him an emotionally 
draining care experience:
Now he’s 11—these will be defining years. I’m hopeful, you know, my feel-
ings change from month to month sometimes, but right now I’m hopeful 
that we will be able to maintain a relationship and that I’m not sure when 
or how, but I think, over the long run, I’m hopeful this will be an impor-
tant relationship for him and for me. I’m actually more hopeful than I used 
to be, so I think that yeah, I’m hopeful that the hard years are behind us. I 
don’t think they’re completely behind us, I think they are about three or 
four more, to be honest. […] We’re dealing with the courts and psycholo-
gists trying to redefine visitation. I mean this whole, and I’m battling very 
hard to play an active role in his life. And mostly have the court and mostly 
have the psychologist on my side but his mother is, is an adversary to be 
reckoned with, and she has custody. […] Yes, although I have to say very 
recently I’ve become a little bit more reluctant to just blame everything on 
the mother. I mean there’s a lot to blame on her, I’m happy to do it, you 
know, but also the fact that he’s a young kid and I’m pretty much an absent 
father. Now, if the mother had been more cooperative, I would be a much 
less absent father. But I still wouldn’t be there every day, still wouldn’t be 
under the same roof, I still wouldn’t see him in a way that I see my children 
here. He knows that. And so it wouldn’t be without its challenges.
 Care as a Luxury Item 
and the Commodification of Care
Another important dark aspect of care is related to the fact that care, this 
universal and ubiquitous phenomenon, is increasingly becoming a luxury 
item which is sold and bought at high prices. This paradox—as we just 
saw, care is one of the least valued goods in Western neoliberal societies—
is explained and reinforced by the fact that some of the most important 
resources necessary to take care of our loved ones (time and financial 
resources) are becoming more and more scarce. Things can be further 
complicated for those social actors—such as gay and lesbian parents—
who are still not acknowledged as fully entitled to care for their children. 
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We have seen how challenging and emotionally costly it can be, for same- 
sex couples, to merely get to parenthood. The costs of the procreative 
choice, though, are not only emotional and psychological costs but also 
economic ones, particularly for a male same-sex couple who opt for sur-
rogacy.11 At the time of the interviews, as Byron reminds us here, surro-
gacy costed up to $100,000:
I have one acquaintance, one friend in Washington who paid a surrogate, 
who paid a surrogate and bought an egg from a third party and used a sur-
rogate, you know. But that costs a lot of money. Like $100,000 I think.
It goes without saying that parenthood implies emotional and eco-
nomic costs for everyone, regardless of people’s sex and sexual orienta-
tion, as Stephanie, a heterosexual married mother, points out. Quite 
understandably, the lexicon she uses in the following quote is similar to 
that she could use if she was talking of the purchase of a car or a house:
Let’s say that we are planning many things on the financial side or work 
side, many other sides because we are considering to have a second child. 
Because we are so well adjusted that I think we can afford it.
However, it is quite evident that, with the exception of those lesbian 
mothers who decide neither to resort to adoption agencies nor to other 
forms of medically assisted procreation,12 the economic costs of a child 
starts later for heterosexual parents than it does for same-sex parents, who 
often have to deal with those costs and several other considerations since 
the moment they make their procreative choice, that is, even before the 
child is there. Linda clearly illustrates this point in the following excerpt:
There were two challenges with adoption. If you have, if you look in the 
system, which is the Department of Children and Families, that takes chil-
dren out of one home and places them with someone else, then you’d have 
children who have been either abused or neglected. And they have emo-
tional problems and a lot of times, sometimes you’re not able to adopt, you 
only can be a foster parent and then they end up going back to their family. 
The other option was to—either internationally or in the United States—
to go through a private agency, and that was very expensive, $15,000, 
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approximately, yes, approximately $15,000. And especially if you go in the 
United States, the birth mother has, I believe it’s two days, to change her 
mind after the birth. So you could be working with a pregnant woman, go 
all the way through where you pay her medical bills and you give her, you 
know, you’re working with her and then she has the baby and she changes 
her mind. It’s her legal right to do that, and I respect that, but I decided I 
didn’t want to risk that. So then we looked into insemination in a clinic or 
a hospital, it’s very expensive and it’s, most of it is not covered. No insur-
ance, no assistance. Only people who are infertile can have assistance, and 
some insurance providers only give certain assistance. And I wasn’t infer-
tile; it’s just that we were two women instead of a woman and a man. So it 
wasn’t considered infertility. […] So then we looked into what they call 
at-home insemination. If you have a known donor and you can do it at 
home without a doctor—and we didn’t think it was gonna work. We just 
did it at home and Joanne and me and this guy that we talked to about 
being a sperm donor—it worked, we got pregnant [laughter]. So it wasn’t 
expensive, there were no doctors or clinics. So it was really good. But it 
took us a while to get to that point, to where we knew our options and had 
made that decision.
Once parenthood has been attained, the economic costs of care may be 
comparable for all types of caregivers, and affording a full-time nanny 
rather than paying a day care or a regular baby-sitter, quite obviously, is 
not related to people’s sexual orientation but rather to their material com-
fort. Omar and Curtis, for example, living in their large seventeenth- 
century mansion and supported by a considerable economic capital, 
acknowledge that if it was not for their full-time nanny, both their lives 
and care responsibilities would not have been as merry and cheerful as 
they are, which also reintroduces a gender dimension within the context 
of the costs of care13:
Omar:  Right, we are blessed enough that we can afford a fulltime 
nanny, which alleviated a huge weight. ’Cause if the baby’s 
having a bad morning, which he’s really good, he hasn’t had 
that, I mean the mother would be traditional, would be the 
one that would get to work late. I’m never late, he doesn’t have 
to be late because we have a nanny here that she would take 
care of that. So our case is
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Curtis:  We don’t have to run to day-care, we don’t have to rush home 
to pick him up from day-care.
Omar:  We are not, we are in a specific place that we are lucky to be 
there.
Curtis:  And having a little bit of money has allotted so we don’t have 
to compromise as much as we would otherwise […]
Similarly, Leila acknowledges that if it was not for her affluent family, 
she would probably still be paying her student loans instead of saving 
money for the future education of her two children:
Well, you know, I mean we’re saving money for college, I mean we have 
college funds open and, you know, they won’t be fully funded but, you 
know, hopefully it can go a long way towards helping them with their edu-
cation. […] It’s a huge issue. I mean I know people, when I was in law 
school there were people who had student loans from their college and 
then student loans from law school and […] they had $200,000 in student 
loans. And there’s really not many jobs that you can take that will pay you 
enough money so that you can pay off all those loans and pay rent and, you 
know, have a life. And so you really, forget it if you think you want to work 
in a public interest area, you can’t do it, you can’t do it. And so to me, hav-
ing grown up in a family where we were lucky enough that I didn’t have to 
pay for college and I didn’t have to pay for law school and so I was really, 
had a lot of freedom to really find my way.
Building up a family and raising children is expensive for everyone. Yet, 
not being enough affluent can involve for gay and lesbian prospective par-
ents not being in the position of having children at all. In other words, 
money, time and other primary resources are indispensable for everyone, 
but whereas most people can choose to take the risk and have a child regard-
less, for gay and lesbian prospective parents getting to parenthood can 
become unworkable for several reasons, among which the high economic 
costs of conception or adoption. This introduces a quite evident class bias 
between gay/lesbian and heterosexual prospective parents, but also, and 
perhaps even more, between affluent and less affluent prospective same-sex 
parents. Thus, even the gratuity of the procreative choice is dissolving in the 
context of adoption, medical assisted procreation and other forms of non-
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biological parenthood, raising questions about whether and how payments 
for getting care affect caring relationships themselves. ‘Getting to parent-
hood’—not only care work14—is increasingly commodified and this cre-
ates an unprecedented scenario the multiple sociological and ethical 
implications of which should be further explored. A sociological discourse 
could focus, for example, on the (different?) nature of the procreative choice 
according to whether the child is born to a fertile heterosexual couple, an 
infertile heterosexual couple, a lesbian female couple, a gay male couple or 
a single individual; and it could explore whether and how the gift ethic or 
the idea of unconditional love are affected by the presence of financial and 
legal issues, cash exchanges and other commodifying elements.
Love towards a desired child, a child who is still to come, is absolutely selfish; 
but, it seems to me, also absolute. It is done for one of our needs: our need to give 
all sorts of good to a creature that is still not there. Perhaps, it is a sort of precog-
nition of perfection, of a life which might represent all sorts of good we can do. 
It is an a priori of that life itself.
This is a quote taken from one of the online discussions of an Italian 
association of same-sex parents or prospective ones.15 To what extent does 
the commodification of same-sex parenthood affect this desire to love, or 
what we might call the love to come of prospective gay and lesbian parents? 
This prospective love that is somehow aware of its intrinsic selfish compo-
nents? Monetary exchanges, the existence of implicit or explicit contracts, 
bureaucracy, legal issues, financial transactions and—when adoption is 
involved—home studies, profiles of the prospective parents or the several 
children waiting for a family publicised online, and emotionally intense 
competitions between the couples of the pool of prospective parents, all 
contribute to shape a somehow darkish mantle on the spontaneity of the 
procreative choice; a mantle which sometimes pushes prospective parents 
to renounce to parenthood altogether or to find, when it is possible, alter-
native paths to it. These kinds of complications affect all the aspirant 
parents who cannot resort to biological parenthood; however, the finan-
cial and emotional costs and the legal and bureaucratic difficulties associ-
ated with the procreative choice met by gay and lesbian prospective 
parents tend to be higher and more complex, which adds an extra layer of 
inequality to this stigmatised segment of the population.
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Another penalised group, together with same-sex parents, is that of 
single adoptive parents, especially when, as in the following case, the pro-
spective parent is a single man, which is often viewed with a bit of suspi-
cion. Christian, a heterosexual single parent, describes here the criteria by 
which he was forced to narrow down his range of options according to 
the possibilities offered by the adoption “market”:
[…] what I was looking for is I looked to find those countries where I was 
at least, where it seemed possible that I could adopt. And at the time it 
seemed like through different agencies I could have gotten a child from 
China, Guatemala, Vietnam or the Philippines. But then I looked at, I sort 
of looked at four criteria, how long would it take to get the child, costs, 
although they’re almost all the same cost except Guatemala, which is more 
because it’s more privatized. It’s almost like 10 grand more, Guatemala. 
Gender choice, do you have your choice or do you just take what they give 
you. Like in China, obviously 90 percent of the time it’s a girl, and I actu-
ally wanted a boy. And fourth was the age range of the child. I didn’t really 
want somebody who was like so young, like six months old, I wanted 
somebody who was like over a year or between a year and two years. So 
anyway, so basically of those four criteria Vietnam was the best choice.
Sullivan talks instead about the growing tendency of adoption agencies 
to ask prospective parents to prepare a booklet—inclusive of biographical 
information, photos and personal comments—to be publicised on the 
agency’s website so that birth mothers or any other subject who is looking 
for a family for their children can easily access these large databases adver-
tising all potential parents available on the market.16 And while, on the 
one hand, he critically describes the practice of advertising oneself and 
competing with other couples as “disgusting”, on the other hand, he is 
forced to play by the rules and prepares a “strategic” booklet where pho-
tos of his first adopted son are carefully selected in order to increase his 
chances to win the competition:
Because she says, you know, we have four other couples who have given 
their information, if you want you can put your name in. And we had 
prepared, I should have brought it, we prepared this booklet, it was a book-
let that we were asked to prepare for birth mothers. It says—it was a dis-
gusting booklet saying why you want us to be the parents of your child—I 
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say it’s disgusting because it’s disgusting to have to advertise yourself this 
way, and it’s disgusting to basically compete with other couples. So we 
prepared this book, which basically you can’t say no to because […] It’s 
starring Max [the first adopted son]. Every picture is like Max, you know, 
there’s Max in France, there’s Max in the swimming pool, there’s Max with 
all his loving cousins, there’s Max doing this and that, and it’s starring, it 
basically says—there’s pictures of us, too, and you say, you can live with us 
and you’re gonna have this unbelievable older brother. And we knew, yes, 
we would be chosen, which we were, for Rosie.
Sometimes, substantial financial costs to achieve parenthood can be 
faced also by heterosexual parents. Such is the case for Mitchell, a married 
father who describes the five-year long ordeal he went through with his 
wife in order to untie their infertility problem, which would have costed 
them several thousands of dollars if it was not for the private healthcare 
insurance his wife could rely on. Should they not have had this coverage, 
they would never have had a child:
And it didn’t really work out for us for the first year or so, then it became 
an obsession to get it done [laughter]. Yes, at that point we already put a 
year in and there was a, yeah, we had fertility problems, we had to go 
through the whole medical treatment, at which point… […] So yeah, we 
were doing like the hormones and then we did the injections and then we 
did like the super-hormone injection that drives them crazy, yeah, yeah, it 
was like hiding the silverware sort of crazy. […] But we got through it. We 
pretty much went the gambit on what you could do fertility treatment 
wise, you know, it was like two and a half years of giving it all of our go. 
Honestly, if it wasn’t for XXXX’s healthcare we probably wouldn’t go as far 
as we did because they paid for some absolutely ridiculous stuff that was 
like, you know, like some of these injections we were doing were like $500 
an injection. Yeah, we were like are you kidding me, you know, it’s costing 
us like $40 co-pay so we’ll give $40 more a month this month. I mean if it 
was $500 a month, there’s no way.
As shown in the above quotation, many heterosexual parents with 
infertility issues can at least count on a partial or total coverage of the 
economic costs sustained to get to parenthood. Furthermore, especially 
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in the case of adoption, heterosexual couples may find in infertility not 
only a justification for their choices but also a sort of sympathetic under-
standing for their difficult, challenging and ultimately brave choice. The 
same sympathetic understanding certainly does not apply to prospective 
gay and lesbian parents, especially when they are men.
Moreover—yet, to my knowledge, there is not sufficient evidence to 
support this occurrence beyond the limits of my sample17—when hetero-
sexual prospective parents opt for adoption agencies, they are less likely 
to be exposed to shocking stories such as the one that follows. Because of 
a mistake caused by the adoption agency, Omar and Curtis—the same- 
sex couple we have already met and who eventually opted for surrogacy—
were offered a “last-minute deal”. Stories like this, unfortunately, are not 
as rare as one might wish, and gay male subjects, in particular, seem to be 
more exposed to these kinds of inglorious bargains:
So we talked to this one broker, she called me and she said I’ve got a perfect 
situation for you, the woman’s pregnant, she’s had a child before, there’s no 
issue with that, she’s Caucasian, the father’s Caucasian, blah, blah, blah. 
And it was like great, what do we, you know, we kept talking. She said well, 
I do have to tell you that there’s a chance that the father’s African American. 
I was like what do you mean. She said well, her partner’s Caucasian but it 
was a crazy weekend and she said there is a chance that the father’s black, 
but don’t worry, if it ends up being a half black child, then I’ll cut my rate 
for you and I’ll do it for half price. I hung up the phone and I called Omar 
and I was like, I can’t do this, this is disgusting. I’m like I refuse to do this 
anymore. So we switched [to surrogacy] pretty much that day.
These appalling examples show how high the emotional costs of a 
commodified parenthood can be and partly explain why some gay and 
lesbian prospective parents might end up opting—like Stephan—for 
quite atypical solutions. As we saw previously in the book, Stephan had a 
biological child with the female partner of his sister, and his sister, even-
tually, had a biological child with Stephan’s male partner. Here, Stephan 
describes how the adoptive option was ventilated for a very short period 
and then immediately rejected, precisely in order to avoid the risk of 
“buying” his parenthood:
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Oh, you know, you can go to XXXX or whatever and you give a lot of 
money and two days after you have a child and you can come back here. 
You know, it’s buying a child, I mean now you can buy like groceries if you 
want. I mean if you are rich and if you go to a really poor country, you can 
buy a child. So I was really close to, oh, my goodness […] So we talked 
with my sister about that.
The tension between money and social ties and the risk that the phe-
nomenon of pricing could expand to all realms of human activity repre-
sent a recurrent theme in social theory. For example, although Simmel’s 
approach is in several respects antagonistic to Marx’s throughout his 
work,18 Simmel’s concern about money’s shaping every aspect of modern 
life and breaking down traditional family ties19 was not dissimilar from 
the Marxian concern that a dehumanising commodification would 
unavoidably spread throughout capitalist society. Nevertheless, if it is 
true that the commodification of parenthood is indeed a risk, I also tend 
to agree with Zelizer (1994, 2005) that there are limits to the commodi-
fying effects of money, or, to put it in her own words, that there is “a 
reciprocal sacralization process by which value shapes price, investing it 
with its social, religious, or sentimental meaning” (Zelizer 2005: 21); that 
there are markets where non-economic and non-rational criteria clearly 
prevail. In other words, as I mentioned elsewhere in the book, there is 
something about the rationality of care (Waerness 1984) which helps the 
social actor to transcend cynical calculation and blind emotional expres-
sion and to recombine them both in new, original syntheses which do not 
belong to the usual type of market but rather to a EE market; a market 
where people value and negotiate, also with money, their EE trade-offs.
This chapter illustrated a range of situations and conditions under 
which care can become the site for unsuccessful interactions and emo-
tionally draining experiences. We have seen how even the most critical, 
problematic and dark sides of care can allow people to engage with EE 
dynamics which are not always and necessarily disempowering or drain-
ing. For better and for worse, care introduces dynamising aspects that at 
least prevent emotional stagnation, which is typical of the total absence 
of interaction.20 This is why care becomes a particularly relevant site of 
exploration of Collins’ Interaction Ritual theory (IR model): because care 
is a universal experience, and when we truly care about someone, we do 
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not do it intermittently and only when the person is present, but con-
stantly, in a continuous internal dialogue with ourselves and the rest of 
the permanent visitors who inhabit our thoughts. When our care-related 
interaction rituals are not successful and can therefore become emotion-
ally draining, we are pushed to make up for our short-term defeats and 
improve our future performances to get better results in the long run, no 
matter what. There is a strong internal drive in doing that, which is 
embedded in the very nature and definition of caring about.
Thus, while the dark sides of care represent an undeniable dimension of 
care for everyone, such dimension is the least significant when compared to 
the other, more important dimension: that of the rewarding and empower-
ing aspects of care which is commonly overlooked by current literature. 
The next chapter shows evidence of some of these important aspects of care 
and illustrates how different types of caregivers make their way through the 
brighter and yet less explored dimensions of the care world.
Notes
1. The conceptual containers referring to a specific topic and/or emerging 
theme. See the Appendix for further elucidation on the use of N-VIVO 
and the qualitative analysis of the data.
2. On this subject, see also Hochschild’s famous and provocative book 
Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes Work.
3. Procreative consciousness is an expression I borrow from Berkowitz and 
Marsiglio. In their compelling qualitative study (2007), Dana Berkowitz 
and William Marsiglio examine how emerging structural opportunities 
and shifting constraints shape gay men’s experiences with their procre-
ative and family identities.
4. See, in particular, the works by Nancy Fraser on the care crisis under 
neoliberalism.
5. Literature on parenthood shows that there is a middle-class model of 
intensive parenthood that is setting the standards for what an adequate 
and/or successful parent should do. Dynamics of inclusion/exclusion 
from being considered a good/successful parent, therefore, also include 
the possibility of complying with this model and of setting a distance 
from lower-class models of parenthood. On these aspects, see also the 
works by Gillies (2011), Dermott (2008), Dermott and Miller (2015) 
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and Taylor (2009, 2010). On the other hand, the risk that civil rights 
such as the legal recognition of same-sex parenthood may depend upon 
compliance with a definition of the “good citizen” which is based on 
middle- class models and neoliberal agendas of social control and regula-
tion is highlighted by Bell and Binnie (2000), Bertone (2013), Brown 
(2012), Cossman (2007), Duggan (2002), Edelman (2004), Eng (2010), 
Phelan (2001), Richardson (2000a, b, 2004, 2005), Seidman (2002).
6. What psychologists call cognitive dissonance.
7. On caregiving and care receiving among LGBT adults, see also Grossman 
et al. (2007), Cantor et al. (2004), Kurdek (1993), Weston (1997).
8. Photo elicitation is one of the research instruments I used during the 
interviews. This tool turned out to be very useful in soliciting arguments 
and discussions that would not otherwise have been raised. For more 
details about this research instrument, see the Appendix.
9. Together with only one heterosexual man.
10. Sullivan’s emotional reactions during the interview are quite comparable to 
William Wordsworth’s idea of emotion recollected in tranquillity: “the emo-
tion is contemplated till by a species of reaction the tranquillity gradually 
disappears, and an emotion, kindred to that which was before the subject 
of contemplation is gradually produced, and does itself actually exist in the 
mind.” William Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1802). The grad-
ual materialisation of Sullivan’s past emotions through the story- telling 
represents an empirical evidence that we not only are and behave accord-
ing to what we feel, but also that what we feel is mediated by what we 
think, in other words, of the unescapable social mediation of emotions. At 
times, the cognitive appraisal process at the basis of emotion—what we 
think we feel—can be so strong that it can induce us to feel the emotion 
even when what we think is wrong or only self-illusionary, or when what 
we think we feel belongs to past, as in the case of Sullivan.
11. Surrogacy is a method of assisted reproduction whereby a woman agrees to 
become pregnant for the purpose of gestating and giving birth to a child for 
others to raise. She may be the child’s genetic mother (the more traditional 
form of surrogacy), or she may be implanted with an unrelated embryo. In 
traditional surrogacy, the surrogate is pregnant with her own biological 
child, but this child was conceived with the intention of relinquishing the 
child to be raised by others; in gestational surrogacy, the surrogate becomes 
pregnant via embryo transfer with a child of which she is not the biological 
mother. A recent, critical examination of the multiple issues involved in 
this specific form of procreative choice is provided by Danna (2015).
12. By using what is called “at-home insemination”.
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13. On the problematic nature of gender equality in heterosexual and same-
sex intimate relationships, see also Schwartz and Singer (2001).
14. On the blurring dualism between paid and unpaid care work and between 
economic spheres and intimate ties, see also Folbre and Nelson (2000), 
Himmelweit (1999), Hochschild (2003), Illouz (2007), Ungerson (1995, 
1997) and Zelizer (2005).
15. Famiglie Arcobaleno (Rainbow Families), which, as explained in the meth-
ods section, represented one of the many online resources on which the 
phenomenology of same-sex parenthood discussed in this book was based.
16. Before hearing about these booklets from Sullivan, I had found several 
websites of adoption agencies that display a lot of these personal profiles. 
I have read several profiles and they document, at length, the history of 
the couple, the couple’s family background, their friends, their house, 
their jobs, their hobbies, the way they use their spare time, their travels 
and so forth. Everything is accompanied by several photos of the couple, 
their families, their friends and so on. It is an interesting and somehow 
striking form of marketisation of the presentation of self, because people 
know that there is a form of competition between the numerous pro-
spective parents and that they need to “sell” their profile and the way 
they present themselves. Even a small detail in their profile can be deci-
sive for them to be selected from the pool of potential adoptive parents. 
On the positive side, singles and couples, heterosexual and same-sex 
couples are presented together, without distinction, at least in the online 
adoption agencies which do not discriminate.
17. The fact that same-sex couples are more likely than heterosexual couples 
to be offered adoption of children with significant physical or mental 
health issues emerged quite clearly in my sample as well as from the analy-
sis of the grey literature and of the massive amount of online material. 
Sometimes, particularly with prospective gay fathers, the couple is offered 
the opportunity to adopt children with serious physical or psychological 
problems in order to increase their chances to be selected from the agency. 
But I do not have enough scientific evidence to corroborate and support 
this hypothesis. On this matter, see also Strah, Gay Dads, (2003).
18. For a discussion of Simmel’s Philosophy of Money in comparison with the 
analyses of money in the writings of Marx (as well as Weber and 
Durkheim), see Mathieu Deflem (2003) “The Sociology of the Sociology 
of Money: Simmel and the Contemporary Battle of the Classics.” Journal 
of Classical Sociology 3(1): 67–96.
19. The Philosophy of Money/Philosophie des Geldes (1900), Georg Simmel. 
English translation by David Frisby (Ed.); London; New York: Routledge, 
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2004. In the Philosophy of Money, and particularly in the final essay “The 
Style of Life,” Simmel explores the way in which money mediates social 
interaction, shaping every aspects of modern life and breaking down 
 traditional family ties. But he also shows how this loosening of tradi-
tional, emotional bonds allows for individuals to react creatively and 
make one’s own way through the world. It also brings about a new kind 
of intellectual life and a new particular kind of freedom which can pro-
vide a filter against the sensory overload of modern life.
20. This will be further illustrated in Chap. 8.
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The Productivity of Care
The phenomenological exploration of the dark sides of care has revealed 
how, even in the most challenging and draining aspects of care, people 
manage to find what William James called a “second wind”: an unex-
pected strength and energy allowing them to overcome such challenges 
that emerge precisely from their caring about their beloved ones, no mat-
ter how difficult and problematic things can be.1 In this chapter, I will 
navigate through another astonishing aspect of the phenomenology of 
care, which will bring us closer to its core nature.
Contrary to common belief, care work does not necessarily produce 
stress or make people less productive; at least not always and not under 
all circumstances. Far more than we are willing to acknowledge, being a 
caring person also means being a productive one. For some, this might 
mean giving more attention to quality than to quantity; for others, it 
might mean keeping the same standards in terms of quantity and paying 
slightly less attention to details. What emerges as quite evident from all 
the interview accounts is that having important care responsibilities, 
under certain conditions, make people more efficient and increase their 
capacities to get more things done in a more focused way.
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It is also evident that one of the latent or less visible purposes of care is 
the production of emotional states that resonates with Hammond’s 
 concept of “affective maximization” (1990), a more or less conscious 
strategy to maximise people’s supply of positive emotions. It does not 
matter whether this unanticipated outcome of care is conscious or uncon-
scious, whether it is planned or unintended. The point here is that the 
phenomenological exploration of the meanings of care in the entire ecol-
ogy of people’s lives brings to the surface important and understudied 
elements, perhaps a blend of new and old elements, which nonetheless 
acquire a completely new significance in light of Collins’ IR model and 
with the inclusion of same-sex parents. One of these elements concerns 
exactly the energising and empowering effects of care responsibilities that 
visibly help people not only to handle the fatigue connected with their 
daily multiple tasks and routines but also to address their perceived status 
exclusion from other contexts.
 Parenting Gives Me Energy
The energising nature of care is illustrated by Jason, one of the gay fathers 
we have already met. In the following excerpt, Jason underlines the self- 
empowering effects of care responsibility when he recalls the challenging 
period during which he was finishing his dissertation, teaching full-time 
and being a dad:
R:  It was a hellish couple of years. But at the same time I think being a 
dad helped me to balance out some of that. I mean I think if I would 
not have been a dad and would have just been trying to finish the 
dissertation while teaching full-time, I think I would have driven 
myself crazy. [….] Because for me parenting really gives me energy.
I: In what sense?
R:  I feel, well, after—my kids make me feel good about myself and 
academia doesn’t always make me feel good about yourself [laugh-
ter]. In fact, growing up, neither of my—I’ve always felt a little inse-
cure in academia just cause my, neither of my parents were college 
graduates and this whole thing is very—my parents were pig farmers 
and so I’ve always felt very insecure.
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Jason is a professor in a liberal arts college who is not extremely satis-
fied with his professional career and feels frustrated when he compares his 
CV and publication records with those of his colleagues. However, nei-
ther his emotional difficulties related to his ongoing process of coming 
out nor the frustrations connected with his unsatisfactory professional 
career seem to put him down. And his energy, as he says, emerges from 
his parental activities and responsibilities.
On the other hand, Sarah, a single mother, highlights how inhabiting 
all at once the statuses of single mother, part-time student and full-time 
worker can create a sense of “non-fitting” or a feeling of status 
exclusion:
R:  Yeah, like I don’t know, it makes me feel like I don’t fit in very well 
at school.
I: You don’t fit in?
R:  Well, because nobody in my department really has children, other 
than some part-time students, and so I don’t know, the people are 
like at a different stage in their life because, even though they’re 
around the same age as me, they don’t have like a lot of responsibili-
ties in life so they can go out and socialize and do whatever. And me, 
I don’t get to go out and socialize ever, and if I do, I have to take her 
with me. So it’s a different kind of social life.
She also describes the sticky labelling process others do, based on ste-
reotypical assumptions and prejudices towards her multiple statuses as 
single mother, full-time worker mother and student:
R:  I feel like a lot of times when people find out that I’m a single parent 
they always have all these stereotypes of what I am and, […] you 
know what I mean, stereotypes of what I’m supposed to be like. […] 
Like people just have stereotypes of what single parents are like, you 
know, that I don’t spend time with her and stuff like that. And I spend 
more time with her than most married moms do. […] People just 
have these stereotypes about … like that whole unwed mother kind of 
thing and me be a kind of stereotype [….] Yeah, like a married couple 
where the mother is like a homemaker and all that other crap.
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However, neither the non-fitting feeling nor the stereotypes connected 
to her status of single mother seem to dramatically affect her sense of self- 
confidence, her productivity and her drive for action—in short, her level 
of emotional energy (EE), as clearly emerges in the following excerpt:
R:  I am [energetic]. I manage my time extremely well because I know 
[…] other people, who have a lot less on their plate, who struggle to 
get all their work done; and I always get everything I need done, 
always.
Sarah is one of the interviewees I had the chance to meet again for lunch 
several months after our first meeting, and with whom, for a while, I had 
also been regularly in touch via email. Her humble but firm self- reliance as 
well as her cheeriness were still there the last time I saw her, when she was 
going to move to another city, brilliantly progressing with her PhD, going 
through several job interviews and happily taking care of her daughter. She 
eventually became a successful manager and consultant of several govern-
mental institutions and non-profit organisations in Washington D.C.
 The Busier I Am, the More Effective I Am
Roger, father of three children, in remembering an extremely busy period 
of his past, emphasises how the challenges connected to finding a balance 
between his work, a master program, his wife’s pregnancy and other 
important care-related issues pushed him to become more effective and 
productive:
R:  […] My son was born in January of 2002 and the following August I 
started a master’s programme at night. And those two things forced me 
to become a much better manager of time, to really allocate, you know, 
this much time for this, this much time for this. […] When I have a 
little bit less requirements to get done, fewer requirements, I’ve gotten 
lazy about being careful. […] Well, there’s an expression that if you want 
something to get done, ask a busy person to do it. And I think that defi-
nitely holds true for me. The busier I am, the more effective I am.
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Roger is not an isolated case. Several other interviewees confirm the idea 
that work-related efficiency increases when care-related responsibilities 
are added to the daily routines. Byron is one of them. Byron is a wealthy 
financial advisor who, at the age of 52, decided to have a child with a 
lesbian friend. At the time of the interview, they lived in separate homes 
and worlds, but they equally shared childcare responsibilities. This is 
Byron’s account of increased efficiency:
I:  Would you renounce to something in term of career or job opportu-
nities or your personal development…
R:  Well, is that a good question for me because I don’t have to renounce 
anything, you know.
I:  Well, if you had, probably if you had additional care 
responsibilities…
R:  Maybe, but I could still manage to do my job. You know, I became 
extremely efficient after the baby was born in doing the work with 
30 or 40 percent less time and I still managed to do it all.
I: Really?
R:  Absolutely, mm, hmm. Because time had many more things packed 
into it so I had to become more efficient—a rather easy thing to do. 
If you want someone to do something, you pick someone who is 
busy to make sure it gets done, you know.
I: So, the more you are busy…
R: The more productive you become, absolutely.
The theme of the increased efficiency and productivity connected to 
care responsibilities seems to emerge recurrently for both male and female 
caregivers, be they gay/lesbian or not. But, whereas for the female sub-
jects of my sample, the increased efficiency is often experienced within 
the domestic sphere, men, in contrast, still seem to measure it by looking 
at their ability of “getting things done” within the professional context. 
Alena, for instance, is one of the numerous women who explicitly stated 
to measure their efficiency by “trying to use every bit of time efficiently” 
both at work and at home:
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I also think it’s really, it’s been good for me because I’m a very, I’m a hyper- 
efficient person. I was before a very efficient person when I worked, and so 
I have this, I always want to maximize what I can do in any given time that 
I have. And that was true at home as well, I would have a bunch of different 
projects to get done and I would be trying to use every bit of time effi-
ciently, whether I was at home or at work.
On the other hand, Jacqueline is one of the women who seem willing 
to step back or to renounce their career prospects in order to find a satis-
fying balance between work and family, or to facilitate their partner’s 
career advancement. Interestingly enough, Jacqueline’s account of the 
increased efficiency focuses here mostly on her husband’s arduous attempt 
to reconcile work, professional development and family, rather than on 
her own experience as full-time worker and mother of three children:
Well, yes, because you have less time to work and so you have to be much 
more efficient. But I think that’s true of whether you have children or 
whether it’s something else that’s taking up your life. Like my husband, I 
think it was right after my second child was born, no, it was actually he 
started before and it was while he was doing it that she was born, he did an 
MBA. He was working full-time, we had a young baby, I was pregnant and 
he started an MBA. And his life was insane. I mean, he went to classes in 
the evening and, you know, when you already have a full-time job that’s 
really demanding and you have a child, you think I cannot add anything 
else to my plate. And when it happens, you do it, you deal with it.
In the following quotation, George seems to develop still another 
aspect related to the theme of increased efficiency. Having children helped 
him learn how to rely on other people in a way he was not used before, 
which, in turn, improved the overall quality of both his work and his life:
For example, when I do interviews for a film I used to sit down and tran-
scribe all the interviews. […] And that’s how you absorb the material, that’s 
how I absorb the material and that’s how I start thinking creatively. I can’t 
do it now, I can’t take seven hours a day and sit down—so I send it out. And 
the same thing is, even for looking for footage, I used to like to do it all 
myself because I felt very proud of—a film that has my stamp on every 
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aspect of it. And so I had to change my mind and think that my works now 
have my sensibility but I sort of have to rely on other people to help me. All 
that comes with professional growth, too, and confidence. I don’t know if 
they’re separate but I do know that it helps now that I have kids that I have 
to rely on other people. But I also might have grown professionally where 
I’m confident enough to share responsibility and I know my ideas are strong 
enough that I know that I can communicate them clearly to people and 
have the same execution. […] They [care and work] complement each 
other in that way because I know I have to make decisions quicker and 
probably in the end I come to the same decision. I come to the same deci-
sion but now I come to it a lot more quickly because I don’t have the time 
for—I ask people for help in a way that I didn’t do before, and I think that’s 
always good, asking for help. It stretches the work, it stretches you.
 Energy Begets Energy
Not only care-related responsibilities produce a second wind and an extra 
layer of energy, inducing people to become more efficient in getting 
things done and more focused in achieving their goals, but they also pos-
sess an emotion-enhancing effect which creates virtuous loops of ongoing 
EE production. Roger, the above-mentioned project manager, explicitly 
talks about the “energizing power” of care, stressing how the EE deriving 
from his care activities not only compensates for the physical exhaustion 
but is also positively reflected on his job accomplishments:
It’s unbelievable, they just have two speeds it seems, fast forward and stop. 
And that has to carry over to some degree. On the one hand it makes you 
exhausted because you have to keep up with them all the time, but on the 
other hand energy sort of begets more energy. So the kids go to bed and I’m 
tired, but at the same time I’m energized and I have the energy and the 
strength to keep working later at night that I might not have if they weren’t 
there.
Several examples support the domino effect idea that care-related 
responsibilities beget more results and more energy to achieve them. 
Julia, the single mother who happened to give birth to her daughter at 
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the same time she lost her job, attributes the merit of her further educa-
tion (and income increase) to the birth of her daughter, explaining how 
the energetic loop in which she was forced pushed her to think that it 
would have been “best to nip it in the bud” and get through a temporary 
period of stress in order to improve her cultural and economic capital:
R:  […] And in fact I probably wouldn’t have pursued education, the 
truth be known, had Sarah not be born. I made that decision based 
on her. I would have continued in the mental health field and not 
thinking about summers off or the hours I’m working or the breaks 
I have off.
I: So you studied more because you have a kid.
R: Right, I went back to school.
I: It sounds like a paradox [laughter].
R:  Right, and I decided it would be best to nip it in the bud, get it over 
with when she was young, go full force, gung-ho, get through it and 
then I can relax and I’d have a career. And my income doubled, that 
was another good part of going back to school.
The energy loops care brings in seem to induce people not only to 
accomplish ordinary tasks but also to visualise and appreciate entirely 
new details of their lived experience—details that, most likely, they would 
never have explored otherwise, as Jeremy tells us in the following quote:
[…] because they bring a fresh perspective, they bring in energy, they bring 
a vitality to things. When you have children in a family there’s a vitality to 
things, there’s a shakeup, well, why would you do these things. You’re 
exposed to a lot of new material because of children.
 Good Stress and Bad Stress
The productivity of care is also translated in an interesting distinction 
between “good stress” and “bad stress,” as Byron illustrates in the follow-
ing quotation, evoking the theme of the increased efficiency connected 
with his parental responsibilities:
6 The Productivity of Care
a.pratesi@chester.ac.uk
 143
There’s good stress and there’s bad stress, but the stress that causes the feel-
ing of responsibility in caregiving, in a way, that’s not resented. I like the 
opportunity to have the pressure and the stress of caring for this child, so 
it’s a good thing.
Another example of good stress is connected for Kendra to the “tremen-
dous amount of responsibility” she describes when thinking about the 
amount of power she exerts on her children as a role model and the 
amount of personal growth stimulated by “these little people just study-
ing you”:
And so you have these people that like look at you like you’re their idol and 
you feel such a sense of responsibility, like wow, I really have a tremendous 
amount of responsibility. And I’m not saying it’s bad or good, it just is a lot 
of responsibility. And so that really pushes you, for me as a person to really 
be clear on what is pertinent[?], what do I want to teach them, what do I 
want them to know about the world. If I say one thing and do something 
else, I’m contradicting myself, clearly I’m not, that’s not how I want them 
to grow up. I want them to understand that, you know, we have certain 
values in our family about just basic respect for people or whatever that 
might be, and to be able to live that out consistently. […] And that is a 
huge personal growth thing because when you don’t have anybody, when 
it’s just you, you don’t have to think about that as much. But when you 
have somebody like literally studying you, these little malleable people, you 
see it, for me I see it in a whole new light, like wow, that’s powerful, that’s 
a lot of responsibility. […] So I think for me that has been the hugest 
growth piece, and it comes from that sense of responsibility of these little 
people just studying you.
There is some sort of good stress also in the frustration which at times 
characterises those moments when one “can’t really do anything produc-
tive” because of childcare responsibilities. This (purported) temporary 
lack of productivity for the market seems to be amply compensated by 
the engagement in playful care-related activities whose benefits will even-
tually be positively reflected on other contexts:
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Morgan:  You know, if he needs to go outside for a walk to calm him 
down, well, that’s a walk that I never would have taken had I 
not been caring for him. I would be at the office or I would be 
doing something here at the house. And with Henry there’s a 
lot of time where you can’t really do anything productive and 
so you just, you know, you can go for a walk or look around 
the yard or…
Alena:  Yeah, that’s right. So it’s been really nice. That surprised me 
and that’s been really a nice thing.
On the bad stress side, instead, this seems to be more linked to the 
absence of care or to the presence of problematic aspects within care rather 
than to the presence of important care activities and responsibilities in 
themselves. In the following excerpt, Pamela describes the stressful feel-
ings she experiences each time she separates from her children as she 
brings them back to her ex-partner. She also describes the emotional roll-
ercoaster she experiences each time she has a strong argument with her 
“verbal” elder son; nonetheless, she cannot even imagine or remember 
her life before her children became part of it:
R:  When they’re not with me it’s very hard sometimes to separate from 
them. If we’ve been together for the whole weekend and we’ve had a 
really good time and then when I go to drop them off, it can be very 
hard for me to let go. And at one point I think it was hard for the 
kids but now I think they’re very comfortable going back and forth. 
They’re like okay, bye, you know. And certainly what I gained from 
having the children, I’ve learned a lot about myself and just never, I 
can’t remember my life without them.
I: That’s interesting, there’s not a “before”.
R:  Well, I don’t remember it anyway. Yeah, you know, they fill me up in 
so many ways with good things and even though we’re busy running 
around and I complain sometimes that we’re never home, it’s some-
body else’s activity each night. It’s also fun, it’s fun to, I think, see the 
world through the eyes of a child growing up and a child that you 
actually have an influence on and you’re helping to mould them and 
teach them. It’s also extremely frustrating because my son, he knows 
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how to press my buttons, so to speak. You know, he’s very verbal 
from when he was little and he can negotiate the feathers off a 
chicken. He’s something. So he can be very challenging and very 
frustrating. I think from having children I’ve reached, I’ve developed 
a range of emotion that I didn’t know was possible from just pure 
elation to anger, frustration, hurt. You know, he can say things that 
hurt me and I have to remember that this is a child and put it into 
context. You know, it’s really an emotional rollercoaster in a lot of 
ways, lots of ups and downs.
Happy workers are more productive. Simon seems to corroborate the 
vast and growing literature associating productivity with happiness and/
or subjective well-being. The “tremendous sense of wellbeing” he is get-
ting from having a family—no matter how demanding—allows him to 
be productive, resilient and creative at work:
There’s a lot of creativity involved in our teaching and our scholarship. And 
a lot of people need to feel that things are sort of under control and okay 
and they’re relatively happy in their roles in order to be productive. And I 
think that I’m certainly one of those people. If I’m really stressed out or 
really bothered about something, I can hardly keep focusing on my work 
[…] Some people do just the opposite, they channel themselves into their 
work and they get a lot done. But I don’t, I have to be happy with myself 
and life in order to be productive. And, you know, that way having a fam-
ily, which is so satisfying to me, despite all of the demands, is tremendously 
helpful because I just have this tremendous sense of wellbeing that I can 
carry over to my work and to the rest of my life.
 Less Ambitious, Less Perfectionist, But Still 
More Productive
The productivity of care does seem to be jeopardised by a smoother, less 
rigid approach to professions and careers or by an overall redefinition of 
people’s priorities and ambitions. On the contrary, revisiting one’s atti-
tudes towards work and life and reviewing one’s existential priorities can 
be extremely helpful to increase productivity and efficiency. Emily, 
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mother of a one-year old child and PhD candidate at the time of the 
interview, provides in what follows her idea about the difference between 
ambition and productivity. For Emily, developing a different attitude 
towards her work and future ambitions because of her care responsibili-
ties does not necessarily mean being less productive:
I think I became more practical also with my work. Before it was some-
thing that I thought that I would really have to be something great or 
something special and I was very concerned about. And after Tommy was 
born it’s something that, I started to think of it as something that is very 
important for me to get done. In terms of wanting it to happen, it hasn’t 
changed. But the way I approach it, I’ve become more practical, I think, 
you know. It’s whatever I can do, it’s whatever I can do with the amount of 
time that I have. […] No, I think I got much more productive, that’s true. 
Every time I have now that I sit down, I have more, a greater ability to 
concentrate and get things done, I think. I have this feel of urgency that I 
only have four hours or I only have this afternoon, this day or, you know, 
I have to leave at 4:30 to pick Tommy up no matter what. […] But now, 
you know, when I have to leave, I have to leave, so I have to be more pro-
ductive. […] I got less ambitious, but I got more productive.
For most respondents, the meaning and the importance of work have 
not diminished and the ability to get more things done in a shorter 
amount of time has improved; but the overall attention to details and 
other performance indicators can be to a certain extent lowered, as Eliza 
states in the following quote:
I don’t think I feel differently about the value of it, I think I’m more efficient, 
you know, I try to be more efficient. So I don’t think I’m doing actually very 
much less work but I’m able to be more efficient. I also think my standards 
are not as particular, you know, I’m not as a perfectionist as I was before, so 
I could let things go if they’re not quite how I would like them to be.
Being less of a perfectionist is not necessarily deleterious for work pro-
ductivity; quite the opposite. For Stephanie, worrying less about perfec-
tion and more about results allows her to achieve more goals, whereas in 
the past she used to be less productive precisely because of her excessive 
zeal and eagerness to do well:
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Definitely, absolutely, because I am a Type A personality so I was so ambi-
tious and so focused on the job that I gave it too much importance; so the 
job sometimes I would too much, worry too much about the job, about the 
career. And worrying too much, actually, can be paralyzing. While right 
now that is thing number two and not number one. Actually I see that I 
can accomplish most things in less time just because I worried less about 
the perfection of the job.
Some jobs and occupations are more prone than others to be positively 
influenced by parental care. Thus, for example, Sullivan’s fatherhood has 
significantly improved his social skills and the way he approaches his pro-
fession as a child psychiatrist. On the other hand, he also considers that 
his overall professional performance in terms of availability outside the 
working hours has been reduced, as if extra-time working patterns were 
necessarily an indicator of good performances. Perhaps one could say that 
care manages to achieve what trade unions are not anymore able to 
achieve:
Well, I actually think that being a father has helped me immensely being a 
child psychiatrist because I really understand things much differently. I 
mean I really have an understanding of parenting completely different than 
before. So I get it when parents are frustrated. And I didn’t get it before, it 
was too theoretical. So I think I’m a much, much better clinician and ther-
apist. And I think that that, you know, patients know that. On the other 
hand, I’m less present, like if people want to talk to me outside of my work 
hours I’m just not available because I’m doing something with my kids. 
But almost everyone understands that, almost everyone understands that 
and they’re very forgiving. And then, you know, things like I work, the 
hours I work have to be fewer based on things.
Having or not childcare responsibilities translates itself in a totally dif-
ferent sense and use of time, as Vivien notices in the following excerpt 
when she talks about her former boss. Discussing the theme of her 
increased productivity since she became a mother, she recalls when she 
used to work late because of her boss’ totally different perception and 
management of time due to the fact that she did not have any care 
responsibilities:
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I:  Do you feel that your productivity … from a professional point of 
view, has been affected by care activities?
R:  No, no, I don’t. As a matter of fact, I think I’ve become more effi-
cient and, you know, much more focused when I’m at work know-
ing that there’s things that I need to get done and I need to get done 
in this timeframe because I don’t have the flexibility to get it done 
later. So I’m much more diligent and focused on achieving those 
goals and achieving them quickly and getting things done early 
because
I: So your productivity has been affected positively?
R:  Yeah, I think, I guess so, I think I’m more … more efficient, I think, 
yeah. Whereas I remember in previous work experiences when, for 
example, my boss before I worked here, she was not married, she didn’t 
have children and she didn’t care about her time, you know, well, she 
just thought about it differently, so that if she had to stay in the office, 
she would work in the office all day and then at 5:00 we would try to 
go home because that was the end of our workday and she would all of 
a sudden remember a project that we had to do and keep us there until 
7:00 at night or something. It was, you know, to me that was ridicu-
lous because you could have done it earlier in the day, why stay late. 
But she just didn’t think about her time the same way.
In sum, as all the examples above illustrated, care is simultaneously a 
key drive increasing the ability to achieve their objectives in a smaller 
amount of time and a key source of EE. But there are other less visible 
and less explored aspects of care we need to highlight if we want to get 
closer to its core nature. The role of care as status enhancer and its func-
tion in increasing people’s subjective well-being are among them.
 Something That Makes You Feel Good: Care 
as Status Enhancer
The sentimentalisation of adoption and, more generally, the emotional 
capitalisation of children’s value are not new social phenomena; they have 
been traced back to the twentieth century, as Viviana Zelizer (1994) has 
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shown. What is new in the twenty-first century are the “customers” in the 
emotional market: they have expanded beyond more or less traditional 
married couples to include singles and same-sex couples. “I have children 
because it makes me feel good,” says Kendrick driving me through his 
personal experience as a single father.
For a similar reason, Christian, a successful financial advisor living in 
NYC, still single at the age of 38 and worried about getting older without 
having a family, decides to start building his family by adopting a child. 
Christian is the only heterosexual single adoptive father of the four pres-
ent in my sample of 80 caregivers; the other single adoptive fathers are 
gay. Christian’s case is particularly interesting not only because it is quite 
difficult to find a man who, at a certain point of his life, decides to adopt 
a child by himself, but also because he represents an example of a still 
relatively unnoticed, certainly understudied, but apparently growing 
phenomenon: adoption by single heterosexual men. These men, having 
postponed or given up on the search for the right woman, do not yet give 
up on the idea of having children, as if in their transition to adulthood, 
fatherhood assumed a more central role than marriage, and marriage 
could be either temporarily postponed or even bypassed.
This new emerging phenomenon, which, paraphrasing Hertz (2006), 
could be branded “single by chance, fathers by choice,” would definitely 
deserve further analyses, particularly in light of current debates and dis-
courses surrounding care and parenthood in contemporary society. This 
phenomenon seems to support that part of the literature on citizenship 
which highlights how, in Western societies, parenthood provides full enti-
tlement as a “normal citizen” even more than heterosexuality on its own 
(Turner 1999a, 2008; Richardson and Turner 2001). During the inter-
view, Christian told me he knew several other professionals or business-
men living in NYC who had opted for single parent adoption before 
finding the right partner. It would be interesting to explore the extent to 
which this still not-so-visible phenomenon is changing our notions of the 
family or just revisiting its conventional steps: first a child and then a 
partner rather than the other way around. Above all, it would be interest-
ing to know the extent to which the phenomenon of men desiring par-
enthood, with or without a partner, is becoming less uncommon also in 
those countries that do not legally allow single-parent adoption. At the 
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time of the interview, Christian was dating a female partner and did not 
exclude at all the possibility of getting married, should he find the right 
match. However, although he still had not found a partner, he decided to 
adopt as a single parent because—he says—similarly to a woman who 
decides to get pregnant, he felt that the time had arrived for him to get 
something more out of his life; something that could make him “feel 
good”:
I: Why did you choose it?
R:  Well, I just thought that, you know, well, I knew I wanted to have a 
family and I thought it was very important to have more meaning in 
my life than just working and going out drinking with friends and 
blah, blah, blah, you know. I mean I liked my life, you know, I never 
complained, I’m not one of these people that complains about not 
being married or whatever because I mean I actually, I like living in 
New York City and I like my friends, I like my social life and I like, 
my job is okay, you know. But I just thought I wanted to have a little 
more meaning to it, and I always wanted to have a family and I just 
didn’t want to wait any longer because I was getting older. So I don’t 
know, you know, as far as like how this, I mean years from now how 
do you judge this, I don’t know. I really thought I could provide a 
loving home for a child, then that child would bring as much to my 
life, you know, as I would to his, you know, maybe it’s like one of 
these things where it’s hard to really explain it. People always ask me 
this, I don’t know what you’re—it’s a hard question to answer because 
it’s like why are you doing this or what do you want to get out of it 
or what are your expectations, and none of those—they’re all hard 
questions because you’re not really sure what you’re gonna get out of 
it. […] …but you’re doing something that makes you feel good as 
you’re really providing something else that, something for a child 
that can benefit his or her life. I don’t know, I’m never good at put-
ting this into words. I guess it’s the same reason people get pregnant, 
they just, they feel like they […] have something more to give or 
they want something more out of their life and, you know, the only 
way to do that is to have a child in their life.
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I:  So it doesn’t make any difference, in this respect, adoption or 
pregnancy?
R: No, it wouldn’t for me.
Max, instead, a single caregiver, clarifies in the following quotation 
how taking care of his grandmother not only makes him feel good, but it 
also helps him to rediscover a sense of existential continuity, security, 
meaningfulness; in other words, a clearer sense of his own personal iden-
tity and biographical trajectory. Through the daily interaction with his 
grandmother, he comes to know old family stories and anecdotes he 
would never have known otherwise and this creates a sort of coherent and 
uplifting narrative in his life:
I guess gain, you gain a nice sense of giving, helping other people makes me 
feel better about myself, so I always think it’s good to give. Because I think 
it generally makes you feel better about yourself as a person. I always find 
that, I feel good about […] helping my grandmother somewhat, helping 
out. And knowledge, (she) tells a lot of stories, giving a sense of what it was 
like in the older days and you get a lot of tradition, and the closeness, 
there’s always company, it’s always nice to have people around, you know, 
get a lot of welcomeness, which is good. And we play games, we play 
Scrabble, do some things together.
Another clear account of care as “something that makes you feel good” 
is provided by Tom, who also shows how the emotional dynamics implied 
in care can be activated through people’s internal conversations: the long 
lasting effects of EE and other emotional states are activated in people’s 
mind even when the person who receives care is not physically present. In 
the following excerpt, Tom describes himself as “really energized” by the 
simple idea of going to visit his elderly friends, even before he sees them. 
And then, his energy—in his own words—“goes greater, higher” when he 
is with them, and it lasts also after he leaves them. The positive EE pro-
duced and released through Tom’s internal conversations assumes even 
more interesting connotations when we consider the fact that he is talk-
ing about elderly people affected by Alzheimer’s disease who interact with 
him mostly through their body language and their emotions:
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R: […] I get really energized when I go there to take care of them.
I:  How do you, first of all, can you walk me through this kind of feel-
ing energized, being energized? How do you feel energized?…
R:  I feel, yes, my energy level before I even got there even goes greater, 
higher. It makes me want to do more than what they even expect me 
to do.
I:  Does it last, do you feel that this effect, energizing effect lasts also 
when you leave, that you still have this sort of…
R:  Yes, I still have it, yes, after I leave the persons, yes, knowing that I 
have done something for somebody and that is my emotional energy, 
yeah.
I:  How do you get a sense that you did a good job if they don’t tell 
you…
R:  The way they do respond to certain things, I do pick up their appre-
ciation, their body language, yes.
I:  So even if they are in an advanced stage of Alzheimer’s disease, you 
still do have…
R:  I do recognize their body language and I even recognize when they 
are happy and when they are sad, yes.
Besides making people feel good, care, and particularly parental care, 
possesses important implications in terms of status enhancer; it provides 
people with different individual reputations2 and social positioning, quite 
often producing what I have called a status upgrading effect. The status 
upgrading effect in terms of personal reward, self-worth and self-esteem 
deriving from care responsibilities is eloquently exemplified by Kiara. In 
the following quotation, she gets emotional in trying to express how tak-
ing care of a needy person makes her feel “a good person”:
Well, there’s definitely a satisfaction that you get and you certainly get a lot 
of love, and you get a feeling of being a good person. There’s a lot of per-
sonal satisfaction, if you will, in caring for someone else, even if they can’t 
tell you they appreciate it. […] Yes, and when you’re caring for somebody, 
for example, who’s sick, sometimes you do it because you know how it 
feels. When you’re sick and somebody, you know, when you’re up in the 
middle of the night vomiting and somebody—when I remember being 
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little and somebody being with me, that was a wonderful thing, you know. 
It makes me a little teary to think about that. When you’re really feeling 
terrible and there’s someone there for you, it’s a wonderful thing. So to be 
that wonderful person for someone else is a really satisfying thing [crying]. 
Also, from my religion it’s—I don’t know if you know the word, mitzvah, 
a mitzvah is a good deed. So it’s really a mitzvah, more than a good deed, 
but it’s like a wonderful, it’s like beyond words how wonderful it is to care 
for someone who needs care, and especially if it would be an older parent, 
to care for someone who’s ill, you know, to care for a child. So I’ve kind of 
grown up with this teaching of, you know, to do for others and to invite the 
needy person into your home, to give to the poor, you know, donate when 
you can. So there’s this satisfaction of feeling like I did a good thing.
The implications of parenthood in terms of status are visibly illustrated 
in the following excerpt where Morgan and Alena, discussing the social 
propensity to give parents a higher ranking in society, spontaneously and 
explicitly use the term “status”:
Morgan:  […] I think a lot of men get a lot of status out of being fathers, 
even though they … they don’t necessarily do as much.
Alena:  They may not do as much, yeah, they may not be very involved 
fathers but they get a lot of juice culturally from being fathers. 
Look at all our politicians [they] have to have children, pretty 
much, to get elected.
Pamela pushes herself to say that motherhood provided her not only 
with a different social status (“I gained some respect”; “you can connect 
with other people through your children”) but also with a different social 
visibility:
I:  Do you feel that other people started looking at you in a different 
way since you became a mom?
R:  Yeah, definitely since I became a mom. For some people in my fam-
ily I then gained some respect, whereas as a single adult or coupled 
but no children, yeah, it was though I didn’t exist in some ways. And 
I think part of it is because you can connect maybe with other peo-
ple through your children. You compare notes about your children. 
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But it was my sister-in-law, really, who once I became a parent I 
think she definitely viewed me in a different light. And part of that 
may be because I’ve changed since becoming a parent, to some 
extent.
The social acknowledgement of the caregiver’s worthiness reinforces 
the emotionally empowering and rewarding aspects of care. Martin illus-
trates this in the following excerpt where he also highlights a form of 
gender discrimination towards single mothers. As a single father, he feels 
he is getting a substantial amount of social acknowledgment and reward 
or even admiration for the fact that he is taking part in children’s social 
and recreational activities at school; whereas for single mothers, he says, 
there is not such an appreciation because, from a societal point of view, 
they are just doing what they are supposed to do. Thus, Martin’s involve-
ment in his children’s lives and social activities seems to be important not 
only to ensure the children’s well-being but also for his individual reputa-
tion, for his being “seen in a positive light”:
R:  And that’s what I always try to show the boys as well, which is, I 
always prioritize their needs and their wants and what’s important to 
them first. I’m gonna run, I’m gonna do for them and if there’s 
something going on at the school or wherever else. And again, I 
think people have only seen me in a positive light because when 
there’s an event everyone at the school knows me. If there’s an event 
at the school I’m there with the kids. If there’s an event, you know, 
at the park or in the community or something else, everyone knows 
me because again, they see me with the boys, always have all the 
time. […] I think society sees it as it’s the mother’s job and responsi-
bility. And I think that’s unfortunately a stereotypically shame, 
unfortunately, that, you know, the mother should stay at home and, 
oh, she’s getting child support or whatever. I think there is a double 
standard and I think, you know, I get accolades for it where a single 
mom, they might go oh, well, that’s what she’s supposed to do. And 
frankly, it’s sexist [laughter].
I:  So you think that there’s a distinction between single moms and 
single dads in this respect?
R:  Absolutely, absolutely, and again I think single moms get the short, 
for the most part get the short end of the stick on that one.
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Feeling good and acquiring a sense of self-esteem or self-worthiness are 
not the only emotional states brought up by parenthood or care more 
generally. Megan underlines the particular sense of pride that accompa-
nies every experience of parenthood perceived as successful. And such 
sense of pride assumes a completely different meaning and implication 
when it is analysed within the context of gay and lesbian parents; I will 
address this important point more closely in the chapter specifically 
devoted to same-sex parenthood. It is worth noticing, here, the emphasis 
with which Megan stresses the “REALLY” enormous amount of pride she 
feels for being a good mother (the capitalised letters indicate such 
emphasis):
Well, I didn’t think of myself as a mother and I REALLY think of myself as 
a mother, and I REALLY, I take an enormous amount of pride in being a 
good mother, I mean I really, really do. And it’s very valuable to me. And I 
feel like I’m good at it.
In the following quotation, James talks explicitly about his increased 
sense of self-worth and how the emotional effects originating from his 
successful parenthood can also create a positive emotional contagion in 
other contexts:
Well, yes, I think I started to take things much more seriously with my child 
because I guess it’s a means to, I don’t know, it just, I guess, changed my whole 
outlook on life because the sense of responsibility for a child is almost over-
whelming and I guess I tended to put that into all aspects of my life. Because I 
feel like a success as a father, I think I can use that in other ways in my life. It’s 
really made me feel much better about my own self- worth, I guess.
 Compensatory Effect of Care and Care 
as an Alibi
Another less explored aspect of care within the context of its positive/
productive sides is what we could call the compensatory effect of care. 
Sometimes care responsibilities and activities help people make up for 
and/or justify shortcomings in other contexts, and particularly in the 
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professional context. The compensatory role of care goes hand in hand 
with another characteristic of the phenomenology of care, which, in my 
thematic analysis, I called care as an alibi. Using care as an alibi occurs 
when care responsibilities are used as a sort of ex post justification for not 
having been able to accomplish certain goals in life. This justification 
typically occurs in a professional setting—when people use care as an 
excuse to justify their own career gaps or shortcomings; but it can also 
involve other contexts—for example, when people use childcare respon-
sibilities as a justification for not being involved in other types of care 
responsibilities, such as elderly care.
Although these two aspects of care share some common ground, they 
are quite distinct. The compensatory effect of care, in fact, is an eminently 
subjective process that tends to precede, as its premise, the care choice, 
while care as an alibi is an eminently inter-subjective process which is 
subsequent to the experience of care and is used as a form of explanation 
of failures in front of a whole set of generalised others (i.e. colleagues, 
family members and friends). In other words, care can assume a compen-
satory role as a redeeming and consolatory strategy making up for disap-
pointments in other contexts, or it can be used as an alibi, to explain and 
somehow justify those disappointments in front of others. The rationale 
of the first strategy might be summarised as follows: I am not a successful 
worker/teacher/writer/partner/academic/and so on, but I am a successful 
parent/caregiver/friend. The argument of the second strategy can be 
instead illustrated with the following statement: I am not a successful 
worker/teacher/partner/and so on, because I am a successful parent/care-
giver. Although quite different, these two mental processes belong to the 
broader category of the productivity of care illustrated in this chapter 
because they both possess the ability to transform unsuccessful (or not- 
so- successful) existential or professional outcomes into positive ones, or 
at least to mitigate their costs. Many of the caregivers I met, more or less 
unconsciously, seem to be using both these strategies when they are try-
ing to assess their outcomes in the professional world as either successful 
or unsuccessful. The ambivalence of these strategies, especially when they 
are used simultaneously, is exemplified in the following excerpt where 
Jason, on the one hand, transforms family care into an excellent substi-
tute and rationale for his not-so-brilliant CV, and, on the other, he can-
didly admits the following:
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I’m often surprised at, particularly with dads, I find that other college pro-
fessors, men who have kids, I’m often surprised at what they’re willing to 
do, like come in at night, teach night classes and be gone a lot more than 
I’m willing to do. […] So I’ve felt bad before with other men who I know 
have kids and I’m not willing to do things that they seem to be willing to 
do, for work purposes. So I suppose in some ways I’m an exception in that 
way. I think that they would probably all say, too, though, that their family 
is the number one priority. But time wise I just […] Time wise I think I put 
more in with the kids than many of my colleagues who have kids, male 
colleagues who have kids. And that’s really important. And I feel like, I 
mean I do feel like that’s hurt me professionally. I mean I just, actually this 
afternoon I got together with a guy who was in grad school with me now 
and he probably has, I just saw his CV the other day, he must have 12 or 
13 publications. He just works like crazy. He’s got two kids and we’re very 
similar people but he just doesn’t spend as much time with his kids but he’s 
got this amazing, this really nice CV now that is much better than mine. It 
has a couple book chapters and, you know, and it’s, you know, in some 
ways the routine of class, of teaching, is, you know, I have to be there for 
that. But it’s those extra things like writing and research and things like 
that, that I find that I don’t do. Maybe I’m using the kids as an excuse, but 
I think a lot of that is because I’ve chosen just to spend more time with the 
kids, too. When you’re a parent you’re always comparing yourself to other 
parents. And, most of the time, I often feel like I’m just not measuring up, 
you know.
Jacqueline assesses the benefits and the costs of care with a similar 
ambivalence. “If I did not have children then that would be a different 
story”, she claims; however, she then adds, what I get from them “is price-
less”. If I had more time, she continues, I would have done more research 
and attended more conferences; but “I was never really a career woman 
anyway because when I accepted the job that they offered me at XXXX it was 
not a tenure track”. And so on and so forth. Her wavering between “ifs” 
and “buts” underlines the circularity and the ambivalence of her argu-
ments, to a certain extent torn between the use of care as an alibi and the 
use of care as a substitute, but ultimately more inclined to admit that 
prioritising care over her academic career helped her to find “the perfect 
balance”:
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Now, if I did not have children then that would be a different story. I think 
then my work would be a lot more important. But having children, you 
know, I want to spend time with them, I want to see them grow up and so 
I need to have time for that, which is also why I do what I do, because I 
have my summers. And at least if I’m crazy busy during the school year I 
know that I have three months in the summer where I can spend time with 
my children. […] Well, yes, there are things that I would like to do for 
work that I cannot do because simply I don’t have the time. On the other 
hand, what I get from my children is priceless. So, you know, it’s a trade- 
off. And then that’s the hardest thing about becoming a parent, you have 
to learn what your limitations are and live with them. Because otherwise 
you would drive yourself crazy if you, you know, if you think, oh, my God, 
I’m not putting enough time into work, I’m not doing all the things I 
should be doing. For example, I haven’t done research since I finished my 
Ph.D. because I don’t have time. I can’t go to conferences, you know, with 
children. […] … [But] I was never really a career woman anyway because 
when I accepted the job that they offered me at XXXX it was not a tenure 
track. So if I had been, you know, if career was the most important thing 
for me, I would not be doing what I do here, I would have looked for a 
tenure track position. And I didn’t because I knew right after I finished my 
Ph.D. when I was like 35, that I wanted to have children and that if I was 
gonna have children I could not dedicate as much time to my job as I 
would have needed with a tenure track position. So that’s, you know, I 
found the perfect balance.
Differently from Jacqueline’s fluctuations, Edward’s account provides a 
quite unambiguous example of the potential compensatory effect of care. 
His daughter, in fact, was born a year after a tragic event in his life: the 
sudden death of his oldest brother. Parenthood became for Edward a 
“blessing” occurrence which helped him to come to grips with that tragic 
event:
I let her know how much I love her. And I let her know how much she was 
the best thing in my life, that ever came in my life and she was a godsend. 
My daughter was born a year after my brother, my oldest brother’s death. 
My oldest brother passed away a year before my daughter was born. So she 
was born, she was like a godsend, yeah, she kind of filled the void. So to 
me, I’ve always let her know that she was a blessing. And like I said, she’s 
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the best thing that came in my life ever, ever. And if I turn back the clock, 
do I wish I could turn back the clock and change it all over again, other 
than trying to hope that at that time me that me and her mom could have 
worked things out differently like as far as being together, probably. But 
otherwise as far as having my daughter, I don’t regret a day having her.
Jerome, a single gay man who has unsuccessfully tried to become a 
father, shares his internal conversations about parenthood making some 
considerations about the intrinsically ambivalent nature of the procre-
ative choice, but also exemplifying the complexities and the grey areas 
surrounding the multiple implications and meanings of parenthood:
I don’t know, I think a lot of people, and it’s a very easy thing here to say, 
and I don’t know for women because I think women have more of a 
response to having kids. I think they’re more programmed for this. And 
maybe men, some men are too, and I’m not saying that it should be denied 
to anyone because I think that it is very important that people do what 
they feel and if they want to have a child. At the same time I think it’s a bit, 
I find it a bit conventional somehow, that, you know, people will want to 
have kids as the answer to a lot of things. And that’s my feeling. Sometimes 
I think it’s a little bit of a smokescreen in order not to assume a lot of other 
things. But I could go back over all this and say, well, this is ridiculous 
because people are, you know, I’m sure some people really feel like they 
want to have kids.
Not surprisingly, considering the gender inequality which still charac-
terises our societies, more women than men in the sample use childcare 
to explain gaps in their careers and disappointments; and often with no 
regret. Thus, although Megan concedes that childcare responsibilities 
have radically changed her professional and existential priorities, she does 
not see it as a negative occurrence:
No, and it’s not, I mean in fact I think that I, I mean it’s not all Alena and it’s 
not negative, necessarily, either. I mean if it’s made me think about what it is 
I really want to spend my time doing, then maybe that’s a positive. You know, 
if I’m only gonna be able to work, you know, if I have a finite amount of time 
for work, maybe I want to make sure that I spend that time on stuff that I 
really care about instead of trying to get an article published [laughter].
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Meredith, instead, says she would never change her choices, although 
she admits her regrets for not “having accomplished” or “written more”:
I wish I were, you know, a more productive person and I could do it all 
[laughter]. Yeah, yeah, I deeply regret not having accomplished more, not 
having written more, yeah. But knowing the circumstances and what I had 
to deal with, I would make the same choices.
The enormous power of parental care when professional career is not 
enough is highlighted by Rose in the following quote, where two of the 
most important aspects of individuals’ identity—work and family—are 
assessed, and parenthood seems to be overwhelmingly winning over 
career:
But it made me a better person because now I don’t feel lost anymore and 
I don’t feel—like I feel appreciated, I feel like I have a lot of purpose now. 
But before you just don’t really—Other than a career, what kind of purpose 
do you have before children? I don’t think, I mean that’s from my life 
experience.
On the other hand, using childcare responsibilities to explain or justify 
the absence of a fully satisfying career and expressing some regrets for this 
is more typical of some (but not all) male respondents. Having children 
and not getting a degree at the right time affected Ronald’s ability to have 
a successful and more fulfilling career, or at least his overall attitude 
towards work and career, as he says in the following quotation. In doing 
so, Ronald also points to another important aspect of parental care: the 
power it can exert not only on people’s actions and behaviours but also on 
their cognitive, affective and motivational states3:
I may not have been wealthy financially but I became wealthy in relation-
ships with my children, in memories, in—and now, you know, my children 
are adults and that’s wonderful relationships, you know, good relationships, 
loving relationships. So what I’ve gained in having children I don’t think 
can be measured. What did I lose? Maybe I lost a bit of a fulfilling career, 
perhaps, that might have been the thing I lost. But I’m a pragmatist, you 
know, I mean I know that most people, most people don’t enjoy their jobs, 
I think, for the most part. I mean some do, and they’re very privileged, I 
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think, and fortunate. But I think most people, you know, they have to 
work. They just work and it may not be everything to them, but they work. 
So I don’t see myself as… […] Yeah, I mean I guess I do think that. Although 
some people who are successful in career and also have a close family would 
disagree with me. I mean there are people, many people that have had suc-
cessful careers and successful families. I see that, I’m sure that that’s true. I 
don’t think you must have one and not have the other. I mean some people 
can, I don’t think that I’ve managed my career as well as I probably could 
have, you know. And certainly having children and not having a degree 
earlier on affected my ability to have a successful, more successful career. 
Does that make sense? It affected my attitude about that, anyway.
The examples above illustrate the internal processes through which 
people either justify their disappointments and shortcomings or find a 
sort of compensation for all their not-so-successful life accomplishments 
by means of successful and rewarding care experiences. Regardless 
whether they use care as an alibi or as a substitute for unsuccessful out-
comes, the majority of the caregivers I met seem to find in care not only 
a possible scapegoat and refuge but also the possibility to transform even 
the least significant care experience into a potential source of EE produc-
tion. What if these people would not have had care in their lives? How 
does denying people the opportunity to care about their children and 
their beloved ones raises issues of inequality also in terms of access to and 
utilisation of such emotional resources? Care, and particularly childcare, 
is a crucial site for people’s self-realisation and for their definition as 
human beings. Denying people the possibility to care as legitimate and 
fully entitled caregivers creates a serious type of inequality as it denies the 
possibility of fulfilment of one’s own potential through care. And care, as 
we saw in this chapter, can also become for some a sort of decompression 
chamber or buffering zone to make up for the inescapable disappoint-
ments and shortcomings which accompany everybody’s lives.
The self-empowering aspects of care and their relevance for status 
inclusion and the production of EE have been significantly neglected 
from current literature on care, particularly in a perspective that includes 
different ways of doing care and doing gender. This chapter has highlighted 
the productivity of care and its multiple facets in terms of increased effi-
ciency, emotionally empowering dynamics, increased well-being, status 
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enhancement and identity reinforcement and confirmation. 
Acknowledging the intrinsic value of care and highlighting its potentiali-
ties in terms of social inclusion and self-empowerment does not mean 
giving voice to a romanticised view of the world or failing to recognise 
the draining aspects of care, but rather capitalising on care as a long-term 
investment and a resource. If the majority of the caregivers in this study 
experience care, and particularly childcare, in terms of status inclusion 
and self-empowering processes, some however experience feelings of 
exclusion, isolation and powerlessness.
The capitalisation of care can only be accomplished by facilitating the 
conditions under which care can become a self-empowering and produc-
tive experience and by reducing those under which it becomes a con-
straining, excluding or EE draining experience. Creating the conditions 
for more caring, more just and more inclusive societies and  acknowledging 
the role of all different types of carers (single and partnered/married; het-
erosexual and homosexual; involved in childcare or elderly care etc.) rep-
resents the first step towards these ends. In doing that, we can also reduce 
the different forms of inequality connected to this fundamental, universal 
activity. But all this, quite obviously, cannot be left to the individuals 
alone and their personal/private responsibilities; it needs to be a public 
and political objective, and it needs to take into account all these still 
unexplored and less visible implications of care.
The next chapter illustrates other important and less explored aspects 
of care and the ways in which the care experience shapes people’s existen-
tial priorities, pathways and feelings. A preliminary emotion-based typol-
ogy of caregivers is also presented and discussed.
Notes
1. William James, The Energies of Men, New  York, Moffat, Yard and 
Company, 1913.
2. On the importance of individual reputations, see Chap. 5.
3. Social psychologists have long identified three components of attitudes: a 
cognitive component, an affective component and a motivational compo-
nent. See Scherer (2005).
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Feeling the Experience of Care: 
Emotional Typologies
Either directly or indirectly, the experience of care accompanies every-
one’s life path, from the cradle to the grave, and shapes our existence in 
ways few other social phenomena do. Care experiences affect all our exis-
tential contexts, from work to leisure time, and their emotional compo-
nents affect the ways we navigate throughout these contexts and, 
ultimately, the way we make our way in the world. This chapter provides 
some accounts about the different ways in which people choose care or 
experience it as a gift, the specific form of rationality characterising care 
(Waerness 1984), and the felt and lived experience of care, accounts which 
are summarised in a preliminary emotional and existential typology of 
the caregivers I met. Through their care practices, people experience an 
entire emotional spectrum outlining and shaping their daily practices 
and care choices but also their broader, long-term attitudes towards life 
and the ongoing process of definition of their identities. The following 
sections provide us with important insights about the caregivers’ abilities 
and creative strategies to make sense of their felt and lived experience of 
care and to make—through it—their own way in the world.
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 Care as a Choice and/or as a Gift
Whilst the positive, bright and productive sides of care are often reported 
as something unexpected, the majority of the caregivers I have met 
described care1 as a deliberate choice corresponding to the specific exis-
tential plans they have designed or imagined for their lives. This is clearly 
the case of Kendrick who, in order to pursue his parental choice, not only 
leaves his partner who did not want to have children but also renounces—
with no regrets—to a successful millionaire’s professional career. Kendrick 
has always put parenthood at the centre of his existential choices and care 
has shaped, from the outset, his whole existential ladder2:
The decision, I made the decision many, many, many, many years ago. But 
I was with, I had two long-term male relationships that, where the other 
partner did not want to have kids. So the last time I broke up that second 
relationship, which would have been about 10 years ago, I just decided it’s 
more important for me to be a parent than to wait for the right husband to 
come along. So from that standpoint the decision was easy, I always knew 
I was gonna be a parent. The bigger, the harder decision was to decide I 
wasn’t gonna wait for the right person to come along. That was the hard 
part. […] I mean I made choices professionally at the very beginning that 
were lifestyle related. I mean most of my friends from graduate school are, 
you know, they’re making a million dollars a year and they have these high 
powered jobs and, you know, I wasn’t into that, it wasn’t really what I was 
looking for. So my personality created a different sense of what my ladder 
would look like, I guess.
Quite obviously, the element of choice assumes different connotations 
for gay and lesbian parents; the strong motivation and the additional 
complications of getting to it being some of them, as we saw. Such strong 
motivation and the additional difficulties they meet create a situation in 
which the parental choice can only mature gradually and during a rela-
tively extended period of time. Besides, the social pressures that some-
times push a “conventional”, heterosexual couple to consider parenthood 
as a “must” certainly do not apply to same-sex couples, for whom, on the 
contrary, social pressures go exactly in the opposite direction, and having 
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children, as Frida says in the following excerpt, “is not an easy thing to do 
at all”. In what follows, Frida emphasises precisely this difference: the dif-
ference between those who “are doing it because they’re supposed to be 
doing it” and “those of us who are doing it and […] it’s not an easy thing 
to do at all”. Gay and lesbian people, as she highlights, cannot get preg-
nant and/or decide to have a bay by chance or “casually”:
And I think the distinction of, you know, at least for now there aren’t any 
gay and lesbian couples that are kind of casually deciding to have kids, I 
mean you just couldn’t do it. I mean it took so much intentional effort for 
Leila and I to have these kids that it has to pay off in terms of the quality 
of care that we’re giving them, as opposed to like, oh, you know, we got 
married and of course we’re gonna have kids but we didn’t even really think 
about what having kids meant. And so now we’ve got kind of people who 
are doing it because they’re supposed to be doing it versus, you know, those 
of us who are doing it and it’s still another layer coming out and, you know, 
it’s not an easy thing to do at all. So both from intentionality, like you 
know, you have to be really intentional about it, it’s not gonna just happen, 
so you’re never really stuck with it. […] I mean you can’t say you were stuck 
with a baby, you know. So those who end up with the kids are, you know, 
really, so those kids are incredibly well served because they’re, the caretakers 
of them, you know, so much want to be, do it all for them.
Care choices, however, can be visualised in many other ways and they 
can also involve adult or elderly care. One of these circumstances is exem-
plified by Claire, who, facing the problem of her mother’s health issues 
while she was working full-time in another country far away from home, 
decided to go visit her at any cost, even at the expense of her own job. 
After a long period during which she had never managed to spend more 
than a week every year with her mother, she realised then that her moth-
er’s conditions required her presence; and she was willing to quit her job, 
should her employer not allow her a care leave:
…so when a situation like that occurred, which was not, like she was not 
in a bad, she didn’t have any major problem or anything, she broke her 
arm, she couldn’t do anything at home. But mostly she was, I think she was 
a little bit depressed and I just felt that that was more important than 
 Care as a Choice and/or as a Gift 
a.pratesi@chester.ac.uk
166 
 anything, that I had to go and I had to be able to spend more time with her 
than I usually spend, than I had spent over the last five years, which was, 
you know, a week, or two every year, you know, maximum. And I said no, 
that’s enough, I’ve been here for five years and I want to be with her for 
more than 10 days and really be with her for a while. So that was it. It was 
a no-brainer for me, actually, because when I decided that I was ready to 
leave the job if that was the case, if they didn’t agree. […] Yeah, and I 
remember when I talked to Rob [her partner] about it before talking to the 
company, I said well, I’m gonna talk to them this week about this, I really 
have to go, it may be that they’re not gonna accept it and if they don’t, they 
don’t.
While, for some, care choices can become a reason of family disrup-
tion,3 for others, they can instead become one of the key elements or 
premises of a relationship. Forrest, who at the time of the interview had 
been living with his partner for more than 25 years, is one of the numer-
ous gay interviewees who told me that he and his partner had chosen 
each other also on the basis of their procreative intentions. Bearing in 
mind his age (51), he can probably be considered as one of the pioneers 
of same-sex parenthood in his generation. He already knew, with his 
partner, they wanted to be a parent back in the 1980s, and they eventu-
ally managed to adopt their daughter ten years later:
So, yeah, and in fact that’s why we, that’s part of the reason we liked each 
other when we met is because we both wanted to have kids. And we have 
the same politics and all that stuff. But we both were interested in having 
kids and finally, 10 years later, we were able to adopt a child.
Experiencing care as an intentional and purposeful choice undeniably 
represents one of the most powerful sources of emotional energy (EE) 
and, quite obviously, the chances of gaining in terms of emotional and 
psychological resources are much higher when care is deliberately chosen 
and embraced. However, as we have seen in Chap. 5, even in the darkest 
care experiences, there is always room for gleams of light; and the role of 
care in terms of status enhancement and production of EE can be visual-
ised also when people do not necessarily choose care and when they are 
forced to assume their role of caregivers by default rather than by choice.
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Care becomes particularly enriching and empowering when it is lived 
and felt as a gift.4 And also elderly care, which is typically associated with 
problematic aspects or viewed as a burden, can be welcomed by some as 
an unexpected gift. Nora, for instance, gets emotional when she recalls 
her choice to give up her profitable law firm job in order to take care of 
her mother. Despite the multiple challenges she had to handle while tak-
ing care of her mother, leaving her job also gave her the opportunity to 
make up for the time she had never managed to spend with her 
daughter:
Like a lot of people would say to us, like even when I left my job in, my law 
firm job, I had a client who was an attorney […] she and I were friends and 
she just couldn’t believe. She couldn’t believe that, you know, saying oh, my 
God, why would you do this, why are you giving up so much? And people 
would say to me, about my taking care of my mother, you guys are doing 
so great, all that sacrifice, they used that word, sacrifice. And I think, in the 
end I always thought it was a gift. It was a gift, [crying] a gift that my 
mother gave me, it was a gift to be able to stay home with my little girl 
when she was three, the year that we stayed home together with Maggie. 
That very first week that I was home with her and she wasn’t in school and 
we were doing all these things and going to the zoo and it didn’t matter, we 
could go to the zoo, she liked kangaroos and stand there for an hour and 
watch kangaroos, we didn’t have to rush. […] We’d go in the middle of the 
day, we’d just sit there and we’d watch the kangaroos for like an hour and 
we’d just stay there; you have the luxury of just doing whatever you want.
This brings us back to how Western societies devalue care, as discussed 
in Chap. 5, and raises important issues in terms of social class and social 
justice. Evidently, not everyone can afford to quit their jobs to take care 
of their beloved ones; but there is something deeply wrong, intrinsically 
unjust and entirely irrational in all this. The pricelessness but also the 
affordability of the experience of care as a gift is something that should be 
part of the building blocks of our societies, as there are things which sim-
ply cannot be commodified or reduced to mere logics of market. Marlon 
illustrates here the priceless implications of the unconditional love he gets 
form his daughter and critically underlines the inhumanity of reducing it 
to a commodity:
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As far as rewards, there’s a lot of them. You get to feel like, you know, like 
there’s nothing more than the unconditional love you get from your child, 
I mean that you can’t buy anywhere. You come home, there’s somebody 
that’s so happy—every time I go to the day-care to pick her up, there she 
is—daddy, you know, she’s all happy, wants to tell me about everything she 
did. So that’s something, I mean like people, movie stars making hundreds 
of millions of dollars, you know, still have that […] but they might not 
have that unconditional love. It’s not a commodity, it’s something you can’t 
buy, you know, and you get that from a child.
Describing care in terms of a choice or a gift by virtue of its inherent 
rewarding aspects might induce one to think that there is an implicit 
costs/benefits assessment of its potential advantages and disadvantages; in 
other words, that the care choice could represent for some a sort of ratio-
nal choice. And indeed, whilst care responsibilities reduce people’s free-
dom and options, they also give them status, enhance their sense of 
self-worth, self-empowerment and well-being and produce significant 
inputs of EE, redefining their strategies in the direction of a more pro-
ductive and efficient action mode. However, even when care corresponds 
to life choice which is intentionally planned, the caregivers I have met 
tend to describe it as something whose multiple benefits, meanings and 
implications can be fully grasped and understood only after people have 
experienced it. Moreover, would an explanation of the care choice based 
on a mere rational or cold-blood calculation be satisfactory at all? Which 
other ingredients compose the vast phenomenological portrait of care, 
intertwining elements that make it difficult to draw clear-cut distinctions 
between emotional rationales and rational explanations?
Even accepting the idea of a market of EEs5 in which EE seekers con-
stantly evaluate their costs/benefits balance—attracted by EE-empowering 
and repelled by EE-draining situations—can we be satisfied with an 
unequivocal distinction between positive and negative emotions or suc-
cessful and unsuccessful interactions? How then do we explain people’s 
fascination and appeal also for less successful or more problematic experi-
ences of care? Similarly to other key existential and emotional compo-
nents of our life, care inhabits a sort of transversal dimension that cuts 
across binary distinctions between positive and negative, rational and 
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irrational, public and private, inclusion and exclusion and so on, making 
of it an attractive and seductive good in itself, no matter what. The hybrid 
and complex nature of such transversal dimension of care is what I aim to 
discuss and illustrate in the next section.
 The Rationality of Care
The motivations that push people towards care are various and multifac-
eted. We have discussed the importance of care as a (more or less con-
scious) strategy for pursuing long-term emotional satisfaction and status 
belonging; but we have also seen how people can find themselves trapped 
in their role of caregiver by default and without having chosen this situa-
tion. We have also seen examples of the productivity of care, of its com-
pensatory or justificatory effects and of its appealing, emotionally 
energising and empowering aspects, especially when care is perceived as a 
choice and/or as a gift. Together with these important components of the 
entire phenomenology of care,6 there are other emblematic aspects of care 
that—albeit rational—go beyond the simple sphere of scientific rational-
ity and pertain to those practices of care that most caregivers learn or 
create intuitively and that are not easily grasped without a closer look at 
people lived and felt experience of care. I am talking here about those 
aspects of care practices and rationales that can neither be learned from 
books nor can be easily understood from the perspective of an outsider; 
they are instead shaped and given meaning by the caregiver’s subjective 
experience. In other words, I am talking about what Kari Waerness long 
time ago defined in terms of rationality of care, something “of fundamen-
tal importance for the welfare of the dependents, and at the same time 
different from and to some degree contradictory to the scientific rational-
ity on which professional authority and control in the field of reproduc-
tion is legitimated” (Waerness 1984: 195). In order to understand the 
rationality of care, “one has to think and act on the level of the particular 
and individual. This means one has to understand from the position of an 
insider, and the kind of generalized scientific knowledge one may have, at 
best, seems very insufficient in guiding one’s practices” (Waerness 1984: 
197).
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In this section, I illustrate examples of the different ways in which the 
rationales of care and its specific form of rationality can be translated; how 
people creatively shape their care strategies and adjust them according to 
the changing needs of the care receiver; how people make sense of their 
care experiences; how often the care receivers need forms of care that have 
not much to do with professional, medical or scientific care; and how 
people ultimately intertwine the rationales and the rationality of care 
with their own biographical trajectories and identities and with broader 
sociological, political and ethical issues. Thus, for example, in the next 
touching excerpt James tells me how he managed to find his own original 
way to communicate with his father, whose speech abilities had been 
partially impaired by a stroke. The creative and unique strategy he 
employs to interact with his father is something that spontaneously surges 
out of his position of “insider” and experience as a caregiver; something 
that is quite unlikely to be found in a specialist book on adult/elderly 
care:
R: He can eat by himself. Someone needs to cook for him, though, 
someone needs to, you know, change his bed, do his laundry, just 
day-to- day everything, just about. He’s paralyzed on half of his body 
and he can’t speak, so
I: He can’t?
R: No, he cannot, so it’s all done with yes and no, you know, gestures, 
head gestures.
I: Can he write?
R: He can’t write either, because he’s right-handed and it’s his right 
hand. So he’s paralyzed. However, he can sing, which is an 
interesting
I: Sing?
R: Yes, he remembers songs. If you can hum a tune, he can sing words. 
And sometimes we’ve used that as a way, a link to speech, to com-
mon everyday speech. My na-me-is-John, you know, I’m-do-ing 
well (singing ♫)—if you put things in a melody for him, he can 
catch on.
For Heather, there is a sort of double rationale underlying her decision 
to care for her elderly grandmother. On the one hand, she feels she should 
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reciprocate the love and care she received from the grandparents who 
raised her; on the other hand, she also thinks that, by doing that, she will 
be an important role model for her three children and provide them with 
a good example of gratitude, generosity and reciprocity. Both motiva-
tions help Heather to make sense of her not-so-common choice and, at 
the same time, to make her demanding care responsibilities more bear-
able. Above all, the pedagogical rationale underlying her care choice rep-
resents also an example of how—by doing care—people also reproduce a 
specific idea of reciprocal entitlements and duties; in other words, a spe-
cific idea of citizenship7:
I’m an only child so, growing up, many times my mother and I moved 
from one home to another, and a lot of times I lived with my grandparents 
and they raised me. […] during my life I spent probably more time living 
with my grandparents than I did my mom, so this gives me an opportunity 
to give back to her all that she gave to me. […] and she doesn’t—her retire-
ment is not a whole lot of money so she wouldn’t be able to be in one of 
the nice assisted livings, she would have to end up in one of those, you 
know, state-funded basic nursing homes. And as long as I can take care of 
her and she can still get herself to the toilet and feed herself, I’ll keep her 
with me as long as I can. […] Even though she’s, like I said, she’s 91, she 
complains a lot, she’s very childish, still it’s very fulfilling for me to have her 
there. And I think it’s showing the children, it gives them a good lesson, 
too, about how families should take care of each other.
In Max’s case, taking care of his grandmother fits perfectly into his cur-
rent existential situation: he is single, he is gay, he has no children and he 
shares his care responsibilities with his open-minded father who has no 
problems with his sexuality. But care assumes, in this case, even more 
evident social and cultural implications, as it involves pooling resources 
and team work philosophies and rationales. Thus, for Max, cohabiting 
with and taking care of his grandmother becomes also a convenient strat-
egy to pool resources together and maintain family ties; and ultimately—
as he puts it—having three generations under the same roof is “cool”:
I guess our goal is to make her [Max’s grandmother] comfortable and to 
help meet her needs physically, her medication and her diet and a little 
exercise. And I guess it means also a good way of keeping the family intact, 
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it’s nice to have three, in a way, three generations in one household, it’s 
kind of cool. I feel happy that I could help, too, that I’m able to help and 
feel that—I don’t have children so I do have some extra time on my hands 
that I can do certain things that maybe somebody with five kids couldn’t. 
And I’m single, I’m gay, my dad accepts me, so it’s kind of a good situation. 
I look at it as pooling resources. Like I help my dad, he helps me, we both 
help my grandmother. I always look at the group—more people are stron-
ger than one person by themselves, that’s how I’ve always look at it. So I 
think me and my dad can accomplish more as a team than either one of us 
separately.
When looking at parenthood, one of its underlying rationales seems to 
be connected precisely to the idea of life as a sort of existential ladder 
characterised by several steps and stages, which in turn correspond to 
multiple statuses and roles in society. The majority of the parents I met 
admitted that one of the reasons they started thinking about parenthood 
was related to the necessity to fill a gap in their existential ladder, once 
they had achieved several other important goals in their life. Thus, for 
example, Omar describes how, at a certain point, parenthood became for 
him a sort of remedy against “selfishness” but also a way to elude the 
existential boredom typical of those who feel relatively satisfied with their 
professional, economic and social achievements and need additional 
stimuli and additional sources of EE in their lives; which raises important 
questions and implications about the gratuity of care. “After you get to a 
certain level”—in his words—what is the point of living a comfortable 
life just made of expensive travels and other luxury items?
And for me it was more about getting a quality of life, a little bit selfish. I 
wanted my, the way of living that I liked, but we have anything we want, 
we don’t have any complaints. And there’s a moment that you have, I mean 
I think that we live a very comfortable life, it’s comfortable. I was at first, 
you know what, I’m not gonna be dancing […] I’m not gonna be dancing 
until I’m 60 and then you start thinking what’s gonna be after, I mean and 
having a kid, it’s kind of like you build that family and it’s really nice. […] 
And I mean I remember in my case, I mean it was, first it was no because I 
never thought of it, it was selfish; I wanted to get to a certain level. But 
once you get to a certain level, what is it, to fly every, like every weekend to 
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an island and have barbecues, and now you’re gonna do that for the rest of 
your life. […] Wasting your time or energy doing silly things. It also gets 
boring after a while.
The search for additional sources of EE is also exemplified by Sullivan 
in the following quotation. For both him and his partner, the prospect of 
spending the rest of their life just going “on fancy vacations and travels” 
or enjoying their affluent lifestyle did not seem fulfilling enough 
anymore:
Well, the reason why we became fathers then was because we went on a 
very fancy cruise in the Mediterranean and we had a great time. We went 
to Greece and Turkey and it was great. And we had been together as a 
couple for about eight years. We had a great time. And we were on the 
cruise going this is really, really great and we thought, is this it? So the rest 
of our life is gonna be we’ll go on fancy vacations and travel. And to us that 
just didn’t seem fulfilling enough. We were like we really want to have kids, 
that’ll be fun. And so that was our idea, that’s the way it is. […] We have a 
couple we’re very close to and we love who are very similar to us but they 
don’t have children. And we were very clear that their life would be our 
lives if we didn’t have kids. And yes, they have beautiful multiple homes. 
See, we wouldn’t have homes like that, they have more money than us, but 
they have beautiful places to live, they travel all the time, they go out to 
dinner—ehh, I mean and it’s great, they work hard, they have friends, it’s 
great. But I’m like oh, okay, so we go on another fabulous vacation, okay, I 
mean great, but it’s not as fun.
Eliza’s parental choice matures instead within the context of two other 
existential considerations. On the one hand, she felt that there was not 
“much discovery or growth” in her life anymore and that, as a conse-
quence, she needed to imagine a significant turning point; which clearly 
shows the role of care as a key source of inspiration, personal growth and 
EE. On the other hand, she felt that “most people of her age have many 
more sort of categories” and that her being identified just as “an aunt” or 
as “a daughter” was a bit limited and certainly not fulfilling enough from 
an existential point of view; which clearly shows the crucial importance 
of care in terms of status and identity:
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I think I just was so ready. I think it’s been a really good experience for me. 
One thing is, I mean this may sound odd, but one thing I had been think-
ing about, and I don’t know that I adopted to solve this problem—I mean 
there were two things, one was I felt like I knew my life before parenting, I 
knew it pretty well, and I was ready for some kind of change. And one kind 
of change might have been to go live overseas again or something like that. 
But I felt like I knew my daily life in a way that I didn’t feel like there was 
much discovery or growth in it anymore. And I had probably way too 
much time for introspection. So I could think about these things, I mean I 
think that a lot of people who are in relationships, they may be miserable 
but they’re undergoing some kind of growth through being miserable or 
whatever. And so I sort of felt like that wasn’t happening with me, and I 
wasn’t finding somebody I was interested in. So that was one thing. And 
another thing was that my mom had died in 1994 and there would be 
times, so it was like eight years till the time I adopted, where I really felt like 
most people my age have many more sort of categories, they call it, to, you 
know, that they’re daughter, they’re wife, they’re mother, they’re sibling, 
they’re this and that, aunts and uncles, you know, I just somehow—you 
know, I’m an aunt and I had been a daughter, but I didn’t—and I was a 
sister, I mean I am a sister, but I felt like it was very, like somehow it didn’t 
feel like […] I think I felt like there needed to be something closer where I 
was in a relationship with somebody where it would seem the most impor-
tant relationship in both our lives, if that makes sense.
The idea of parenthood as an important, symbolic milestone in peo-
ple’s existential pathways is vibrantly exemplified by Frida, who makes an 
interesting comparison between heterosexual and gay/lesbian adults. Gay 
and lesbian people, she claims, “are not served by” the typical rites of pas-
sage that usually characterise the heterosexual transition towards adult-
hood and maturity: engagement, marriage, children and so on.8 As a 
consequence, it is somehow less escapable for them to prolong their ado-
lescence and to spend larger spans of their entire life course in a sort of 
youth culture mode. When heterosexual people approach their mid-30s, 
they start asking themselves the “and now what?” question, and this is 
how many of them decide to have children—says Frida—but since gay 
and lesbian people do not “normally” have kids, what can they do? For 
many of them the parental choice can be more challenging, especially 
because of the societal constraints and the stigma surrounding it, but it is 
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certainly not less emotionally rewarding or less entailing in terms of sta-
tus and existential growth:
Oh, I gained tremendously, I mean because I have the kids, it’s made a 
huge difference in life, I mean it’s all the clichés, really, you know, they 
make you more, they’re fun, they’re funny, they’re, you know. It forces you 
really to be an adult, you know, and not just always be acting like and adult 
and feel like a kid [laughter]. So I feel like it’s supported my personal matu-
rity, which is a value of mine, you know, like I believe in personal growth. 
And I think sometimes, again, political digression, [sometimes I think] 
that gay and lesbians, we also are not served by not having these rites of 
passage like marriage and kids for our own personal growth, you know, like 
it’s easy to hang out and just like kind of party, you know, adolescent, late 
adolescent life for, you know, 10, 20 years. I spent a lot of time, not wasted 
time, but I spent a lot of time in a culture of, you know, lesbian women, 
sports kind of culture and, you know, you could do it for 30 years stretched 
out in front of you. And I was just kind of like well, I did it for about 10 
and I was in my late 20’s, I’m like all right, well, now what do we do?, you 
know. I guess this is when people would be having kids, you know, but we 
don’t normally have kids as lesbians, so like what do I do. So I buried 
myself in my work because I wanted to make a difference in the world, you 
know, I wanted to be more than just me and the next rugby game or soft-
ball game or whatever it was, that that didn’t have enough meaning for me. 
So I got a doctorate and, you know, whatever. But at the time when I was 
getting my doctorate, which just was like a way of deferring my student 
loans, it wasn’t like I grew up thinking, oh, I want to be an intellectual, you 
know, thank you very much, [laughter] I really want to write a dissertation. 
It was a way of deferring my student loans and kind of another milestone 
and, you know, learning something along the way and figuring something 
meaningful to do, you know, to help people, whether as a teacher or what-
ever. But I was like one of the few in the crowd that was remotely con-
cerned with lifespan development, you know, and issues of that. So the 
kids have added to that and made it part of my personal theme of all right, 
well, what’s my next challenge, you know, what will it be, what would it be 
to be a parent.
Let me conclude this section on the rationales of care and its atypical 
form of rationality with Leila’s closing remarks. In the following excerpt, 
Leila describes care as an underlying core principle that permeates every 
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single aspect of her life and incarnates the very essence of her own iden-
tity, of who she wants to be:
I: What is the meaning of care in your life?
R: I think at the end of the day it will be my most important job and 
the one that gives me the most fulfilment and the most, will contrib-
ute the most to being the person I want to be.
I: What do you mean?
R: In terms of being a good friend or being someone who can, who will 
make a priority of caring for a friend in need, that that is important 
to me and that people know that about me, that they can count on 
me, much more so than any satisfaction I would get from, you know, 
being the officer of a small business. To me helping raise two fabu-
lous sons to be fabulous men and, you know, caring for Frida, I 
mean that is, goes to the essence of who I am and who I want to be.
I: Thank you.
R: Thank you.
The rationality of care can be defined as an intangible good that can be 
only experienced, felt, learned, or donated, but not easily conceptualised, 
purchased, or measured. The intangible value of the rationality of care is 
likely to become an increasingly important asset for the future genera-
tions and, simultaneously, an increasingly scarce resource. This is true for 
everybody, regardless of their gender, social class, age, ethnicity or sexual 
orientation. However, the scarcity of this intangible good can have more 
implications for sexual minorities, especially for the aging generations. 
Until several decades ago, the majority of gay/lesbian people still got mar-
ried to opposite sex spouses and had kids. Today, Western societies are 
dealing with the first large group of gay/lesbian childless baby boomers. 
Several studies have found that more than two-thirds of older gay/lesbian 
people live alone, and many of them have no one to turn to for help. 
Unless legally married (where this is possible), gay and lesbian people 
cannot get time off when a partner is ill or dies.9 Political and cultural 
choices recognising the importance, the entitlement and the contribu-
tion of all type of caregivers would help many children without a family 
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to find one, to deal in a more rational way with present care crises and 
deficits, and to anticipate future ones.
 Feeling the Care Experience
At the beginning of this chapter and throughout the book, I highlighted 
the importance of analysing people’s felt experiences of care and people’s 
care rationales, practices and strategies in order to get closer to the nature 
of care and visualise the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, but also of 
status- and EE-production people generate while caring for others. The 
emotional variation connected to care practices partly reflects—together 
with other structural variables—the different capacity of social actors to 
maximise the benefits of successful care interactions and minimise or 
relocate the costs of less successful ones. Through the detailed description 
of the emotions they experience while doing care, the caregivers allowed 
me to get important insights into their ability to handle complex issues, 
their resilience to stressful situations, their propensity (or lack thereof ) to 
think positively, to underestimate their limits or overrate their resources, 
and their levels of EE. In other words, they allowed me to sketch an over-
all profile of each of them based on their aptitudes and general attitudes 
towards life, which goes beyond the care experience in itself and consti-
tutes the basis to start building an emotional typology of caregivers. In 
this section, I analyse this emotional spectrum emerging from the inter-
views and the variations in the emotions experienced while doing care 
based on the caregivers’ gender, marital status and sexual orientation.
It goes without saying that the emotional spectrum people experience 
within the context of their care activities and responsibilities cannot be 
reduced to a limited range of emotional states. However, in order to facil-
itate a conversation on this subject matter, during the interview I showed 
the research participants a thermometer of feelings10 and asked them to 
assess the intensity (from 0 to 100) of a series of positive and negative 
emotions related to their care activities and responsibilities. As I clarified 
in the second chapter and elsewhere, this study was not aimed to  compare 
different types of caregivers but rather to provide a broader and more 
inclusive phenomenology of care which might fill existing gaps in the 
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literature on care. Nevertheless, I think it might be interesting to have a 
visual representation of the different emotional states emerging from the 
caregivers’ accounts, based on their gender, marital status and sexual ori-
entation. The mean scores shown in Figs. 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 give 
us a general indication of how intense or weak and positive or negative 
the emotions triggered by care responsibilities are for the different sub- 
groups. The number of respondents and their distribution among the 
different sub-groups (see Table 2.2, Chap. 2) are good enough to hypoth-
esise a reasonable distribution of social desirability biases or other types of 
interferences and to provide a good picture of some of the emotional 
differences between the groups. In what follows, I will limit myself to 
illustrate the results and to suggest some preliminary interpretations of 
them.
The distribution of the different emotional states and their intensity by 
gender is probably the least surprising (Fig. 7.1). Men, in fact, score aver-
ages quite below the women’s averages on the entire side of negative 
 emotional states, which might be interpreted in terms of men’s tendency 
to underestimate (or less willingness to declare) the negative feelings asso-
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ciated to care responsibilities or, alternatively, in terms of their tendency 
to overestimate their emotional resources and abilities to manage them. 
Notwithstanding the unsurprising character of this finding, the differ-
ence between men’s and women’s score on the negative side of the emo-
tional spectrum is still prominent in the following emotional states: 
pressure/stress (52 for men vs. 66 for women), sense of inadequacy (22.5 vs. 
39.1), sense of insecurity (20.6 vs. 35.7) and lack of preparation (24.7 vs. 
38.6).
According to the findings, male caregivers feel less pressure and stress, 
consider themselves less inadequate in their role of caregivers, feel less 
insecure, less unprepared and, in general, less affected than women by 
negative emotional states when they think about their care activities and 
responsibilities. The extent to which this is plausible for men in general 
requires further evidence; but this is the picture provided by the men of 
the sample. On the positive side of the emotional spectrum, men claim 
to experience higher levels of joy/happiness (82.6 for men vs. 73.7 for 
women), organisational skills (68.7 vs. 59.8) and amusement/fun (75.5 vs. 
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69.1), on the one hand, but lower levels of sense of responsibility (86.6 for 
men vs. 92.3 for women) and empathy (71.8 vs. 78.1) on the other.
Slightly more surprising than the findings comparing the intensity of 
the emotional states of men and women are those comparing the average 
scores of gay/lesbian and heterosexual caregivers. Gay and lesbian care-
givers tend to show unexpectedly high averages in the positive emotional 
states and low averages in the negative ones. As we can see in Fig. 7.2, gay 
and lesbian caregivers combined tend to show higher levels of strength 
(76.5 for gay/lesbian caregivers vs. 72 for heterosexual caregivers), EE 
(76.9 vs. 73.4), sense of organisational skills (66.5 vs. 61.5) and empathy 
(77.5 vs. 72.4).11 However, on the side of the negative emotional states, 
the graph shows an overall higher sense of isolation/exclusion (27.3 for gay/
lesbian caregivers vs. 24.2 for heterosexual caregivers), anxiety/unease (41 
vs. 36.2), and depression (23.3 vs. 18.9), but also a lower level of frustra-
tion (41.4 vs. 45.6), nervousness (31.2 vs. 34.2) and sense of insecurity 
(25.5 vs. 30.4). Thus, at least on a mere descriptive level, gay and lesbian 
caregivers tend to report a more positive and intense emotional  experience 
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than heterosexual caregivers, showing less significant differences on some 
of the positive emotional states. On the negative side, the higher levels of 
some of the negative emotional states (such as exclusion, anxiety/unease, 
and depression) reported by gay and lesbian caregivers, seems to be some-
how counterbalanced by lower levels of frustration, nervousness and 
sense of insecurity compared to heterosexual caregivers.
The differences between partnered/married and single caregivers 
appear decisively more marked and somehow more striking (see Fig. 7.3). 
Overall, there is a substantial gap between the average scores of single and 
partnered caregivers, for both positive and negative emotional states. The 
most notable gaps among the positive emotional states concern the aver-
age levels of EE (83.7 for single caregivers vs. 70.9 for partnered ones), 
the perceived sense of organisational skills (75.8 vs. 60), with a difference 
of more than 15 points, the level of amusement/fun (80.5 vs. 69.5), and 
the level of gratification/fulfilment (85 vs. 73.8). On the side of the 
 negative emotional states, single caregivers appear to feel far lower levels 
of pressure and stress than partnered caregivers (47.6 for singles vs. 63.7 for 
couples), showing a remarkable gap of more than 16 points, considerably 
lower levels of anxiety/unease (32.4 vs. 41.1), lower levels of sense of inse-
curity (22.4 vs. 30.4) and exceptionally lower levels of nervousness (18.7 
vs. 38.6), with 20 points of discrepancy between the averages of single 
and partnered caregivers.
Part of this might be explained by the fact that singles represent only 
one fourth of the sample (21 out of the 80 subjects) and that the majority 
of them are male subjects (13 single men and 8 single women), which 
may add a bias in the results due to the—previously mentioned—sup-
posed tendency of men to underestimate negative feelings and overesti-
mate the positive ones. Yet, since we are talking of averages, gender biases 
or other possible intervening factors should be at least partially mitigated. 
Moreover, and once again, these figures should be read simply as  snapshots 
of the temperature of feelings the caregivers I met experienced while 
doing care and their value is mainly heuristic. Nevertheless, they provide 
us with a reliable, visual and experiential sense of the emotional experi-
ence revolving around care as it emerges empirically from the caregivers’ 
voices.
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The last two sub-groups I thought it would be interesting to have a 
look at are the two groups of men and women disaggregated by sexual 
orientation. In other words, I compared heterosexual women with les-
bian women and heterosexual men with gay men. Some of the findings 
illustrated below were quite unexpected, particularly on the side of male 
caregivers. Let us first have a look at the female comparison (Fig. 7.4).
As it concerns the positive emotional states, the most significant varia-
tions between heterosexual and lesbian women concern their sense of 
responsibility (90.3 for heterosexual women vs. 96.7 for lesbian women), 
organisational skills (64.2 vs. 54.7), amusement/fun (73.6 vs. 64.3) and 
gratification/fulfilment (78.3 vs. 72.5). Still on the side of positive emo-
tions, lesbian caregivers tend to describe themselves as more patient 
(patience scores an average of 64.3 for heterosexual caregivers and 68.3 
for lesbian caregivers) and more empathetic (75.9 vs. 79.3) than hetero-
sexual caregivers. By looking at the side of negative emotional states, les-
bian caregivers feel more pressured/stressed than their heterosexual 
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counterparts (the average level of pressure/stress is 69.7 for lesbian women 
and 63 for heterosexual women), more anxious (anxiety/unease is 48.1 for 
lesbians and 36.2 for heterosexual women), more depressed (depression is 
34.1 for lesbians and 19.8 for heterosexual women) but, ultimately, more 
prepared for the care responsibilities (lack of preparation is 33.9 for les-
bian women and 44.1 for heterosexual women).
Much more visible and quite surprising are the differences between gay 
and heterosexual men (Fig. 7.5). The difference, here, is particularly sig-
nificant for positive emotional states where while, on the one hand, gay 
men seem to experience a lower level of joy and happiness (80 for gay men 
and 86.7 for heterosexual men), on the other hand, they report much 
higher levels of strength (75.9 for gay men vs. 69.7 for heterosexual men), 
empathy (76.2 vs. 67.3) and, markedly, EE (83.4 vs. 70), with a difference 
of more than 13 points between the two averages, and organisational skills 
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Fig. 7.5 Emotions experienced in doing care by sexual orientation (heterosexual 
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(76.3 vs. 57.7), with a difference of more than 18 points between the two 
averages.
When we look at the negative emotional states, one of the most con-
spicuous differences concerns the caregivers’ sense of isolation/exclusion, 
which is much higher for gay men (25.6) than for heterosexual men 
(16.7). Gay male caregivers seem to experience a higher sense of isolation 
and exclusion than their heterosexual counterparts. Other noticeable dif-
ferences concern the level of pressure/stress (45.6 for gay caregivers and 
55.7 for heterosexual caregivers), which is much higher for the hetero-
sexual men, the level of frustration (35 vs. 47.1), still much higher for 
heterosexual men, the sense of insecurity, which shows the largest gap 
(12.5 for gay men vs. 27.7 for heterosexual men), and lack of preparation 
(20 for gay men vs. 30.3 for heterosexual men).
Some of the main findings illustrated by the charts and discussed above 
are summarised below:
 1. The difference in the intensity of the emotional states based on the 
caregivers’ gender is larger than that based on their sexual orientation; 
men report less intense negative emotional states than women and 
more intense positive emotional states, although the distribution on 
the positive side of the emotional spectrum seems to be slightly more 
random and uneven for both men and women.
 2. The largest difference between the reported emotional states of gay/
lesbian and heterosexual caregivers concerns the positive emotional 
states. Compared to their heterosexual counterparts, gay and lesbian 
caregivers tend to report higher averages on the side of the positive 
emotional states and slightly lower averages on the side of the negative 
ones. All in all, however, the differences between the emotional states 
of gay/lesbian and heterosexual caregivers do not appear as relevant as 
those between men and women.
 3. Marital status seems to be the most significant element in making a 
difference in the intensity of the caregivers’ emotional states. Differently 
from what one might expect, though, single caregivers report much 
higher averages on the side of positive emotional states and much 
lower averages on the side of negative ones, compared to partnered/
married caregivers.
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 4. The difference between the emotional states of gay/lesbian and hetero-
sexual caregivers becomes more marked when men and women are 
compared separately. This is true especially for the group of male care-
givers, where gay men report much higher levels in the intensity of 
positive emotional states and much lower levels in the intensity of the 
negative ones. On the other hand, lesbian women report instead 
higher levels of negative emotional states than heterosexual women 
and, on the side of positive emotional states, lower levels of amuse-
ment/fun and gratification/fulfilment.
Whilst these findings do not have the ambition to be representative of 
the entire population of caregivers, the first-hand, phenomenological 
richness they provide is invaluable. The in-depth, thick analysis of the 
qualitative data emerging from use of the thermometer of feelings allowed 
me to access—with a magnifying glass—the complex web of the emo-
tional experience of care but also to grasp something which is much closer 
to what really constitutes it, understanding the extent to which it is 
affected by the caregivers’ external or intersubjective factors (available 
resources, social networks, work context, job flexibility etc.) and internal 
or subjective factors (sense of inclusion/exclusion, status belonging, care 
perceived as a mostly draining or mostly empowering experience and 
supplies of EE). In the following and concluding section, I integrate the 
felt experience of care with these external and internal circumstances as 
they emerge from the interviews’ accounts to create a provisional typol-
ogy based on some of the most relevant dimensions illustrated thus far. 
The emergence of clear patterns within the different biographical trajec-
tories seems to represent an additional confirmation that, at least on the 
level of a preliminary descriptive analysis, the foundations of such typol-
ogy are soundly and solidly grounded.
 Towards an Emotional Typology of Caregivers
The main goal of the typology is to shed light on the fundamental role of 
emotions in structuring our lives both at the micro- and macro-level of 
analysis. The two main dimensions I consider are: the status condition of 
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the caregivers as it emerges from their accounts—that is, the subjective 
sense of satisfaction or comfort connected with the caregivers’ statuses and 
individual reputations12—and the felt experience of care—that is, the dif-
ferent outcomes in terms of EE depending on whether care is experi-
enced as mostly EE-draining, mostly EE-empowering or something in 
between. These two dimensions interact with one another in multiple 
ways, producing outcomes which vary according to the different possible 
combinations: (1) whether the experience of care is perceived as success-
ful (EE-empowering) or unsuccessful (EE-draining) and (2) whether the 
caregiver’s status or individual reputation is perceived as satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory. For heuristic purposes, I will call status comfort (or status 
ease) the condition of a caregiver who is satisfied and/or feel at ease with 
his/her status or individual reputation and status discomfort (or status 
uneasiness) the condition of a caregiver who is not satisfied and/or does 
not feel at ease with his/her status or individual reputation.
The caregivers’ satisfaction with their statuses or individual reputations 
is shaped primarily by social experiences: either via face-to-face interac-
tions or through their internal conversations; but it also depends on 
inner, subjective factors and personality traits. Status comfort or discom-
fort can be related, for example, to people’s role as caregivers, their occu-
pational profile, their work and career position, their marital status and 
their sexual orientation. On the other hand, whether the care experience 
is perceived as mostly emotionally energising or mostly emotionally 
draining depends on a combination of several subjective and inter- 
subjective factors, such as emotional capital, symbolic capital, cultural 
capital, economic capital, social capital, type of job and quality of the 
work environment, quality and quantity of resources available, networks 
of care and so on. By intersecting these two main dimensions,13 we obtain 
a series of possible outcomes describing not only the either successful 
(EE-empowering) or unsuccessful (EE-draining) nature of the care expe-
rience and the either comfortable or uncomfortable nature of the caregiv-
ers’ statuses, but also their current positioning in terms of their social 
activity and their ability to produce social change14 (Table 7.1).
The aim of this preliminary, broad categorisation was to organise the 
vast amount of information collected from the caregivers in a relatively 
simple, visual rendering which could avoid the lack of clarity typical of 
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complex taxonomies touching on too many dimensions simultaneously. 
The different combinations illustrated in Table  7.1 represent a sort of 
ideal-typical continuum that goes from the highest peaks of EE and sta-
tus comfort—associated with social activity and social change—to the 
lowest levels of EE and status comfort—associated with social stagnation. 
Let us now have a closer look at how it should be read and interpreted.
Social Activity and Social Change. The combination of a type of care 
experience lived as mostly emotionally empowering with a high level of 
Table 7.1 Possible social outcomes according to the quality of caregivers’ status 
and care experience
Status comfort/ease Status discomfort
Care as mostly EE 
enhancing
Social activity and social 
change
← Social fluidity(+)
(with a tendency towards 
social activity and the 
production of social 
change)
Balance between EE 
empowering and EE 
draining care 
experiences
Social stability(+) ↑
(with a tendency towards 
social activity and the 
production of social 
change)
Social stability(−) ↓
(with a tendency towards 
immobility and social 
stagnation)
Care as mostly EE 
draining
Social fluidity(−) →
(with a tendency towards 
immobility and social 
stagnation)
Social stagnation
(no social activity)
Description: Social activity and social change = caregivers are socially active and 
interactive and possess a stronger potential, through their interactions, to 
produce social change.
Positive Social fluidity (+) = caregivers are in a changeable and fluid position, but 
with a strong potential to move towards a situation of social activity and social 
change.
Positive Social stability (+) = caregivers are in a relatively balanced and stable 
position, with a strong potential to move towards a situation of social activity 
and social change.
Negative Social stability (−) = caregivers are in a relatively balanced and stable 
position, but with a strong potential to move towards a situation of social 
stagnation.
Negative Social fluidity (−) = caregivers are in a changeable and fluid position, 
but with a strong potential to move towards a situation of social stagnation.
Social stagnation = caregivers are in a standby position, with no much potential 
to move towards a situation of social activity and social change.
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satisfaction with one’s several social statuses and individual reputations 
produces a situation in which people not only are more inclined to social 
action and interaction, but also more proactively engaged, either directly 
or indirectly, with the realisation of social change. Both the self- 
empowering effect of EE deriving from a positive care experience and the 
subjective well-being connected to people’s status comfort maximise the 
individual’s internal drive to become a potential agent of social change. 
Social change connected to care activities, as we will see more clearly in 
the next chapter, can be realised in several indirect ways and does not 
necessarily require explicit forms of social activism or political mobilisa-
tion in order to be effective.
Positive Social Fluidity. When a mostly successful, positive and EE 
charging care experience is combined with an only partial comfort with 
one’s social statuses and individual reputations, caregivers are in a more 
changeable and unpredictable situation, but with a predisposition to 
move up in the category of social activity and social change. Examples are 
those caregivers dissatisfied with their occupational situation or with 
their career, or who still do not feel totally comfortable with their sexual 
orientation or with their family arrangements, but who describe them-
selves as strongly emotionally empowered by their care experience.
Positive Stability. The caregivers who are at ease with their several social 
statuses and describe a relatively good balance between EE-empowering 
and EE-draining aspects of care, have a potential to move up in the cat-
egory of social activity and social change; but, at present, they are in a 
quite stable position. “Stable” does not mean “not changeable”, and the 
potential direction of change is, in their case, most likely upward.
Negative Social Stability. When the balance between EE-empowering 
and EE-draining care experiences is combined with an overall sense of 
discomfort with one’s several social statutes or individual reputations, the 
caregivers experience a relatively stable (but changeable) position, with a 
stronger likelihood to move towards social stagnation.
Negative Social Fluidity. The combined presence of a care experience 
that is mostly perceived ad EE-draining and an overall sense of comfort 
with their social statuses and individual reputations, creates for the care-
givers a more changeable and unpredictable situation, with a tendency to 
move towards social stagnation.
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Social Stagnation. At the lowest extreme of the ideal-typical contin-
uum, which is characterised by a primarily draining care experience and 
an overall dissatisfaction or discomfort with social statuses and individual 
reputations, the caregivers experience a situation characterised by social 
stagnation. In this case, the potentialities to move up in the category of 
social activity and social change—although present—are very low.
The direction of the arrows shown in the table indicates what is “most 
likely” to occur in the long run rather than what will necessarily happen 
for every individual. If the conditions of the care experience change (e.g. 
if the care experience becomes mostly EE-draining), or the status comfort 
turns into status discomfort, then a situation of “positive social stability” 
can be transformed into a situation of “negative social fluidity” or even in 
a condition of “social stagnation”. The conditions under which care is 
experienced and felt can be affected by a whole range of external factors: 
changes in the financial situation or in the amount of social resources 
available, a new job, a new partner, alterations of the available network of 
caregivers and so on. On the other hand, the internal factors affecting the 
experience of care have to do with people’s comfort or discomfort with 
their several social statuses and individual reputations. Working on status 
comfort and discomfort requires different kinds of adjustments, depend-
ing on the nature of the status involved. For example, transforming a 
work-related status discomfort into a status comfort might be easier—by 
changing the job—than transforming a status discomfort related to sex-
ual orientation and its perceived unfitness with parenthood; and, in gen-
eral, working on the status uneasiness which might be connected to the 
sense of “full entitlement” to parental roles can be easier for a married, 
heterosexual parent than for a single parent or for a gay and lesbian par-
ent and so on and so forth.
By grounding empirically this preliminary classification in the vast 
amount of additional information collected from the caregivers, I built 
the following emotional typology of caregivers, shown in Table 7.2 fur-
ther below:
Type 1: Happy with care and comfortable with social statuses and indi-
vidual reputations. This type of caregiver is fully emotionally energised by 
the care experience and fully comfortable with social statuses and/or indi-
vidual reputations (as successful caregivers, workers etc.). For gay and 
 Towards an Emotional Typology of Caregivers 
a.pratesi@chester.ac.uk
190 
Ta
b
le
 7
.2
 
Em
o
ti
o
n
al
 t
yp
o
lo
g
y 
o
f 
ca
re
g
iv
er
s
Ty
p
es
:
1)
 H
ap
p
y 
w
it
h
 
ca
re
 a
n
d
 
co
m
fo
rt
ab
le
 w
it
h
 
so
ci
al
 s
ta
tu
se
s 
an
d
 in
d
iv
id
u
al
 
re
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
s 
☺
☺
2)
 H
ap
p
y 
w
it
h
 
ca
re
 a
n
d
 o
n
ly
 
p
ar
ti
al
ly
 
co
m
fo
rt
ab
le
 w
it
h
 
so
ci
al
 s
ta
tu
se
s 
an
d
 in
d
iv
id
u
al
 
re
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
s
☺

3)
 P
ar
ti
al
ly
 h
ap
p
y 
w
it
h
 c
ar
e 
an
d
 
fu
lly
 c
o
m
fo
rt
ab
le
 
w
it
h
 s
o
ci
al
 
st
at
u
se
s 
an
d
 
in
d
iv
id
u
al
 
re
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
s

☺
4)
 P
ar
ti
al
ly
 h
ap
p
y 
w
it
h
 c
ar
e 
an
d
 
p
ar
ti
al
ly
 
co
m
fo
rt
ab
le
 w
it
h
 
so
ci
al
 s
ta
tu
se
s 
an
d
 
in
d
iv
id
u
al
 
re
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
s


5)
 U
n
h
ap
p
y 
w
it
h
 
ca
re
 a
n
d
 f
u
lly
 
co
m
fo
rt
ab
le
 w
it
h
 
so
ci
al
 s
ta
tu
se
s 
an
d
 
in
d
iv
id
u
al
 
re
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
s

☺
6)
 U
n
h
ap
p
y 
w
it
h
 c
ar
e 
an
d
 m
ai
n
ly
 
u
n
co
m
fo
rt
ab
le
 w
it
h
 
so
ci
al
 s
ta
tu
se
s 
an
d
 
in
d
iv
id
u
al
 
re
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
s


Po
ss
ib
le
 
o
u
tc
o
m
es
:
So
ci
al
 a
ct
iv
it
y
+
+
Po
si
ti
ve
so
ci
al
 fl
u
id
it
y
+
 /
Po
si
ti
ve
so
ci
al
 s
ta
b
ili
ty
/ +
N
eg
at
iv
e
so
ci
al
 s
ta
b
ili
ty
/ /
N
eg
at
iv
e
so
ci
al
 fl
u
id
it
y
− 
+
So
ci
al
 s
ta
g
n
at
io
n
− 
−
C
as
es
:
7 
g
ay
 m
en
3 
n
o
n
-g
ay
 m
en
4 
le
sb
ia
n
 w
o
m
en
1 
n
o
n
-g
ay
 w
o
m
an
4 
g
ay
 m
en
2 
n
o
n
-g
ay
 m
en
3 
le
sb
ia
n
 w
o
m
en
2 
n
o
n
-g
ay
 w
o
m
en
3 
g
ay
 m
en
9 
n
o
n
-g
ay
 m
en
4 
le
sb
ia
n
 w
o
m
en
7 
n
o
n
-g
ay
 w
o
m
en
6 
g
ay
 m
en
4 
n
o
n
-g
ay
 m
en
4 
le
sb
ia
n
 w
o
m
en
7 
n
o
n
-g
ay
 w
o
m
en
3 
n
o
n
-g
ay
 w
o
m
en
3 
le
sb
ia
n
 w
o
m
en
2 
le
sb
ia
n
 w
o
m
en
2 
g
ay
 m
en
7 Feeling the Experience of Care: Emotional Typologies
a.pratesi@chester.ac.uk
 191
lesbian caregivers, belonging to this category implies being fully comfort-
able with their sexual orientation and their status of parents. For this type 
of caregiver, the dimension of agency tends to be stronger than social struc-
tures and, as a consequence, the possibilities to stimulate social change are 
decisively more marked.
Type 2: Happy with care and only partially comfortable with social sta-
tuses and individual reputations. This type of caregiver is fully emotionally 
energised by the care experience and only partially comfortable with 
social statuses and personal reputations. The present situation of this type 
of caregivers is relatively stable in terms of social activity and potential for 
social change, but with good premises for further evolution.
Type 3: Partially happy with care and fully comfortable with social sta-
tuses and individual reputations. This type of caregiver is totally comfort-
able with social statuses and individual reputations and only partially 
energised by the care experience. The present situation of this type of 
caregiver is relatively fluid and unpredictable, but with good chances to 
move towards a position facilitating social activity and social change.
Type 4: Partially happy with care and partially comfortable with social 
statuses and individual reputations. This type of caregiver is partially ener-
gised by the care experience and feels partially comfortable with social 
statuses and personal reputations. The present situation is one of negative 
social stability, and the likelihood of moving towards “social stagnation” 
is higher than that of moving up, either towards “positive social fluidity” 
or “positive social stability”.
Type 5: Unhappy with care and fully comfortable with social statuses and 
individual reputations. This type of caregiver is mostly EE-drained by the 
care experience but fully comfortable with social statuses and individual 
reputations. The present situation is one of “negative social fluidity”, and 
the probability of moving towards “social stagnation” is higher than that 
of moving towards “positive social stability”.
Type 6: Unhappy with care and mainly uncomfortable with social statuses 
and individual reputations. This type of caregiver is mostly EE-drained by 
the care experience and does not feel totally comfortable with social sta-
tuses and individual reputations. From the point of view of social activity 
and mobility, this caregiver is relatively trapped in a standby condition 
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where the chances to move upward towards more “comfortable” and 
“energising” situations are relatively low.
The categories of caregivers are not always clear-cut and, as it happens 
with all typologies, there may be some overlapping areas between the six 
types. Besides, these categories portray only a snapshot of the situation 
that I was able to reconstruct through a substantial amount of informa-
tion15 referring to the period of the interview and, as such, subject to 
change. Nonetheless, there are at least four types of considerations that 
we can do by looking at the above distribution of caregivers. To start 
with, the fact that only single, gay/lesbian caregivers are located in the 
type (6) of the typology (Unhappy with care and uncomfortable with social 
statuses and individual reputations). This might seem to confirm a com-
monsensical idea that gay and lesbian caregivers (or single parents) might 
more easily experience a sense of status uneasiness or discomfort. It must 
be said, however, that all the caregivers included in this category are 
examples of caregivers who also dealing with particularly difficult and 
draining experiences of elderly care. In other words, their being at the 
same time “less happy with care” and “less comfortable with their sta-
tuses” might be related more to the type of care experience than to their 
sexual orientation or marital status. Whichever the case, there are not 
heterosexual or married caregivers in this category. The second 
 consideration concerns the fact that a good half of the caregivers who are 
comfortable with their statuses (status comfort) are gay/lesbian caregivers 
(21 out of 42), and that 7 gay men and 4 lesbian women belong to the 
type (1) category, that is, to the category of caregivers who are both happy 
with their care experiences and comfortable with their social statuses and 
individual reputations. The third observation is that several heterosexual 
caregivers (both men and women) belong to the category of status dis-
comfort, although the most common form of status discomfort they 
declare is work-related or career-related, and, as such, more easily man-
ageable than a status discomfort related to sexual orientation. The last 
observation concerns the different distribution of male heterosexual care-
givers in the category of status discomfort compared to gay/lesbian care-
givers and heterosexual women. More specifically, while only one third of 
all male heterosexual caregivers of the sample describe some form of sta-
tus discomfort, all the other types of caregivers—heterosexual women, 
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gay men and lesbian women—are more evenly distributed on both sides 
in terms of status comfort/discomfort (see the distribution of the caregiv-
ers by status at the bottom of Table 7.3 below, which reports the distribu-
tion of the caregivers by quality of care experience and status).
This latter observation resonates with some of the data shown in the 
charts of the thermometer of feelings, showing that the gap between the 
emotional states of male and female caregivers is larger than the gap 
between the emotional states of gay/lesbian and heterosexual caregivers. 
The largest differences between the emotional states of gay/lesbian and 
heterosexual caregivers concern the positive emotional states most likely 
because heterosexual men tend to experience (or to admit) lower levels of 
Table 7.3 Distribution of caregivers by quality of care experience and status
Status comfort Status discomfort
Care as mostly EE 
enhancing
Social activity and social 
change
7 gay men
3 non-gay men
4 gay women
1 non-gay woman
Social volatility(+)
←
(potential social activity 
and social change)
4 gay men
2 non-gay man
3 gay women
2 non-gay women
Balance between EE 
empowering and 
draining
Social stability(+) ↑
(potential social activity 
and social change)
3 gay men
9 non-gay men
4 gay woman
7 non-gay women
Social stability(−) ↓
(potential social 
stagnation)
6 gay men
4 non-gay men
4 gay women
7 non-gay women
Care as mostly EE 
draining
Social volatility(−) →
(tendency towards 
immobility or downward 
mobility)
3 non-gay women
3 gay women
Social stagnation
(no social mobility or 
downward mobility)
2 gay women
2 gay men
Distribution of caregivers by quality of status
Status comfort
12 heterosexual men
11 heterosexual women
10 gay men
11 gay women
Status discomfort
6 heterosexual men
9 heterosexual women
12 gay men
9 gay women
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status discomfort than all other types of caregivers. Despite that, gay men 
describe, on average, lower levels of negative emotional states than het-
erosexual men.
It is time to reiterate once again that this research is not a comparison 
between different types of caregivers but rather a broader and more inclu-
sive phenomenological approach in which the consideration of different 
caregivers (single, partnered, gay/lesbian, heterosexual) is aimed to fill a 
gap in the current literature on care. In this sense, it is clear that all the 
nonconventional families and caregivers I met (atypical single parents, 
different types of same-sex parents, stay-at-home dads, single adoptive 
parents etc.)—which are commonly relegated to specific studies rather 
than being included in comprehensive phenomenologies of care—all 
contribute to the ongoing process of social change. On a daily basis and 
through their visibility, they represent the living evidence that our notions 
of family are socially constructed and that, as such, can be changed. They 
transform new ways to make a family into ordinary practices. They chal-
lenge gender stereotypes and force us to rethink our notions of care enti-
tlements (who has the right to care whom and how) and parenthood. 
They are actively engaged in the production of social change in ways and 
forms that become particularly successful and effective to the extent that 
they are grounded in daily care practices and offered to people’s 
 examination in small doses, gently and in nonthreatening ways. It took a 
very long time to mitigate the social stigma surrounding single mothers 
in Western societies, a stigma which still exists, although not with the 
same negative implications it had 50  years ago, and which was partly 
mitigated by the fact that, over time, single mothers became numerically 
more relevant and more socially visible. Same-sex parenthood is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon, and yet, the process of social recognition 
seems to have known a decisive acceleration in the last 10–15 years, with 
significant sociological and political implications in terms of social inclu-
sion, social change and citizenship. This is why the next chapter illus-
trates some of the main characteristics of this emergent phenomenon, 
which is paradigmatic of an unprecedented social change and also par-
ticularly relevant to explain and visualise the links between doing care and 
doing citizenship.
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Notes
1. In my sample, the majority of the caregivers I met describe both child-
care and elderly care as a clear choice.
2. One of the questions of the semi-structured interview concerned what I 
call the “existential ladder”. I showed the interviewees the drawing of a 
staircase and I asked them to locate themselves on one or more steps 
according to their perceived sense of personal and intellectual maturity, 
satisfaction, self-realisation, gratification, status, career, success, contri-
bution to society and so on. Each step of the ladder defines therefore a 
different stage of the overall personal development. I then asked the 
interviewees to identify and describe the step defining their present situ-
ation, their situation 10 years before and their future situation.
3. As we saw earlier in this chapter and also in Chap. 5 (see the story of 
Pamela).
4. On the problematic and interdisciplinary nature of the concept of “gift”, 
see also a recent collection of essays edited by Schrift (2014).
5. See Chap. 4.
6. That is, of what can be seen, touched, felt, experienced or described of 
this universal phenomenon.
7. Although care responsibilities seem to be confined, in this quotation, to 
the private sphere of families, rather than being more broadly and criti-
cally thematised as a public and political responsibility.
8. On this important distinction, see also the seminal article by Simon and 
Gagnon (1967).
9. See also Cantor et al. (2004).
10. A detailed description of the methods and the research instruments I 
used in my research is provided in the Appendix. However, very shortly, 
the thermometer of feelings is a research tool based on a large drawing of a 
thermometer where respondents are asked to locate their feelings on a 
scale ranging from zero to one hundred using several tags corresponding 
to the different emotional states. Whilst I created this specific research 
tool, the validity and reliability of other “standard measure of affect” 
have been shown by several studies (see also Alwin 1997; Brandstätter 
2001; Marradi 1998, 2007; Tusini 1998). These studies have shown that 
standard measurements of emotions convey more reliable and more 
valid than 5- or 7-category rating scales. Quite obviously, the data I col-
lected through this scale are only relevant for the sample; nonetheless, 
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the thermometer of feelings was extremely useful from a heuristic and 
phenomenological point of view, especially if we consider the tremen-
dously rich and detailed additional information I could collect while the 
interviewees located the different tags on the thermometer and com-
mented their choices.
11. Strength must be intended as both emotional and physical strength. 
Emotional energy was defined, on the tag, as enthusiasm, self-confidence 
and initiative.
12. The degree to which people are either comfortable or uncomfortable 
with their various statuses as caregiver, worker, partner, parent and so on 
and the individual reputations they build around these statuses (see also 
Chap. 5).
13. The characteristics of the care experience and the characteristics of the 
caregiver’s status.
14. Social activity is to be interpreted as the inclination of social actors to be 
engaged in a whole series of actions and interactions. Collins describes 
EE as a long-lasting emotion that builds up across situations and makes 
individuals initiate or fail to instigate interactions, “a feeling of confi-
dence and enthusiasm for social interaction” (Collins 2004: 108). The 
combination of internal/subjective and external/intersubjective factors 
gives rise to a whole set of possible outcomes above described and creates 
the  conditions under which social actors, through their actions and 
interactions, can become the initiators of social change.
15. The typology is not only based on the large amount of information col-
lected during the interview or with the diaries but also on the informa-
tion I sometimes managed to collect beyond the context of the interview. 
Quite often, for instance, the interview took place at the respondents’ 
house, sometimes accompanied by a dinner, a coffee or longer conversa-
tions, allowing me to get a thorough, phenomenological understanding 
of the caregivers’ lived and felt experience of care.
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8
Emotional Stratification, Social Inclusion 
and Citizenship
The great revolution in our generation is the discovery that human beings, by 
changing the inner attitudes of their minds, can change the outer aspects of 
their lives.
William James
Our life is what our thoughts make it.
Marcus Aurelius
The multiple and at times conflicting narratives of the carers I met and the 
fact that Collins’ Interaction Ritual theory (2004) seems to require addi-
tional empirical applications to be further verified make the argument for 
a new conceptual framework to study care and its connection with inequal-
ity, social inclusion and citizenship even stronger. In the previous chapters, 
we have seen the mechanisms through which the emotional dynamics 
revolving around care—and parental care in particular—produce different 
outcomes in terms of inclusion or exclusion which can be visualised at the 
level of micro-interactions. The dynamics of status inclusion/exclusion 
and the ongoing construction of individual reputations people experience 
while caring for others generate a sort of emotional stratification based on 
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the extent to which people feel more or less “successful” and more or less 
“entitled” as parents. This chapter further clarifies the mechanisms through 
which such dynamics are connected to social inclusion and social change 
and provides additional empirical evidence to support them, confirming 
the necessity of new theoretical approaches to understand social inequality 
and social change.
Drawing on Archer’s idea of human reflexivity (2003, 2007), my argu-
ment is that repeatedly internalised images of Self perceived as either 
successful and fully entitled or unsuccessful and not fully entitled parent 
create the conditions for an emotional stratification ranging from very 
high levels of emotional energy (EE), feelings of status inclusion, confi-
dence and initiative for action and interaction, to almost inexistent levels 
of EE, feelings of status exclusion, frustration and withdrawal from action 
and interaction. Different emotional states stratify over time within the 
parents’ self-identity during their constant internal conversations with 
themselves and a whole range of generalised others. Significant episodes 
of parental care memories repeatedly experienced as positive within the 
parents’ internal conversations end up solidifying feelings of self- 
confidence, empowerment and initiative for (inter)action. These latter 
simultaneously result from and create the basis for new successful interac-
tions and, over time, affect people’s perceptions of their positions and/or 
statuses in society. The opposite occurs with significant episodes of paren-
tal care memories that are repeatedly perceived as negative, emotionally 
draining or socially marginalising. These latter, over time, can induce lack 
of confidence, lack of self-esteem, depression, apathy and avoidance of 
further interactions. However, as we will further illustrate later on in this 
book, under certain circumstances, exclusion, marginalisation and 
inequality represent the preliminary conditions for social change.
People who hold positive images about themselves and others and rely 
on multiple sources of motivation tend to have more chances to develop 
those transferable skills and means which are necessary to achieve their 
goals.1 For our concerns, how accurate the parents’ perception of what 
others think of them is does not really matter, nor whether the status 
inclusion/exclusion perceived by the parents is real or just imaginary; 
and we do not need to invoke Thomas’ theorem to show that.2 What 
does truly matter here is people’s perceived sense of themselves as totally 
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entitled and successful parents, since it is their felt and lived experience 
of parental care as such that makes them either fully entitled/successful 
or not fully entitled/unsuccessful parents. There are, of course, many 
other external, structural factors affecting people’s positioning in society, 
their sense of entitlement and their sense of inclusion: different starting 
points; material resources; cultural, social and symbolic capital; life 
chances; specific institutional, political and economic configurations; 
different forms of discriminations; and so on all play a significant role. 
However, the crucial point explaining the link between internal conver-
sations and social positioning and mobility is that all these external and 
structural factors become causally effective only and exclusively through 
the subject’s reflexivity.
The causal connection between internal conversations and social posi-
tions/statuses is not straightforward and direct. In Archer’s own words: 
“the argument ‘for reflexivity’ in no way denies the importance of struc-
tural and cultural factors; it only insists that they are reliant upon ‘active 
agents’ for their activation and consequent efficacy. Since activation and 
non-activation are themselves reflexively determined and because reflex-
ive powers vary between people, no form of constant conjecture can be 
expected” (Archer 2007: 89). Thus, the reflexive mediation is the conditio 
sine qua non for the realisation of people’s objectives and goals, or else of 
the realisation of their personal ambitions.
When these private, psychological and emotional processes simultane-
ously affect larger and larger segments of the population, as is happening 
with same-sex parents in Western societies, they can generate social 
change. Same-sex parents produce social change by gaining social visibil-
ity, enriching the possible definitions of family and parenthood, challeng-
ing stereotypical gender roles and hegemonic sexualities and living in and 
interacting with heterosexual cultures (in the negotiation with schools, 
teachers, other parents, local communities and so on). We will analyse 
with details the characteristics of such change in the final chapter of this 
book. What needs to be done, now, is clarifying the actual (rather than 
assumed) ways in which care-related inequality is concretely enacted by 
the different social actors at the micro-level of interaction. Quite surpris-
ingly, in fact, for the majority of the same-sex parents I met and inter-
viewed, parenthood seems to produce unexpected outcomes in terms of 
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status inclusion, therefore in terms of increase in their emotional capital. 
Indeed, as one of the interviewees eloquently highlighted, parenthood 
becomes for many “an easy way to connect with people” and seems to open 
the doors to a sort of universal language of care connected to child rear-
ing, facilitating dialogues between gay/lesbian and heterosexual people 
which would probably not occur otherwise.
 Care-Related Inequality Reframed
My findings show that it is not the care activity in itself but rather the 
way people interpret, experience and feel it that strongly affects inequality 
in terms of status exclusion and unequal distribution of EE. Far more 
than what one might expect, they also seem to indicate that the stratify-
ing effects produced by parental care, rather than resting on a clear-cut 
inequality between men and women or same-sex and heterosexual par-
ents, are redefined in terms of more or less entitled, visible, acknowledged 
and valued caregivers, and therefore in terms of more or less emotionally 
empowering or emotionally draining care interactions. In other words, nei-
ther gender nor sexual orientation can be considered, by themselves, suf-
ficient to establish the different outcomes in terms of care-related 
inequality. There can be multiple combinations of several factors, and 
being gay or straight, male or female does not imply being automatically 
channelled toward a predefined outcome, nor necessarily starting with 
unequivocally defined symbolic ingredients.3 The inputs and outcomes of 
the internal dialogues related to the care activity are not clearly defined by 
gender or sexual orientation alone; they intersect other systems of differ-
ence and inequality, such as race/ethnicity, social class, age, able- 
bodiedness and religion, just to mention a few. In other words, 
intersectionality (i.e. the interaction of multiple identities and experi-
ences of exclusion and subordination) is unquestionably an issue at stake; 
an issue which I have intentionally not included in this study.4
Inequality and exclusion do not seem merely connected to hegemonic 
identities and statuses, but rather to their perceived “fitness” with the 
dominant or conventional values of our societies: in other words, to the 
multiple, complex ways in which these identities and statuses may or may 
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not fit together. Thus, for example, if for heterosexual parents may be 
 difficult to reconcile their several statuses as parents, workers, sons/
daughters, friends, partners, lovers and so forth, for same-sex parents cer-
tain statuses simply do not fit with each other according to mainstream 
societal views. For many, the status of mother seems at odds with the 
status of a lesbian woman; and the status of father (or husband) fits even 
less with the status of a gay man. Gay men, in particular, come across an 
additional challenge which has to do with the need to “justify” their 
parental choice: Do I do it for selfish purposes, narcissism, necessity to fill 
a gap in my life, willingness to look for alternative forms of gratification, 
mere altruism, because I always wanted that and so on? And whilst the 
same challenge applies to lesbian women, the widespread feminine mys-
tique5 culture typical of Western societies seems to make it more suitable 
and acceptable for a woman than for a man—regardless of their sexual 
orientation—to opt for the parental choice.
The question here is not as much connected to the real reasons of the 
parental choice but rather to the fact that, in ways and with a stronger 
intensity than that experienced by any other parent, in the case of same- 
sex parents such a choice must be carefully addressed and somehow justi-
fied in front of a whole series of generalised others—adoption agencies, 
friends, families of origin, other parents, colleagues, relatives and so on—
who are constantly present both in real life and in the processes that make 
up of thinking, that is, in our internal conversations. Nobody seems to be 
overly concerned about the potentially selfish, narcissistic or instrumental 
motivations sitting behind a heterosexual parental choice in the same way 
many people are when it comes to question the potential motivations 
lying behind a parental choice for same-sex parents. In the case of adop-
tion, for example, infertility or other health conditions not only provide 
heterosexual couples with a clear justification for their choice but they 
also tend to evoke feelings of sympathy, empathy and appreciation for the 
brave parental choice. Unquestionably, similar empathetic and sympa-
thetic feelings are not aroused when the adoption involves same-sex pro-
spective parents, especially when these latter are men. In the case of single 
adoptive parents, then—be they gay/lesbian or heterosexual—the status 
of (fully entitled and successful) parent is often invisible and silenced 
altogether; or it can be even denied. Such is the case of Christian, the 
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heterosexual single father we already met in the previous chapters, who 
had to go through an ordeal of bureaucratic rules and regulations and a 
substantial amount of blatant discrimination and stigmatisation before 
he could finally adopt his 20-month-old child:
R:  So I researched a lot of agencies and a lot of countries and then I had 
to find out which countries adopt or allow adoptions for different 
types of individuals. I would say, you know, for young married cou-
ples there’s probably, who knows, maybe 20 or more countries they 
can choose from. Or maybe they can adopt, it might be easier even 
to adopt in the US. But if you’re a single woman there’s a smaller 
percentage of countries, and if you’re a single man there’s even a 
smaller percentage of countries. So I was…
I:  Oh, really? A single man is definitely at the lowest level of the 
rankings?…
R: The lowest, yeah.
What does this mean in terms of feeling fully entitled as parents or 
prospective parents? Does it require a different kind of effort for single 
parents or same-sex parents to deal with the issue of belonging to the 
intangible community of fully entitled and successful parents? And are they 
doomed to fail in their effort to create and recreate reputable and suitable 
individual reputations as fully entitled and successful parents? Yes and no. 
Yes, it does indeed require a different effort for these unconventional par-
ents to get to parenthood and to be acknowledged as fully entitled and 
legitimate parents; and yet, such different effort does not necessarily and 
automatically locate single or same-sex parents into a subordinate posi-
tion in terms of individual reputation, or at least not with the same inten-
sity one might suppose. Once again, the interactional outcomes in terms 
of EE and inclusion/exclusion are never determined by gender, marital 
status or sexual orientation mechanically and inevitably; but the different 
inputs, or the initial symbolic ingredients of the interaction, are. Thus, 
whilst for both heterosexual and same-sex parents (or single and coupled 
parents) reconciling their multiple roles and statuses can be difficult, for 
same-sex parents the problem of status fitness (i.e. the coherence between 
their different socially accepted statuses) adds an extra layer of difficulty 
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to their challenges; their status as parents, in fact, is still viewed by many, 
almost by definition, as imperfect. Whether this negative prejudice nec-
essarily creates dynamics of social exclusion and emotionally draining 
care experiences or, conversely, facilitates alternative, unusual, less visible 
forms of inclusion, entitlement and social change is something that 
depends on multiple factors and that will be gradually clarified through-
out this book.
A more complex space of status negotiation emerges for unconven-
tional parents, more clearly fragmented in its multiple individual and 
social dimensions. Same-sex parents (and single parents) are still associ-
ated with stigmatised categorical identities, and the goodness of their 
parental care practices is assessed by using different criteria and starting 
from different vantage points: in the best case scenario, a parent can be 
considered good, legitimate and successful despite his/her sexual orienta-
tion or relationship status, but never regardless of it. Quite obviously, this 
creates different starting points and different symbolic ingredients in 
terms of distribution of status, emotional capital and entitlement to 
rights, or else citizenship. Citizenship is a controversial concept that can 
be understood in a variety of different ways. The entitlement to what I 
have called elsewhere the right to care (Pratesi 2011), that is, the right to 
be and to feel fully entitled as a parent/carer, is one of those.
 The Right to Care
We often talk about the right to receive care and the duty to provide care. 
We rarely consider, however, the right to provide care, or, to put it plainly, 
the right to care for and about our children, partners, friends and other 
loved ones—a right which should be socially acknowledged, valued and 
supported since care is not a free resource. During the last two decades, 
there has been a renewed interest in care both as a scholarly topic and as 
a practical and political issue in need of further, innovative policy devel-
opment. This renewed interest is also facilitating a better understanding 
of the connections between the worlds of money and care, due to the 
increasing commodification and marketisation of care and to the increased 
need of care combined with the scarcity of resources to cover it (Folbre 
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and Nelson 2000; Ungerson 1997; Zelizer 2005). The care deficit is 
drawing more attention to the strategic importance of care, within an 
international context in which even the most radical supporters of laissez- 
fair strategies are now realising that the current ways of conceiving of care 
must be reviewed not only for ethical reasons but also for economic ones, 
and if we want to avoid a political and social catastrophe.
The right to care has given life to an authentic care movement,6 which 
seems to cut across social categories and academic disciplines. The num-
ber of international organisations of researchers, policymakers and advo-
cates involved in various domains of care work and the number of online 
websites of associations providing volunteer service for friends, family, 
colleagues and neighbours to assist loved ones in need have been literally 
booming across the globe in the last 20  years7; and also the increased 
frequency of health and social care-related issues discussed in the media 
is remarkable. However, this more recent attention to care involves differ-
ent arenas in different degrees and with different implications for the 
different social actors involved. On the one hand, there is the conven-
tional arena where scholars from different disciplines and different back-
grounds discuss care and the care deficit in relation to issues like gender 
inequality, the ageing population, the difficult or unfair balance between 
work and family for men and women and so on; and, on the other hand, 
the parallel and not-so-thematised arena of same-sex parents for whom 
additional issues are at stake, such as their legitimate aspiration to be 
acknowledged, legitimised and valued as fully entitled parents not in spite 
of their sexual orientation but regardless of it, as equally entitled citizens of 
societies where the privileges associated with hegemonic identities or sta-
tuses are progressively eradicated.
Thus, for all those parents who still have not reached enough social 
visibility, entitlement and acknowledgement the right to care might 
indeed go side by side with some of the care movements mentioned 
above, but it might also embody a new frontier for civil rights which is 
not necessarily aligned with the agenda and the interests of other parents 
or carers. There cannot be a universal manifesto for all different types of 
carers; this would neither be achievable nor desirable. Yet, what can be 
hoped for is the eradication of a deceptive sense of competition between 
different types of parents/carers in a context where resources for care are 
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already limited and—most likely—will be more so in the future. 
Responsive and responsible social policies and programmes for families 
may only develop when we openly acknowledge and understand the con-
tributions and challenges of all types of carers; even more, if we acknowl-
edge and understand the real value (and added value) of care and the real, 
multiple facets and implications of care. As I anticipated in the second 
chapter of this book, care possesses several implications and less visible 
rationales, which diverge substantially from the evident rationales of 
tending to and looking after someone. I will now further clarify these less 
visible rationales and implications of care.
 Care as Private and Public Process
While I was analysing my qualitative data in light of Collins’ Interaction 
Ritual model, less visible rationales and more latent purposes of care, 
diverging from the manifest purposes of taking care of someone, clearly 
started to emerge. What might these latent and less visible purposes of 
care be? As this book clarifies from the outset, an explanation of care- 
related inequality that confines its causes mostly to gender and to the 
different distribution of tasks and responsibilities was not considered sat-
isfactory. I thus decided to focus not merely on care in itself, with its 
unequal distribution of tasks and responsibilities, but rather on the ways 
people experience, reflect on and feel their care practices; in other words, on 
both the external and internal processes shaping the experience of care. The 
combination of these processes, I claim, is what determines the difference 
and consequently produces inequality among carers: an inequality based 
on the long-term effects of the emotional stratification, which stems from 
the ongoing process of self-reflexivity, rather than purely from the tradi-
tional and often reified categories of gender and sexual orientation. These 
latter are situated at a second level of the analysis, resulting from the less 
visible first level of the analysis represented by the internal processes of 
human thinking and feeling. I therefore postulated that (and showed evi-
dence of how) care is not only about tending to someone but also about 
status inclusion and EE production, which, I maintain, are its latent pur-
poses. Without necessarily being aware of that, all carers participate in 
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this indiscernible process of internalised stratification, which constitutes 
one of the most relevant factors among the many affecting their social 
positioning and statuses.
The role of care as an essential source of EE production is explicitly 
acknowledged by Kendrick, who candidly confesses that his decision to 
become a father responded—in his own words—to a fairly “selfish” fun-
damental desire. Caring for somebody and “being able to love some-
body” makes him feel good, fulfilling one of the basic human emotional 
needs:
Yeah, I think in the broad sense that it’s a very selfish thing, I mean I have 
children because it makes me feel good, you know, and so caring for him 
and being able to love somebody, help somebody grow and develop… I 
mean people always say, oh, that’s such a noble thing you’re doing, what a 
wonderful thing you’re doing. No, it’s all selfish, I did it for me, you know. 
I mean, the benefit is, I think he is a good kid and we have a great relation-
ship, but I think he’s—I think I’m raising him well, but let’s be honest 
about it, I mean that was kind of a fundamental desire, I had this need and 
there he was.
We have seen in the previous chapter how Collins (2004) describes the 
EE in terms of the long-lasting emotion associated with feelings of self- 
confidence, enthusiasm and initiative for action which are produced by 
and simultaneously initiate successful interactions. Every successful inter-
action generates a sense of status membership or status inclusion which 
increases the supplies of EE and fosters a sort of loop or chain of EE 
production. Care activities and responsibilities generate forms of group 
membership or status enhancement and consequent outcomes in terms 
of EE that affect people’s emotional stratification; this, in turn, affects 
people’s ability to assume certain positions/statuses in society as well as 
their ability (or power) to manage the whole process. We have seen how 
reflexivity is the essential condition through which carers assess their care 
experiences in terms of either successful or unsuccessful interactions. 
Without denying the fundamental importance of structural, material and 
cultural factors in the reproduction of inequality, I have claimed that all 
these factors need the active mediation—that is, the capacity and the 
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willpower of individuals to act independently and to make their own 
choices—in order to be effective. Through their internal conversations 
(Wiley 1994; Archer 2003, 2007) individuals reflect upon and mould 
their social situation also in light of their care-related tasks and concerns. 
These inner dialogues govern the carers’ responses to social forces, their 
actual and potential patterns of social stratification, and whether or not 
they contribute to the reproduction of the status quo or instead to social 
change.
The search for and the production of EE (Collins 2004), which occurs 
during the constant interactions and inner dialogues of Self with a whole 
set of generalised others, represents the missing link between individual 
and society; and the care experience represents a crucial site to observe 
the ongoing processes of reproduction of emotional stratification that is 
at the basis of social inequality. In what follows, I illustrate further exam-
ples of how these processes can be visualised through the parents’ direct 
accounts. More specifically, I discuss the key role of same-sex parenthood 
in (1) clarifying how private/emotional processes of care intertwine with 
public processes involving status and power dimensions and (2) micro- 
translating the structural dynamics which are at the basis of social inequal-
ity and social change.
 The Transformation of Sexual Identities
Same-sex parents represent a key subject to understand the multiple 
implications of care and its connections with social inclusion and citizen-
ship because they cannot become parents by chance.8 On the contrary, 
their pathways towards parenthood are often difficult, emotionally chal-
lenging and complicated. Why should they accept to go through emo-
tionally challenging pathways in order to attain their parental choice? 
What does explain the relatively recent phenomenon quite suitably 
described by several scholars in terms of a gayby boom? (Patterson 1994; 
Johnson and O’Connor 2002). Quite obviously, these rhetorical ques-
tions can also be reversed: Why shouldn’t gay/lesbian people desire to 
become parents like many other heterosexual people? Why should the 
pathways to get to parenthood be so painful and complicated for  same- sex 
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couples or gay/lesbian people? What did explain, in the past, the total 
invisibility of gay/lesbian parenthood? And so on and so forth.
It is evident that questioning the parental choice for gay and lesbian 
people implies not only reproducing an ideologically tainted discourse on 
same-sex parenthood, but also considering same-sex parents in terms of 
peculiar social actors who are not logically or naturally entitled to desire 
children like anybody else. The parental choice is a longing of the heart 
and, as such, is something transversal that goes beyond and cuts across all 
possible social labels. Similarly to anybody else, gay and lesbian people 
are EE seekers, but their starting point for such search is quite different 
because it is based on the constant necessity to deal with explicit 
homophobia, more or less subtle and blatant forms of discrimination and 
a still widespread social stigmatisation attached to sexual minorities.
The willingness to increase their supplies of EE and to be part of the 
global network of EE seekers/exchangers can be handled in several ways 
by sexual minorities, depending on the different phases of their lives, 
their choices, their resources and constraints, and the variably homopho-
bic environments in which they live. Successful self-realisation based pri-
marily on career or economic achievements can become for some a sought 
after goal; although this option can turn into a minefield, as several fac-
tors—including what some economists call employer bias,9 less linear or 
typical career paths and the necessity of sexual minorities to avoid work-
place cultures in which conformity to traditional gender and family 
norms is enforced and valued—seem to produce in our societies a steady 
income gap between gay/lesbian and heterosexual employees. The search 
for EE through the channel of identity politics can too become less pro-
ductive and more risky for gay/lesbian people. In fact, while the literature 
on social movements suggests that social activism and participation in 
protest can have short- and long-term effects for all types of activists,10 
in the case of LGBT politics and activism the negative effects of disclos-
ing one’s sexual identity can also result in career bias and discrimination, 
and more or less explicit forms of repression, discouragement and retali-
ation exercised by dominant groups (Levine 1992; Taylor and Whittier 
1992; Taylor and Raeburn 1995). Besides, LGBT identity politics can be 
extremely limited and limiting because of the way they have been 
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 culturally constructed in Western societies. When sexual minorities began 
to organise themselves in the 1970s following the example of other civil 
rights movements, they transformed sexuality in a political interest-con-
stituency, establishing the watermark of this “non-group” whose social 
status is by default fluctuating, fragmentary and ambiguous. As Michael 
Warner described it in the 1990s:
At present there is no comparable category of social analysis to describe the 
kind of group or non-group that queer people constitute. “Class” is con-
spicuously useless: feminism could at least have a debate whether women 
constituted a specific economic class; in queer theory the question is unin-
telligible. “Status,” the classical alternative in social theory, is somewhat 
better but does not account for the way the ascribed trait of a sexually- 
defined group is itself a mode of sociability; nor does it describe the terror 
and atomization by which its members become “members” before their 
presence in any co-defined group; nor the definitive pressure exerted by the 
assumption that this group, far from constituting one status among many, 
does not or should not exist. A lesbian and gay population, moreover, is 
defined by multiple boundaries that make the question who is and is not 
“one of them” not merely ambiguous but rather a perpetually and necessar-
ily contested issue. Identity as lesbian or gay is ambiguously given and 
chosen, in some ways ascribed and in other ways the product of the perfor-
mative act of coming out—itself a political strategy without precedent or 
parallel. In these ways sexuality defines—for most modern societies—a 
political interest-constituency unlike even those of gender and race. Queer 
people are a kind of social group fundamentally unlike others, a status 
group only insofar as they are not a class. (1991: 15)
Defining sexual minorities in terms of a (relatively homogenous) status 
group is not only theoretically erroneous but also politically problematic. 
There are as many ways of being LGBT as there are of being heterosexual, 
and homosexual people face as many challenges, choices and crises as 
heterosexual people; they also vary profoundly in the degree to which 
their sexualities become the organising principle of their lives. In their 
seminal article written with admirable lucidity at the end of the 1960s, 
Simon and Gagnon (1967) had already denounced the necessity to over-
come reified and reifying definitions of sexuality by claiming that:
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It is necessary to move away from an obsessive concern with the sexuality 
of an individual, and attempt to see homosexual in terms of the broader 
attachment that he must make to live in the world around him. Like the 
heterosexual, the homosexual must come to terms with the problems that 
are attendant by being a member of society: he must find a place to work, 
learn to live with or without his family, be involved or apathetic in political 
life, find a group of friends to talk and to live with, fill his leisure time use-
fully or frivolously, handle all of the common and uncommon problems of 
impulse control and personal gratification, and in some manner socialize 
his sexual interests. There is a seldom-noticed diversity to be found in the 
life cycle of the homosexual, both in terms of solving general human prob-
lems and in terms of the particular characteristics of the life cycle itself. 
(1967: 181)
The two scholars, then, highlight how some of the “behavioural mani-
festations” (symptoms) allegedly accompanying the ageing process of sex-
ual minorities are wrongly and deceptively attributed to sexual orientation 
(rather than to external, social and structural factors) and “misread as global 
aspects of homosexuality”, as if there was something such as a “natural” 
inclination of all homosexuals to behave according to specific patterns:
Another life cycle crisis that the homosexual shares with the heterosexual in 
this youth-oriented society is the crisis of aging. While American society 
places an inordinate positive emphasis on youth, the homosexual commu-
nity, by and large, places a still greater emphasis on this fleeting character-
istic. In general, the homosexual has fewer resources with which to meet 
this crisis. For the heterosexual there are his children whose careers assure a 
sense of the future and a wife whose sexual availability cushions the shock 
of declining sexual attractiveness. […] The management of aging by the 
homosexual is not well understood, but there are, at this point of his life, a 
series of behavioural manifestations (symptoms) attendant to this dramatic 
transition that are misread as global aspects of homosexuality. Here, […] it 
is important to note that most homosexuals, even with fewer resources, 
manage to weather the period with relative success. (1967: 182)
If there is something typically and commonly shared by sexual minori-
ties, this has to do with the distinctive paradox they have to face in terms of 
entitlements and identity politics: that is, the necessity to be acknowledged 
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(and to acknowledge themselves) as individuals claiming a specific sexual 
identity, on the one hand, and the necessity to be and feel part—as “nor-
mal” citizens—of a broader societal consortium without being mostly or 
exclusively defined by their sexuality. Similarly to what happen to their 
heterosexual counterparts, some gay men and lesbian women develop at 
some stage of their lives a desire for parenthood. The realisation of such 
desire, as I will further clarify in what follows, can allow sexual minorities 
to overcome the above described paradox and to achieve the successful 
coexistence of two seemingly irreconcilable needs: the necessity to define 
themselves also as sexual minorities and the necessity, on the other hand, to 
detach their multiple individual and collective identities and statuses from 
an exclusive focus on sexuality.
 Parents Are Parents: Parenthood 
as Homogenising Process
Same-sex parenthood and a family-oriented pathway can become, for 
some, an appealing, reassuring and comforting option with unanticipated 
consequences in terms of status membership, EE production and even 
social change. The qualification “for some” should be stressed here, since, 
not differently from what happens to heterosexual people, there are many 
gay/lesbian people for whom parenthood is not an appealing option. 
Interestingly enough, same-sex parental choice involves, simultaneously, 
embracing the banner of non-conformity and becoming members of the 
conventional club of parents, with positive effects in terms of 
EE. Additionally, same-sex parenthood can also become a way to open up 
new channels of communication with the heterosexual counterparts. 
Parenthood, in fact, opens the doors to the universal language of child-
bearing and childrearing and facilitates new forms of interaction and 
communication between gay/lesbian and heterosexual people which 
would probably not occur otherwise. This is clearly exemplified in the fol-
lowing excerpt, where Frida defines parenthood as a “globally/universally 
shared experience” and makes an interesting comparison between a before, 
when, as a childless woman, she was just considered a career woman, and 
an after, when, as a mother, she started feeling “part of the mainstream”:
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Yeah, and, from a wider perspective, I’ve been amazed at the degree to 
which having children is like this globally shared experience. So, when I 
was a childless woman, that’s a little bit strange in the world, childhood 
world, to be a childless woman. But people put you in that box, so she’s the 
career woman. […] So that’s the downside. But the upside is the globally 
kind of universal experience of having children is really easy to talk about, 
it’s like an easy way to connect with people. And it’s really ubiquitous […] 
when I didn’t have kids I wasn’t part of the conversation. But as soon as you 
start to have kids—on a bus, in a training program with an executive, it 
doesn’t matter—you can relate to so many people, you know, from this 
shared experience, this universally shared experience of having kids. So that 
is interesting, I’m part of the mainstream (laugh).
This is indeed one of the most interesting findings emerging from my 
research: far from feeling excluded from the intangible community of 
(fully entitled and legitimate) parents, the same-sex parents I met and 
interviewed felt included in a new, more comprehensive status group 
mediated by parenthood. As a corollary to this, another significant pat-
tern emerged from the interviews: the same-sex parents I met felt more 
disconnected, sometimes even excluded, from the social networks of gay/
lesbian friends without children than from the social networks of hetero-
sexual parents. In other words, it clearly emerged from the findings that 
having or not having childcare responsibilities is what mostly determines 
the difference in terms of group membership and status belonging. With 
parenthood, sexual orientation stops being the primary social marker (i.e. 
the master status) and the newly acquired social identity of “parent” 
seems to be stronger than and somehow overcome the social identity of 
“gay” or “lesbian”. For these parents, “being gay” or “being lesbian” is 
gradually shaped in terms of a new social identity overshadowing their 
sexual identity (Langdridge 2013; Pratesi 2012a; Warner 1999). The 
dynamics of status membership/inclusion seem to be particularly evident 
in the following excerpt, where Kendrick, a single adoptive father, clearly 
describes his parenthood as a sort of gateway allowing him to access to 
the “club of heterosexual parents” and—as he says—to be “accepted into 
a totally different society”. For Kendrick, becoming a parent means 
simultaneously belonging to a new club—the club of dads—and being 
excluded from another club—the club of his gay/lesbian friends with no 
children:
8 Emotional Stratification, Social Inclusion and Citizenship
a.pratesi@chester.ac.uk
 213
You have a different level of credibility with straight couples … I coached 
my son’s baseball team, I was a baseball coach, you know. And […] I didn’t 
come out and say I was gay or anything, I just did my job as a baseball 
coach. Most of the people in the urban setting are not stupid. I’m a white 
man with a black child, they’re gonna figure out I’m probably gay. But I 
would have never had those relationships with those parents without a 
child. […] Whereas these people, I would never have met, ever, except for 
sports or child activities. And it’s like you belong to their little club and you 
talk about the same things and you talk about struggles at school and your 
kid and oh, it’s like being accepted into a totally different society. […] I 
love it because I’m very comfortable with straight people and a lot of the 
crowd that we’ve sort of been hanging with […] it keeps me a little bit in 
touch and stimulated when I can sit down and have a real conversation 
with an adult. Because now my gay friends see me differently. They don’t 
call, they don’t write, they don’t talk to me anymore.
These examples, which resonate with other recent research on same-sex 
parenthood (Clarke 2007, 2008; Nelson 2007; Patterson and Riskind 
2010; Pratesi 2012a), provide evidence that the divide between the social 
categories of parents and non-parents seems by and large to overshadow the 
divide the social categories of gay/lesbian and heterosexual. The difference 
(and inequality) connected to care responsibilities is not purely related to 
people’s gender, marital status or sexual orientation, but it is rather a dif-
ference between being and not being a parent. In other words, it is the dif-
ference between those who do have childcare responsibilities and those 
who don’t that mostly determines the unequal distribution of status, emo-
tional capital and entitlement; in other words, unequal forms of citizen-
ship. Increasingly, as Forrest highlights in the next excerpt, the connection 
with “straight people with kids” accompanies the corresponding discon-
nection from single or gay/lesbian friends without children, who do not 
share and empathise with similar interests, motivations and concerns:
And we found out that it is straight people who are more helpful than gay 
people, straight people with kids. Because there are not that many gay 
people with kids […] So your cohort is people who are like you with kids 
and job and family and shopping and laundry and the same issues. Straight, 
single, gay people don’t have the same issues. They have more time but 
maybe they don’t understand. And I don’t come in contact, I don’t go to a 
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bar […] Maybe they sympathize but I don’t go to a bar and I don’t meet 
that many single gay people. So they don’t know my family, my problems, 
my history. Mother and father down the block, they know my history 
because they have the same problems we’re talking about, care, work, 
mother, their parents, their kids. So I have more in common now, in some 
areas, with straight, in the care area, with straight people than I would have 
with single, with gay people who don’t have kids.
Thus, the dynamics of status exclusion are more likely to occur within 
the groups of friends with no children—be they heterosexual or homo-
sexuals—for whom status membership seems to imply quite different 
rules and inclusion criteria. But they can partly assume specific connota-
tions for sexual minorities because of the social and political implications 
related to LGBT identity politics we discussed earlier. Kurt, for example, 
underlines here the sense of exclusion and almost stigmatisation he expe-
rienced within “the actual gay community” because of his heterosexual 
past. The fact that Kurt was formerly married with a woman raised some 
issues with some of the gay/lesbian acquaintances and friends with whom 
he was in touch with at the time of the interview. Almost certainly this 
does not involve the majority of them—Kurt maintains in what fol-
lows—but there are gay and lesbian people and parents who tend to criti-
cise other parents or even to discriminate against them depending on the 
modalities through which a person achieves the status of parent (i.e. via 
previous heterosexual marriage, surrogacy, fertilisation and adoption):
[…] I’ve run into bigger issues within the actual gay community because a 
lot of men and women have adopted children. And I think I, there’s a cer-
tain stigma that’s attached with being a gay man who’s divorced with a 
child. […] Because first of all there’s a lot of gay men who feel like if you 
married, you sold out. If you weren’t true to yourself, you know, why would 
you do something like that? And secondly, I mean even the first time I went 
to the gay dad’s brunch and, I mean, any time I’ve been around that group, 
it feels like—and it’s something that I’m not, it’s not that I’m hypersensitive 
about this and I’m making this up—but there are men who feel like, 
because I’m not a fulltime dad like they are, it doesn’t really, it’s not the 
same, it doesn’t count. […] It’s very strange, but it’s sad. I mean, I honestly 
think it’s sad because considering the fact that, you know, there’s so much 
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discrimination against gays and then gay parents, why then would gay par-
ents discriminate against each other depending on whether they were mar-
ried or whether they adopted or did a surrogate or whatever. I mean it’s very 
disconcerting.
This seems consistent with some of the common topics emerging from 
the online discussion forums of same-sex families to which I took part11 
as well as from a recent publication on the surrogacy debate (Danna 
2015), where the author critically discusses the topic and raises several 
sociological, political, legal and ethical issues revolving around this spe-
cific form of procreation. The difficult and not always clear balance 
between different social statuses and identities, between different ways to 
be a parent while simultaneously belonging to a sexual minority group is 
also exemplified by Jason, who highlights here another interesting exam-
ple of the dynamics of inclusion/exclusion which are produced within a 
“gay husbands discussion group”12 he attended regularly when I met him. 
The discussion group involved gay men who were still in a heterosexual 
marriage. Depending on their age and whether or not they have chil-
dren—he explained to me—the members of the discussion group tend to 
split into two main groups: those—usually older and with children—
who decide to stay married and those—usually younger and often with-
out children—who decide instead to divorce their wives. Interestingly 
enough, Jason, a mature man at the time of the interview, was quite criti-
cal toward those married gay men who, rather than opting to live in the 
closet, decide to interrupt their heterosexual marriage and pursue a same- 
sex relationship:
Well, many—what’s interesting is I found that at the XXXX meetings we 
split up into, most of the time we split up into two groups. We start off 
together, we have some discussion, and then we split up into those who are 
married or staying married and those who are divorced, split up or getting 
divorced. And my group, those who are married, tend to be me and maybe 
one other guy about my age and very old men [laughter]. And the younger 
guys tend to be the ones who are, and oftentimes without kids, who are 
divorcing. And so my group tends to be many men who were growing up 
and getting married in times where it was just much more unacceptable to 
be gay and, you know, and still staying married despite these urges and 
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everything. Where now it’s much more acceptable to be gay and to come 
out and express that. […] What I can’t understand is men whose wives still 
want to stay together but want to leave the marriage in order to pursue a 
gay relationship. It’s just not that important to me, you know. I lay in bed 
and cry at night because I don’t have that sometimes, but the idea of shar-
ing, working out a shared arrangement just, I can’t imagine it, you know. I 
can’t imagine not waking up, and even when I leave early, knowing that my 
kids are in that next bedroom or coming home at night to those kids. And 
who knows, you know, two years down the road maybe that will be differ-
ent, maybe my wife and I will decide this isn’t working, you know. Maybe 
she will fall in love. But there are some men who just kind of assume well, 
okay, I’m gay now, we can’t stay together and so we have to work out other 
child arrangements. I just couldn’t do that at this point.
In this case, parenthood, Jason’s strong attachment to his children and 
habits, but also his strong internalisation of heteronormative social norms 
seem to outweigh his intimate desire to pursue an intimate same-sex rela-
tionship. And although Jason does not exclude that “two years down the 
road maybe” things might be different, at the time of the interview his 
social status and identity as a parent outweighed substantially both his 
individual, sexual identity and his intimate and frustrated desires as a gay 
man.
Overall, these examples illustrate and confirm how neither gender nor 
sexual orientation is sufficient, in themselves, to produce unambiguous 
outcomes in terms of status inclusion/exclusion and production of 
EE. Above all, they confirm the necessity to rethink parental care and its 
multiple implications by contextualising them into specific empirical 
situations and interpreting them within new theoretical and analytical 
frameworks. In this chapter, I have clarified the rationales of such new 
conceptual framework to understand social inequality and social exclu-
sion in light of Collins’ Interaction Ritual model. As I also discussed 
elsewhere (Pratesi 2012a), same-sex parenthood is playing a crucial role 
to understand the nature of these intersections, representing a key subject 
to visualise the micro-dynamics which are at the basis of social inequality, 
but also at the origin of social inclusion, of new forms of entitlements 
and of an unprecedented form of social change. Becoming a parent 
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involves a significant identity shift and transforms gay and lesbian people 
in (or perhaps makes them closer to) ordinary people; within such a con-
text being gay or being lesbian is increasingly constructed as a social rather 
than a sexual identity (Langdridge 2013; Pratesi 2012a; Warner 1999) 
and the gap between socially constructed categories dramatically shrinks.
Social changes concerning families, intimacies and relationships are 
shaping new forms of entitlement which, in some parts of the world, 
have led to the emergence of a new citizenship discourse asserting the 
“normality” of being gay and lesbian (Puar 2007; Richardson 2004; 
Seidman 2002). This is consistent with that part of the literature on citi-
zenship which highlights how in Western societies parenthood, rather 
than (merely) heterosexuality, is the condition for a full social entitlement 
as a “normal citizen” (Turner 1999a, 2008; Richardson and Turner 2001). 
Quite obviously, none of the same-sex parents I met embraced the paren-
tal choice to be transformed in a “normal citizen” or to make a political 
statement; but the private is political and their parental choice uninten-
tionally and unavoidably becomes also a political act. The eminently 
social and political implications of same-sex parenthood make of this 
social phenomenon an extraordinary engine of social change. The next 
chapter shows how shedding light on the emotional dynamics revolving 
around same-sex parenthood is crucially important not only to explain 
but also to enable such change.
Notes
1. See also Taylor’s theory of positive illusions (Taylor 1989) and the vast, 
growing literature on the so-called “positive psychology”.
2. “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences”. The 
theorem was originally formulated by William Thomas and Dorothy 
Swaine Thomas in their book The Child in America: Behaviour Problems 
and Programs, Thomas and Thomas (1928): 572.
3. See Collins’ Interaction Ritual Chains model (2004).
4. Whilst the book’s main aim is to develop inclusive, empirically grounded 
and innovative ideas of care, inequality and entitlements overcoming 
current limitations, unresolved contradictions and gaps, intersectionality 
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sits on the backstage of this book and represents one of its general aspira-
tions and recommendations for further developments. I am entirely con-
vinced that any study of care that truly aimed to fill those gaps will need 
to carefully address these multiple systems and experiences of exclusion 
and inequality. However, for the reasons I exposed in the first two chap-
ters, in this book I purposely focus on a specific segment of care and carers. 
By including too many sociological variables, I would have nullified the 
strength connected to the empirical grounding of theory on such a spe-
cific part/segment of the whole phenomenon (see also Scheff 1997).
5. See: Friedan (1983/[1963]).
6. Cf. Stone, D. “Why We Need A Care Movement” in The Nation, March 
13, 2000.
7. A simple internet search will provide a clear idea of this growing 
phenomenon.
8. There are also different-sex couples who cannot become parents by 
chance for different reasons, and their additional challenges have been 
recently documented, among others, in the work by Nordqvist and 
Smart (2014). However, whilst for different-sex couples this occurrence 
represents an exception, for same-sex couples it is an unescapable rule.
9. According to several studies, gay people’s non-conformity to traditional 
gender norms and family patterns penalise gay/bisexual men’s income 
and tend to have ambivalent effects on gay/bisexual women. Gay and 
bisexual male workers can experience up to 32 per cent income disad-
vantage relative to heterosexual peers with the same experience, educa-
tion, occupation, marital status and region of residence. The evidence 
for lesbian and bisexual women is more variable. However, several stud-
ies indicate that the earnings for lesbian women can be between 20 and 
30 per cent higher than for heterosexual women, because lesbian 
employees would be exempt from marriage-based gender discrimina-
tion (Goldin 1990). See also Black et al. (2003), Badgett (1995) and 
Blanford (2003).
10. Scholars addressing the impact of identity politics widely agree that par-
ticipation in the grassroots feminist, civil rights, student, anti-war and so 
on movements has usually stamped a lasting imprint on the occupations, 
incomes and personal lives of activists as an effect of ideology and more 
specifically of the fact that these activists made of their life a political 
project and subordinated career to politics. Taylor and Raeburn (1995) 
argue that when gay and lesbian activism is involved, the backlash effects 
of identity politics can be even more direct: less mediated by the activists’ 
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ideology and more directly forthcoming from the overt repression of the 
dominants groups.
11. My ethnographic work on same-sex parenthood included taking part in 
recreational and cultural activities at one of the largest LGBT commu-
nity centres in Philadelphia and the analysis of the messages that parents 
exchanged on the online common forums of LGBT parents associations 
(in Europe and the United States). The range of messages was vast and 
multiform; sometimes they were dealing with health, medical or legal 
issues related to the specificity of same-sex parenthood, some others with 
issues related to common matters these parents faced in their everyday 
lives. The messages could be related to school matters, health problems, 
behavioural bewilderments, emotional troubles, legal advice, birth or 
baby shower announcements, informal meetings and many other social 
and private occurrences or requests of help and/or information. Debates 
on surrogacy were quite often part of these conversations.
12. A self-help discussion group of gay men (most of them openly gay and 
some of them still in the closet) who are still in a heterosexual marriage.
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Please, Just Call Us Parents
In the previous chapter, we have seen how same-sex parenthood repre-
sents a homogenising process which redefines sexual identities in terms of 
social identities and produces social change through the emotional 
dynamics intersecting private, intimate, inner processes related to care 
with public processes involving status, power and entitlement (or citizen-
ship) dimensions. This chapter shows how understanding such emotional 
dynamics is critically important not only to explain but also to facilitate 
and accelerate the process of social change. Once same-sex parents 
become conscious of their new status of parents, they do not think of 
themselves as “gay/lesbian parents” but rather as “parents” with no labels; 
and their new status of parents (with no labels) is also expected to reflect 
broader societal perceptions of them:
Brenda:  But I feel tremendously lucky to be able to do it all, especially 
when I remember I’m a lesbian, which I don’t remember all 
the time. […] I mean, most of the time I just feel like a mom, 
I don’t feel like a lesbian mom in an interracial, interfaith fam-
ily. Most of the time I just feel like I’m a mom and I’m trying 
to remember to do what I need to do in the world.
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Sydney:  And I think we’re viewed that way by people. I mean at Eli’s 
school we are the class parents.
Moreover, Brenda and Sydney emphasise another interesting aspect—
relatively empowering and productive in terms of emotional energy 
(EE)—which has to do with the fact that other parents might consider 
their gender unconventional situation with a bit of envy:
Sydney: And, you know, people at work, most of the people in my 
Department are moms of small children and we talk about 
being moms. But my experience is not seen as weird or differ-
ent. I think actually people are kind of envious about having 
two-mom families because they tell us that…
Brenda: They think…
Sydney: …Their perception is that the work is more equally shared and 
that the childcare, housework, things…
Brenda: I don’t think they’re wrong.
Sydney: I don’t think they’re wrong either, but I think that if anything 
we’re looked at, you know, we’re envied a little bit.
Brenda: The idea that there’s somebody else who is remembering to 
make doctor’s appointments and that there’s toilet paper in the 
house and like everything that goes toward parenting and hav-
ing a family, managing a household, there really are two of us.
Becoming part of the intangible community of legitimate, fully enti-
tled and successful parents through unconventional pathways also 
involves challenging traditional assumptions about what makes of a par-
ent a good parent. In the following excerpt, Shannon and Allison, moth-
ers of a five-month-old baby, discuss the inherent risks attached to such 
assumptions, emphasising their firm resistance against any socially 
defined or conventional definition of what makes “a good mother”:
Shannon: I actually think a good mother is a dangerous concept 
because it makes so many people feel like they are bad moth-
ers. And I think you are a good mother if your children are 
safe and fed and their basic needs are provided for. […] I 
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think a lot of women are made to feel really bad because they 
have this idea in their head about oh, I’m not a good enough 
mother and a good mother would do this, a good mother 
would do that.
Allison: […] I agree with you that there are too many definitions out 
there, [about] what’s a good mother, I think that’s true. And 
we don’t need any more measuring sticks [laughter].
In this respect, many of the same-sex parents I met may be seen as 
cultural innovators, while others seem instead more inclined to embrace a 
revised version of more traditional definitions of the family, ending up 
inspiring their parental practices to romanticised images of the “happy 
family” which resonate with those idealised by more conventional defini-
tions. This is the case of Clayton and Jerry, who, on the one hand, strenu-
ously defend their right to be called dads, with no other labels:
I don’t think of gay dads or straight dads or non-gay dads, I just think of 
dads. […] And this is what I strive for. I want people to start to see us as 
dads, not gay dads. And don’t think anybody means anything bad by it, but 
in other words I will define myself for the purposes of research, a gay dad, 
I don’t have a hang-up with that; just in the outside world we’re just that, 
it’s okay, we’re just both dads.
And, on the other hand, clearly embraced a relatively traditional and 
conventional template of what constitute, for them, a happy family. After 
the interview, I met this couple of dads on several other occasions and 
during and after the research, and for several years, they sent me photos 
of their growing son and postcards with their latest family news on a 
regular basis. On one occasion, I was invited to their home for a dinner 
and I had the chance to gather additional information about them, their 
relationship with the child and their families of origins, their lifestyle and 
the meticulous care with which they had built a perfect, safe and pro-
tected family environment representing their version of what represents a 
happy family. During the dinner, Clayton and Jerry also highlighted—
with a bit of pride—how their unconventional family contradicted many 
of the typical assumptions and stereotypes about same-sex couple 
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 relationships in terms of sexual promiscuity, adultery, instability of the 
relationship, attachment to traditional family values, commitment and so 
on. In fact, of all the members of their families of origins, they were the 
only ones to have a child and to be in a stable relationship.
A similarly interesting paradox emerges with Omar and Curtis who, 
having gone through several existential steps and angsts (including a dif-
ficult acceptance of their sexuality), through parenthood end up rediscov-
ering a completely new relationship with their families of origin and 
being epitomised as a model of successful family in an trendy family and 
lifestyle magazine addressed to upper-class readers. In the magazine arti-
cle, photos of the historical mansion where the couple lived, of the couple 
with the new-born baby and of the in-laws complemented the interesting 
narrative about this successful, stylish, unconventional family. During 
the interview, Omar described the slow but radical change his parents 
went through thanks to the new arrival: after a difficult acceptance of 
their son’s relationship with another man, not only did they end up 
acknowledging such a relationship and the related parenthood as a fully 
legitimate one but also living it, somehow, as less problematic compared 
to the experience they had with another married (heterosexual) son:
[…] My mom was a kind of strongly Catholic traditional Spanish woman 
and would not accept my relationship with Curtis. There was a big prob-
lem. Years later, she said that we are ‘more normal’ than my other two 
brothers. […] Which is, ’cause my two brothers are married and she’s 
reporting that my oldest one has more problems than I do and that my, 
Ismael, the second one, the one in the middle—I’m the youngest one—
they just had a baby and the wife, she’s so jealous of my mother. […] And 
they live in the same small town of XXXX and they don’t let them see the 
baby because she’s jealous. So my mother’s like, I always thought we’ll be 
taking care of the grandkids and I’m now taking care of my gay son’s kid; 
which is something that she never, she would have never thought she 
would do.
An additional, interesting irony connected with Omar and Curtis’ 
atypical family structure emerges in the following excerpt, where the cou-
ple describes how the fact that they are two men allows Omar’s mother to 
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avoid any of the typical mother-in-law vs. daughter-in-law rivalries and 
competitions or any other forms of gender-based status/power unbalance 
associated with the concept of the “assumed family” and the rhetoric of 
domesticity discussed in Chap. 3.
Omar:  No, no, after she got over all these Catholic things and she saw 
how normal Curtis and I are and how normal our relation is 
and that we are happy and it’s a normal thing, she […] You 
know, my mom is like, I think, like an Italian mom: she’s a 
mom and she runs the house.
Curtis: Right, so we don’t really care if she does that, we’re not offended 
and it’s not like, there’s not this female-female house control of 
the house competitive thing.
Thus, parenthood not only involves a crucial identity shift by which 
gay/lesbian people stop identifying themselves mostly or just as such and 
claim their right to be perceived just as parents with no labels, but it also 
becomes an important turning point by which the relationship with the 
family of origin is radically renegotiated on the basis of a new intergen-
erational contract. This is clearly showed in the following account, when 
Stephan describes the major identity shift his decision to have a child 
triggered both for himself and his parents. Interestingly enough, and 
despite the quite atypical way to get to it,1 parenthood simultaneously 
marks Stephan’s transition to adulthood and seems to bypass for his par-
ents the problem with his homosexuality, dramatically changing the rela-
tionship between them:
R:  […] I mean I was in really bad relationship with my parents. And 
when Victor was born we, you know, I went to see my parents, I said 
okay, I’m going to be father, so they were glad, but you know, very 
reserved, like what’s going on’
I: They didn’t ask you about…?
R:  Yeah, yeah, they knew about everything, they knew about every-
thing. I told them everything and I didn’t really talk to them often, 
but I was there and I say, okay, what I want from you when Victor 
will be born, I want you to take your place as grandparents. I want 
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Victor to have grandparents because I think it’s important for his 
education. So would you like to be grandparents? And they said, yes, 
of course, if you let us be grandparents. And I said, okay, I know we 
are not in a good relationship, but you will have your place. […] 
And in fact I let them have, and Victor is just crazy about his grand-
parents and I’m glad. I’m glad that this relationship, that it’s working 
well because it’s important for him. And so my parents are, you 
know, now they’re not considering me anymore as like their baby 
child but more like as an adult because, I have this place […] now I 
am a father and they cannot talk to me as they used to do. So it 
changed, really radically.
In the above excerpt, the social and individual implications of parent-
hood as an important marker of adulthood are clearly highlighted, which 
are typical of all parents, regardless of their sexual orientation. What 
makes of Stephan’s account an interesting one is that, in his specific case, 
parenthood not only involves the tacit reconciliation of his parents with 
his homosexuality, but also, at least in part, the tacit resolution of his 
conflict with his parents’ homophobic attitudes. Stephan’s conflict with 
his parents, which is largely connected with his sexual nonconformity, is 
progressively replaced with a different form of interaction, based on new 
social roles and statuses and new power dynamics. His decision to become 
a father encourages him to ask his parents to “have their place” in his life 
as grandparents, relocating them with a new role and starting with them 
a new dialogic (rather than dialectic) interaction which, most likely, 
would never occur otherwise. By doing that, Stephan exemplifies a micro- 
translation of forms of inclusion and entitlement which occur at the level 
of face-to-face interactions even when structural forces of exclusion, 
homophobia and stigmatisation persist at the macro-level.
The reconciliation of individual, stigmatised identities with social, 
acceptable ones through the mediation of parenthood is also powerfully 
exemplified by Stacey, interviewed in her dual role of expert of LGBT 
civil rights and mother. In describing people’s reaction to her mother-
hood, Stacey provides an additional confirmation of the connecting 
power of parental care. Parenthood unpredictably connects gay/lesbian 
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parents with the external world of people who “would have never stopped 
and talked to you before”; all those generalised others who are present in 
Stacey’s internal conversations as potentially hostile interlocutors because 
of her sexual nonconformity. Her parenthood and the simple presence 
and visibility of her new-born daughter activate forms of (successful) 
interactions with significant implications in terms of social inclusion and 
social change. It is as if the presence of “this little pink screaming 
 bundle”—as she says in the following excerpt—was able by itself to can-
cel layers of homophobic prejudices and concerns inducing people to act 
and interact differently:
And my mother starts calling up some of her cousins who knew that I was 
a lesbian and I don’t know if they ever said anything about it, some of them 
are more religious than others, and my mother called and told them that 
we were having a baby, and these people were beside themselves with hap-
piness and joy. And it’s just something, it’s really kind of whacky, I can’t 
explain it […] but people freak out in a good way when you have a baby. 
It’s just, you know, people stop on the street and want to talk to you that 
would have never stopped and talked to you before. People, everybody 
wants to get you a gift, everyone in the world wants to be at your baby 
shower, they want to know where the pictures are. I mean it’s this unbeliev-
able thing that I had really not expected to the degree that it’s happened. 
And there’s just something about this little pink screaming bundle that it 
makes people act differently.
For Josie, on the other hand, the birth of her daughter gives her the 
opportunity to dispel once and forever any potential rumour about her 
sexual orientation in the work context and to start a different relationship 
with her colleagues:
Other people? Oh, definitely, yeah, people never dreamed that I would 
have a baby. And, yeah, actually I think everything’s different because I 
wasn’t really like out at work, people didn’t know that I had a relationship 
with Linda or with anybody, really. So once we had the baby, I kind of had 
to tell everybody [laughter]. And they all took it very well, I was surprised. 
So yeah, now […] everybody is very supportive and it is nice, it was a nice 
surprise the way everybody treats me now.
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The (partial) reconciliation with the family of origin instigated by the 
experience of parenthood can also manifest itself as an ongoing process of 
retrospective elaboration of past family memories. For example, in the 
following excerpt Frida describes her desire to take a distance from the 
problematic relationship she had with her family of origin; she hopes that 
the relationship with her two children and with her partner will be differ-
ent from the one she had in her family of origin when she was growing 
up. Creating her “family of choice” (Weston 1997) becomes for her, at 
the same time, the opportunity to develop new forms of intimacies, rela-
tionships and care, and to reflect upon the not-so-successful family inter-
actions she experienced as a child and that she keeps experiencing as an 
adult:
I hope that they will want us in their lives and I don’t take that for granted 
at all. I think you have to make that happen because it hasn’t happened in 
my family origin—I don’t mean my generation but in previous genera-
tions. It’s just, you know, I don’t come from a close family at all, so I’m 
gonna have to cut against my own grain, in some ways. It’s easy for me to 
go six or eight weeks without seeing my parents or even talking to them. 
And vice versa, you know, they don’t call me either, right. And everybody’s 
quite happy with the pattern, but I don’t want that to be the pattern that I 
end up with, with Liam and Miguel, you know; I want something differ-
ent. So I’m cognizant of trying to figure out how to make it be something 
other than what would be natural for me. And given that Leila’s parents 
really prematurely and unexpectedly died, you know, I think we’re both a 
bit at a loss around that because it would have been easier to just kind of 
follow the pattern, her parents would have led the way, you know. But 
that’s not for us to enjoy this go-around, so we’re gonna have to figure out 
for ourselves, you know, how to keep these guys engaged with us in other 
than instrumental ways, you know.
And if it is true that parenthood often becomes for all types of par-
ents—be they heterosexual or homosexual—the opportunity to reflect 
on and take a distance from those aspects of their primary socialisation 
which are not considered pedagogically or emotionally appropriate, in 
the case of gay and lesbian parents taking a distance from the family of 
origin often implies several other aspects. These aspects can include a 
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whole range of more or less intentional and unintentional, symbolic or 
real, subtle and blatant dynamics of exclusion enacted by the family of 
origin such as wedding ceremonies, family portraits, family gatherings, 
phone calls, email messages, heteronormative and marginalising assump-
tions about the family and sexual non-conformity, and more explicit 
forms of discrimination and homophobia. Undeniably, the relationship 
between same-sex couples and their heterosexual families of origin repre-
sents a striking absence from the research on same-sex families, as also 
recently highlighted in a Special Issue of the Journal of GLBT Family 
Studies (Bertone and Pallotta-Chiarolli 2014). The insights emerging 
from these latter examples of the dynamics of inclusion/exclusion experi-
enced by same-sex parents are also aimed to fill some of these gaps.
 Doing Social Change Through Visibility 
and Informal Street Activism
Quite often, in our societies, people start familiarising with the idea of 
same-sex families simply by seeing them in random, everyday encoun-
ters. Gay/lesbian people and their families do not live, in fact, in a social 
vacuum and their existence and visibility, which are often denied at a 
structural and institutional level, are inevitably part to the societal con-
text and intersect people’s everyday lives. Thus, for instance, Stacey 
underlines here the unintended pedagogical effect produced by same-sex 
parents’ visibility and presence in people’s everyday care practices and 
routines (at the school, down the street, at the bus stop, in the supermar-
ket, in the park and so forth), highlighting how care-related issues repre-
sent a common denominator for all parents, regardless of their sex or 
sexual orientation:
And so when you have this child who will have two parents of the same sex, 
you know, we’ll have to deal with teachers, we’ll have to deal with other 
parents and other people. And those people will start looking at, if they 
haven’t met a same-sex family before, will start looking at us and say yeah, 
you know, we have the same family problems that they have. You have to 
wake up in the middle of the night and feed the kid and you have to change 
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the diapers and you have to figure out what you’re gonna do about day-care 
or after-school programs and all the tensions and all the issues for any fam-
ily, and also all the good things, are the same regardless of whether the 
parents are opposite or same genders. And that’s very […] it’s very educa-
tional and enlightening to people who … many of which probably just it 
never occurred to them to think about before.
George describes his going to the park, pushing the baby carriage with 
his adopted son and talking with people as a form of impromptu and 
informal “street activism” which somehow compensates his lack of 
engagement with any type of formal activism involving sexual minorities 
or same-sex families. He never engaged, with his partner, in any form of 
political activities, partly because of lack of time and partly because he 
never felt the necessity to wave a flag or to support same-sex parenthood 
as such. This form of political disengagement or detachment from collec-
tive action was quite typical among the same-sex parents I met, partly 
because of time constraints and partly because of the individualistic cul-
ture characterising the American society in general. I interpreted this 
common attitude—which appeared to be a distinctive characteristic of 
most of the upper/middle-class same-sex parents I met—in terms of self- 
centred familism, although further empirical evidence would be required 
to support my interpretation.2 What remains undeniable, nonetheless, is 
that parenthood is for George (as well as for all the other same-sex par-
ents) something primarily private, intimate and personal; but also some-
thing he does not want to hide or feel embarrassed about. Thus, by simply 
walking down the street with his son, sharing his care responsibilities 
with another dad and answering people who sometimes ask unfortunate 
questions about the child’s mother (“where is mommy?”; “does mommy 
have the day off?”), George feels he is already accomplishing, somehow, 
an important pedagogical role and indirectly contributing to the cause of 
same-sex parenthood:
R:  […] And this is my activism, walking down the street, explaining to 
everybody who asks. I get a lot of questions.
I: Oh, really?
R:  Yeah, yeah, and it’s always very positive, but usually I feel like the 
best thing that I can do is just explain. Though some will say…
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I: It doesn’t bother you, people asking you questions?
R: No, no, it really doesn’t.
I:  That’s interesting, you feel like, yeah, that’s very interesting, I haven’t 
thought about that. You feel like you are an activist just by going 
down the street.
R:  We get what I call the triangle eyes, which is the stroller, and you see 
people trying to make out, […] and then people would say, where is 
his mommy? Is it daddy’s day? Does mommy have the day off? You 
know…
I: Right, they usually ask: where’s mommy…
R:  Yeah, so we usually say, well, I usually say that this baby has two 
dads, you know, try to keep it pleasant in life. […] If I have time and 
if I feel like their energy is a positive energy … [I do engage in talk-
ing with them]. If not—I don’t feel like engaging, if I don’t get a vibe 
that I want to engage with somebody. But, more often than not, I 
say that and, more often than not, it’s met with a smile or something 
pleasant.
It is unquestionable that seeing same-sex parents “in real life”—as 
revealed in the following excerpt—can be, by and large, one of the most 
effective ways to familiarise with same-sex parenthood; much more effec-
tive than any other possible information taken from media, books, aca-
demic papers, newspapers, television programmes or conversations:
It’s up on XXXXX Street. And there was this young woman, African 
American woman and she was taking our order, you know, processing our 
things and she looked over and we were talking to Henry, and she said: are 
you both his parents? And we said, yeah, and she said I’ve read about this 
but I’ve never seen it in real life [laughter]. And she had a big smile and, 
you know, we laughed.
However, the pedagogical function of what we might call casual 
 behaviours—that is, simple daily actions and interactions that make it easier 
and smoother for people to become aware of and somehow acknowledge the 
existence of same-sex families—can be attained in several other ways. One 
of the most interesting scenarios I had the chance to observe during my 
ethnographic work was a quite unusual Easter Sunday in New Jersey. 
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That episode, perhaps, allowed me to gather more useful insights than 
many of my 80 in-depth interviews. I was invited to spend Easter Sunday 
in the countryside by a French couple of dads I had met and interviewed 
several months earlier. The place and the surrounding areas were stun-
ning and the situation was quite atypical for several reasons. The majority 
of guests were third generation children of Jewish Polish immigrants who 
had prepared a copious lunch, mixing Jewish, Polish and American tradi-
tions. There were, then, American (heterosexual) families with their 
school-aged children, a group of French people (which included the two 
dads I had interviewed and the lesbian couple with whom they had had 
their children), an older couple of American artists, an Asian/American 
mixed couple with a new-born child, a French/American same-sex couple 
with no children and myself. The French birth mothers of Stephan’s son 
and Claude’s new-born daughter were visiting Stephan and Claude dur-
ing the Easter holidays. Thus, the group of guests was heterogeneous in 
terms of age, ethnicity, culture, sexual orientation and family structure.
Although I was there to enjoy a nice day-out in the countryside, the 
possibility to observe the interactions between the different social actors 
attending the event was invaluable, not only from the point of view of my 
sociological research. I was able to observe, for example, how every-
body—including older generations—looked relatively at ease with the 
unusual form of kinship connecting the four French guests: Stephan had 
a biological son with his sister’s female partner and Claude had a biologi-
cal daughter with Stephan’s sister. In other words, one of the two biologi-
cal fathers was the brother of one of the two biological mothers, which 
means that the two children were siblings and cousins at the same time. 
Confusing enough? What struck me the most, however, was the interac-
tion between the several children who were present at the social gather-
ing. There was a group of children, between five and ten years old, who 
were playing with Stephan’s biological son (four years old) and one of the 
youngest children started asking him a series of questions about who was 
his father, who was his mother, how many dads or moms he had and so 
on. After a moment of visible embarrassment for the adults who were 
close by the scene, one of the older children started explaining the exist-
ing relationships between the four parents and their respective children, 
without any effort. In sum, what might have looked like a quite sensitive 
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and difficult issue to explain to school-aged children, turned out being a 
relatively easy task to handle, thanks to the prompt intervention of a 
smart young girl.
Quite obviously, this episode represents a single case and we cannot 
rely on that to assume that all the new generations in every part of the 
world will be more equipped to understand the changing nature of rela-
tionships and families than their parents. Moreover, we all know how 
kids can be surprisingly and candidly cruel, especially at certain ages. 
Nevertheless, that episode induced me to think that it is quite likely that 
the change of attitudes towards same-sex families might accelerate signifi-
cantly in the next 10–15 years—at least in those societies where same-sex 
parenthood will become more visible—due to a growing exposure to and 
interaction with a whole variety of forms of intimacies, relationships, 
families and care. During my two-year long ethnographic work, I had the 
opportunity to meet and observe many children of same-sex couples; I 
did not interview any of them, partly because most of them were very 
young, which would have raised significant ethical issues, and mostly 
because it would have been out of the scope of the research presented in 
this book. However, I had the chance to collect some of their direct 
accounts in at least a couple of occasions: once at a convention organised 
in Philadelphia which involved several political and institutional repre-
sentatives3 and during which several adolescent children of same-sex 
couples spoke about their personal experiences; and the second time at 
the William Way Community Centre of Philadelphia, where children of 
same-sex families of different ages were informally interviewed by one of 
the organisers of LGBT friendly summer camps.4 Some of the insights 
emerging during this latter occasion seemed to me particularly revealing 
and I will therefore shortly illustrate them in what follows.
 Having Same-Sex Parents Is Cool. But…
As part of my full immersion in events, social gatherings and meetings 
associated in different ways with same-sex parenthood, I had the chance 
to attend a round table where school-aged children (between 7 and 
13 years old) talked about some of the issues they faced as children born 
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and raised in unconventional families. No more than 25–30 persons were 
present in the room, including same-sex parents, their children, a facilita-
tor and some prospective same-sex parents. The atmosphere was very 
informal and relaxed. The facilitator was probing the children with ques-
tions about their experience of living in social environments (at school, 
with peers, at the summer camps and so on) that might make them feel 
“different” and about the strategies they used to deal with such issues. It 
was extremely stimulating and revealing, for me, to hear directly the chil-
dren’s accounts and to observe their behaviour. None of them denied or 
tried to minimise the potential problems connected to their being chil-
dren of families that are still strongly stigmatised; however, they also 
clearly showed the crucial importance of these meetings—and of same- 
sex families associations in general—in providing safe, protected spaces 
where status inclusion and sense of belonging can be recreated while at 
the same time the perceived sense of status exclusion can be mitigated if 
not eliminated altogether.
A couple of adolescent children made an interesting distinction based 
on age and the different school stages: younger children in elementary 
schools vs. adolescent children in middle schools. According to their 
accounts, whereas first, second and third grade children tended to react 
to family diversity with some bewilderment and confusion, at least at the 
beginning, older/adolescent children more frequently showed a different 
level of awareness and thought that having two moms or two dads was 
“cool”. Thus, quite surprisingly, the adolescent children of the group—
for whom dynamics of status inclusion/exclusion are supposedly more 
significant—seemed to feel more comfortable and somehow even cooler 
than their classmates because of their status of children of same-sex par-
ents. On the other hand, a couple of younger children still attending the 
elementary school said that they preferred not to tell other schoolmates 
about their two moms or, at least, that they tried to avoid talking about 
the subject, unless strictly necessary. This seems to resonate with some of 
the information I collected online through forums and email messages 
exchanged among members of the American and European association of 
same-sex parents, according to which some of the young children 
(between five and seven) who are raised in female same-sex families prefer 
to say that their father is dead; while others tend to hide or to be vague 
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about the fact they have two mothers or that they do not have a mother 
at all—when they are in a male same-sex family.
Some of these interesting insights provide a more balanced account of 
the multiple challenges faced by same-sex families, in case what I described 
so far in the book gave the reader the impression that being part of a 
same-sex family—either as a parent or as a child—is always an easy, rosy 
thing. Building and raising same-sex families undoubtedly requires daily 
efforts and negotiations, strategic choices and a constant commitment to 
handle heteronormative assumptions, unwritten rules and prejudices. 
Despite these challenges, the same-sex families I met and their children 
have the same possibilities to be happy, well-adjusted and equipped with 
copious supplies of EE as any other heterosexual families and their chil-
dren. Whilst opponents of same-sex parenthood argue that children with 
same-sex parents are exposed to a higher risk of negative developmental 
outcomes, to date there is no scientific evidence that the development of 
children with same-sex parents is compromised in any significant way 
relative to comparable children of heterosexual parents (Patterson 1992; 
Stacey and Biblarz 2001; Campbell 2005; Crowl et al. 2008; Perrin et al. 
2013; Golombok 2015; Richards et al. 2016).
Research shows that structural aspects of the family, such as gender, 
sexual orientation and genetic relatedness of parents, are less important 
for the children’s psychological wellbeing than the quality of family rela-
tionships. Other external factors, including poverty, inequality, marginali-
sation and social exclusion, are instead crucially important in determining 
the children’ overall well-being and social development. In some cases, 
being the child of a single or a divorced parent can actually expose to more 
challenges than being the child of same-sex parents—especially from the 
economic point of view. Together with social status, the economic status 
of several divorced parents (especially women) and their children is likely 
to decline significantly. All this clearly holds significant policy implica-
tions. Policies can facilitate and support children’s emotional well-being 
and social development by acknowledging the variety, legitimacy and 
equal dignity of these different types of parents who, by doing care, simul-
taneously undertake a fundamental societal role—which possesses impor-
tant ethical implications—and shape new ways to do family and to define 
entitlement and social inclusion. Teachers, families, peers, friends, media, 
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schools and other educational sources can all differently and substantially 
contribute to create positive, beneficial, learning environments for all 
types of children, regardless of their parents’ marital status, gender and 
sexual orientation. But the problem of full acknowledgment, entitlement 
and inclusion within the community of carers is also political and requires, 
as such, political solutions.
 I’ll Wait for You Here, Honey, Don’t Forget 
to Wash Your Hands
The additional challenges met by same-sex parents are not only limited to 
legal or bureaucratic aspects. As mentioned earlier, my two-year ethno-
graphic work on family care included being part of a variety of networks, 
forums and same-sex families associations and having access to online 
forums and conversations. The range of messages these families exchanged 
was vast and diverse, dealing at times with health, medical or legal issues, 
and occasionally with more or less common issues experienced by these 
parents in their everyday lives. Quite often, beyond their practical and 
immediate utility in providing guidance and useful information, these 
virtual communities and interactions accomplish another important role, 
which is that of generating a sort of Durkheimian collective effervescence 
among the community members, fulfilling their search for status inclu-
sion and sense of belonging. The following announcement, for example, 
appeared in the forum of one of the same-sex parents associations of 
Philadelphia. A member of the association was trying to put together an 
editorial for the monthly newsletter entitled “How Does Your Family Do 
It?” and asked the members of the forum to provide some anecdotes and 
stories. The specific topic of the month concerned how same-sex couples 
with opposite sex children dealt with the use of public toilets when their 
children need help.
This time I have a more serious topic in mind: It’s not unusual for families 
with moms to have sons, and families with dads to have daughters, creating 
a public restroom issue. Someday I’ll have to send my sweet baby boy into 
a men’s room without me, and I’m not looking forward to it!
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SOME OF YOU HAVE ALREADY BEEN THROUGH THIS! and 
lived to tell about it. Please share with me at [email address] any deep 
thoughts or advice or anecdotes.
Help us get ready for the day we stop explaining to our children, “You 
have to go to the bathroom that matches the adult you’re with” and move 
on to “I’ll wait for you here, honey. Don’t forget to wash your hands.”
I will also accept anecdotes from dads who had to find changing tables 
for their baby girls. I might hold them for another time, but they may also 
fit here.
Thanks
At first glance, this simple example and its related little dilemma looks 
relatively innocuous and quite funny; however, it also shows how even a 
trivial issue, such as the use of a public toilet, can become for same-sex 
parents one of the multiple daily reminders about how gender and sexu-
ality are strictly socially regulated and how the dualistic opposition 
between hetero- and homosexualities is one of the most pervasive, dis-
tinctive and yet highly unnoticed structures of our societies. Torn between 
conflicting demands—that is, resisting the assimilationist power of a het-
eronormative world, on the one hand, and supporting their children’s 
inclusion in a discriminating world, on the other—some of these parents 
opt for softer strategies of social integration, accepting inescapable com-
promises. Most of them, however, rely instead on the potential benefits 
and advantages of their difference and transform the additional chal-
lenges they face into opportunities for personal growth, both for them 
and their children. Inhabiting marginal areas, in fact, can enable these 
parents to develop stronger forms of flexibility and a stronger ability to 
embrace change or invent new strategies to deal with it (see also Ahmed 
2010). Thus, shedding light on these visions from the margins help us, at 
the same time, to expose and challenge conventional heteronormative 
scripts and to understand the nature of an occurring social change.
Whilst there can be some advantages in growing up “being a little bit 
different”—as vividly described in the following excerpt—the concern 
about their children’s psychological and emotional well-being and the 
need to protect them from discrimination are constantly present in these 
parents; so is the concern of being a potential target of homophobic 
attacks, as Leila recalls here:
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I think that the important thing is that the couple be strong and loving and 
create a loving environment. I think there is equal potential for dysfunc-
tion and abuse in a gay family as there is with straight people. I think, you 
know, we’re all human beings. And I think there are some advantages in 
that you grow up being a little bit different, and some people would say a 
lot different, depending on where you live, you know; living in a house that 
has either two dads or two moms instead of a mom and a dad, it can be 
confusing. You have to deal with some pretty complex issues at a pretty 
young age, that I think kids in straight families don’t have to deal with, 
don’t have to do. And I think it becomes a very easy topic for teasing, 
things like that. And you know, there’s a potential to open yourself up to 
be the target of people who are hateful in the same way that if, you know, 
you’re black or Hispanic or a girl that, you know, people who have 
prejudices…
Same-sex prospective parents often encounter additional challenges 
also before they have their children. In previous chapters, I have illus-
trated some examples of how difficult the procreative choice can be, espe-
cially for gay men. In the following account, Clayton reminds us some of 
the negative implications involved in denying or discouraging adoption 
for same-sex couples. Legal obstacles and constraints induce in fact some 
prospective parents to resort to alternative options, precluding, in this 
way, the possibility of providing numerous institutionalised children 
with a loving family:
I’ve always wanted to have children and have always—always had the idea 
that I would have children in my life. […] I always expected to have a child 
through adoption, and it wasn’t until, you know, I realised, okay, it’s not an 
easy path, it’s very difficult for a gay man to adopt, that we investigated 
surrogacy.
In this way, the additional challenges and legal obstacles met by same- 
sex couples who want to adopt a child can also facilitate the introduction 
of a classist component, especially for men. In fact, the considerable eco-
nomic costs of surrogacy (including traveling costs to reach the countries 
where it is legal) or other alternative options to adoption automatically 
exclude all those aspirant parents who cannot afford to pay for them. 
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Apart from that, several other sociological, legal and ethical issues—
which would be out of the scope to discuss here—are raised by this spe-
cific form of procreative choice (Danna 2015). The additional challenges 
met by prospective same-sex parents can be extremely exhausting, both 
from an emotional and psychological point of view, generating, for some, 
several consequences in terms of well-being, motivation, anxiety disor-
ders and even depression; consequences that can last for years and that 
dramatically affect people’s career and personal life. We have already met 
Jack and Ishmael in Chap. 5, where they described the ordeal they went 
through during their long journey towards parenthood: a journey that 
lasted nine years. In the following excerpt, Jack gives us an additional 
flavour of the stressful condition which accompanied their long journey:
Well, the first one was in Guatemala but then that agency fell through. It 
was a gay man who had an agency out of Hawaii but then Guatemala got 
wind that he was a single man, he was adopting to gay men, so they closed 
him down. That was the first thing and that was nine years ago. Then we 
went to a different agency in Ukraine, but they were promising us twins 
[…] but then, when I called the people who had just been to Ukraine, they 
said there were no babies at all, zero. […] And then we went, we started 
talking with Jennifer and Mary, our lesbian friends, having a baby with 
them. So for a year or two years, a while, we started really investigating 
that. We both got therapists, we both got lawyers and we were trying to 
make that work out. And then that didn’t work out. After two years, they 
decided not to do it. And so that was very devastating.
In the following excerpt, instead, Sullivan raises another important 
challenge, connected to the difficulties of figuring out and isolating cases 
of harassment at school, especially when the victims of harassment do not 
report the episode, as is often the case among adolescents:
We have friends whose son is 12, whose son has been harassed at school, in 
Bucks County. And I spoke with the father the other day and reviewed a 
report that had been prepared because the father is trying to get the school 
to be more protective of their son. And there’s only so much they can do. 
What they can do is, if there’s a report of something, if a child who is not 
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shy reports something, then the school can theoretically do something 
about it. But if the child is too shy to, or too reluctant to report it…
This latter point highlights the importance of creating safe, inclusive 
and non-discriminatory learning environments for all children from the 
very beginning of their process of socialisation: in the family, among 
peers and above all in the school, which is one of the most important 
agents of socialisation. In the UK, for example, recent government regu-
lations for schools to combat homophobic bullying provide teachers with 
guidelines such as avoiding the assumption that pupils’ have two different- 
sex parents. The guidance, which was jointly produced by the LGBT 
rights group Stonewall and Educational Action Challenging Homophobia, 
was formally launched at the end of January 2008 by children, schools 
and the Families Secretary. It recommends, for example, that secondary 
schools “should make efforts to talk inclusively about same-sex parents” 
by avoiding the assumption that all children have a “mum and dad”; and 
states that children who call classmates “gay” should be treated the same 
as racists as part of a “zero tolerance” crackdown on the use of the word 
as an insult. Teachers should avoid telling boys to “be a man” or accuse 
them to behave like a “bunch of women” since this sort of rebuke “leads 
to bullying of those who do not conform to fixed ideas about gender”. 
Most likely, the guidance would be more effective if it tried to fight simul-
taneously against any type of discrimination—including the discrimina-
tion against single parents or ethnic and religious minorities—rather 
than dealing with homophobia as a separate subject matter. Moreover, 
the guidance has no statutory force. However, it represents an important 
signal and an example of social and cultural change which is acknowl-
edged and supported by political institutions.
Meanwhile, elsewhere, Brenda and Sydney (together with many other 
proud parents) have already started their own individual, micro-situated 
and emotion-based process of social change. With their words “we see 
ourselves as sort of civilizing him to the world” they effectively summarise 
and clarify their personal idea of what a “good parent” is or should be. 
Being a good parent means embracing a moral responsibility that encom-
passes—among other aspects— teaching children to become respectful, 
responsible, inclusive and caring adults:
9 Please, Just Call Us Parents
a.pratesi@chester.ac.uk
 241
[…] and I think also I don’t think of it in terms of just being a good parent, 
I think of it in terms of taking care of all of us, we all matter, we all need to 
be taken care of. But the thing I’m most concerned is that he has is emo-
tional closeness and security. And also we are careful about what we feed 
him and he’s not allowed to see very much TV and he has no violent toys 
and, you know, we have other aspects to that philosophy. Like, we want 
him to be a kind and gentle and caring person. So we see ourselves as sort 
of civilizing him for the world [laughter]. But in a way that means being 
respectful and loving, I think. I think that’s the core.
 A Respectable Scandal: Accelerating the Pace 
of Social Change
Raising new generations of open-minded, thoughtful and responsible 
children is one of the not-so-manifest functions of same-sex parenthood. 
Societal constraints placed on gay/lesbian people are still numerous and 
quite often end up being unnoticed or discounted even by those who, 
although not overly homophobic, unwittingly reproduce them. In the 
collective imaginary childcare is primarily designed, built and intended 
for nuclear families, reinforcing a cultural norm of “family life” with a lot 
of heterosexism and a bit of patriarchy on the agenda. This creates for 
gay/lesbian people a tainted emotional approach to childcare and affects 
the potentialities of successful and EE-enhancing care interactions.
As I have mentioned earlier in the book, in analysing the emotional 
impact of care interactions on different kinds of caregivers I privileged 
those relatively informal and unfocused interactions—mostly internal 
and typical of our thinking processes—which define individual reputa-
tions (Collins 2004). Similar to (and sometimes more than) anybody 
else, gay and lesbian people come to grips with status and power dimen-
sions and the construction of positive individual reputations. Within 
such a context, parenthood is becoming for some of them one of the 
several interaction channels through which they can attain new layers of 
respect or respectability and new forms of social visibility. In our still 
largely homophobic societies, same-sex parenthood has become a way to 
give LGBT civil rights at large a halo of respectability. LGBT civil rights 
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can still be perceived by some as “scandalous” or of secondary impor-
tance, but the introduction of a totally new and unquestionably reputable 
status dimension such as parenthood, particularly when it involves adop-
tion or foster care, adds to these rights different connotations, making 
these latter somehow more respectable; in other words, transforming 
their new social status into a sort of respectable scandal, as Shannon elo-
quently maintains:
Perhaps [it is] still scandalous but respectably scandalous, something like 
that.
At the time of this study, these societal dynamics of “acceptance” and 
recognition seemed to concern predominantly same-sex couples com-
posed by two women; however, it is reasonable to expect that, in the 
future, both male and female same-sex parenthood will become less scan-
dalous, more visible and more customary as well. To use a Goffmanian 
terminology, these couples bring to the front-stage the “respectable part” 
(=childcare) of their social statuses and identities and simultaneously 
overshadow the backstage component (=sexuality) to which they are typi-
cally associated. Becoming parents, gay and lesbian people manage to 
relocate the key dimensions of both their personal and collective identifi-
cation and to challenge the invisible social membrane defining and con-
straining them on the basis of their sexual behaviour. Parenthood seems 
to dissolve the typical, obsessive societal concern with the sexual aspects 
of gay and lesbian people’s life; and this clearly resonates with Gagnon 
and Simon’s seminal article (1973) quoted in Chap. 4. If as “homosexu-
als” and “lesbians” they are mostly defined by their sexuality, as “parents” 
they can claim their right to be considered like any other person whose 
sexuality is not an issue at stake or, at least, not the main social marker.
If it is true, as Butler suggests (1990, 2004), that heterosexuality is a 
highly unstable system, always in the act of performing itself and exclud-
ing homosexuality for its very survival and for fear of being undermined, 
one could say that same-sex parenthood is a way to “normalise” homo-
sexuality without threatening heterosexuality by making it “deviant”. By 
ruling out sexuality as the exclusive site around which organising sexual 
politics and including something that is lived by most people as less 
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threatening and more easily locatable within a sense of moral order, gays 
and lesbians choosing parenthood raise and combine two important 
issues at the same time. On the one hand, they challenge radical LGBT 
anti-assimilationist politics and, on the other hand, they challenge ideo-
logical, homophobic reactions against same-sex families.
The extent to which the politics of same-sex parenthood might involve 
potential benefits for sexual minorities at large, and particularly for child-
less gay and lesbian people, is still debated. Thus, for example, some 
scholars highlight how, implicit in this process of normalisation, there is 
a risk of heterodirected identity adaptations or changes which would 
involve the assimilation of LGBT citizenship into mainstream heteronor-
mative (and heterosexist) notions of citizenship rather than an affirma-
tion of equal rights within the reciprocal acknowledgment and valorisation 
of diversity and otherness. Duggan (2002) describes this risk in terms of 
“new homonormativity”, which “…does not contest dominant hetero-
normative assumptions and institutions but upholds and sustain them, 
while promising the possibility of a demobilised gay constituency and a 
privatised, depoliticised gay culture anchored in domesticity and con-
sumption” (Duggan 2002: 50). However, as I further clarify towards the 
end of this chapter and in the final chapter, my findings confirm that 
same-sex parents, through their unprecedented ability to integrate two 
allegedly opposite constituencies (i.e. the right to be acknowledged—
with their diversity—as fully entitled citizens and the right to be 
 acknowledged—with their diversity—as fully entitled parents), bypass 
simultaneously exclusion from and assimilation with dominant, pre- 
existing, heteronormative definitions of families, intimacies and 
relationships.
The changing nature of sexual politics from a mere focus on sexual citi-
zenship to a new focus on what I have called the right to care has been 
amply documented by that part of the literature which shows how, dur-
ing the 1990s, LGBT movements and activism have been characterised 
by a gradual move towards identity- and relationship-based rights claims 
contrasting with freedom of sex-based rights claims of earlier political cam-
paigns (Richardson 2000a, 2004). This also seems to resonate with those 
critical theorisations of care and citizenship which have bridged the gap 
between the theories and practices of care, sexuality, intimacy and social 
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inclusion, providing broader, more grounded, intersectional understand-
ings of the concept of citizenship (Epstein and Carrillo 2014; Fudge 
2014; Kershaw 2010; Longman et al. 2013; Sevenhuijsen 1998; Yuval-
Davis 2007). For example, Longman et al.’s comparative, intersectional 
analysis of mothering in non-conventional mother–child relationships 
(2013) shows how care work and its micro-based, affective potential to 
shape politics of inclusion and recognition become a form of citizenship 
practice which changes hegemonic understandings of belonging and enti-
tlement. Kerhsaw’s claim the “caregiving for identity is political” (2010) 
advances the debate on the contested status of care work as a form of 
political citizenship. Fudge (2014) discusses the extent to which universal 
human rights and citizenship discourses intersect when migrant workers 
claim for greater protection in a growingly globalised world. Epstein and 
Carrillo (2014) illustrate the concept of “immigrant sexual citizenship” by 
discussing ethnographic data from a study on Mexican gay and bisexual 
male immigrants to California and describing the multiple, intersectional 
challenges they face.
For all the same-sex parents I met, the parental choice represents a 
quintessentially intimate, personal and private choice and not a political 
statement or a conscious and deliberate choice in terms of sexual citizen-
ship. However, the personal is political5 and parenthood inevitably 
becomes also a political act for same-sex couples; a political act which is 
dramatically accelerating the pace of an ongoing process of social change, 
as some of the leading figures within the LGBT associations seem to have 
clearly understood. Stacey the director of an American organisation for 
the legal defence of the rights of sexual minorities observed that the 
LGBT movement has made more progress in the past 10 years than dur-
ing its first 50 years of existence. In the following quote, she highlights 
the acceleration of the change in the social attitudes towards homosexual-
ity suggesting some interesting parallels with other minorities:
And it’s something that’s interesting, you know … in the history of civil 
rights generally, the speed with which the LGBT movement is going, is 
actually at warp speed. In an age where nothing can happen fast enough, 
you know, everyone is sort of, they’re on the Internet and you just click here, 
get instant results kind of a thing. It can’t be fast enough. But in comparison 
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to, look how many years women were fighting for the right to vote, look at 
how many years it took for African-American people, just from the time 
that slavery ended to 100 years later, until the Civil Rights Acts were passed. 
So if you say that it took 100 plus sort of years and there’s still discrimina-
tion against African-American people, and that was, you know, civil rights 
bills were passed 30 something years ago, or 40 something years ago. So 
then if you look at the LGBT movement, Stonewall was in 1969, it hasn’t 
even been 50 years and we might potentially have a federal nondiscrimina-
tion law. […] But the fact that people have been hidden for so long and 
we’ve been moving at the speed that we’re moving really is, I think, an 
incredible thing in that, you know, the changes are happening so much 
faster. We wouldn’t be having the same type of conversation we’re having 
today even 5 years ago or 10 years ago.
Within and beyond the broad and diverse community of sexual minor-
ities, the minority represented by gay and lesbian parents is becoming 
one of the most significant drives of such acceleration. The stories of these 
parents are relevant not only to their individual lives but also to the gen-
eral processes of social change investing sexuality, gender, family and par-
enthood. Thanks to the extension of the possible definitions of family 
and parenthood and to the battle against sexism and heterosexism, these 
stories are also relevant to other sexual minorities and to the broader soci-
ety. Feeling entitled to care may be a slow process, which at times is accom-
panied by hesitations, frustrations and multiple concerns; but it is a 
process constantly at work and for which the supplies of EE created and 
recreated through chains of interaction rituals (email messages, online 
forums, face-to-face meetings, exchange of information between parents 
and so on) are crucial. At times, then, even the additional challenges that 
sexual minorities face in order to become parents can be productive in 
terms of EE, as they force same-sex parents to develop further strategies 
and approaches (solidarity, cooperation, dialogue with other parents) to 
handle those challenges.
To conclude, the still relatively invisible experiences of same-sex fami-
lies possess important implications in terms of citizenship, social inclu-
sion and social change. This chapter has shown how shedding light on 
the emotional dynamics revolving around same-sex parenthood and their 
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implications in terms of status inclusion or exclusion is crucially impor-
tant not only to explain but also to facilitate such change. Same-sex par-
ents are accelerating this process of social change, representing something 
completely different, intrinsically and ontologically different; and their 
atypical form of social inclusion—which avoids assimilation—resonates 
with the concept of “cultural citizenship” (Pakulski 1997), involving the 
idea of a full inclusion in the culture of a specific society.6 They can be 
seen as cultural innovators who produce and foster social change through 
their intimate and yet eminently political care choices and practices 
(Pratesi 2017). In fact, by gaining social visibility through their care 
responsibilities, enriching the possible definitions of family and parent-
hood, challenging stereotypical gender identities and roles and fighting 
against hegemonic sexualities, gay and lesbian parents carry on a peaceful 
battle involving simultaneously social and cultural aspects. A battle based 
on their unique ability to be and feel included without being and feeling 
incorporated or assimilated into pre-existing models of parenthood. No 
matter how contemporary neoliberal cultures may try to incorporate and 
control aspects of same-sex relationships and intimacies that fit with capi-
talist and heteronormative agendas, gay and lesbian parents claiming 
their right to care represent a momentous, radical historical change which 
can be seen as a model of anti-assimilationist citizenship. They produce 
social change by being visible, in all their diversity, and “having to live in 
close proximity to heterosexual cultures (in the negotiation with schools, 
other mothers, local communities, etc.) whilst not being able—or 
 willing—to inhabit the heterosexual ideal” (Ahmed 2004: 152). The cul-
tural gap between the heterosexual script(s) about the family and the vis-
ibility and specificities of same-sex parenthood—including the “embodied 
difference” of the family—unavoidably involves a reworking of the script: 
hence, social change. Clearly, as emphasised by Ahmed (2004: 152), the 
script reworking should not be taken for granted as it does not necessarily 
involve any “conscious political acts” (parenthood is a typically private and 
intimate matter, not a political one) and it is contingent on other social 
variables including class, age, education and status. However, the closer 
that same-sex parents get to spaces defined by heteronormativity, “the 
more potential there is for a reworking of the heteronormative” script 
(Ahmed 2004: 152), to the extent in which the proximity “shows” 
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how non-normative, nonconventional forms of kinship, relationships 
and families are possible.
The final chapter of this book discusses the extent to which same-sex 
parents—with their ability to bypass both heteronormative definitions of 
parenthood and marginalising definitions of sexual citizenship—may 
represent a possible model of inclusive and anti-assimilationist citizen-
ship precisely because of the still ambivalent and politically undetermined 
nature of their civic entitlements. Same-sex parenthood and care prac-
tices translate into the coexistence of two seemingly irreconcilable needs: 
the necessity of coming to grips with newer forms of membership and 
civic entitlement, on the one hand, and the inevitability to also (re-)
define and (re-)affirm their identity politics as members of sexual minori-
ties on the other. In the next chapter, I examine how getting insights into 
this paradox may involve potential benefits for other marginalised and 
unequally entitled communities.
Notes
1. Stephan is a gay man in a same-sex couple relationship who decides to 
have a biological child with the female partner of his lesbian sister.
2. In 1958, Edward Banfield published The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, 
a controversial account of poverty and family ties in a village in Southern 
Italy, where he argued that the backwardness of the community was to be 
explained “largely but not entirely” by “the inability of the villagers to act 
together for their common good or, indeed, for any end transcending the 
immediate, material interest of the nuclear family”. Banfield attributed 
this inability to the ethos of amoral familism, which defined for the author 
a cultural pattern characterised by the absence of moral obligations to 
anyone who does not belong to the family group, together with a strong 
distrust toward social and political institutions. I am not claiming here 
that the attitude of upper/middle-class same-sex parents is in any way 
comparable to what Banfield called amoral familism, which, in itself, is a 
questionable concept. However, during my two years of full-immersion 
into same-sex parenthood, I could observe in these families a certain ten-
dency to self-centeredness and absorption in private, family matters to the 
detriment of collective, public ones. This attitude can be justified by the 
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necessity to claim rights that are still not there and to create forms of pro-
tection and a sense of group membership within the still marginal com-
munity of same-sex parents. Yet, by doing that, sometimes same-sex 
parents unwittingly recreate an invisible divide between a “we parents” 
and all the rest of “childless gay/lesbian people” who are in fact excluded 
from their community.
3. Including the Major of the City of Philadelphia and the Governor of 
Pennsylvania State.
4. The event was mostly meant to be an informal social gathering during 
which the social operators working in the summer camps collected 
information—in a sort of focus group involving same-sex parents and 
their children—about the children’s motivations, expectations and 
perspectives.
5. The personal is political (or the private is political) was the well-known 
slogan of student movements and second-wave feminism from the late 
1960s which emphasised the ways in which different forms of dominance 
and power produced within the personal realm (micro-level) reflected the 
social and political structures and forces operating at the macro-level and 
vice versa.
6. According to Pakulski, cultural citizenship represents a new set of claims—
including the right to symbolic presence and visibility vs. marginalisation, 
the right to dignifying representation vs. stigmatisation, and the right to 
affirmation and propagation of identity vs. assimilation.
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Future Directions and Possible 
Applications
This chapter examines the extent to which same-sex parenthood—which 
manages to attain inclusion bypassing assimilation—may represent a 
possible model of inclusive and anti-assimilationist citizenship applicable 
to other examples of unequally entitled citizens. The non-violent, micro- 
situated and emotion-based model of social change embodied by the 
experience of same-sex parents, is the argument, can be imaginably 
applied to other social groups, contexts and settings, creating the founda-
tions for more caring, more just and more inclusive societies. The overall 
objective is to open a discussion around the possibility to develop new 
theoretical frameworks of analysis overcoming current limitations and 
uses of the concepts of care, social inclusion and citizenship.
Both my research and a growing literature on same-sex parenthood sup-
port the argument that this latter provides the opportunity to explore pos-
sible routes of resistance against macro-structural forces while at the same 
time avoiding marginalisation (Berkowitz and Marsiglio 2007; Duncan 
and Smith 2006; Hicks 2011; Langdridge 2013; Mallon 2004; Pratesi 
2012a; Rabun and Oswald 2009; Roseneil and Budgeon 2004; Shipman 
and Smart 2007; Smart 2007; Stychin 2001, 2003; Stacey 2006; Weeks 
et al. 2001; Weston 1997). The question, then, becomes how to apply the 
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vast potential of citizenship discourse concerning  same- sex parents to 
other contexts, other types of unequally entitled citizens, and how to inter-
sect the theoretical, emotion-based model of social inclusion and social 
change illustrated in this book with other important variables such as 
class, gender, education and ethnicity.
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2014) use the terms “world families”—or 
“families at a distance” or “global families”—to define families that live 
together across national, religious, cultural or ethnic borders. In Beck’s 
analyses, “world families” represent a group of very different social actors, 
including couples of mixed cultures and ethnicities, low-paid migrant 
workers, skilled migrant workers, asylum seekers, refugees and distant 
families who challenge the culturally homogenous understanding of fam-
ily and society and are defined therefore as “pioneers of cosmopolitanism” 
and cultural diversity. As such, they represent a possible synthesis between 
private and public spheres, centre and periphery, national and interna-
tional borders, traditional and liberal politics, and force us to rethink the 
concept of citizenship by virtue of their geographical mobility and their 
increased contacts with different cultural and national groups.
Quite obviously, when we talk about “world families” we talk about a 
series of quite different subjects who vary considerably, depending on the 
reasons which are at the origin of the geographical separation, the possi-
bility (or impossibility) to change them, and, above all, depending on 
several sociological variables such as social class, ethnicity, culture, age, 
able-bodiness, sexuality and many others. What they do have in com-
mon, however, is that they all inhabit cultural, legal and political limbos, 
in-between areas whose borders are still not clearly defined. These differ-
ent social actors—which I prefer to call unequally entitled citizens—have 
in common their “liminality” in terms of belonging and entitlement to 
rights, in other words, their inequality in terms of citizenship. The con-
cept of liminality—from the Latin “limen”—has to do with margins, 
borders and edges. A state of liminality is characterised by the simultane-
ous coexistence of present, past and future which is typical of those sym-
bolic or real passages (from one phase of life to another, from one country 
and/or culture to another etc.) during which the usual point of references 
is temporarily suspended; what is left behind starts being elaborated in 
terms of past experience and identity and what waits ahead in terms of 
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new social and cultural landscapes is still undetermined. Liminality is 
therefore a land of opportunities and open spaces, where ambivalence, 
ambiguity, openness and indeterminacy show all their positive and nega-
tive potential (Deleuze and Guattari 1988; Sennet 2011; Sharma 2013). 
But it is also a land filled with risks and challenges. It is “a world without 
rules and controls, without borders or boundaries, a world … where any-
thing is possible” (Sharma 2013: 109). It may represent a chance of inclu-
sion and entitlement for someone and at the same time it may involve 
exclusion and marginalisation for others.
These in-between areas, momentarily freed from normative con-
straints, social roles and status membership, open up the possibilities of 
social change and foster the creation of new alternative worlds and identi-
ties. Innovation happens in the interstices of liminality. Losing one’s 
dwelling place allows the potential of becoming something radically new. 
Such potential unfolds itself in different directions: it can create uneasi-
ness, anomie, depression, despair and even illness and death; but it can 
also set the foundations for positive transformation of both Self and 
Others. Sennett (2011) describes the foreigner’s experience of displace-
ment as one which creates value: a reflexive value which allows the subject 
to add meaning and solidity to his/her experience. The nature of liminal-
ity, its complex features and multiple implications can be analysed best by 
looking at those social actors who experience several layers of displace-
ment, intersecting, for example, social inclusion with geographical mobil-
ity and cultural and ethnic diversity.
Research on citizenship has shown the multiple challenges involved in 
the attempt to overcome current limited and limiting uses of the lan-
guage of citizenship (Ambrosini 2005, 2007a, 2008; Castles 2014; Erel 
2009, Fortier 2010; James 2014; Lister 2003, 2007; McLaughlin et al. 
2011; McNevin 2006; Shachar 2014; Stychin 2001, 2003; Turner 1993, 
1999a; Yuval-Davis 2003, 2007) while at the same showing the vast 
potentialities of citizenship discourse offered precisely by its “multivalent 
and politically indeterminate character” (Stychin, 2001: 286). Hannah 
Arendt’s foundational definition of citizenship as the “rights to have 
rights”(Arendt 1958 [1951]), as the bedrock to fulfil the right to belong 
to some kind of organised community, still represents a benchmark for 
analyses on migration, nationalism and human rights (Shachar 2014). 
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Nevertheless, our “basic right to have rights remains deeply fragile and 
insecure so long as we can be deprived of membership in an organised 
political community” (Shachar 2014: 115). In this sense, both Hayden 
(2008) and Richmond (1994) have noted how the contradictory nexus 
between “national sovereignty” and “human rights” highlighted by 
Arendt long time ago can be described today in terms of a global system 
of apartheid which is spreading across the world and creating an under- 
class of human beings with no rights and identity. Global developments 
and global economic crises contribute to reshape our understanding of 
citizenship and its ambivalent and shifting boundaries.
The so-called EU refugee crisis1 raises important issues in terms of 
social inclusion, citizenship, international relations and social change, 
but it also represents a unique opportunity for Europe and the UK to 
redefine themselves and their identities. The necessity to provide a grow-
ing number of refugees and asylum seekers with immediate and adequate 
responses clashes with the growing emergence of nationalisms and atti-
tudes of closure and rejection at the institutional and political level. 
Within this context, James (2014) emphasises the importance of the 
social and ethical framing of the problem, which requires going beyond 
unilateral, monolithic, inflexible and value-neutral definitions of entitle-
ment to rights. More specifically, the author suggests grounding the ethics 
of rights to an “ethics of care through which fundamental questions of dif-
ference/identity, inclusion/exclusion, and mobility/belonging are negoti-
ated” (James 2014: 221). This requires shifting the focus from the 
macro- to the micro-level of analysis and to look at the ways in which 
people constantly construct and reconstruct their sense of entitlement 
and belonging and produce forms of relational social inclusion through 
the sentiments and practices of care (Epstein and Carrillo 2014; Erel 
2011; Erel and Reynolds 2014; Fudge 2014; Kershaw 2010; Longman 
et al. 2013; Reynolds and Zontini 2013; Sevenhuijsen 1998; Yuval-Davis 
2007). Emotions are key to show the grey areas connected with the con-
cepts of care and social inclusion and challenge their conventional and 
stereotypical interpretations. However, when emotions are considered in 
studies on refugees and asylum seekers the perspective is often pathologi-
cal or follows a medical-behaviouristic argumentation that mostly focuses 
on negative emotions and feelings (Albrecht 2016; Wettergren 2013). 
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But an exclusive focus on negative situations and interactions seems to be 
too short-sighted and needs to be expanded. Integrating emotions within 
migration and refugee studies (Albrecht 2016; Svasek 2010; Boccagni 
and Baldassar 2015) and overcoming conventional approaches to migra-
tion, citizenship and social inclusion merely based on economic, politi-
cal, static and normative interpretations of the reality allow us to develop 
a non-pathological, emotion-based, interactional model of social inclu-
sion and to visualise new forms of citizenship and social inclusion which 
are creatively performed at the local level, that is, at the level of micro- 
interactions, even when forms of exclusion, borders-defence attitudes 
and racism persist at the institutional and political level (see also Isin 
2008, 2009, 2012; Aradau et al. 2010).
Refugees and asylum seekers who try to reach European coasts and 
countries are exposed to terrible circumstances, quite often including 
death and loss; they experience several forms of exclusion at the institu-
tional and political level and several forms of negative emotional reac-
tions at the social level, including the fear of crowds of invaders, the fear 
of the “other”, the fear related to health and security issues and economic 
fears. But they also experience several forms of successful interactions, 
when we look at what happens at the local level. Citizens, professionals 
and volunteers involved in rescuing them, providing them with immedi-
ate care, shelter and food contradict and challenge on a daily basis, 
through their care practices, the multiple forms of institutional exclusion 
which persist at the political level. In other words—and similarly to other 
unequally entitled citizens—refugees and asylum seekers experience 
forms of interaction rituals at the micro-level of face-to-face interactions 
which expose them to different emotional outcomes in terms of status 
inclusion/exclusion, membership and sense of entitlement. But, at the 
same time, they expose the hosting countries and populations to different 
emotional outcomes. Different emotional outcomes related to the images 
of overcrowded boats, different emotional outcomes related to these peo-
ple’s life and death, different emotional outcomes related to direct or 
indirect interactions with them, different emotional outcomes related to 
the fact that these unequally entitled citizens remind us or make us aware 
of the responsibilities that European countries have in explaining and 
dealing with this unprecedented mass exodus. Thus, the different forms 
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of institutional racism, closure, border-defence attitude which are 
 propagated at the macro-level seem to be somehow and sometimes com-
pensated at the local level by micro-situated forms of social inclusion 
based on two key elements: care—the immediate care, provided for the 
survivors, or the posthumous care for the dead—and emotions—the emo-
tional reaction, collective and individual, provoked by the dramatic 
images of refugees escaping from war, torture and famine and, too often, 
finding a fatal epilogue in our self-defensive, unwelcoming and bordered 
countries.
The dramatic visibility and sudden proximity of the constant waves of 
refugees and their children reaching the European coasts rework at the 
micro-level, through forms of situational and relational solidarity, the 
nationalist, uncaring, neoliberal politics concerned with issues of secu-
rity, defence and protections of borders imposed at the macro-level. By 
crossing our geographical, cultural and political borders and telling us an 
alternative, situational story about human rights, people’s entitlements, 
individual and collective responsibilities, refugees and asylum seekers 
induce us to rethink the relationship between our nation-state borders 
and the people placing themselves next to them. Micro-dynamics of situ-
ated and relational inclusion occur at the level of face-to-face interac-
tions, providing a social and political template of how a truthfully 
inclusive, caring and multicultural society might look like. With their 
presence and visibility, refugees and asylum seekers force us to rethink 
our ideas of citizenship, borders and social inclusion. They undermine 
and rewrite the citizenship boundaries against which they struggle 
through the emotional dynamics revolving around their interactions with 
local communities and through their transnational accounts bridging 
and connecting different affective, social and political cultures.2 They 
produce social change by being visible, by telling us another story about 
Europe and its responsibilities in terms of human rights, by interacting 
with local communities and exposing them to different, extraordinary 
forms of interaction rituals: the ritual of saving them form the sea (or 
recuperating their corpses), the ritual of hospitality, the ritual of care, the 
ritual of providing them with food and shelter, the ritual of helping them 
to join their families, the ritual of preventing them from crossing the 
borders, the ritual of treating them as unwelcome aliens and the ritual of 
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sending them back to their country of origin. The gap between our 
Eurocentric narratives and the visibility and specificities of refugees/asy-
lum seekers and their stories of forced exodus unavoidably involves a 
reworking of the narrative, a narrative which involves important issues in 
terms of human rights, social and cultural inclusion and citizenship.
It is in the context of situated interactions—be they real (face-to-face) 
or virtual (via images) that the micro-emotional dynamics unfold entirely 
their potential for social inclusion and social change. Any form of dis-
crimination and phobia, ultimately, is deeply characterised by ignorance 
and an irrational fear of the unknown. The closer the refugees get to the 
symbolic and physical spaces defined by our Eurocentric ideas of national 
borders and national identities, the more potential there is for a rework-
ing of those spaces, partly as the proximity “shows” (Ahmed 2004) how 
non-conventional forms of social inclusion are not only possible but nec-
essary. Similarly to what happens with same-sex parents, proximity and 
visibility are key here, as they show us how unusual, unconventional 
forms of inclusion and entitlement to rights are needed to enlarge and 
enrich our limited definitions, uses and interpretations of the concept of 
citizenship. In the case of the refugees and asylum seekers, the gap 
between the cultural scripts of the hosting society and the necessity to go 
beyond unilateral, inflexible and state-bounded definitions of entitle-
ment to rights inevitably involves a reworking of the scripts and antici-
pates future policy and political needs. Thus, the social interactionist, 
emotion-based theoretical approach here illustrated highlights the possi-
bility of local and individual changes that are produced at the micro-level 
even as structural and cultural influences persist at the macro-level. It also 
emphasises the necessity and describes the conditions of innovative, flex-
ible and inclusive definitions of civic entitlement and social participation 
inspired by a growing number of unequally entitled citizens.
In no way am I suggesting that the emotion-based, relational and situ-
ational forms of social inclusion here discussed take place automatically 
and that they are successful in any circumstances, providing an entirely 
alternative interpretation of the relationships between the different social 
actors involved. The emotional dynamics as well as the care practices are 
imbued with issues of power, dependency, asymmetric relationship, 
inequality, economic transactions and so on (see also Basch et al. 2005; 
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Zelizer 2005) both in the context of refugees/asylum seekers and in the 
context of the other examples of unequally entitled citizens here described. 
What I suggest, instead, is that by looking more closely at the social fields 
that cross geographic, cultural and political borders (Schiller et al. 1992, 
1995; Fontanari 2016), we can get useful insights into the ways in which 
alternative narratives and accounts slowly become more visible and force 
us to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions about issues of belonging, 
identity, social inclusion and entitlement. Quite obviously, the role of 
social, legal and political institutions, the role of national and suprana-
tional policies and politics, the role of media, the role of education, the 
role of the multiple and diverse examples of unequally entitled citizens 
described by some scholars as “pioneers of cosmopolitanism” (Beck et al. 
2014) are all fundamental and can only be partially addressed here. 
Nevertheless, there are, I think, several theoretical and methodological 
suggestions which emerge and would be worth being further investigated 
starting from the arguments discussed in this book. The micro-situated 
and emotion-based model of social and cultural inclusion exemplified by 
same-sex parents—I argue—can be a useful analytical and practical tool 
overcoming the limitations of current models of citizenship and integra-
tion, as long as conceptual clarity and methodological soundness are 
respected. As several contributions demonstrate (Ambrosini 2013; 
Baldassar and Merla 2013; Boccagni and Baldassar 2015; Finotelli and 
Michalowski 2012; Freeman 2004; Koopmans 2010; Koopmans et  al. 
2012; Sassen 1998), it appears all the more necessary to abandon conven-
tional approaches to integration and social inclusion based on rigidly eco-
nomic, political and normative interpretations of the reality in favour of 
more nuanced, qualitative, phenomenological and dynamic approaches 
based on innovative theoretical and analytical tools and on complex range 
of new methods of inquiry. The extent to which such theoretical and 
methodological project can be fully realised still needs to be further 
explored and will crucially depend on our ability to care about and 
acknowledge the value of diversities and cultural differences.
One way to measure the relevance and the potential impact of the theo-
retical and methodological model here illustrated will be the development of 
(1) policy recommendations based on more grounded and innovative 
accounts of the politics of care, situating abstract ideas of citizenship into 
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specific empirical contexts and providing important  practical tools for social 
inclusion and crucial insights on social change; (2) innovative methodologies 
to investigate the extent to which the micro- situated and emotion-based rep-
resented by these unequally entitled citizens or pioneers of cosmopolitanism 
can be used as a general model of citizenship and social inclusion; (3) an 
integrative knowledge about the effects of new, emerging social phenomena 
in various social and cultural contexts; and (4) innovative, creative strategies 
of social inclusion based on micro-policy and micro-politics of emotions.
The numerous examples of successful, inclusive care practices which 
occur at the micro-level of interaction for different types of unequally 
entitled citizens represent some of the “social fields” where geographic, 
cultural and political borders are regularly crossed and combined (Shiller 
et  al. 1992, 1995; Fontanari 2016) thanks to face-to-face interactions 
involving ethics of care and emotion dimensions. Without ignoring the 
fundamental role of important dimensions and variables (i.e. power, sta-
tus, social class, education, gender and ethnicity), these examples undeni-
ably challenge our conventional wisdom and make traditional lens and 
paradigms to interpret citizenship and social inclusion inadequate because 
they are not able to capture through fine-grained phenomenological anal-
yses the entirety and the complexity of what happens at the level of face- 
to- face interactions. Many of these examples of successful forms of social 
inclusion—that is, forms of social inclusion occurring in pluralistic rather 
than assimilationist ways—have been documented by media and other 
non-academic accounts. What is needed, thus, is further developing the 
emerging interdisciplinary approaches intersecting migration and refu-
gees studies, citizenship studies, ethics of care studies and the sociology of 
emotions (Boccagni and Baldassar 2015; Albrecht 2016); in other words, 
intersecting the concept of citizenship with the concepts of care, care 
practices and the emotional dynamics revolving around them. This pro-
cess of theoretical hybridisation and contamination should be accompa-
nied by a careful implementation of innovative research methods which I 
describe elsewhere (Pratesi 2012b) and in the Appendix of this book. In 
order to be more effective, then, the innovative empirical agenda should 
involve cross-cultural collaborations and adopt holistic and participatory 
approaches (Creswell and Poth 2017; Hayes et al. 2016; Van den Hove 
2006) based on the development of ethnographic, phenomenological, 
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narrative analyses to explore ways of doing or undoing social inclusion and 
citizenship through care interactions.
Further developments may also be achieved by rethinking the concept 
of citizenship as a social relation emotionally charged and integrating the 
connection between the ethics of rights to the ethics of care highlighted by 
James (2014) with an ethics of respect, respect of diversity and dignity of 
every individual, in which fundamental questions of difference/identity, 
inclusion/exclusion, visibility/invisibility, entitlement/responsibility are 
universally granted and individually negotiated at the micro-level of face- 
to- face interactions; but also by linking the multiple, micro-situated and 
emotion-based ways of doing citizenship and social inclusion to the funda-
mental dimension of collective responsibility.
The credibility of the theoretical and methodological model here illus-
trated can be solidly grounded in the participants’ local, contextual, lived 
and felt experience of the phenomenon studied and in the multiple meth-
ods and tools we use. The specific importance and contribution of qualita-
tive studies rely upon acts of interpretation, convincing reconceptualisation 
of a phenomenon and dialogue within and across fields and disciplines. 
The interpretive phenomenological analysis illustrated in this book is a 
complex, time-consuming and labour-intensive process, which requires 
the researcher to acknowledge the complexities and ambiguities of the 
research participants’ narratives and simultaneously come to terms with 
the necessity to illustrate their accounts in a form that is clear, credible and 
exhaustive. Since we do not rely upon statistical tests to verify whether a 
pattern or a relationship between variables is significant, we have to make 
carefully considered judgments about what themes, patterns and categories 
represent truly relevant information to analyse these narratives. Producing 
readable, linear narratives out of complex social realities is one of the prob-
lems shared by all qualitative researches. In the end, all qualitative works 
contain “some mix of careful planning, serendipity, blunder, and idiosyn-
cratic predilections” (Leidner 1993: 233). As a consequence, we must be 
aware that what we discover is shaped by us, that it is not the only truth, 
and that both our theoretical ad methodological approaches require an 
ongoing reflexive attention. But equally, we should engage in designing 
approaches where what we construct cannot be seen as arbitrary and what 
we find cannot be seen as only limited to the research participants’ stories 
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and individual troubles (Mills 2000), but rather as a valid start to question 
more conventional interpretations and approaches and to expand our pres-
ent understanding of a phenomenon.
These types of qualitative, phenomenological approaches can indubi-
tably help us to experience what Denzin calls a “dialogic relationships 
with the [moral] community” we all belong to, as social researchers 
(2001b: 43). These dialogic relationships, in turn, allow us to better 
understand what any phenomenon might truly involve when freed from 
its cultural scripts and lived in the entirety of its ethical, emotional and 
political implications, in a sort of ideal democracy of feelings in which 
individuals possess different but equally acknowledged emotional rights 
and responsibilities; different but equally valued ways to be and feel enti-
tled as parents; different but equally respected ways of doing care and—
through care—doing citizenship.
Notes
1. I intentionally and critically use the expression “so-called” to qualify the 
term crisis as this latter indicates a sudden, unexpected and problematic 
event. This is not the case of the current humanitarian emergency, which 
is a structural phenomenon that has been affecting the lives of thousands 
of refugees and asylum seekers for years and will continue to do so in the 
future. Dealing with this phenomenon by looking at it as a crisis, rather 
than an integral part of the process of human, social and economic devel-
opment, is simply wrong and represents a missed opportunity.
2. Schiller et al. (1992, as cited in Ambrosini 2007a: 1) define transnational-
ism as “the emergence of a social process in which migrants establish social 
fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders […] and take 
actions, make decisions and feel concerns within a field of social relations 
that link together their country of origin and their country or countries of 
settlement”.
 Notes 
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11
Grounding Citizenship to an Ethic 
of Care: Conclusions and Implications
The purpose of the empirical work illustrated in this book was to inter-
sect care and emotion and analyse less explored and less visible dimensions 
of care-related inequalities: the inequalities which emerge from—and are 
related to—the emotional dynamics revolving around care. More specifi-
cally, this book sheds light on the emotional implications of informal care 
(a) by looking at the different types of care arrangements which develop 
in different types of family contexts and other forms of intimate relation-
ships and (b) by using innovative theoretical ad methodological 
approaches to study this complex phenomenon and get closer to its fun-
damental nature. The original idea was to develop a thorough and more 
inclusive phenomenology of care by looking at the lived and felt experi-
ence of care and at the multiple and uncharted meanings and implica-
tions of care.
From the theoretical point of view, this study was based on a phenom-
enological approach showing the not always manifest links between sym-
bolic interactionism, social constructionism and ethnomethodology; and 
it made use of those theoretical traditions in the sociology of emotions 
describing inequality in terms of emotion-based processes which occur at 
the level of micro-situated interactions. In particular, it drew on Collins’ 
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Interaction Ritual model (2004) according to which people’s statuses and 
ranking in society are also and fundamentally based on emotional dynam-
ics rather than merely on structural dimensions. The combination of 
these theoretical traditions allowed me to get important insights into the 
multiple and, at times, contradictory ways in which the emotional 
dynamics shape the experience of care and produce different outcomes in 
terms of inequality and social exclusion; but also in terms of social inclu-
sion, citizenship and social change.
Borrowing from Fenstermaker and West’s idea (2002) that gender is a 
fluid, contingent and situated accomplishment through which outcomes 
of inequality are constantly reproduced, my argument is that a system-
atic, in-depth, phenomenological investigation of the interactional and 
emotional processes involved in doing care provides significant clues to 
visualise the processes involved in doing citizenship; in other words, the 
multiple ways in which people—through their ongoing interactional, 
lived and felt experiences of care—produce different outcomes in terms 
of equality/inequality, inclusion/exclusion and entitlement to rights. 
Care is seen as a strategic site to disclose the invisible, emotion-based, 
interactional mechanisms through which social exclusion and inequality, 
on the one hand, but also social inclusion, status membership and citi-
zenship, on the other, are constantly reproduced at the micro-level. The 
integration of some of the most recent theoretical developments in the 
sociology of emotions with Fenstermaker and West’s ethnomethodologi-
cal approach was aimed to overcome the current limitations characteris-
ing conventional approaches to the gendered division of care work and to 
offer a more exhaustive and reliable picture of different ways of thinking, 
feeling and doing care within a heterogeneous set of family and non- family 
contexts.
Deceptive dichotomies between a female world of expressiveness and 
care and a male world of instrumentality and rationality still tend to char-
acterise current discourses on care, reproducing confusing and erroneous 
distinctions between the worlds of emotion and rationality.1 The Cartesian 
dualism between mind and body which has shaped for centuries Western 
culture largely explains these erroneous distinctions. Thus, one of the 
issues addressed in this book had to do with the necessity to overcome 
these misleading, dichotomist ideologies and look for more inclusive, 
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empirically grounded and emotion-based approaches to social inequality 
and social exclusion; approaches which might be able to go beyond a 
mere logic of gender-related inequality or other structural factors affect-
ing people’s inequality. Putting emotions at the centre of the analysis and 
expanding the category of gender by looking at the multiple ways in 
which different men and different women do gender represented the start-
ing point as well as the strategy to deal with the above limitations. The 
purpose was to prevent a limited and ideologically tainted discourse on 
informal care.
In this sense, the inclusion of same-sex couples or other unconven-
tional family arrangements was strategic in several respects. First of all, in 
order to challenge conventional and heteronormative approaches to fam-
ily care which tend to either exclude unconventional families or to spe-
cifically focus on them in a comparative perspective that aims to analyse 
the assumed specificities of their care practices. Second, because these less 
conventional families are crucially important to envision the emotional 
dynamics of inclusion/exclusion people produce while caring for others. 
Third, because unconventional family arrangements are key in showing 
the links between agency and structure, that is, between micro-situated 
action and interaction, on the one hand, and macro-structural forces 
reproducing inequality, on the other. And finally, in order to initiate a 
broader, more inclusive debate on care challenging conventional ideas 
and definitions of the family based on legally acknowledged contracts 
(marriage) and dominant forms of sexuality (heterosexuality). This is why 
the sample of 80 caregivers included different types of caregivers (married 
and single caregivers, male and female caregivers, heterosexual and gay/
lesbian caregivers) and different types of care (childcare and elderly care).
Through a thick description and interpretive phenomenological analysis 
of the care practices experienced and felt within these different types of 
family contexts, the book sheds lights on the less visible rationales and 
implications of care which have to do with the production of emotional 
energy (EE) (Collins 2004), status inclusion, civil entitlement and social 
change and provides the premises for a substantial reconsideration of the 
current literature on care and the ethics of care. Thus, whilst the contri-
bution of all types of care and caregivers is extremely important, the spe-
cific focus of the book on same-sex parenthood is essential to visualise 
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and understand the link between doing care and doing social inclusion and 
social change. Parenthood, in fact, is conventionally constructed and 
thought as typically heterosexual, leaving sexual minorities out of the 
picture. The book fills this gap and sheds light into the interactional and 
emotional dynamics through which care produces forms of exclusion and 
inequality which are not (only) related to the care activity in itself, but 
rather to the feeling of entitlement to care or its lack thereof.
Most of the scholarship and current literature on care focuses on the 
gendered costs of care while far less attention is paid to the consequences 
of being excluded from care or not being acknowledged as a fully entitled 
and legitimate caregiver. Even less attention is paid to the inherently 
rewarding and empowering aspects of caregiving. In the previous chap-
ters, we have seen how indefensibly scarce the attention given to the right 
to care and to its positive implications in terms of status inclusion and EE 
gain is. One of the key contributions of this book is to show how the right 
to care should be more explicitly reframed and discussed as a public pro-
cess involving (public) status and power dimensions as well as (private) 
emotional and psychological processes. This is true for all kinds of care-
givers, regardless of their sexual orientation. For same-sex parents, how-
ever, the right to care is associated with a momentous historical change: 
their claiming the right to be parents as fully entitled and acknowledged 
caregivers is something that has never happened before. For this minority 
within the minority, parenthood is increasingly becoming an effective 
way, perhaps the most viable one, to achieve a by default recognition of 
other civil rights connected with the changing nature of citizenship in 
Western societies, such as those related to marriage or civil union.2 In 
fact, discriminating against same-sex parents means discriminating 
against their children, and whilst LGBT’s civil rights are still considered 
by many as sectarian or of secondary importance for the broader society, 
children’s rights seem to maintain a universally shared appeal which inter-
sects social, cultural, geographic and political borders.
Same-sex families asking for the acknowledgment of their right to care 
redesign the symbolic, legal and political boundaries of the concept of 
citizenship, revealing an interesting paradox: they look for social and legal 
inclusion within pre-existing definitions of families and, at the same time, 
they claim their unique right to care by embodying and giving visibility 
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to new, unconventional perspectives on families, relationships, intimacies 
and care-related entitlements. In Chap. 9, we showed examples of how 
same-sex families produce social change by broadening conventional 
ideas of family and parenthood, increasing the social visibility of sexual 
minorities, challenging gender stereotypes and living in close proximity 
to heterosexual cultures without being incorporated into or assimilated 
by them.3 Same-sex parents claiming their right to care can be seen as a 
model of anti-assimilationist citizenship, or as a model of more pluralist, 
inclusive and relational citizenship which involves the entitlement to (a) 
the right to symbolic presence and visibility vs. marginalisation, (b) the 
right to dignifying representation vs. stigmatisation and (c) the right to 
affirmation and propagation of identity vs. assimilation (Pakulski 1997; 
cit. in Richardson and Monro 2012).
The previous chapter has examined the extent to which the micro- 
situated and emotion-based model of social inclusion embodied by the 
same-sex parents might represent a possible model of inclusive and anti- 
assimilationist citizenship applicable to other types of unequally entitled 
citizens. The main objective of the suggestions for further research dis-
cussed in Chap. 10 is to initiate a dialogue on the opportunity to develop 
new theoretical and methodological approaches to the concepts of care, 
social inclusion and citizenship. Emotions, I have argued throughout the 
book, constitute the (missing) link between doing care at the micro-level 
of interactions and doing or undoing difference at the macro-level of social 
structures; and different ways to do care and to do gender must be taken 
into account if we want to grasp a truly comprehensive and panoramic 
picture of the phenomenon of care and of its whatness. Highlighting “the 
centrality of emotions to routine operations of social interaction” 
(Barbalet 2001: 3) and their explanatory role in producing social change 
was one of the aims of this book. This study has indeed revealed and clari-
fied the emotional dynamics through which forms of relational social 
inclusion are produced at the micro-level of interactions even when forms 
of inequality and social exclusion persist at the macro-level of social struc-
tures. More specifically, it has clarified the interactional, emotional 
dynamics connecting parenthood, sexual orientation and citizenship and 
the complex ways they are shaped by and shape the structures in which 
they are embedded, producing social change. Ironically enough, these 
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minority parents are opening the doors to social change by capitalising on 
one of the least valued goods in our capitalist, neoliberal societies: family 
care.
Being a parent still makes a significant difference in our societies,4 but 
different ways to attain parenthood—biologically, through adoption, 
surrogacy and so on—or to be a parent—single or in a couple, gay/les-
bian or heterosexual, married or unmarried and so on—make an even 
more important difference: a difference that translates into inequality but 
that can be challenged by reconsidering the role and the multiple impli-
cations of care and emotions in our life. By doing care we also do citizen-
ship, social inclusion and social change: through emotions.
Notes
1. Research on the neurology of emotions has demonstrated that supposed 
opposition of emotion and rationality is simply wrong. Several studies 
have clearly shown that there is a strong connection between the cerebral 
cortex, which makes our rational decisions possible, and the subcortical 
emotions centres of the brain (the amygdala). When this connection is 
compromised, human rationality appears to be greatly affected, if not 
impossible altogether (Damasio 2003, 2006). Therefore, what we call 
human rationality is not neurologically detachable from our emotional 
response; that is, if it is true that decision-making can be considered as 
one of the most prominent outcomes of our rational activity, then also 
decision-making proves to be dependent on emotions. To put it in the 
words of neoclassical economics, the activity of attaching valences or “util-
ities” to different alternatives is far from being disconnected from its emo-
tional counterpart. See also Bechara et al. (2000), LeDoux (1998), Turner 
and Stets (2005).
2. Which are crucially important for other forms of legal entitlements (such 
as who has a say in health-related issues, inheritance and patrimonial 
issues) and other expressions of the right to care: the right to care for and 
about one’s partner as a fully entitled citizen.
3. This latter point is particularly important, as one thing is affirming a differ-
ent (acknowledged, legitimate, dignified and valued) model of parenthood 
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and another thing altogether is being co-opted within pre-existing, hetero-
normative and hegemonic models of family and parenthood.
4. Several scholars have critically emphasised how in Western societies par-
enthood, rather than (merely) heterosexuality, is the precondition for a 
full social entitlement as a “normal citizen” (Turner 1999a, 2008; 
Richardson 2005; Richardson and Monro 2012).
 Notes 
a.pratesi@chester.ac.uk
269© The Author(s) 2018
A. Pratesi, Doing Care, Doing Citizenship,  
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63109-7
This appendix provides further details about the analytical and method-
ological approach informing this book and illustrates the multiple 
research methods and tools used in the study. Reflexive accounts on my 
epistemological position as a researcher complement this session, with 
the aim to further support and reinforce the persuasiveness of the analy-
ses and interpretations proposed in this book. Situating oneself epistemo-
logically is an important element of credibility1 and reflexivity (Archer 
2007; Doucet 2008; Mauthner and Doucet 2003), because it puts the 
reader in the position of judging how the researcher’s location and subjec-
tivity might affect any aspect of the research or interpretative process. 
Reflexivity is a methodological principle and instrument that sheds light 
upon the ways in which a researcher’s intellectual and personal involve-
ment with a particular subject matter influences, acts upon and informs 
his/her research. In other words, it requires an explicit acknowledgment 
and awareness of the researcher’s contribution to the construction of 
meanings throughout the research process.
Within the context of social sciences, reflexivity is therefore a research 
tool used to analyse personal, intersubjective and social processes which 
shape our research. It enables researchers, particularly within the qualita-
 Appendix: Research Methods and Tools
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tive tradition, to acknowledge their role and the situated nature of their 
research. No matter how aware and reflexive we are, there are influences 
that the researcher may be unaware of, or that require time, distance and 
detachment from the research to be better identified and articulated. 
Nevertheless, if being aware of possible interferences does not eliminate 
them, by disclosing our potential biases we can put the reader in a better 
position to weigh the credibility of the research accounts. When I started 
this research I did not have a specific personal stance towards same-sex 
parenthood. As a sociologist, I thought that including same-sex parents 
in the sample of “normal” caregivers was strategically important to high-
light the emotional dynamics of status inclusion/exclusion and also theo-
retically necessary, to fill an existing gap in the literature on care. As a gay 
man, I was interested, both intellectually and personally, in exploring a 
phenomenon for me still completely unknown. Throughout my in- 
depth, ethnographic study of the phenomenon of care and, in particular, 
the exploration of the uncharted territory of same-sex parenthood, my 
originally neutral stance was partially modified. Given these premises, I 
cannot exclude the influence of those unintentional factors that are not 
easily visible to the researcher or that require time, distance and detach-
ment from the research to be better identified and articulated. 
Nevertheless, as Mauthner and Doucet (2003) suggest, paying attention 
to the epistemological accountability2 of a study is far more productive 
than providing the reader with a mere literal account of the multiple fil-
ters, influences and factors potentially affecting our research.
Our epistemological stances are reflected in and by the ways we experi-
ence and construct our realities and the social world. Each time we choose 
specific theoretical paradigms and methodological approaches, we oper-
ate some form of influence on the research outcomes, but we also provide 
a significant contribution to the construction of social reality (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966). Our knowledge, ideas and views of reality are deeply 
entrenched in the historical, cultural, political and societal contexts in 
which we live; and so are our research practices and methodological 
choices. This is why it is important to reflect on and to explicitly clarify 
our theoretical and methodological choices: because, also through them, 
we can unintentionally create dynamics of exclusion and inequality or 
reproduce the social realities supporting them. One of the research’s aims 
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was gaining insights into the inner, emotional and interactional mecha-
nisms through which different types of caregivers produce inequality and 
social change while doing care. The argument of this book is that, by doing 
care, people create forms of emotional stratification at the micro- level that 
affect their social positioning at the macro-level and their social inclusion 
or exclusion within specific groups and contexts. In other words, the “pri-
vate” experience of care possesses important “public” implications in 
terms of status inclusion/exclusion, status membership, social and civil 
entitlement and, ultimately, citizenship. In order to shed light on the 
links between the private, inner, emotional processes related to care and 
their public, social, structural outcomes, I needed methods of data collec-
tion that could capture and visualise the emotionally charged and lived 
experience of care in different types of caregivers; that is, methods that 
could be innovative, creative and reliable enough to allow me to claim the 
credibility of my findings3 and to induce the reader to endorse it.
In what follows, I first describe the methodological approach and the 
analytical strategy employed to grasp and interpret the emotionally 
charged and lived experience of same-sex parenthood; I then illustrate the 
different research strategies and toolkits which underpinned this study; 
and, finally, I reflexively position myself describing the emotional labour 
in which to some extent I was involved, intellectually and personally, as a 
researcher. The collection of qualitative data drew on several research 
methods and instruments: semi-structured in-depth interviews, diaries, 
ethnographic participant observation, online conversations with and 
between same-sex parents, key-informant interviews and secondary 
sources about informal care and same-sex parenthood collected from 
adoption agencies, newspapers and the web. While the contribution of all 
these methods has been crucially important to inform and feed my criti-
cal phenomenological inquiry, many of the interpretations and explana-
tions discussed in this book have been largely based on a thorough, 
meticulous and systematic analysis of the interviews’ verbatim transcrip-
tions4 and on the use of the constant comparative method and analytic 
induction, which represent the most appropriate methods to corroborate 
studies based on large amounts of qualitative data. The constant com-
parative method involves repeated comparisons within and across cases to 
verify or disconfirm provisional hypotheses and it also entails searching 
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and highlighting those cases that do not fit immediately with the rest of 
the sample. Analytic induction is a process which builds explanations by 
constructing and testing a set of causal links between events, actions, pat-
terns and so on in one case and then extending them to further cases.5
 Methodological Approach and Analytical 
Strategy
Although several theoretical advances in the sociology of emotions—
notably Collins’ Interaction Ritual model (2004)—informed my empiri-
cal research, none of them had been previously applied to examine the 
topics discussed in this book; moreover, I did not have any specific 
hypothesis to verify nor did I know what would have emerged from my 
inclusive, phenomenological study of informal care. Data collection and 
interpretation were guided by the principles of Grounded Theory (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967), which is an inductive method requiring a meticulous 
analysis and constant comparison of data while searching for emerging 
themes, recurring patterns and analytical categories. This method involves 
a complex series of steps which include collecting additional data from 
the research participants or finding new sources of information to either 
validate or discharge emerging categories of analysis and patterns. 
Constant comparison and analytic induction enable the ongoing and sys-
tematic emergence of hypotheses from the data. Thus, the theory is pro-
gressively developed from and directly grounded in the qualitative data 
and observations rather than being generated in abstract terms or formu-
lated a priori. As the data collection goes on, central theoretical concepts 
are identified and tentative links are developed between those concepts 
and the collection of new qualitative data. The early stages of the  empirical 
research, especially when this also involves ethnographic work and obser-
vation, tend to be quite open, laborious and time-consuming, but also 
extremely productive. The subsequent stages of the research involve con-
stant corroboration, comparison and systematisation of the emerging 
ideas, concepts hypotheses and patterns. The overall goal is trying to con-
verge towards a few core conceptual categories and sets of hypotheses that 
are central. The whole process never really ends and could continue 
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indefinitely: essentially, it ends when the researcher decides to or is forced 
to conclude the collection of new data (and the associated formulation of 
new hypotheses) because of time and resource constraints.
The analysis of the substantial amount of qualitative data collected 
during the two years was guided by what Denzin calls interpretive interac-
tionism (Denzin 2001a)6 and some other scholars call interpretive phe-
nomenological analysis (Smith 2004; Smith et  al. 1997, 1999). This 
analytical approach involves trying to understand the individuals’ life 
experiences, how individuals make sense of them and what meanings are 
attributed to them (Smith 2004). Thus, the qualitative approach adopted 
and described here can be defined and summarised as phenomenological, 
interactionist and interpretative in that it is concerned with the individu-
als’ perceptions or accounts of a social phenomenon, focuses on people’s 
subjective experiences and interpretations of the world and views the ana-
lytical outcome as resulting from the interactions between the individu-
als’ accounts and the researcher’s frameworks of meaning. The interpretive 
phenomenological analysis involves therefore a high degree of subjectiv-
ity, as it is shaped by the researcher’s interpretative frameworks. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the traditional criteria to evaluate 
the research’s quality and soundness are completely irrelevant when we 
assess this type of qualitative research.7 With such a context—to para-
phrase Becker (2001)—we are not directly dealing with validity in its 
canonical meaning, but rather with something which seems as essential 
to us as validity does to others in other research contexts. In this analyti-
cal context, the social significance of a relationship, a similarity or a differ-
ence becomes more relevant than the statistical significance,8 since 
statistically significant differences might be socially insignificant and 
socially significant differences might not be revealed by statistics (see also 
Epstein 1997; James 1997).
One of the first practical and analytical steps of this approach involves 
repeated reading of the interviews’ verbatim transcripts, resulting in 
annotations on key concepts, general recurring themes and common pat-
terns. After this process has been reiterated several times, the next step is 
connecting the resulting set of general themes with common patterns 
emerging from the different transcripts; this should allow, then, to pro-
duce a broader set of themes, patterns and links between them. In order 
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to grasp the complexities of the entire process, we now need to provide 
some details about the format of the semi-structured interview, its under-
lying rationale and objective and the multiple, innovative research tools 
which accompanied and enriched it.
 The Narrative, In-Depth Interview as a Short 
Film
The in-depth interviews focused on the caregivers’ lived experience of 
care and included, as such, questions on the different types of care 
arrangements, care networks, strategies to combine work and care, the 
emotional and practical implications of care, the effects of care responsi-
bilities on personal identity and the subjective and reflective interpreta-
tions of such effects. The interviewees were invited to talk about their 
family/relationship contexts, their networks of care, their care activities 
and responsibilities, their everyday practices and concerns, their thoughts 
and their feelings revolving around the experience of care. The interview 
was conceived and delivered as an interactive practice where both inter-
viewee (as a storyteller or narrator) and researcher co-construct interpre-
tive frameworks and orientations. This, while the interview was 
semi-structured and followed a clear pathway, its nuances and construc-
tive digressions were constantly negotiated within a context where practi-
cal contingencies and expertise blended together and the interviewee’s 
“felt” experience of care emerged from a complex and comprehensive 
range of means. New themes and different ways to interpret them are 
developed during this type of (inter-)active interview and the interview 
questions are adjusted accordingly (Holstein and Gubrium 1995).
The format of the interview was based on a set of open-ended ques-
tions as initial probes on a wide variety of topics and included several 
tools aimed at getting insights into the felt experience of care and the 
emotional dynamics revolving around it while at the same time facilitat-
ing the tones of an informal conversation. Among these multiple tools, a 
drawing with two concentric circles which was showed to the respon-
dents at the beginning of the interview to help them describe their net-
works of care; a scale (the thermometer of feelings) to help them describe 
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their emotions when thinking or doing care; a drawing with a staircase 
(the existential ladder) to facilitate the respondents’ visualisation and 
accounts of their existential moves and progress; several photos portray-
ing different kinds of care context and situations which were shown at the 
end of the interview as a visual elicitation to stimulate additional thoughts 
and reflections about the respondents’ care experiences.
The interviews format allowed for more than a simple in-depth account 
of the participants’ experience of care. Reading the verbatim transcrip-
tions and going through them over and over again were more than a 
simple reading: it was like watching several times a short movie, which 
included the visualisation of the overall atmosphere, the type of interac-
tion between researcher and respondent, the interview context and cir-
cumstances, the smiles, the laughs, the enthusiasms, the disappointments, 
the frustrations, the joys and, sometimes, the tears. If, for obvious rea-
sons, all these elements hold particularly vivid and memorable images 
and feelings for the researcher, the reader should also be put in the posi-
tion of visualising most of them with a similar intensity through the 
analysis of the long interview’s excerpts and the researcher’s thick inter-
pretation of them. Both images and feelings will not be the same, since 
the reader can only imagine the situations, but the emotional intensity 
and tenor emerging from the respondents’ accounts should not diminish. 
This can be achieved when the conditions for a proper interactive inter-
view (Holstein and Gubrium 1995) are produced and the interview for-
mat includes some of the creative tools illustrated below.
 The Thermometer of Feelings
The use of the thermometer of feelings involved asking the respondents to 
qualify, assess and weight the emotions revolving around their care 
responsibilities and activities. The respondents were given a sheet with 
the drawing of a large thermometer and 20 tags, representing different 
emotional states (positive and negative) and then they were asked to 
locate the tags on a scale ranging from zero, for the lowest intensity, to 
one hundred, for the highest. They were expected to place the 20 tags on 
the scale by thinking about their care activities and responsibilities and 
a.pratesi@chester.ac.uk
276 Appendix: Research Methods and Tools
describing the different circumstances, contexts and situations of care to 
which the different emotions were associated. Ten tags corresponded to 
positive emotional states (ranging from happiness to gratification/fulfil-
ment), while the other ten tags corresponded to negative emotional states 
(ranging from isolation/exclusion to depression).
The structure of the thermometer of feelings allowed the respondents 
to position their tags on the scale using multiples of ten, five, or even less, 
and to change the place of each tag at any time if they changed their 
mind. During the process, the respondents were providing me with a 
thorough, detailed phenomenological account of their emotional experi-
ence of care, explaining and commenting the reasons of their choices and 
contextualising them. The thermometer of feelings, which other scholars 
have arguably conceptualised in terms of a standard measure of affect 
(Alwin 1997; Marradi 1998, 2007), was used in this study with a quite 
different approach and rationale: to encourage the emergence of reflexive 
accounts upon the multiple, conflicting emotions revolving around care 
and to stimulate the production of additional information on topics that 
might have not been previously raised or adequately explored. Precisely 
because I was not interested in any sort of statistical significance or stan-
dardisation of the data, but rather in their phenomenological and deeply 
qualitative nature, the way in which I designed and applied this innova-
tive research instrument enabled me to obtain extremely rich and price-
less information about the respondents’ lived and felt experience of care.
 The Existential Ladder as a Dynamic, 
Diachronic Portrait
The existential ladder is a drawing of a large staircase which I showed to 
the respondents to allow them visualising their life in terms of symbolic 
steps. The use of this research tool is very simple: the respondents are 
given the drawing of the existential ladder (a series of subsequent steps) 
and asked to describe what each step represents to them in terms of pres-
ent, past and future achievements, objectives and goals. Objectives, 
achievements and goals include multiple existential dimensions articu-
lated in terms maturity, quality of life, personal and intellectual growth, 
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affective and intimate life, family and relationships, professional life, cre-
ativity, personal gratification, social status, income, career, contributions 
to the wider society, mindfulness and so on. Each step of the symbolic 
staircase should provide details about the respondents’ present, past and 
future existential positioning.
During the process, I probed the respondents with questions, mostly 
focused on the presence of any potential clashes between their profes-
sional and personal careers and pathways: in other words, on whether or 
not their current or past care responsibilities and activities negatively 
affected their life choices and opportunities. The narratives which are 
developed in this way provide the researcher with a comprehensive, sys-
tematic and dynamic portrait of the respondent’s experience of care. The 
employment of this research tool is therefore extremely fruitful as it 
allows the respondents to provide a diachronic and dynamic picture of 
their biographical pathways rather than merely an instant snapshot of 
their present situation; a dynamic and comprehensive picture which also 
provides significant insights into the multiple emotional dynamics affect-
ing the caregivers’ perceived sense of inclusion exclusion, entitlement, 
personal and social development and personal and social mobility.
 Photo Elicitation: The Images of Care
Photo elicitation was another fundamental component of the in-depth 
interview. Towards the end of the narrative interview, the respondents 
were asked to select and to comment on photos showing different types 
of care-related situations, including positive and/or less positive care con-
texts from the point of view of emotions. They were invited to have a 
look at a wide range of images of care, choose some of them and then 
explain the reasons of their choice: that is, whether the photos reminded 
them something familiar, described some of the situations they had expe-
rienced while doing care, or, more simply, were evocative of a feeling, a 
memory, an idea, an anecdote and so forth. Showing the participants 
these pictures was like presenting them a series of visual statements, 
which were expected to be read and commented according to their sub-
jective interpretations and experiences of care.
a.pratesi@chester.ac.uk
278 Appendix: Research Methods and Tools
This type of research instrument allows the researcher to access a deeper 
level of meaning. With a photo elicitation, the respondent interprets or 
re-interprets the meaning of these visual statements, becoming a cultural 
specialist (see also Becker 1995; Harper 2002; Steiger 1995). In the photo 
elicitation interview, the participants choose a series of thematic pictures 
that best illustrate their feelings. With photo elicitation, the respondents 
are often more open and frank about the details of their everyday care 
experiences. At the end of the process, different meanings and dimen-
sions emerge: the respondents’ selection and subjective interpretation of 
the photos that represent most closely the emotional states connected to 
their lived and felt experience of care, and the factual visual elements 
present in the photos that hold their own meanings, aside from the 
respondents’ subjective descriptions or interpretations. Through photo-
graphs, meanings became much more complex, and at times even contra-
dictory; but the end result is a rich, multidimensional, visual and 
ethnographic understanding of them.
 Computer-Assisted Data Analysis
Among other things, the analysis of data relied also on the utilisation of 
N-VIVO, one of the several computer softwares which can be used for 
the analysis of large amounts of qualitative data. This application allows 
a complex coding process through which vast amounts of data—textual, 
visual and audio data—can be organised, managed and correlated. The 
coding process and the manual uploading of the interviews’ quotations 
and other qualitative data are extremely time-consuming9 but also 
extremely productive. To start with, the researcher needs to go through a 
careful analysis of the interviews’ transcripts, over and over again, and to 
generate a list of emerging themes and recurring patterns. The emerging 
themes or nodes10 should then be used as general frameworks to organise, 
illustrate and support the interpretation of findings and to verify or dis-
confirm emerging hypotheses, patterns and links.
For some of the broad themes emerging from the narrative interviews, 
the noding process produced hundreds of pages, which eventually needed 
to be further filtered, selected and organised; for others, it only produced 
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a few pages. This allowed getting an immediate sense of the relevance (or 
irrelevance) of each individual node. Some of the nodes I generated—
such as, for example, the respondent’s subjective definition of the family, 
the balance between work/career and care, the meanings of care, the 
draining or energising aspects of care, the gains and losses related to care, 
the existential ladder, the dynamics of status inclusion or exclusion and so 
on—were explicitly addressed in the semi-structured interview structure; 
others—such as, for example, “being old/sick”, “being gay”, “care as a 
choice”, “the divide between caregivers and non-caregivers”, “care as an 
alibi”, “happy to be out of the rat race”, “not relying on other people”, 
“the productivity of care”, “the global/universal experience of care” and so 
on—emerged instead from the analysis of the interviews’ transcripts.
Sometimes a quotation can fit into multiple nodes and some of the 
nodes can be more interrelated than others. This makes the analytical 
process more complex, but it also allows, over time, to build suitable 
conceptual filters that are neither too broad nor too narrow. Through the 
use of such conceptual filters, the researcher can recover, at any time and 
with a simple computer-assisted procedure, important quotations and/or 
fragments of the interviews’ transcripts that would otherwise be lost. The 
analytical process allowed by this software can never be exhaustive or 
definitive, not only because the aforementioned premises of the Grounded 
Theory approach but also because the potential uses, commands, options 
and applications of N-VIVO are enormous. Nevertheless, the richness of 
the results and of their potential developments undoubtedly makes of 
this important research tool an effort worth being pursued.
 The Diary
Time sampling diary (TSD, also called Time Sampling) is a research tech-
nique designed to collect representative samples11 of people’s subjective 
experiences—specifically revolving around their emotions, perspectives 
and motivations—as they go about their daily activities (Brandstätter 
2001). Research participants are asked to record their subjective, emo-
tional experiences at randomly selected times, several times a day for 
about 30 consecutive days. This technique was first described in the 
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1970s by the Austrian psychologist Hermann Brandstätter, although 
long time before that, the British psychologist and psychoanalyst John 
Carl Flügel had published a study in which participants recorded as often 
as possible, over a period of 30 consecutive days, their emotions during 
the past hour or so.12 Differently from Brandstätter’s technique, however, 
this latter pioneering study did not include random sampling and the 
emotional states were always recollected and recorded retrospectively. 
More recent illustrations of the use of diaries and time/experience sam-
pling techniques can also be found in Bryman (2015), Michelson (2015), 
McDonnell et al. (2016), Nezlek et al. (2017).
In my study, I used a revised and modified version of Brandstätter’s 
technique. At the end of the interview, I asked the respondents whether 
they were willing to fill in a diary that covered at least three to four weeks. 
More specifically, it was expected to cover a 24-hour period,13 during two 
randomly chosen days of the week, for three to four subsequent weeks. 
The diary focused on the respondents’ care-related feelings and emotional 
states experienced in the moments of self-observations. The respondents’ 
care-related feelings and emotional states were expected to be described 
as they manifested themselves in concrete situations and contexts charac-
terised by the following items: type of care activity, time of self- observation, 
place of self-observation, other activities involved, perceived presence or 
absence of resources and constraints and other persons present in the 
observed care context/situation. Thus, the qualitative data concern (1) 
what a person does and experiences (2) in a randomly chosen time and 
place and (3) in immediately responsive interactions with someone else 
(see Brandstätter 2001; Katz 1999). By photographing and reporting the 
respondents’ viewpoint, the diary dramatically reduces the researcher’s 
interpretive biases.
The response rate for the diaries14 and their distribution among the 
different sub-groups of caregivers15 were not sufficient to attribute them 
the same relevance of the interviews in the analytical process. However, 
the richness, uniqueness and quality of the information collected through 
the diaries represented an invaluable additional source of information. 
Table A.1 shows the distribution of diaries among the main sub-groups 
of caregivers.
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 Ethnographic Work
Other methods were involved in this study, including ethnographic 
work, which was facilitated by the fact that during my last year of research 
I moved in a suburban area of Philadelphia characterised by the presence 
of a substantial population of same-sex families. During that period, I 
lived with a lesbian couple who had planned to get pregnant and I took 
part to several social events, informal gatherings, local happenings and 
baby showers involving same-sex families. My ethnographic work on 
same-sex parenthood, however, started before then and it included taking 
part in sport, recreational and cultural activities at one of the largest 
LGBT community centres in Philadelphia and the thematic analysis of 
the messages exchanged on the online forums and chats of same-sex par-
ents associations. As I explained elsewhere in the book, the messages were 
related to several matters—including legal advice, health-related issues, 
school matters, baby shower announcements, informal meetings and so 
forth—and their analysis allowed me to get very useful insights in the 
lived and felt experience of same-sex parents and in their search for status 
inclusion, entitlement and sense of belonging. Finally, regular conversa-
tions (either face-to-face or via e-mail) with some of the research partici-
pants with whom I stayed in touch beyond the interview context added 
to my ethnographic, phenomenological understanding of same-sex par-
enthood an extra layer of depth.
Table A.1 Diaries’ distribution by gender, marital status and sexual orientation
Non-gay (N = 38) Gay (N = 42) Total
Men Women Men Women
Partnered 3 8 6 – 17
Single – 2 2 1 5
Total 3 10 8 1 22
11 women filled in the diary, among 
whom:
 → 8 partnered, non-gay
 → 2 single, non-gay
 → 1 single, lesbian
11 men filled in the diary, among 
whom:
→ 3 partnered, non-gay
→ 6 partnered, gay
→ 2 singles, gay
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 Emotional Labour and Positionality: Reflexive 
Accounts
The nature of the emotional processes I explored is too complex for any 
pre-planned script to fit all situations. Mixing creatively the above- 
illustrated qualitative research methods and tools was crucial to obtain 
reliable and readable insights into the emotionally lived experience of 
same-sex parents. My deep, thorough, ethnographic immersion in the 
phenomenon of same-sex parenthood during the (over) two-year research 
added the rest and allowed me to obtain a more comprehensive grasp and 
understanding of the emotional dynamics revolving around this specific 
form of care. Emotions observed and lived within and beyond the inter-
view context are, themselves, important data, although difficult to con-
vey (Hoffmann 2007). Besides, as Hochschild maintains (1983), the 
respondents’ emotional dynamics during the interview are as real and 
important as any other product of the interview; and so are the research-
er’s emotional reactions.
The emotional labour I was engaged with during the interview process 
was far less demanding and more rewarding than my subsequent attempt 
to communicate it to the reader through my interpretative accounts. 
Given the highly emotional nature of my research topics, sudden emo-
tional outbursts were not uncommon among the research participants. 
Most of the times, however, they told me they felt comfortable also 
(and perhaps even more) during emotionally intense moments of our 
conversations; and none of them did ask me to turn the tape off even 
when they could not restrain their tears. There were also circumstances—
several ones—in which contagious laughing prevailed. Each time, I had 
to decide how much to share and show or instead hide and conceal in 
terms of my own emotions in order to avoid introducing biases and, 
simultaneously, giving the research participant the impression of being a 
cold-blooded and insensitive researcher.
As several methodologists maintain, if the research participants are to 
be encouraged to abandon any filtering and emotional labour in order to 
freely express their emotions, the interviewer, beyond his/her ethical duty 
of care and sensitivity, should carefully avoid any form of emotional 
involvement during the interview (Holstein and Gubrium 1995). Of 
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course, there were situations where not sharing or not showing empathy 
and sympathy for the research participants’ emotional states would have 
had a negative impact on the interview as much as sharing would have in 
others. There were situations in which I tried to keep my emotional reac-
tions to what the research participant was telling me as unobtrusive and 
discreet as possible and other situations in which the conversation became 
quite emotional for me as well or, at least, I felt compelled to interrupt 
the interview and turn off the tape recorder to respect the research par-
ticipant’s sensibility, even though they did not ask for it. And there were 
also situations—as mentioned above—in which the emotional contagion 
involved laughing, joking and sharing other positive emotional states.
Regardless of the different degrees and tones of my emotional involve-
ment and detachment (see also Elias 1987a), it was not difficult for me to 
be genuinely engaged with and interested in the research participants’ 
stories, and this, I think, facilitated the development of a condition of 
reciprocal trust which is crucially important for the successful outcome of 
the interactive interview (Holstein and Gubrium 1995). Most of the 
research participants looked extremely comfortable and open also during 
the most emotionally intense moments of our conversations, and eventu-
ally they told me they had thoroughly enjoyed the interview structure 
and its multiple emotional “opportunities”. One of the best indicators of 
the successful outcome of the interactive interview is when the research 
participant says that the interview was a useful occasion to reflect on 
important issues that would have otherwise been neglected. The emer-
gence of such indicator became, for me, also a sort of partial compensa-
tion for the enormous sense of debt and gratitude I felt towards of my 
research participants.
Simon’s care experience reported below, although “stuffed with tons of 
things to bear”, seems to represent one of the numerous examples of the 
emotionally empowering effect of care experiences. In the following 
excerpt, Simon says that the foundation for most of the issues he consid-
ers most important to his life is “very much in place”:
Simon: Okay. Well, this interview has made me, I don’t know, has 
encouraged me to think about some of these questions in a way 
that I hadn’t in a long time.
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I: I’ll take this as a compliment...
Simon: Absolutely, absolutely. Maybe part of being a father and being 
so, you know, having such immediate, I don’t know, so many 
immediate things in my life that I haven’t felt the need to sort of 
step back and reflect existentially as much as I used to. Because 
I did, I used to, for sure. I very much see myself, for better or 
worse, sort of, you know, “nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita” 
(in the middle of my life path)16 right now, I really do.
I: …but not “in una selva oscura” (But not in a dark forest) I 
hope…
Simon: No, no, no, no, no, just a little stuffed with tons of things to bear. 
I think that I’m very, I think I’m right in the middle. And I think 
I’m very satisfied because the foundation for most of the things 
that I think are most important to my life is very much in place.
Considering the richness and the amount of the material of which we 
tend to dispose with qualitative research and the strict selections we are 
unavoidably forced to make, we can never be sure whether the founda-
tion for most of the things that we consider important to support our 
arguments is “very much in place” as well. Similar to Simon, the majority 
of the research participants I met told me that the interview experience 
was an opportunity to shed light on questions that they would have never 
thought about otherwise. This, in itself, represents an important result 
and also an additional evidence that those questions lie at the core of the 
phenomena we are studying.
Notes
1. Within the context of qualitative research credibility, rather than validity 
(in the dogmatic sense in which it is often described), becomes the crite-
rion to assess the quality, trustworthiness and persuasiveness of the anal-
yses and interpretations proposed. The reader is put in the position of 
judging whether the work has represented accurately the subject matter 
or clarified and expanded his/her appreciation and understanding of it, 
by means of the presentation of accurate, precise and wide-ranging data, 
that is, data based on an in-depth knowledge of a wide range of relevant 
topics rather than just relatively few variables (Becker 2001).
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2. Being as explicit as possible about the epistemological positions that 
inform our research practices and making these positions as transparent 
as possible.
3. In the sense clarified above.
4. In-depth interviews and the innovative research instruments I describe 
further below represented the primary source of data collection because 
they allowed the research participants to emphasise the subjective quality 
of their different care experiences, the contextual nature of knowledge, 
the social construction of the multiple meanings of care and the interac-
tive, emotional character of the status of caregivers.
5. “Analytic induction is equivalent to the statistical testing of quantitative 
associations to see if they are greater than might be expected at random 
(random error). However, in qualitative analysis (…) there is no random 
error variance. All exceptions are eliminated by revising hypotheses until 
the data fit. The result of this procedure is that statistical tests are actually 
unnecessary once the negative cases are removed” (Fielding and Fielding 
1986: 89; cited in Denzin 2001a: 237).
6. Interpretive interactionism is defined by Denzin as “the attempt to make 
problematic lived experience of ordinary people available to the reader. 
[…] The research methods of this approach include performance texts, 
auto-ethnography, poetry, fiction, open-ended and creative interview-
ing, document analysis, semiotics, life history, life story, personal experi-
ence and self-construction, participant observation, and thick 
description. The term interpretive interactionism, as the above list of 
methods suggests, signifies an attempt to join traditional symbolic inter-
actionist thought with critical forms of interpretive inquiry, including 
reflexive participant observation and postmodern and literary ethnogra-
phy; feminist, cultural studies, and critical race theory; queer theory; 
naturalistic, constructivist, and case studies; poetics, life stories, and tes-
timonios; creative and active interviewing; participatory action research; 
narrative semiotic, interpretive, and Foucauldian structural discourse 
analysis; and the interpretive, hermeneutic, phenomenological works of 
Heidegger and Gadamer” (Denzin 2001a: xi).
7. For example, Silverman (2004) maintains that reliability can be improved 
by using standardised methods to write field notes and analyse tran-
scripts, and validity can be claimed by using different methods (e.g. 
observation, interview and personal messages or personal correspon-
dence) to see whether they corroborate one another; constantly compar-
ing all the data fragments that arise in a single case (Glaser and Strauss’ 
constant comparative method); proceeding through analytic induction; 
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situating the sample and providing basic descriptive data; grounding in 
examples to illustrate both the analytic procedures used in the study and 
the understanding developed in the light of them; specifying the 
researcher’s theoretical orientation and personal perspectives so that the 
reader can interpret the findings and consider possible alternatives; 
organising the findings together so that they can form a coherent narra-
tive grounded on data, a map, a framework or an underlying structure 
for the phenomenon analysed; accomplishing a general understanding 
of a phenomenon based on an appropriate range of instances while at the 
same time specifying the limitations of extending the findings to other 
contexts or participants (see Elliot et al. 1999).
8. Statistical significance is a mathematical tool used to determine whether 
the outcome of an experiment or observation is the result of a relation-
ship between specific factors or due to chance.
9. We are talking about a few months of work, for a sample of 80 
respondents.
10. “Nodes” in N-VIVO language are broad themes or conceptual containers 
the researcher creates following the analysis of the interviews’ verbatim 
transcriptions or of other textual or visual material.
11. They are considered representative because they are recorded at randomly 
selected times of the day and the week, over more or less long periods of 
time.
12. The pioneering study was published in the British Journal of Psychology in 
1925.
13. Each day had two to three random times of observations.
14. Twenty two out of eighty respondents: approximately one-fourth of the 
entire sample of gay/lesbian and heterosexual caregivers.
15. Differentiated by gender, marital status and sexual orientation.
16. To express his feeling himself in the middle of his life trajectory, the 
respondent quotes here the famous incipit from Dante’s epic poem 
Commedia, Canto I: “Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita, mi ritrovai 
per una selva oscura, ché la diritta via era smarrita” (which means: In the 
middle of the journey of our life, I came to myself in a dark forest, the 
straightforward way misplaced). In the Divine Comedy (Divina 
Commedia), Dante narrates the story of his metaphorical journey out of 
the dark forest where he found himself, lost, in the middle of his life.
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